

GLOBAL ETHICS SERIES

SERIES EDITOR: CHRISTIEN VAN DEN ANKER

AFTER DEPORTATION
ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES

EDITED BY

SHAHRAM KHOSRAVI



Global Ethics

Series Editor
Christien van den Anker
Department of Politics
University of the West of England
Bristol, UK

Global Ethics as a field builds on traditions of ethical reflection about (global) society and discusses ethical approaches to global issues. These include but are not limited to issues highlighted by the process of globalisation (in the widest sense) and increasing multiculturalism. They also engage with migration, the environment, poverty and inequality, peace and conflict, human rights, global citizenship, social movements, and global governance. Despite fluid boundaries between fields, Global Ethics can be clearly marked out by its multidisciplinary approach, its interest in a strong link between theory, policy and practice and its inclusion of a range of work from strictly normative to more empirical. Books in this series provide a specific normative approach, a taxonomy, or an ethical position on a specific issue in Global Ethics through empirical work. They explicitly engage with Global Ethics as a field and position themselves in regard to existing debates even when outlining more local approaches or issues. The Global Ethics series has been designed to reach beyond a liberal cosmopolitan agenda and engage with contextualism as well as structural analyses of injustice in current global politics and its disciplining discourses.

More information about this series at
<http://www.springer.com/series/15010>

Shahram Khosravi
Editor

After Deportation

Ethnographic Perspectives

palgrave
macmillan

Editor

Shahram Khosravi
Department of Social Anthropology
Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden

Global Ethics

ISBN 978-3-319-57266-6

ISBN 978-3-319-57267-3 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57267-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017944109

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Carleen van den Anker

Cover design: Jenny Vong

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to the contributors for sharing their work in this book. I am also grateful to Christien van den Anker for her generosity and intellectual engagement. I thank my editor Anne Schult at Palgrave Macmillan who helped me as I made the final push to get this book done. Thank you the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research for financial support.

CONTENTS

1	Introduction Shahram Khosravi	1
2	Fieldnotes from Cape Verde: On Deported Youth, Research Methods, and Social Change Ines Hasselberg	15
3	Starting Again: Life After Deportation from the UK Sarah Turnbull	37
4	Helping Women Prepare for Removal: The Case of Jamaica Alice Gerlach	63
5	Back from “the Other Side”: The Post-deportee Life of Nigerian Migrant Sex Workers Sine Plambech	81
6	Paying to Go: Deportability as Development Michael Collyer	105

7	Deportees Lost at “Home”: Post-deportation Outcomes in Afghanistan Nassim Majidi	127
8	“My Whole Life is in the USA:” Dominican Deportees’ Experiences of Isolation, Precarity, and Resilience Tanya Golash-Boza and Yajaira Cecilia Navarro	149
9	Making It as a Deportee: Transnational Survival in the Dominican Republic Evin Rodkey	169
10	Post-Deportation Movements: Forms and Conditions of the Struggle Amongst Self-Organising Expelled Migrants in Mali and Togo Clara Lecadet	187
11	Ripples Across the Pacific: Cycles of Risk and Exclusion Following Criminal Deportation to Samoa Leanne Weber and Rebecca Powell	205
12	“Non-admitted”: Migration-Related Detention of Forcibly Returned Citizens in Cameroon Maybritt Jill Alpes	231
13	Afterword. Deportation: The Last Word? Nicholas De Genova	253
	Index	267

EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

About the Editor

Shahram Khosravi is Professor of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University in Sweden and the author of *Young and Defiant in Tehran*, University of Pennsylvania Press (2008); *The Illegal Traveler: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders*, Palgrave (2010); and *Precarious Lives: Waiting and Hope in Iran*, University of Pennsylvania Press (2017). He has been an active writer in the Swedish press and has also written fiction.

Contributors

Maybritt Jill Alpes works as Senior Policy Officer on deportations at Amnesty Netherlands, and as a researcher at the University of Utrecht on the EU Turkey deal. She is the author of *Abroad at any cost: Brokering High-risk migration and illegality in West Africa* and has been publishing in international journals, such as *Africa, Social and Legal Studies*, *POLAR*, and *Identities*, on topics spanning from exploitative labour migration, the intersection of migration control and social protection, to marriage migration, and the work of migration brokers, consulate offices, and airport staff.

Michael Collyer is Professor of Geography at the University of Sussex, UK. His most recent book is *Migration*, Routledge (2017, with Michael Samers). During the 2012/2013 academic year he held a Fulbright

scholarship in the Department of Geography at the University of Washington, Seattle. He has held other visiting positions at Universities in Egypt, France, Morocco, New Zealand and Sri Lanka. He is on the steering committee of Sanctuary on Sea, Brighton's City of Sanctuary group, an umbrella organisation for refugee and migrant community support groups in the city. At the national level he is an academic member of the Independent Advisory Group on Country of Origin Information, part of the office of the UK's Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. He is also a member of the UK Department for International Development's External Reference Group on Migration. Internationally, he regularly undertakes research or analytical work in collaboration with the UNHCR, IOM, various sections of the European Union and International NGOs amongst other organisations.

Nicholas De Genova is currently on sabbatical in Chicago. Most recently, he held a permanent appointment as Reader in Urban Geography and Director of the Spatial Politics research group at King's College London. He previously held teaching appointments at Stanford, Columbia, and Goldsmiths, University of London, as well as visiting professorships or research positions at the Universities of Amsterdam, Bern, Chicago, and Warwick. He is the author of *Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and "Illegality" in Mexican Chicago* (2005), co-author of *Latino Crossings: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and the Politics of Race and Citizenship* (2003), editor of *Racial Transformations: Latinos and Asians Remaking the United States* (2006), and co-editor of *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement* (2010). He has also edited a new book on *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, Duke University Press (in press, August 2017).

Alice Gerlach received her B.Sc. Arts (Social Ecology/Psychology) at the University of Tasmania. She is working towards her collaboratively funded ESRC-HMIP DPhil at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford. Alice is a member of the Border Criminologies Group, and has a background in the detention estate, including immigration removal centres, working as a researcher for HM Inspectorate of Prisons in the UK.

Tanya Golash-Boza is a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Merced. She has published five books and 35 articles and book chapters. Her latest book *Deported: Immigrant Policing*,

Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism (NYU 2016) was awarded the Distinguished Contribution to Research Book Award from the Latino/a Studies Section of the American Sociological Association.

Ines Hasselberg is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, UK. She has conducted extensive research on deportation, punishment, prisons, family life, and migrant surveillance. She is the author of *Enduring Uncertainty. Deportation, Punishment and Everyday Life*, Berghahn (2016) and co-editor of *Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives*, Routledge (2016).

Clara Lecadet is a researcher at the French National Committee for Scientific Research and a member of the Institut Interdisciplinaire d'Anthropologie du Contemporain at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. Her research focuses on the emergence of expelled migrants' protest movements in Mali and other African countries, and on the various forms of organisation used by expelled migrants during the post-deportation period. She co-edited with Michel Agier *Un monde de camps*, La Découverte (2014) and is the author of the book *Le manifeste des expulsés. Errance, survie et politique au Mali*, Presses Universitaires François Rabelais (2016). She is currently working with Jean-Frédéric de Hasque on an edited volume entitled *Après les camps. Traces, mémoires et mutations des camps de réfugiés*, Acemeia, coll. Anthropologies prospective (forthcoming).

Nassim Majidi is an Affiliate Researcher at Sciences Po's Centre for International Studies (CERI) and Research Associate at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, specialising in return migration. She teaches a graduate course on *Refugees and Migration* as part of Sciences Po Lille's Conflict and Development Programme. Nassim is the Co-Founder and Co-Director of Samuel Hall, a think-tank of the Global South, where she leads evidence-based research and policy development on migration. Her cross-cutting skills have led her to interview refugees, migrants and returnees in border areas, conflict settings, countries of origin and transit. She has developed strategic programmes, national policies on migration, and monitoring reviews that have had a lasting impact. Nassim was nominated in 2015 by the Norwegian Refugee Council for the Nansen Refugee Award for her work on behalf of Afghanistan's

displaced population. Nassim holds a B.A., in Government from Cornell University, a Summa Cum Laude Masters in International Affairs and Development Studies, and a PhD in International Relations from Sciences Po Paris.

Yajaira Ceciliano Navarro graduated with a master's degree in Labour Psychology from the University of Costa Rica. She worked at Academic Latin American Faculty (FLACSO) in Costa Rica, from 2003–2015, where she was involved in various Latin and Central American projects, linked to social integration, immigration, education, youth, and gender. She has published on gender, social dialogue, and youth. She is currently a graduate student in Sociology at the University of California, Merced, working on understanding labour reintegration of deportees from the USA to nations in Latin America.

Sine Plambech is a social anthropologist and postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and formerly Research Fellow at Columbia University in New York, USA. Recipient of the Danish Research Council's prestigious Elite Research Sapere Aude Award in 2016, she conducts fieldwork in Nigeria and Thailand on the topic of human trafficking, sex work migration, and marriage migration to the European Union.

Rebecca Powell is the Managing-Director of the Border Crossing Observatory at Monash University in Australia. She also works as a researcher on a number of the border crossing research projects hosted by the Observatory. She is currently completing a PhD by publications titled *'I still call Australia home': The deportation of convicted non-citizens from Australia and the impact of policy and practice from a criminological perspective*.

Evin Rodkey is Professor in Anthropology and Sociology at Casper College in Casper, Wyoming, USA. Prior to coming to Casper College in 2015 he taught broadly as an adjunct instructor in the Chicago area, where he completed a doctorate in anthropology at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Sarah Turnbull is a Lecturer in Criminology at the School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, UK. Before joining Birkbeck, she was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, where she undertook a study of immigration detention and

deportation in the United Kingdom. Sarah is the author of *Parole in Canada: Gender and Diversity in the Federal System*, UBC Press (2016) and has published in journals such as *Punishment & Society*, *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, *British Journal of Criminology*, and *Canadian Journal of Law & Society*.

Leanne Weber is Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. She researches border control using criminological and human rights frameworks. Her books include *The Routledge International Handbook on Criminology and Human Rights*, 2016 (with Fishwick and Marmo), *Policing Non-Citizens*, 2013 (Routledge) and *Globalization and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier*, 2011 (Palgrave, with Pickering).

Introduction

Shahram Khosravi

Throughout my fieldwork among people who have been deported to Afghanistan, a term coming back in conversations has been *bi sarneveshti*, which literally means lacking destiny, or condition of destinylessness. The term expresses a feeling of uncertainty, suspension, and purposelessness, many experience after deportation. The term “destiny” coming from Latin is the root of the term “destination.” For many deportees the sense of lacking destiny is intertwined with lacking destination. A feeling of being lost is recurrent in the testimonies by deportees throughout all chapters in this book.

This book is about what happens to people after deportation. Deportation studies have increased drastically since the early 2000s; almost a decade after migration had been increasingly criminalised. Deportation studies started to grow at the same time as migration regimes increasingly adopted an approach based on “penalty,” i.e., physical sanctions targeting non-nationals, manifested in detention and deportation, producing a general condition of “migrant illegality” and “deportability” (De Genova 2002).

Although there has been a growing literature on detention and deportation, academic research on what happens after deportation is scarce.

S. Khosravi (✉)
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

The limits of deportation studies have often coincided with the national borders of the departing countries. There is a risk that lack of attention towards what happens after deportation would naturalise and reinforce the idea of nation-states,—what has been called “methodological nationalism.” The body of literature—at least published in English—on what happens after deportation is small but nascent (e.g., Boehm 2016; Collyer 2012; Coutin 2016; Galvin 2015; Golash-Boza 2015; Hiemstra 2012; Schuster and Majidi 2013). This edited volume, covering geographical variety and with significant theoretical and empirical findings, aims to contribute to this new, but growing, research field.

SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL STRETCHING OF ABANDONMENT

Natalie Peutz’s (2006) call for an anthropology of removal has been a call for approaching deportation not as a simple and single relocation of a person from departing country to the country of citizenship but rather as a process that spans long periods of time and geographical areas. Deportation involves a variety of people and institutions, deportees, their families and communities (Hasselberg this volume), and a set of economic relations (Walters 2016). Rather than a divided process in pre- and post-deportation, we see a spatial and temporal stretching of expulsion, from the condition of deportability in the host country to the “estranged citizenship” in the country of origin. The experience of many deportees is “double abandonment” (Lecadet 2013), expelled from one country and outcast in another. Like the condition of undocumentedness, social abandonment after deportation produces a “certain form of spatial and temporal distribution of possibilities” (Keshavarz 2016, p. 263). Deportation engenders an abject social status, a position in the society, formed by practices that continue long after the forced removal. Deportation and its outcomes, thus, stretch over several countries and over a longer period. Financial hardship, facing discrimination in the labour and housing market, stigmatisation, lack of access to social services and sometimes even protection, and cultural estrangement are usual difficulties with which deportees struggle.

The degree of success in becoming socially embedded in society after deportation (Ruben et al. 2009) depends on intersections of several factors, such as class, gender, age, and ethnicity. Social groups who generally experience a high degree of discrimination, such as ethnic minorities (see Khosravi 2016) and women (see de Regt and Tafesse 2015), face

many more challenges to reach a state of embeddedness after deportation than other groups. Similarly, age is of significance as well. Younger deportees, who have spent their formative years in the country they were deported from, have more difficulty to establish networks and to find their place in the society. Not unusually, those who grew up in the host country do not even master the language, assumed to be their “mother tongue.” Furthermore, a gap between their education prior to deportation and the education system in the country they are deported to prevents them from moving forward. Likewise, skills they have obtained are not always relevant and educational certificates, if available at all, are not always translatable or recognised and, therefore, may not be useful after deportation (RSN 2016).

Furthermore, as chapters in this volume show, deportation generally affects both the deportees and the receiving communities negatively. Remittances, i.e., the source of livelihood for many poor families, vanish. Moreover, deportees find themselves in societies that are already struggling with high rates of unemployment, social insecurity, political instability, and, in some cases, with internal displacement. This may have been part of the context in which they or their family decided to leave in the first place.

Part of the condition of “estranged citizenship” is disrecognition of deportees’ citizenship. In some cases deportees have even difficulties to obtain ID cards in the countries they are citizens of. For instance, the majority of young Afghans deported from European countries to Afghanistan were born and grew up in Iran or Pakistan. Subsequently, it is not unusual that they are denied Afghan national ID cards, paradoxically, by the same state that let them be deported to Afghanistan as Afghan nationals. In other cases, the authorities stamp signs on ID cards of deportees, which consequently would lead to easily identifying them and thereby excluding them from labour and housing markets.

Furthermore, the hyper-visibility of deportees, tattoos, foreign clothing styles and body movements, accents, or their signed ID cards make them easy targets of police harassment. As several of the chapters in this volume show (e.g., Weber and Powell; Rodkey) deportees are often scapegoats for worsening crime and other social problems (see Kanstroom 2012). Deportees are a stigmatised group because they are seen as criminal, failed in the migratory project (Plambech this volume) and “culturally contaminated” (Hasselberg this volume; RSN 2016; Schuster and Majidi 2013). Post-deportation stigma is gendered.

Labelling and stigmatisation of women is documented in several chapters. However, men also experience a gendered stigma while unable to be provider for their families (Golash-Boza 2013; Turnbull this volume). With marked bodies, deportees find themselves isolated in the community supposed to be their “home.” They hide themselves or try to pass as non-deportees for instance by “keeping up appearances” (Gerlach this volume). The condition of social abandonment is experienced by being regarded as both “failed citizen” and “failed migrant” before and after deportation.

Deportees in their country of citizenship are turned into denizens with limited access to their citizenship rights. As several chapters in this volume show, while stigmatised as deportee, people’s rights can be suspended, rejected, delayed, and denied. They are left vulnerable not only to the violence of the state, but also to the violence of ordinary citizens. Individuals may be in even more danger after the deportation than before, particularly in countries where seeking asylum or, as Alpes (this volume) shows, “none-admissibility” in the Global North is itself a punishable offence. This is how the condition of post-deportation characterised by fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and insecurity, resembles the condition of undocumentedness prior to the deportation.

NEOLIBERAL DEPORTATION

As several scholars have argued, deportation has become a crucial strategy for contemporary neoliberal capitalism (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; De Genova 2002; Golash-Boza 2015). Deportation has been integrated into the neoliberal policies of social abandonment, that expose vulnerable groups to multiple expulsions from communities, the labour market, the housing market, the spheres of security, the health care system, the education system, and state protection. Without reducing deportation merely to the logic of neoliberalism, however, making visible that deportation is an instrument of neoliberalism, provides a perspective that helps us to clearly understand the current regime of deportation (see Andrijasevic and Walter 2010).

As the essays in this collection show, deportation means the withdrawal of the state, as provider of services and protection, both in the host country and the country of citizenship, while at the same time a moralising and “responsibilising” project aims to turn deportees into responsible, risk-taking, entrepreneurial, and ethical subjects. One

deportation technique is to make deportees believe that they have control over their lives before and after deportation.

The deportee is regarded simultaneously both as a child unable to understand what is in his or her interest and as an adult responsible for his or her deeds and choices (Khosravi 2009). The adjective “voluntary” in relation to return/deportation shows the contradiction very well. As Andrijasevic and Walters (2010, p. 993) show, “voluntary” seems to designate in reality an absence of viable options rather than a deliberate choice. This self-governing aspect of deportation is a salient feature of neoliberalism (Golash-Boza 2015). The neoliberal moralising and educative feature of deportation can be seen in the etymology of the word *deport*, derived from Old French, and have same root as *deportment* meaning “to behave, to carry or conduct oneself well.” The pedagogical aspect of deportation is shown in several chapters. For instance Sine Plambech (this volume) demonstrates how women in her field study, in order to get financial assistance from the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme, attempt to perform “the good deportee”, i.e., an entrepreneurial subject who is capable of self-management and self-development—the ideal neoliberal subject. Likewise, for Dominican deportees, a letter of good conduct (*carta de buena conducta*) is a prerequisite for gaining access to the labour market (Golash-Boza and Ceciliano this volume).

Neoliberal economic rationalisation has become increasingly incorporated in deportation logic, for instance through using economic incentives to turn a failed asylum seeker in the host country into a prospective business owner in the country of citizenship. Moreover, “management” of deportation has been conducted more and more in collaboration between governments, private companies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and development agencies (Collyer this volume).

The observations made in this book are in line with Golash-Boza’s argument (2015) that the emergence of the age of deportation is a consequence of the neoliberal cycle of global capitalism. She sees mass deportation as a part of the policy of controlling the surplus labour, interconnected with outsourcing, the privatisation of society, and withdrawal of the state. The neoliberal turn goes hand in hand with a system of global Apartheid that intends to sustain the class-based and racialised separation between those with the right to free mobility and those exposed to forced immobility. One function of deportation is to

keep two worlds separated from each other. One cosmopolitan, a world of surplus rights of mobility, and the other one a world of checkpoints, borders, queues, gates, detentions, and removal.

The condition of deportability renders migrant workers to be a “distinctly disposable commodity” and creates a flexible and docile labour force (De Genova 2002). Deportation as a form of mobility control of workers is crucial for maintaining the wage gap between the Global North and the Global South. Deportation intends to immobilise workers and thereby sustains wage differences. There is a direct link between outsourcing to countries with low wages and restriction of mobility of the people of those countries (Jones 2016). Deportation preserves and reproduces social inequalities and global injustices. Deportation aims to maintain the unequal access to resources, and thereby upholds the unequal distribution of wealth. For example, Bangladesh, providing one of the lowest-wage labour forces for global capitalism, with 20 million workers in the transnational garment corporations alone, is also one of the countries with the lowest mobility opportunities. Bangladeshi citizens can only travel to 37 countries (other poor countries in the Global South) without a visa while German passport holders can travel to more than 170 countries without a visa.

Recently several deportation scholars have paid attention to the relationship between mass deportation and outsourcing and offshoring (Golash-Boza 2015; Rodkey 2016). Mass deportation provides a flexible and culturally suitable labour force that is bilingual and has the “right” cultural capital, for transnational corporations. Rodkey (this volume) demonstrates that deportees grown up in the USA who speak English fluently and are familiar with American society make the optimal workforce for American companies moving to the Dominican Republic in search for cheap-wage labour. Deportees are spatially expelled from the Global North, to be included in the capitalist system outsourced to the Global South. Thus rather than merely being excluded, deportees are, in Giorgio Agamben’s meaning, abandoned, i.e., “exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become undistinguished. It is literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order” (Agamben 1998, p. 28). This is the sovereign abandonment, an inclusive exclusion. Ethnographies in several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate this logic of inclusive exclusion at work in deportation regimes.

DEPORTEES' TIME

Deportation is not only the removal of a person spatially but also temporally. Many have spent a long time in the host country before being deported. They, particularly long-term residents, have worked, built networks, paid taxes, and spent time to become accustomed with language and culture. The time they *invested* to accumulate these forms of social capital is lost in a large extent. As Lauran Martin (2015) puts it: deportees are dispossessed of their time they had before removal. The Afghan men in Majidi's chapter have left behind unpaid salaries (work time) in Iran. In Hasselberg's chapter, young Americans have left their youth behind and in Turnbull's chapter, deportees have left their children. By being spatially removed, they are also robbed of an amount of time.

The socio-political conditions of post-deportation generates its own temporality. That many, particularly long-term residents, experience post-deportee life as exile (Coutin 2016) or diaspora (Kanstrom 2012) reveals the fact that life is experienced by deportees as fragmented, interrupted, and scattered in the same way exile and diaspora are usually experienced in the form of a broken link between time and place. Lacking a *place*, either within the family or in the society (a job, house, one's own family, a secure future) makes deportees experience time as broken and the life cycle as interrupted.

One feature of becoming "estranged citizen" after deportation is a sense of "not being in-time with others" or a sense of non-simultaneity that emerges from the lack of "the sense that others are doing at the same time things that are meaningfully related to your own experience" (Boyarin 1994, p. 17). Similar to the original diasporic groups, a tactic for deportees to resynchronise themselves is by maintaining links and ties to the host country where they had spent a long time before deportation. Through cultural ties, celebrating national festivals, practicing the language, activating personal networks, and maintaining a transnational parenting role, deportees counter the rejection they face through deportation (Coutin 2016, p. 160). As shown in ethnographies by contributors in this book deportees construct a transnational grammar of simultaneity (see Zilberg 2004).

Lacking a place and a position easily becomes an experience of what Victor Turner (1969) calls *liminality*, a transitory stage between two social positions, between two stages of life. For deportees, liminality is not only a stage of transition but rather of "stuckedness" (Hage 2009),

caught in a position of betwixt and between structures. Accordingly, the individual's liminal status is socially and structurally ambiguous. The loss of social status and role in society results in social invisibility, which, in turn, generates vulnerability. Furthermore inhabitants of the liminality, such as deportees, are seen as dangerous or polluting because of their very unclassifiability (Douglas 1966). When liminality is turned into a protracted waiting, the very structure of social life is temporarily suspended. Echeverri Zuluaga uses suspension to refer to "the interruption of social ties ... as well as to a temporal slowing manifest in the absence of plans in the present, plans deferred to the future, prolonged waiting, and the inability to improve one's life condition" (Echeverri Zuluaga 2015, p. 593). It is not unusual for deportees to use terms such as "dead time" or "a time of death" when talking about their lives. Others use terms such as chaos and confusion (Boehm 2016), boredom (Hasselberg this volume) or "being lost" (Majidi this volume) to express the existential precariousness they find themselves in.

The deportees' time is characterised by waitthood, either in pre-deportation detention or afterward in the country they are deported to. They are constantly waiting for something to happen, for decisions and assistance coming from others, from the authorities, NGOs, family members back in the country they are deported from, a chance to remigrate. The dependence on decisions of others leads to a patronising relationship, which means that the deportee has to surrender to the authority of others, such as NGOs or international organisations.

For young people deportation means postponement of future plans and a disruption in the linear stages of the life cycle from adolescence to social adulthood. The consequence of protracted unemployment, irregular employment and housing, and the dependence on others is that the time of being "adolescent" has become longer. Youth seems to be no longer a transitional stage but an indefinite position of *not becoming* or in words of young Afghan deportees "not arriving" (*be jaiye naresidan*)—referring to not making achievements in life. *Ja* in Dari means place and location, but also position and stable social status. When goals of migration are not achieved and when one fails in establishing new life after deportation, a feeling of incompleteness is engendered.

However, several chapters in this volume demonstrate that, despite suspension, deportees are engaged in ceaseless attempts to improve their situation, networking, political mobilisation (Lecadet this volume), starting a business, and planning for remigration. Not unusually, while

not seeing any “future” in the place they were forcibly removed to and where the prospect of a better life will not be actualised, they seek it elsewhere and in remigration. As several studies and several chapters in this volume show, it is common among deportees to express a desire to remigrate, which is an attempt to “achieve goals thwarted by deportation” (Schuster and Majidi 2013). Remigration is a way to resist the petrifying immobility imposed on them by deportation. As Nicholas De Genova writes in the Afterword (this volume), we see “the autonomy of deportation,” as an autonomy and subjectivity of the deported against their predicament of deportation. A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report shows that up to 80 percent of the people forcibly removed to Kabul attempt to remigrate within a short period (Gladwell and Elwyn 2012). Remigration is an attempt to reclaim the time they had spent elsewhere, and to reclaim a future they had invested in in the country from which they have been deported. They are stuck between on the one side a powerful transnational apparatus that forcibly expels them from the Global North and on the other side the circumstances and the forces that push them towards emigration from the Global South. Mobility, imagined or real, is a strategy to cope with the oppressive condition of deportation and post-deportation. The situation many deportees find themselves in is diasporic, constantly on the move without arriving, a diaspora of deportees.

THE AGE OF DEPORTSPORA

Spatial and temporal stretching of abandonment from pre- to post-deportation turns deportees into members of what Peter Nyers (2003) has termed *deportspora*, an “abject diaspora,” whose members are abandoned people, pushed into “transnational corridors of expulsion.” For those stuck in the post-deportation predicament, the relationship with geography is not expressed only in the standard question “*Where are you from?*” but also in “*Where are you deported from?*” This hints at the sense of belonging both to the country of citizenship and to the country they are deported from. As Golash-Boza (2013) shows, maintaining transnational ties to their former host country is of significance for deportees to cope with hardships and a reminder of who one once was and what one once had. A deportee has relationships to the country she is deported from, in the same way an exile has ties with her “homeland.” A deportee is in a legal relationship with the state that deported her through

re-entry ban. Moreover there are other kinds of relationship, for instance deportees who have served in the US army receive their retirement pays (Golash-Boza and Ceciliano this volume) or through outsourcing companies that hire them.

Deportspora offers a sort of cosmopolitanism, a social imaginary, with which deportees, challenge, resist, and survive the removal. Like other diasporas, members of deportspora have fragmented and hybrid, transnational lives. They are a type of forced cosmopolitan subjects, not by choice, by class, or by ethnic privileges but forcibly by the deportation regime. They speak at least two languages and have a double cultural capital, namely one from the host country and the other one from the country of origin. They are the embodiment of forced transnationality (Zilberg 2004). However, deportees, stuck in the transnational corridor of expulsion, non-citizens in one country and estranged citizen in another, are deprived of the promises and possibilities of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, free mobility and flexible citizenship (Boehm 2016, p. 115). Unlike diasporic ideas of multiple belonging, deportsporic experiences render spatial and temporal stretching of abandonment and inflexible non-citizenship.

TERMINOLOGY

Part of the methodological nationalism deportation studies suffer from, is the language used by scholars. Representation and terminology are part of a methodology yet also constitute an epistemological problem with ethical and political implications (De Genova 2002, p. 423), using the same terminology politicians and bureaucrats use uncritically; social scientists take nationalist discourses for granted. A national-based territorialisation of imaginary and of the analytical focus (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002, p. 307) in this field has resulted in recycling of misleading terms such as *home*, *homeland*, *country of origin*, or *reintegration*.

A term used in post-deportation studies is “reintegration”. The prefix *re* indicates the idea that deportees go back to the society they had been integrated in before they migrated. However, ethnographies in this volume show that this often is not the case. Another term, uncritically and frequently used, is the notion of *home*, which is based on an ideology which naturalises the nation-state system and is built on the uncritical link between individuals and territory that makes border crossing pathological (Malkki 1992, p. 34) and “uprootedness” an “unnatural”

mode of being. Deportation supposedly would restore the “broken” link between “nativity” and nationality. As the following chapters show, for many migrants deportation hardly means “going back home” to a place of safety and belonging—a place from where many migrants had left or escaped from due to various reasons.

This approach towards deportation as *returning home* both moralises and depoliticises. It moralises because it reproduces (home-based) family values. Deportation is often described as *home-coming*, back to the family. As Golash-Boza and Ceciliano (this volume) show, deportees to the Dominican Republic are held in the police station, and are only released to family members, and are not permitted to leave the police station until a family member comes for them. In her essay, Majidi (this volume) states that a part of the “assistance” young Afghans would receive is to be escorted back to their families. A similar involuntary return to one’s family is also observed among Ugandan deportees (Ahumuza Onyoin 2017). Forced family reunification becomes more brutal in cases of minors or women who had escaped patriarchal oppression (e.g., see Ahumuza Onyoin 2017). The familyism promoted by deportation is somehow contradictory since the family split in the host country due to deportation is neglected. The paradox in the logic behind deportation is while on the one hand it emphasises family values and reunification in the country of citizenship, on the other hand, it causes separation of families in the country from which one is deported.

The vocabulary used in this field also depoliticises deportation, by neglecting the power relation between deporting country and the country one is deported to, as well as the conflicts and struggles within the country one is sent to. Through presenting deportation as homecoming, the brutality embedded in deportation is masked and thereby depoliticised. The neoliberal approach attempts to depoliticise deportation through naturalising the notion of home(land) and presenting the family as the most optimal and normal place to return to. It also aims to individualise and personalise the difficulties deportees struggle with and aims to foster responsible, prudent, entrepreneurial subjects.

CONCLUSION

Through providing ethnography of the life of post-deportation, the empirically-rich essays in this volume aim to challenge conventional knowledge about deportation as “going back home”, or ideas about

so-called “reintegration”. Furthermore, they shed new light on hidden aspects of post-deportation. How do migrants narrate their life after deportation? What is the impact of deportations on the local society? What are the gendered aspects of post-deportation life? How does age affect post-deportation life and aspiration for remigration? How do deportees resist and challenge the immobilisation imposed on them by deportation? How do they reclaim the time dispossessed from them?

As the studies in this volume show, deportation rarely means returning home, to a place of safety and belonging. Rather, it often means the forced return to a situation worse than the situation prior to the initial departure: politically, financially, and socially. Deportation, thus, contributes to the perpetuation of the unequal global distribution of mobility, spatially and socially. The following chapters demonstrate that we should not look at deportation as a discrete event, but investigate how the condition of protracted, multiple, and ceaseless abandonment before, during, and after deportation constitutes normality in the daily lives of deportees (Galvin 2015) and are absorbed into the cycle of individuals’ life and the history of communities (e.g., Schuster and Majidi 2013, p. 235).

The essays collected in this book contribute to a more multifaceted picture of what happens to people after deportation. Yet, they also add novel theoretical and empirical aspects and approaches to the field. Studying the various aspects of post-deportation contribute to further knowledge on how deportation is related to broader processes of social exclusion and marginalisation. These empirical-based essays create a space for discussing complicated questions of deportation and the life after deportation in the society. They also raise questions and issues for further research, for example, into the approaches available to deportation studies once methodological nationalism is abandoned. The justifying myths of deportation as just, natural, freely chosen or in the best interests of the deportee, their family and community need to be further explored, as the research brought together in this volume already exposes deportation as a tool for neoliberal policies to control wage inequalities.

REFERENCES

- Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Ahumuza Onyoin, Charity. 2017. A Grim Return: Post-Deportation Risks in Uganda. *Forced Migration Review* 54: 81–83.
- Andrijasevic, Rutvica, and William Walters. 2010. The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (6): 977–999.
- Boehm, Deborah A. 2016. *Returned: Going and Coming in an Age of Deportation*. California: University of California Press.
- Boyarin, Jonathan. 1994. Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory. In *Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time-Space*, ed. Jonathan Boyarin, 1–37. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Collyer, Michael. 2012. Deportation and the Micropolitics of Exclusion: The Rise of Removals from the UK to Sri Lanka. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 276–292.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2016. *Exiled Home: Salvadoran Transnational Youth in the Aftermath of Violence*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant Illegality and Deportability in Everyday Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 419–447.
- de Regt, Marina, and Medareshaw Tafesse. 2015. Deported Before Experiencing the Good Sides of Migration: Ethiopians Returning from Saudi Arabia. *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 9 (2): 228–242.
- Douglas, Mary. 1966. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Echeverri Zuluaga, Jonathan. 2015. Errance and Elsewhere Among Africans Waiting to Restart Their Journeys in Dakar, Senegal. *Cultural Anthropology* 30 (4): 589–610.
- Galvin, Treasa M. 2015. ‘We Deport Them but They Keep Coming Back’: The Normalcy of Deportation in the Daily Life of ‘Undocumented’ Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in Botswana. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 617–634.
- Gladwell, Catherine, and Hannah Elwyn. 2012. Broken Futures: Young Afghan Asylum Seekers in the UK and on Return to Their Country of Origin. *UNHCR’s New Issues in Refugee Research*, November 2012.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya Maria. 2013. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- . 2015. *Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor, and Global Capitalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Hage, Ghassan. 2009. *Waiting*. Carlton South: Melbourne University Press.
- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2012. Geopolitical Reverberations of US Migrant Detention and Deportation: The View from Ecuador. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 293–311.
- Jones, Reece. 2016. *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso.
- Kanstrom, Daniel. 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Keshavarz, Mahmoud. 2016. *Design-Politics: An Inquiry into Passports, Camps and Borders*. Malmö: Malmö University.
- Khosravi, Shahram. 2009. Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers in Sweden. *Race and Class* 50 (4): 30–56.
- . 2016. Deportation as a Way of Life. In *Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global and Transnational Issues*, ed. Rich Furman, 169–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lecadet, Clara. 2013. From Migrant Destitution to Self-Organization into Transitory National Communities: The Revival of Citizenship in Post-Deportation Experience in Mali. In *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation*, ed. Bridget Anderson, et al. New York, NY: Springer New York.
- Malkki, Liisa. 1992. National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees. *Cultural Anthropology* 7 (1): 24–44.
- Martin, Lauren. 2015. Deportation and the Dispossession of Time. *Darkmatter*, <http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2015/10/05/deportation-and-the-dispossession-of-time>. Accessed 10 Feb 2017.
- Nyers, Peter. 2003. Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement. *Third World Quarterly* 24 (6): 1069–1093.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Rodkey, Evin. 2016. Disposable Labor, Repurposed: Outsourcing Deportees in the Call Center Industry. *Anthropology of Work Review* 37 (1): 34–43.
- RSN. 2016. *After Return: Documenting the Experiences of Young People Forcibly Removed to Afghanistan*. London: Refugee Support Network.
- Ruben, Ruerd, Marieke Van Houte, and Tine Davids. 2009. What Determines the Embeddedness of Forced-Return Migrants? Rethinking the Role of Pre- and Post-Return Assistance. *International Migration Review* 43 (4): 908–937.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experiences of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- Turner, Victor. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure*. Chicago: Aldine Publ. Co.
- Walters, William. 2016. The Flight of the Deported: Aircraft, Deportation, and Politics. *Geopolitics* 21 (2): 435–458.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks* 2 (4): 113–133, 301–334.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2004. Fools Banished from the Kingdom: Remapping Geographies of Gang Violence Between the Americas (Los Angeles and San Salvador). *American Quarterly* 56 (3): 759–779.

Fieldnotes from Cape Verde: On Deported Youth, Research Methods, and Social Change

Ines Hasselberg

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I address pertinent issues regarding post-deportation studies, with respect to methods, positionality, and social change. In particular, I ask what can we make of the elements that consistently appear in post-deportation studies? I will do so by drawing on deportation data gathered in 2008 during a brief field visit to Cape Verde. This chapter has afforded me the opportunity to dig back my field diary and interview transcripts and reflect on what the data gathered so long ago may suggest and where it may fit in the existing literature. The data presented here were collected for a project that never took off. Not because it was uninteresting or unviable—quite the contrary, but on account of change

I. Hasselberg—The paper was written when the author was working in University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

I. Hasselberg (✉)
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Centre for Research in Anthropology, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal

on my personal circumstances. Yet, the days spent in Cape Verde, the people that I met and the stories they told me have remained with me. I will start the chapter by overviewing some ethical and methodological concerns over deportation studies. I will then provide a narrative of my time in Cape Verde conducting field research on deportation. Here, I will also present data collected and reflect on its insights and limitations. I will close the chapter by raising some questions for further consideration and discussion.

OVERVIEW

Ten years ago, Natalie Peutz called on anthropologists to pay attention to the practices of forced removal quickly becoming normalised tools of border control across the world. She made a call for an anthropology of removal, that is, an anthropology that would “make its contribution to the endless but vital interrogation of the ‘natural’ order of things” (Peutz 2006, p. 231). In her seminal article, she argued that deportation is not a simple event that (forcibly) relocates one individual from one country to another. Drawing on her research among Somali deportees, she revealed how deportation is in fact a process that spans over long periods of time and geographical areas—what later Heike Drotbohm and I have termed as “deportation corridor” (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015). Deportation is not limited to the encounter between the deported person and the deporting nation-state. Rather it involves a variety of people and institutions, from deportees, their families, and communities to civil servants, border agents, immigration lawyers and judges, prison and immigration detention staff, bureaucrats, civil society organisations, security personnel, activists, and the media. Subsequent studies have provided further evidence to this (Drotbohm 2011; Hasselberg 2016; Kalir 2015; Fischer 2015; Coutin 2015).

Peutz’s call has not gone unnoticed. The past decade has seen a rise in ethnographic studies of deportation from a variety of perspectives and located at different moments and places of the deportation corridor. Yet, there are a rather limited number of methodological accounts of studies of deportation in general and post-deportation in particular. This is surprising given that deportation research often appears as an ethical and methodological minefield. Peutz herself warned about possible difficulties. To start with, she argues, and whether the focus is on those deported following a criminal conviction or an illegal stay, social

scientists should be aware that in constituting deportability as a self-limiting field of knowledge, they may be (even if unwillingly) reinforcing the criminality and illegality that was enforced upon their subjects by a nation-state (Peutz 2006; see also De Genova 2002). Furthermore, deportation is a sensitive matter, where issues of trust, vulnerability, and do-no-harm are particularly poignant. Not only deportees are likely to have been interrogated numerous times on account of their deportation, but also deportation may entail matters of criminal conviction, illegal stay, family relations, stigma, resistance, destitution, and lost hope.

As a non-spatially-bounded social phenomenon, deportation presents other challenges. Deportees are removed elsewhere, taken away from the (deporting) countries they have called home. Experiencing deportability in the host country also often renders foreign nationals immobile and invisible, with deportable migrants frequently developing strategies of active invisibility (see Talavera et al. 2010; Willen 2007) in an effort to avoid the authorities. Furthermore, the increasing use of administrative detention and the criminalisation of immigration offences results in an ever-growing number of foreign nationals under penal or administrative incarceration—sites that are difficult for researchers to access (Bosworth et al. 2016). Once removed to their country of origin, deportees may be spread over large geographical areas, which may translate into difficulties in identifying and locating people to participate in the study. Social scientists studying deportation may very easily find themselves with nothing to observe and no one immediately available to talk to (Hasselberg 2016).

In post-deportation studies in particular, multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) is increasingly used to enable a better understanding of the experience of removal for individuals, families, and communities between and across nations. Heike Drotbohm's (2015) study of deportation of Cape Verdean citizens from the USA is testament that the post-deportation is not confined geographically to the countries that receive the deportees. In visiting the US families of those deported, her study shows how the forced removal of an individual leaves an absence in their family and community. An absence that is made present by changing family power relations and social inequalities produced by deportation (see also Drotbohm 2011; Golash-Boza 2014, 2016; Schuster and Majidi 2013; Gerlach this volume). Multi-sited research is however highly demanding on time and resources and thus not always a feasible option (see Candea 2007). I have argued elsewhere that in the context of deportation, ethnographic research often demands a creative use of a combination of

different methods and positionalities to identify and access both the research population and the institutional sites that form part of their experiences (Hasselberg 2016). Sarah Turnbull (this volume) for instance, has *followed* her research participants in their journeys from immigration detention in the UK to either release to the community or deportation to the country of origin. Through the telephone, email, and social media, Turnbull gained an understanding of the experiences of forced return following a period of administrative incarceration. Nancy Hiemstra (2012, 2014), has, likewise, completed a fascinating study of the reach of the US detention estate, while in Ecuador, equipped with a Skype connection, assisting family members locate Ecuadorians detained in the USA under immigration powers.¹ Where to conduct research might no longer be as important as whom to reach and otherwise engage might.

Peutz's influential work underlines how important it is that the practice of deportation does not go unnoticed (see also Walters 2002). It reminds those of us studying deportation that efforts should be developed towards a public debate of deportation policies, and that revealing how deportation is lived continuously by deportees, families, and communities at both ends "would at the very least resist the removal of these individuals from academic spaces, if not from physical ones" (Peutz 2006, p. 220).

Ten years on, and a growing body of studies on (post-) deportation have shown that forced return deportees, and their families left behind, face a number of problems and challenges in adjusting to their forced removal. Their deportation may be taken socially as a failure (Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2015; Zilberg 2004, 2011) or a normalised outcome of routine border crossing (see Galvin 2015; Schuster and Majidi 2015; Khosravi 2016), but it will nevertheless bring hardships. These tend to be experienced with regards to integrating into their alleged home communities, in dealing with people's conflicting expectations, enduring family separation, adjusting to different cultural settings often with its own gender rules (Drotbohm 2011, 2015; Turnbull this volume; Zilberg 2011; Peutz 2006), or even in attempting to safeguard income-earning activities and assets that were left in the deporting country (Galvin 2015). The data presented below further support these points.

RESEARCHING DEPORTATION IN CAPE VERDE

When I visited Cape Verde in 2008 deportees were depicted either as a problem (as in US government documents, and most Cape Verdean media outlets), as victims (as in Cape Verdean online-community/

diaspora newspapers) or as potential beneficiaries of programmes aimed at easing the adverse impacts of deportation in Cape Verde. My idea in visiting the small island nation was to develop a research project that would recognise deportees not as problems, victims or beneficiaries, but rather as active agents, who were reacting to their removal, developing their strategies and (re)formulating their own aspirations. Truthful to the anthropological gaze, I wanted to view deportees as subjects who carried their own cultural agency and identity. Therefore, I set off to Cape Verde for a brief period of preliminary fieldwork. The idea was to get a sense of the daily circumstances of deportees in order to develop the research project and better prepare its actual fieldwork. I spent some time in Praia, the capital city of Cape Verde, and some time on the island of Fogo where most deportees from the USA are originally from. The fact that the majority originated from one specific small town on Fogo further helped my fieldwork efforts.

At the time, concerns were being raised that gang-related violence and behaviour were being exported to Cape Verde with the deportees and indeed, existing statistics showed that in 2007 the majority of Cape Verdean deportees (86%) from the USA had been deported on account of their criminal records. The perception that deportees were responsible for the rise in crime and violence in Cape Verde was prevalent among politicians, media, and the public at large (see also Weber and Powell this volume). Whether or not deportees were responsible for the (real or perceived) rise in crime and violence, the fact remained that this perception influenced people's actions and their behaviour towards deportees, resulting in stigma and suspicion towards them.

Deportation of Cape Verdean citizens is not a recent phenomenon, but it has changed significantly in the past decades.² Until the mid-1990s, Portugal and France were the major sending countries, with causes for forced removal typically falling under immigration offences (in particular, illegal stay) and drug-related offences (Instituto das Comunidades 2003b). Since the early 2000s however, deportations from the USA have overtaken all others combined. Deportees from the USA also tend to have a different profile from those expelled from Europe. Mostly they are young adults who migrated to the USA at a very early age and were deported following a criminal conviction—more often than not related to gang-activity (Instituto das Comunidades 2003a, b; Carling 2004).

Upon arrival these individuals faced particular challenges. For the most part, they had family links to Cape Verde but little memory of the country itself. For many this was their first time in Cape Verde since their migration to the USA. They spoke Creole and/or Portuguese poorly if at all, and had few qualifications in a country that offered already limited employment opportunities. Furthermore, they were met with increasing suspicion (Instituto das Comunidades 2002, 2003a, b; Carling 2004). They also landed in a country where most of what they took for granted in their lives was gone. This was so not just in relation to their families and social relations, who remained in the USA, but also with regards to daily life as they knew it: as any resident of Cape Verde, they were faced with unreliable or inexistent power and water supply, limited employment opportunities, poor health care, lack of access to services, commodities and entertainment, and so on.

Over the course of my preliminary field trip to Cape Verde in the spring of 2008, I visited two government bodies that were directly addressing “the problem of deportees” and interviewed some of their staff. I met with two Catholic priests who were developing programmes with deportees in Cape Verde and awareness on the risk of deportation in Boston, USA. On Fogo, I collected five life-story interviews with deportees. Furthermore, the days I stayed on Fogo were spent in the company of deported youth. With them I hung around, went to basketball games, and sat around many hours doing nothing, for there was nothing for deported youth to do. I say youth as that was how they were constantly characterised by the media and people at large, and in fact, the majority of those that I engaged with were in their 20s, although I also talked to a few deportees in their 30s and 40s. According to a census carried out among deportees in 2002, the average age of male deportees was 35 years old. This was however based on their age in 2002 and not at the time of deportation (Instituto das Comunidades 2002). In Praia, and on Fogo, I also spoke to numerous Cape Verdeans about their thoughts and concerns over the arrival of deportees.³

FAMILY, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, AND URBAN MYTHS

In preparing my trip to Cape Verde, back in 2008, I tapped into my networks and immediately received the invitation from a Cape Verdean friend to stay at her sister’s where my friend was currently staying. I arrived in Praia, the capital of Cape Verde, at a time of great importance

to her family. My friend was temporarily back from the USA, her younger sister was returning to Praia after many years of residence in France, and her father, who lived in Portugal, was visiting in order to celebrate his 80th anniversary. We were all staying at the older sister's house, along with her husband and children. It was a full house, lively with the joys of family reunion. The time spent with them was instrumental in gaining an understanding of Cape Verdean transnationalism on the one hand, and the importance of family on the other (see also Åkesson et al. 2012; Carling 2004; Drotbohm 2015). It became clear very quickly that I was not merely their guest, but rather part of the entourage. Where the family went, I was not only invited but expected to go, too. Given the particular circumstances detailed above, the time that I spent in Praia was rather too-filled with daily social and family gatherings. Mostly, there were lunch or dinner events, but there was also the occasional afternoon family visit and the evenings when guests would come in, musical instruments would come out, and the flat was alive with music, joy, and nostalgia.

I remember well the conflicting feelings I had about such circumstances. I was grateful, of course, for such warm and extended hospitality and for the opportunity to be a part of this wonderful family and the access to all the social interactions that came with it. As an anthropologist, I could not have asked for anything better. However, I also had a list of people who I wanted to talk to while in Praia and data that I needed to access, and the commitments I had towards the family were leaving me little time to pursue with my research agenda. It took me sometime to realise that the conversations I was having with the many people that I was encountering illuminated how people saw and reacted to (or against) the presence of deportees on the island.

All those social interactions as part of the family meant that I talked to a large number of people from all walks of life about their perceptions of deportees. Over the course of that week I heard how deportees were wrongdoers used to a life style that stood out in Cape Verde; how they “stole” all the girls who were lured by their “Americanness” (see also Peutz 2006; Schuster and Majidi 2015 on deportees as agents of cultural pollution); how they were criminals in the USA and remained criminals in Cape Verde; how they were not really deported on their first offence but need to repeatedly offend to be deported and how that was good reason for concern over their dangerousness; that they didn't do time in prison, but were rather deported straight away. Many of these

perceptions were incorrect or misguided, but seemed to be ingrained in people's conversation about deportation. Several times people described to me what they perceived as chancy encounters with deportees—incidents that seemed to reveal more about people's fear of and apprehension towards the deported youth, than their dangerousness.

One other common theme was how Cape Verdean immigrants in the USA did not really know how to raise their children in such a setting where they were not allowed to punish or physically discipline them. Children were then raised by the school and by the streets, and not by the parents, they would tell me. Numerous stories were told of parents who brought their children from the USA on the pretext of a holiday in Cape Verde only to then leave them in the country without documents so they couldn't go back to the USA—an attempt to set them straight and take them off the streets (Peutz (2006) also describes incidents of “deportation” by parents). Several people narrated one particular story on different occasions, almost like an urban myth, generating much laughter and implicit approval: the father who beat up his teenage daughter for all her accumulated misbehaviour in the USA as soon as they passed the border control at the airport in Praia. Such stories often developed into heated discussions on the difficulty of keeping children, and in particular teenagers, off the streets in the USA, and the moral and social benefits of being raised in Cape Verde. Overall, these stories emphasise what was seen as the corrupting arm of American life on young immigrants. They justify how fellow citizens became criminal wrongdoers while at the same time they remove responsibility from the parents (born and raised in Cape Verde) over their children's behaviour.

The government's efforts in assisting deportees were received with mixed feelings. In 2002, the Instituto das Comunidades—the government body responsible for promoting and executing policies related to Cape Verdean communities abroad—established a working group that was to set up a programme to ease the “social integration” of deportees. The rationale being that given the criminal background of most of this youth, proper social integration was of vital importance not just to their rehabilitation but also to the well-being of the overall country. Later, three bureaus were established in the islands of Brava, Fogo, and Sal that sought to assist deportees in numerous ways: improve language fluency, obtain national identification documents, obtain certified copies of qualifications attained abroad, find relatives, and so on. Of more importance, these bureaus also assisted deportees, logistically and financially, through

loans and expert advice, in developing professional projects such as opening small businesses, farming, developing skills in carpentry or mechanics, and the like.

The deportees that I spoke with on Fogo really appreciated the efforts and support of the staff at this bureau. If nothing else, the project acted as a countermeasure for the stigma attached to them there, and helped them devise a plan for their future. They felt valued and somewhat “cared for.” However, many local people that I talked to were sceptical about these projects. They claimed that young people used to easy money in the USA would not settle for a low income derived from a hard-working activity in Cape Verde. Others were bitter that such efforts and resources were deployed in assisting deportees when so many other citizens deemed more deserving were in need of help. While some others yet considered these as a justified and indeed necessary way to minimise the impact of the deportees in the country.

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF BOREDOM?

I soon left Praia to fly to Fogo where I stayed for the remainder of my time. When on Fogo I made my way to a small town where the majority of deportees from the USA originate. The town had a population of about 400 inhabitants, with a further 9000 living in the surrounding rural areas. On Fogo I was no longer endorsed by a local family. I was a newcomer and a stranger. I was just a researcher wanting to talk to deportees. In such a small and quiet town, my presence did not go unnoticed. I was often approached on the street by people curious about me. Between their knowledge of Portuguese and my extremely limited Creole, communication was, for the most part, possible. Soon I was somewhat known to most people.

In this small town, people were more ambivalent towards deportees. Those who had been forcibly returned were part of their daily life and for many, part of their families. Local people appeared more understanding of their circumstances even if still suspicious of them. As one woman told me:

Each of them [deportees] is a relative of someone here that we know well. It's a small town and we see them every day. It's quite all right. But a few days ago a mobile phone went missing and suspicion immediately fell upon deportees.

The deportees also did not go unnoticed and it did not take much effort to find them. They were visibly identifiable on account of their baggy jeans, tattoos, dreadlocks, the way they walked and moved around. All of which appeared in stark contrast to the local youth. To say that they stood out is an understatement. I was very quickly introduced to two young men recently returned from abroad, and with their help, I met others in the days that followed. Every other day I went with them to basketball training—the only (self-) organised activity they participated in, and one that was much valued. The basketball field was a one-hour walk away from the centre of town. Together we walked and talked, sometimes we were lucky and got a ride.

However, for the most part, I spent my days with them, doing nothing. For there was nothing to do. Therefore, nothing was most of what they did. My initial fears that deportees might not want to talk to me were dissipated as soon as I met them. My presence was a much welcome distraction. The fact that they could speak to me in English, and act towards me as they would towards an American woman was much appreciated. I spent most of my time with this group of young men, who were still trying to come to grips with their new circumstances. Some had arrived a few weeks previously; others had been there for a couple of years. Most of them knew each other in the USA prior to deportation, and all were deported following a criminal conviction. They were now in their mid- to late-twenties, dependent financially on their families in the USA, and unsure of what to do with their lives in Cape Verde. Most had some knowledge of Creole even though all had grown up in the USA. Many of the young men had children and/or partners who remained in the USA. With this group of young men, there were always two other young men from the USA eager that I understand that even though they looked like deportees, on account of being American, they were only there on holiday visiting relatives. I also met with a few others who had been deported long before and had established families and secured some level of income.

They all knew my interest was on their deportation, but I made an effort not to ask them much about it. I would have the interviews to concentrate on that. Indeed, when we hung out we did not always talk. When we did talk, I did not dictate the subjects. We discussed the shark-infested waters and the (volcanic) black beaches of Fogo, soccer, the weather, and hairstyles. They shared numerous anecdotes of life in town, its small-mindedness and lack of sophistication. They told me of the lack

of opportunities on the island and how they missed their families back in the USA. Most had left children behind. They discussed how they felt trapped on the island, not being able to emigrate elsewhere. They often talked of moving to Europe and how great that would be, although what they longed for was the impossible return home—to the USA. They day-dreamed of eventual income-earning opportunities. Some talked of their intention to start selling American goods that their families in the USA could send them, and heated debate over which commodities would sell better kept the hours going. Others talked of farming and growing organic vegetables. Others still had great tourism ventures in mind. Mostly, they commented on the lack of activities and entertainment and tried to convey what was like to feel bored every day for most of the day, and of having little to look forward to. One young man, who had been deported from the USA the year before, told me:

I wake up, I put on a movie, sometimes I jog a little, eat breakfast, walk around, I hang around. That's it. I'm waiting for my diploma from the States, cause my friend said they would try and give me a job teaching here, teaching English. I would like to get a job up there [the local school]. To give me something to do. I just sit around doing nothing all day.

One particular hot issue regarded their adaptation to the local gender expectations. David, a deportee in his mid-20s who had recently arrived in Cape Verde, told me:

Girls here just want to get married so they can live off their husbands. The man is the one who has to provide, you know. I can never tell if a girl really likes me or if she is just looking for me to support her, cause they think we from America have money.

The others nodded in agreement and mentioned how they also found that hard to deal with, and how they missed being able to hang around young women on their own terms. Linda, the one female deportee in town also struggled with local gender expectations. As a woman, she saw her movement, choices, and activities rather restricted, and her contribution to society devalued.

I also conducted five formal interviews. These were taped and lasted one to three hours. Apart from Linda, who I visited in her home, all

others were conducted in cafes or quiet, yet public, parts of town. The men were well aware that having me visiting them in private or in their homes would not be appropriate and would reflect poorly on me, and thus encouraged our meetings always at public places that could afford some privacy so that the interview could proceed without being overheard by others. I had met with all interviewees at least once prior to the interview, so some connection had already been established.

Despite my intention to collect life-story interviews, these interviews ended up being mostly focused on their lives after deportation. Although often I would ask questions related to their migration to the USA, their upbringing, their lives in the USA prior to deportation and so on. These were, for the most part, quickly answered so that deportation could be resumed as the topic of discussion. It could be that interviewees saw these issues as unrelated to their deportation and, as such, of unimportance to me; it could be that talking about their home, their families, and their now lost lives was just so much more difficult; it could be that I was simply asking the wrong questions. These interviews were both a frustrating and rewarding exercise: frustrating because as life-story interviews they failed miserably; rewarding because through them I was able to gather much important data nevertheless. In outlining two of these narratives here, my intention is two-fold: I wish to contextualise the (post-) deportation issues I have addressed thus far, and I wish to provide a venue where their stories can be told in a way that does not restrict their self to a deportation subject. I chose Linda because she was the only female deportee and David because he was the most recent arrival of the five.

Linda was six years old when she migrated to the USA with her family and had never returned. In 2005, at the age of 43, she was deported to Cape Verde. "My first visit here," she told me, "was on the courtesy of the US government." In the USA Linda left her (adult) children and her family and life as she knew it. Her father, still in the USA, had always retained land and livestock on Fogo. Linda now looked after his estate. She felt lonely and, after three years, she was still struggling to adapt. Linda had been arrested on minor drug-related offences a few times prior to deportation. Three months here, six months there. Prison was hard, but she knew she would eventually be out. The last time she was arrested, Linda tried to remain sober. From that prison, however, she never went home. Instead, she was taken to immigration detention, and deportation proceedings against her were set in motion. Her mother

hired a legal representative in an effort to prevent deportation, but Linda said immigration detention was too much and she could not handle it. She gave up and “agreed” to return to Cape Verde.

Speaking of her life in Cape Verde Linda’s words were angry, frustrated, and at times, highly ironic. She particularly felt the local gender norms as intruding her way of being. “A man here can do hell in high water,” Linda told me, “but a woman—your place is barefoot and pregnant! I didn’t grow up like this!” Linda was exasperated with the lack of employment opportunities for women and the idea that she, as a woman, was to be supported by a man, i.e., a husband. In addition, she found socialising difficult. She found people judgemental and fond of gossip. Women were not supposed to have male friends, nor supposed to smoke or drink.

Three years after deportation, she dearly missed speaking in her own language—English. With socialising limited, Linda read a lot. Her mother sent her an American bible. Linda read all the English books she could find in town. They were her distraction and her connection to the language. She told me how she missed everything in and about America, and how only now she realised how much she had lost. In the USA, she could go out and have a drink and smoke with her friends, independently of their gender. There was unlimited supply of water and electricity. She had access to 24-hour shops and could buy her meat already cut and packaged in the supermarket, as opposed to having to wait until someone slaughtered a pig or a cow. Linda regretted everything that led to her removal to Cape Verde. She regretted her drug addiction and the offences that led her to prison. Mostly she regretted not getting citizenship. Her mother urged her, repeatedly, to apply for American citizenship. She never cared. She was well aware now that citizenship was a precious asset. “The saddest part,” Linda said, “is like I used to say ‘Boy would I love to live in a country where it is always hot, near the water’, you know what I mean? But I did not mean it like this. I did not mean it like this. And I have to stay here for now. I don’t know what the future holds for me.” Although she tried to accept this new reality and move on the best she could, sometimes she still found it hard to go on.

As the only female deportee in town Linda felt there was no one around who could understand her way of being in the world and her pain at having to adjust to such a different social world. Male deportees on the other hand, often counted on each other for support and company. Although they too had to adjust to local expectations and society,

as males they enjoyed a larger degree of freedom. Furthermore, many of the male deportees knew each other from the USA. For David, a younger male deportee who recently arrived, it made it easier for him to see many familiar faces upon arrival in Cape Verde, even if he would not wish any of them deported. It was mostly with them that David spent his time. He did not know many people from town yet and truth be said, he did not feel very comfortable around local people. He felt American and was not yet sure how to be American in Cape Verde.

David moved to the USA with his parents and siblings when he was three years old. He had no recollection of his early years in Cape Verde. At the age of 17, he dropped out of high school to “run the streets.” The following years he was in and out of prison on several accounts. At the age of 22, he moved to Florida to start a family and move away from the streets. The following year his son was born—by that time, he had already taken to the streets in Florida too. Again, he was arrested. He obtained his high school diploma while in prison and applied for community college, only to drop out short after. For David, as a teenager, running the streets selling drugs was the “normal thing” to do, as he put it. That was what his friends were doing, and what he grew up around: life was supposed to be hanging around with friends, making easy money, wearing the nice clothes, driving the nice cars, being with girls. His mother was always scared. She knew what he was up to and tried to dissuade him of that life, but David would not listen. He was not thinking about the future, that was just day-to-day life. Sometimes it was violent; a few times, it was very violent. However, no one was ever thinking about it. People just ran the streets. Now, looking back, David wishes he could have changed it. He wished he would have stopped to think about this life and his future. He looks back and sees all the opportunities that were there for him, all the things he could have taken advantage of but did not. He sees all the efforts his parents did to provide for him, to support him, to be there for him, and he blames himself for the choices he made.⁴

David got used to spending time in and out of prison. Laughing, he told me that jail was almost like college campus, only with no women: there were always others from his neighbourhood; they went to the gym, played basketball, listened to music, etc. Things changed however when he was sent to immigration detention. There was nothing but a little dayroom with a couple of televisions to hang about in, all day. So when he was given a court date and the opportunity to contest his deportation, David chose not to. Much like Linda, David could not stand

much longer in detention. He also thought that perhaps in Cape Verde he could stay out of trouble, get away from that life. He did not consider much what his life in Cape Verde would be, rather he was focused on what it would not be—no more ins and outs of jail. Now he is told he can never go back to the USA. When we met, he had been in Cape Verde for only a couple of months and he was “checking things out” but life there was not looking “very promising,” he said. Therefore, he considered going to Europe, perhaps Canada, but he was well aware how difficult it was for Cape Verdeans (as citizens of the Global South) to obtain visas.

In town, he was adjusting to the different culture, to living without (reliable) power and water supply. He missed the variety of foods in America and desperately craved Starbucks coffee. He did not “feel comfortable” around local people because he was always unsure of what was going on. His uncle worked for the local government and his family was well known, so people in general were friendly. However, he soon found out that people had different opinions of him when he was not around to listen, and that made him uneasy. David had strong links to town. He left for the USA when he was three but, unlike Linda, he had returned a few times on holiday. The last time he was in Cape Verde prior to his deportation, he was already a young adult and ended up staying for six months. He was comfortable with the language. Yet, he could not bring himself to say that he was from Cape Verde. “I don’t consider myself from here,” David told me, “they put me here against my will. Against my wishes. This is like a prison away from prison. I still consider myself in prison cause I don’t want to be here.”

Linda and David, much like the others I spoke to, show regret for past actions, resignation about their situation, and longing and appreciation for their families left in the USA. On Fogo they are learning how to live again. Much of what they took for granted back home has vanished. They were learning to live away from their families, in a town where they had little to do, and where gender expectations constrained their movement and social interactions. I wonder what has become of them.

POSITIONALITY, CHANGING NARRATIVES, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Thus far, I have presented narratives from Linda and David, from the young deported men and the villagers on Fogo, from the people I engaged with in Praia, and of course, from myself. We each had

something to say about deportation and perhaps inevitably each of us was bounded by our own positionality. The reader may have noticed how I sound sceptical of the narratives of deportation I heard in Praia, but not of the ones I heard first-hand on Fogo. Yet, none is more valid than the other is—they rather reflect different perspectives and positionalities.⁵

Such is the narrative of time in Cape Verde in the spring of 2008. The data are limited in depth and breadth—it is hardly sufficient to present findings or draw conclusions. However, that was never the intention of the fieldtrip, or this chapter. The aim of the fieldtrip was to raise research questions of relevance and to consider what such an ethnographic study would entail. At the end of my time on Fogo I wondered what sort of ethnography I would carry out if I were to return. An ethnography of boredom, perhaps? Alternatively, perhaps one of resilience? How would it feel to spend one year in that small town, in that small island, in the middle of the Atlantic? What would such an ethnography of deportation resemble?

Unlike my subsequent studies of deportation and border control in the UK and Portugal, on Fogo research participants were easily identifiable and accessible. They were clustered in a small town, available to talk to me. Civil servants made time to see me and answer my questions, people at large were curious about me and open to talk to me, and the deportees themselves were visibly identifiable as such (through their appearance and manner). There were many to interact with and talk to, and much to observe. It was a short fieldtrip, but looking back, I do not think this ethnography would have presented great challenges when it comes to research access. Yet, I wonder about my research approach and my own positionality, and that, in turn, makes me wonder, in addition, of the approach and positionality of many of those who have been conducting research on post-deportation for the past decade. Is it odd that for the most part post-deportation studies are conducted by female researchers (there are exceptions, of course, as evidenced in the work of Michael Collier, Shahram Khosravi, and Evin Rodkey, in this volume, and Brotherton and Barrios 2011)? Is our own positionality as (generally) educated middle-class (white) individuals inviting particular answers? Is deportation being addressed from all relevant perspectives? Again, here I restate the point made earlier in the chapter on the lack of ethical and methodological accounts in post-deportation studies. Given the political and ethical dimensions of border control *and* border research, it is hardly controversial to suggest that more space should be

given to in-depth reflections of researchers' positionality, approach, and motivations in researching post-deportation.

What strikes me when I look at the data that I presented here is how consistent it is with findings from other post-deportation studies across the world: regret, isolation, stigma, gender constraints, strained social interactions, family separation, financial dependency, immobility. Had I carried out this research, would it have become a replication of existing studies? Or was I simply asking the wrong questions? Looking back, and despite my efforts to contextualise deportation, I see that I was nevertheless too focused on the experience of deportation, boredom, and resilience. Heike Drotbohm's (2011, 2015) ethnography of kinship in Cape Verde shows not just the experience of deportation of these young men, but equally important, it reveals and examines the position and role of deportation within local everyday transnational lives. Her study is instrumental in that it goes beyond deportation, and towards everyday life. It is also testament that the framework each of us chooses to utilise will emphasise particular elements of (post-) deportation. Post-deportation studies have revealed a variety of situations across a multitude of geographical locations. Despite the original contribution of the different studies mentioned so far, there is a significant number of elements ever-present in the post-deportation literature. This is important. By now, we know better than to take deportation as the end of migration. We know deportation starts well before removal and its legacy endures long after. We also know that it not only affects those who are deported, but also their families and communities at both ends of migration. For the past decade, several studies have documented not just the suffering, vulnerability, and precariousness of life after deportation, but also the agency, resilience, and subjectivity of those involved. So, I wonder how can we make such consistency of findings more visible. And would doing so trigger action towards social change? How much more evidence is needed to make government bodies, civil society, and communities at large recognise the impacts of deportation policies and practices? Can we, and should we, as social scientists, strive to move towards social change?

It is not my intention to just set an activist agenda in raising these questions, but rather think how we can and whether we should, address them. A pessimistic perspective could argue that people just do not care. That perhaps we are indeed living in the age of *necropower* where instruments of sovereignty seek to create "new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life

conferring upon them the status of living dead” (Mbembe 2003, p. 40). Should that be the case, keeping our gaze set upon deportation would most likely head us towards a pornography of suffering. Yet, whether we like it or not, suffering, destitution, and vulnerability are part of many local realities—they should not be ignored. I would rather take on an alternative perspective. I started this chapter outlining a call for action from a fellow scholar. I end it with a call for action from another. In a recent edited collection on approaches to border control, Leanne Weber (2015a) and her colleagues wonder what peace at the border would look like. They collectively argue for a rethinking of border control, calling on scholars and other parties involved to adopt a “preferred future” methodology. That is, an approach that moves beyond narratives of suffering, hardship, inequality, and punitiveness at the border, towards an engagement with alternative outlooks on a potentially different bordered world (see also Sanchez 2016 on this call). A *preferred future* methodology distances itself from *possible futures* or *predicted future* approaches in that it assumes from the start a particular outcome, thus allowing us to focus on *how* this *preferred future* may be achievable, rather than *why* it should be so (Weber 2015b, p. 9). “This seems to be,” Weber writes, “a more suitable method for articulating a political and ethical project aimed at promoting more open and equitable international borders, while still incorporating some empirical observation” (Weber 2015b, p. 9).

In this chapter, I have sought to underline the need to question how our positionality in the field and our own research approach may impact on research findings. This is a rapidly growing field of studies. When examining policies, experiences, and interests in (post-) deportation scholars may also want to consider how their research approach can mobilise change, or at the very least, how consistencies found across (post-) deportation studies may be articulated in a more visible way.

Acknowledgements I am very grateful to Shahram Khosravi, Heike Drotbohm, Mary Bosworth, and Sarah Turnbull for commenting on early drafts of this chapter. Their feedback greatly enhanced the chapter and was instrumental in thinking some of its elements through. The field trip that gave rise to this chapter was funded through my doctorate fellowship by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (Portugal). The writing of the chapter however was facilitated by the work I am currently conducting under Mary Bosworth’s European Research Council Starting Grant (2012–2017) no. 313362.

NOTES

1. Hiemstra's study is not seeking to examine detainees' experiences. Instead, she examines the US detention estate and its far reach. Being located in Ecuador became a very suitable location to examine US detention practices and its transnational reverberations, while at the same she was able to conduct traditional fieldwork among those already deported and the families of detainees.
2. For in-depth approach to deportation in Cape Verde, see Drotbohm (2011, 2012, 2015).
3. I was also fortunate that my time in Cape Verde coincided with country visits by two experts on the field, Jørgen Carling and Heike Drotbohm, with whom I met and learnt much from.
4. David, like others that I talked to, took responsibility not just for his immigration ordeal, but also for his criminal behaviour. Despite the structural problems that they faced, in their narratives they point also to an element of choice in such behaviour. In David's narrative, this is very clear: he talks of street life as the natural thing to do, what everybody did, but also of his parents' efforts in providing him with alternatives to it. Alternatives that, at the time, he did not care for.
5. I am grateful to Heike Drotbohm for pointing this out to me.

REFERENCES

- Åkesson, Lisa, Jørgen Carling, and Heike Drotbohm. 2012. Mobility, Moralities and Motherhood: Navigating the Contingencies of Cape Verdean Lives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (2): 237–260.
- Bosworth, Mary, Ines Hasselberg, and Sarah Turnbull. 2016. Punishment, citizenship and Identity: An Introduction. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 16 (3): 257–266.
- Brotherton, David C., and Luis Barrios. 2011. *Banished to the Homeland. Dominican Deportees and their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Candea, Matei. 2007. Arbitrary Locations. In Defence of the Bounded Field-Site. *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13 (1): 167–184.
- Carling, Jørgen. 2004. Emigration, Return and Development in Cape Verde: The Impact of Closing Borders. *Population, Space and Place* 10: 113–132.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2015. Deportation Studies: Origins, Themes and Directions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 671–681.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (1): 419–447.

- Drotbohm, Heike. 2011. On the Durability and the Decomposition of Citizenship: The Social Logics of Forced Return Migration in Cape Verde. *Citizenship Studies* 15 (3–4): 381–396.
- . 2012. ‘It’s Like Belonging to a Place That Has Never Been Yours.’ Deportees Negotiating Involuntary Immobility and Conditions of Return in Cape Verde. In *Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Michi Messer, Renée Schröder, and Ruth Wodak, 129–140. New York: Springer.
- . 2015. The Reversal of Migratory Family Lives: A Cape Verdean Perspective on Gender and Sociality Pre- and Post-Deportation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 653–670.
- Drotbohm, Heike, and Ines Hasselberg. 2015. Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 551–562.
- Fischer, Nicolas. 2015. The Management of Anxiety. An Ethnographical Outlook on Self-Mutilations in a French Immigration Detention Centre. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 599–616.
- Galvin, Treasa M. 2015. ‘We Deport Them but They Keep Coming Back’: The Normalcy of Deportation in the Daily Life of ‘Undocumented’ Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in Botswana. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 617–634.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2014. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- . 2016. ‘Negative Credentials,’ ‘Foreign-Earned’ Capital, and Call Centers: Guatemalan Deportees’ Precarious Reintegration. *Citizenship Studies* 20 (3–4): 326–341.
- Hasselberg, Ines. 2016. *Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and the Everyday Life*. New York: Berghahn.
- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2012. Geopolitical Reverberations of US Migrant Detention and Deportation: The View from Ecuador. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 293–311.
- . 2014. Performing Homeland Security within the US Immigrant Detention System. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32 (4): 571–588.
- Instituto das Comunidades. 2002. *Análise dos Dados do Recenseamento dos Repatriados*. 10 Oct 2002.
- . 2003a. *Projecto de Integração dos Repatriados em Cabo Verde*. Instituto das Comunidades.
- . 2003b. *Política de Emigração: Desafios e perspectivas*.
- Kalir, Barak. 2015. The Jewish State of Anxiety: Between Moral Obligation and Fearism in the Treatment of African Asylum Seekers in Israel. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 580–598.

- Khosravi, Shahram. 2016. Deportation as a Way of Life for Young Afghan Men. In *Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global and Transnational Issues*, ed. Rich Furman, Douglas Epps, and Greg Lamphear, 169–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marcus, George E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1): 95–117.
- Mbembe, Achille. 2003. Necropolitics. *Public Culture* 15 (1): 11–40.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Sanchez, Gabriella. 2016. Book Review: Rethinking Border Control for a Globalizing World: A Preferred Future. <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/05/book-review-1>. Accessed 3 June 2016.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- . 2015. Deportation Stigma and Re-Migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 635–652.
- Talavera, Victor, Guillermina Nunez-Mchiri, and Josiah Heyman. 2010. Deportation in the US–Mexico Borderlands: Anticipation, Experience, and Memory. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 166–197. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Walters, William. 2002. Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens. *Citizenship Studies* 6 (3): 265–292.
- Weber, Leanne, ed. 2015a. *Rethinking Border Control for a Globalised World: A Preferred Future*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2015b. Peace at the Border: A Thought Experiment. In *Rethinking Border Control for a Globalised World: A Preferred Future*, ed. Leanne Weber, 1–14. New York: Routledge.
- Willen, Sarah. 2007. Toward a Critical Phenomenology of ‘Illegality’: State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel. *International Migration* 45 (3): 8–38.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2004. Fools Banished from the Kingdom: Remapping Geographies of Gang Violence Between the Americas. *American Quarterly* 56 (3): 759–779.
- . 2011. *Spaces of Detention. The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis Between Los Angeles and San Salvador*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Starting Again: Life After Deportation from the UK

Sarah Turnbull

INTRODUCTION

When I met Dev¹ in mid-June 2014 at Colnbrook Immigration Removal Centre, he was in remarkably good spirits despite having been detained for over three weeks and facing administrative removal to Bangladesh. He had been living in the UK for four and a half years, having migrated to study. Prior to being detained, Dev was enjoying his life in the UK, even though it had been hard living without a regularised status. An upbeat, energetic young man in his early twenties, Dev had been residing in a city in the English Midlands—a place he said had “touched [his] heart” and felt like his hometown—spending time with his friends and girlfriend, a young woman who had also migrated, from Eastern Europe, to the UK to study. When the college he was attending lost its operating licence, and closed, financial difficulties prevented Dev from continuing his studies at a different college and he was subsequently unable to renew his student visa. He became a “visa over-stayer” and continued to live in the UK irregularly until his arrest and detention in late May 2014.

S. Turnbull (✉)
Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

As Dev describes it: “Everything was going good... And suddenly, one morning, they just came, just brought me down, just put [me] in hell. Just like that. Just one single morning. That one morning has just ruined everything.” He was taken to a police station and held for several hours before being transferred to an Immigration Removal Centre (IRC). He spent ten days at this centre before being transferred to Colnbrook IRC where I met him.

Dev did not want to return to Bangladesh. He liked living in the UK. He also did not want to go back empty-handed, without having completed his studies, especially after his family had supported him financially to come to the UK to get his degree with the goal of getting a good job. In addition, he wanted to stay with his girlfriend and was not keen about the prospect of a long-distance relationship and the logistical and financial difficulties of figuring out how—and where—they could be together. For Dev, the years he spent in the UK are especially important to him because they mark his transition from his late teens into adulthood, a transformative life experience: “Once I’m in [the] UK for a long time, and everything has changed in my mind, my thoughts... Everything has been changed.” His hopes and dreams for the future were fixed on the UK; it was the home he imagined and promised the lifestyle he desired.

Although Dev did not want to leave the UK, he did not fight his removal to Bangladesh. Unlike many other rejected migrants who are deported, Dev did not face persecution in his “country of origin” and, admittedly, had a good family there. Still, he did not want to go. In mid-July 2014, after about two months in detention, he was escorted by two private security agents to the airport and into immigration holding where he had to repack his luggage to meet the thirty kilogram weight restriction. The escorts then took him onto the Jet Airways aeroplane headed to Bangladesh (via India) and left him there to travel as a “normal” passenger. Landing, finally, in Dhaka, Dev fortunately had no trouble being accepted back into Bangladesh by immigration officials. He took a long, hot taxi ride to his village and family home, a place from which he would adjust to his new situation and figure out what next.

In 2015, the UK enforced the removal of 12,056 people (Home Office 2016).² This chapter draws on testimonies of individuals, like Dev, who have been administratively removed or deported from British immigration detention, to identify and explore what happens once migrants are forcibly returned to their so-called “home” or third countries.³ The narratives highlight the distressing nature of deportation

and the challenges of starting “from scratch”. Returnees’ experiences, for the most part, speak to the difficulties of (re-)establishing oneself and the resilience needed to cope with the numerous losses—financial, occupational, familial, social, cultural—associated with their exclusion from the UK and the specific issues associated with a forced removal from immigration detention. In so doing, the chapter points to the affective implications of removal and deportation as punitive border control practices that both unmake and remake people’s identities, sense of belonging, and ideas about home.

I begin by outlining the contemporary context of immigration detention and deportation in the UK as reflective of the criminalisation of migration and the expansion of penal power in the service of border control. I then discuss my research methodology and data, introducing my informants who have experienced the British state’s power of expulsion directly from the confines of immigration detention, often after lengthy periods of incarceration. The third section thematically explores returnees’ experiences of forced removal, including the consequences of detention and deportation on their adjustment and (re)integration. The concluding section considers how the themes emerging from this study advance knowledge of the post-deportation lives of migrants.

DETENTION, DEPORTATION, AND THE CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRATION IN THE UK

Immigration detention and deportation are two interrelated practices that form part of the state’s response to managing unwanted migration, controlling borders, and (re-)asserting sovereign power (Welch 1996; Bosworth 2008; Bosworth and Guild 2008). These are not new practices; both have long histories as tools of containing and excluding those deemed threatening or undesirable (Bashford and Strange 2002; Walters 2002; Weber and Bowling 2008; Bosworth 2014; Gündoğdu 2015). Nor are detention and deportation exceptional; rather, they are now normalised responses within state security discourses that frame migration as a “crisis” (Gündoğdu 2015) and disproportionately affect racialised and economically marginalised populations (Fekete 2005; Hernandez 2008; Wacquant 2008; Golash-Boza 2015a, b). The extension and/or merging of criminal law and penal power into the administrative realm of immigration means that logics, tactics, and strategies common to criminal justice and penal systems are increasingly utilised to regulate transnational

mobility, including the state power to detain and expel (Stumpf 2006; Aas 2007, 2011). Over the past few decades, such powers are extending to new populations, including foreign-national offenders, asylum seekers, and international students (Bosworth 2014).

Detention is a key mechanism through which expulsion can be more easily effected: the containment of non-citizens identified for removal within secure institutions (ideally) provides docile bodies who can be easily escorted to the airport and put on aeroplanes. In practice, things are much messier. Individuals may fight—both legally and literally—their removal from the UK, resulting in long and/or multiple stints in immigration detention as well as the often traumatic experiences—and more serious consequences—associated with failed attempts at expulsion.⁴ The state's ability to remove non-citizens is subject to procedural safeguards and legal norms which provide checks on the power to deport (Phuong 2005; Gibney 2008; Gündoğdu 2015). For instance, the travel documents necessary for legally removing individuals are, for a variety of reasons, often difficult to obtain (see e.g., Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency 2014), further delaying or, in some cases, impeding territorial exclusion. De Genova's (2002) notion of deportability highlights the precarity of non-citizens who are subject to the ever-present threat of removal.

Immigration detention is a unique site from which to experience deportation because the carceral conditions significantly limit how individuals can prepare, both emotionally and practically. People who are detained have few, if any, choice for when, how, and where they go. The Home Office sets the date and time, the means (charter flight or commercial airline), and the destination. It also arranges the escorts—typically subcontracted to private security firms such as Tascor or G4S—to accompany the individuals being deported on their flights to ensure they are properly delivered to their destinations. As such, those who are detained and facing removal experience notable constraints on their ability to act in their own best interests, narrowing—but not removing altogether—the scope of choices available.

Detention tends to be sudden and unpredictable,⁵ even when it looms in people's minds as a possibility (see also Hasselberg 2016). Most do not have the chance to pack or dispose of belongings, re-home pets, or settle affairs, including retrieving savings from bank accounts. The Home Office does not permit temporary release from detention to prepare for departure. Those who are detained have to rely on friends or

family members to assist them in this regard, packing up belongings into suitcases and delivering these to the detention centre. The inability to properly prepare for removal contributes to people's sense of detention and deportation as unjust, undignified, and punitive. It also underscores the criminalising and control-oriented nature of these practices, particularly in regards to lack of options (e.g., temporary escorted or unescorted absences) available to detainees to prepare them for deportation. The lack of preparedness, in turn, makes it hard for people to (re-)establish themselves once deported and may compound the psychological distress associated with removal (Cassarino 2004).

Studies of post-deportation outcomes for migrants highlight issues of impoverishment and financial hardship, displacement and loss of identity, cultural estrangement, psychological distress, shame, renegotiations of familial relationships, (gendered) stigmatisation, and, for some, law-breaking and (re-)imprisonment (Peutz 2006; Brotherton and Barrios 2009, 2011; Khosravi 2009; Drotbohm 2011, 2015; Zilberg 2011; Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2015; Golash-Boza 2013, 2015b). These issues, combined with the act of return to similar—or worse—situations from which people originally migrated, often create the conditions for remigration (Hiemstra 2012; Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2015; Galvin 2015; París-Pombo and Peláez-Rodríguez 2015; Khosravi 2016). A smaller body of work explores deportee agency, including the ways in which they are able to use “foreign-earned capital” and transnational networks to improve their post-deportation outcomes (e.g., Anderson 2015; Golash-Boza 2016). In some instances, deportation may result in death or serious injury, both during and after removal (Fekete 2005; Athwal 2015; Walters 2016). Significantly, however, less is known about what happens to migrants removed to third countries under the Dublin III Regulation⁶ or similar protocols.

The “idea of deportation,” Khosravi (2016, p. 172) observes, “is to restore the displaced, out-of-place people to their ‘natural’ place of life, their ‘home-land.’” It is a complex practice of deterritorialisation, an unmooring that can break apart families, disrupt hopes and dreams, unsettle identities, and rewrite futures. As Coutin (2015, p. 674) reminds us, “deportation is not a discrete event; rather, it begins long before an individual is apprehended, through the myriad practices that make someone vulnerable in the first place” (see also Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015; Hasselberg 2016), as well as extends beyond the actual removal itself, enmeshing (some) migrants in what Nyers (2003,

p. 1070) terms a “deportspora,” an abject, “transnational space of expulsion, oscillating between redeparture and redeportation” (Khosravi 2016, p. 178). Moreover, as Walters (2016) convincingly argues, deportation has a particular corporeality as it is made possible through various modes of transport necessary for moving human beings from one place to another. It is marked by traumatic ruptures and emotional suffering through both time (before/after) (Blue 2015) and space (here/there). The impacts and implications of deportation are also felt far beyond the individual deportee, extending to his or her family, the sending and receiving communities, and to broader social, economic, and political contexts (Hagan et al. 2011, 2015; Hiemstra 2012; Khosravi 2016). And yet, although deportation is a violent exercise of state power and one that unequally impacts racialised and poor migrants, it does not reduce people to, in the words of Agamben (1998), “bare life”—irrevocably damaged and politically insignificant. People resist, survive, adapt, (re)build their lives, (re)integrate, and carry on, even in difficult circumstances not of their choosing.

METHODS, DATA, AND INFORMANTS

This chapter draws on data collected as part of a larger study of immigration detention and expulsion in the UK. From September 2013 to August 2014, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in four IRCs to explore the lived experiences of detention as well as questions of home, identity, and belonging. I then undertook (a) formal follow-up interviews with a sample of informants who had been released into the UK or deported to another country, and (b) kept in touch with them through telephone, email, and social media. The purpose of the follow-up interviews was to understand what happens after detention, including informants’ experiences of release or deportation and (re)integration.

This chapter focuses on the research with nine informants (two female, seven male) who were deported from the UK, and includes data collected as part of the formal interviews and our correspondence. With the exception of one informant who was removed to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation, the women and men in the study were returned to their “home”⁷ countries located in three main regions: Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. The formal follow-up interviews, which were conducted over the telephone or via Skype, commenced in May 2015 and occurred 10 to 18 months after expulsion from the UK, with

an average of 14 months post-deportation. I offered a small honorarium (£15) for participants' time that I sent electronically from the UK. I maintained contact with my informants after initially meeting them in detention and followed up with them periodically using the aforementioned communication channels. This follow-up correspondence was important as most informants were removed after I had ceased fieldwork in the IRC in which we had met. Following up with informants and maintaining contact over time enabled a broader understanding of their situations and how they had adapted to their post-detention, post-deportation lives.

The nine informants were:

- *Adel* A man in his late twenties from Morocco who lived in the UK for a year and two months. He was detained after breaking the conditions of his student visa. He spent ten days in detention and then was administratively removed to Morocco in 2014.
- *Aroleoba* A man in his mid-twenties from Nigeria who lived in the UK for four years. He was detained for having over-stayed his student visa and subsequently claimed asylum. He has a British-born son and had a British girlfriend at the time of his removal. He was detained for two months and then “voluntarily departed” to Nigeria through an Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) scheme in 2013.
- *Beata* A woman in her mid-thirties from Namibia. She came to the UK to seek asylum and was detained immediately upon her arrival in the UK for over three months under the UK's Detained Fast-Track scheme.⁸ She was administratively removed to Namibia in 2014.
- *Bruna* A woman in her late twenties from Brazil who lived in the UK for seven years after over-staying her visitor visa. She was detained for three weeks then administratively removed to Brazil in 2014. Her boyfriend (now husband) was also detained (but in a different IRC) and administratively removed one week prior to Bruna.
- *Buddy* A man in his early forties from Pakistan who lived in the UK for nine years. He was accused of over-staying his work visa after his application was lost. He was detained for three months (much of which was spent being detained with his wife in a family detention unit) and then administratively removed via charter flight to Pakistan in 2014. His wife was administratively removed to Pakistan before him.

- *Dev* A man in his early twenties from Bangladesh who lived in the UK for four and a half years. He over-stayed his student visa. He was detained for two months, and then administratively removed to Bangladesh in 2014.
- *Levi* A man in his mid-thirties from Jamaica who lived in the UK for 19 years after coming to the UK at age 14. He was married at the time of his deportation and has four British-born children. He served time in prison and as a “foreign-national offender” was subject to deportation. He was detained for over a year, and then deported to Jamaica in 2014.
- *Olawale* A man in his early forties from Nigeria who lived in the UK for one year prior to his detention. He claimed asylum based on his sexuality and was detained for nearly two years, then administratively removed via charter flight to Nigeria in 2015.
- *Zahir* A man in his mid-twenties from Pakistan whose length of time in the UK is unknown. He claimed asylum after entering the UK via Calais, France. He was detained for four months, and then administratively removed to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation in 2014. He subsequently remigrated to Germany to seek asylum there.

All were forced to leave the UK for different reasons and all left directly from immigration detention. As indicated above, most were either “failed” asylum seekers or had broken the terms of their visas through over-staying or working “illegally” and were subject to administrative removal. Half of the informants reported having resided in the UK for significant periods of time, the longest being 19 years (Levi, Jamaica). All but one participant specified that they did not want to leave the UK, yet all, arguably, were returned “involuntarily.” The nature of this involuntariness is worth detailing, particularly given the context—immigration detention—from which they left British soil and the conditions facing them in their countries of origin (see Webber 2011). This is not to suggest a false binary, but rather to acknowledge the structural and material conditions from which decisions to “cooperate” and “leave” are made.

The only informant, Bruna (Brazil), who wanted to leave the UK, had spent seven years living there irregularly; her detention and subsequent administrative removal marked, for her, a natural ending to this particular migration and to all of the difficulties associated with her life as an irregular migrant, which, in her words, “was not life.” In contrast,

Levi (Jamaica), Olawale (Nigeria), Beata (Namibia), and Zahir (Pakistan) resisted their expulsion to the bitter end, pursuing to the best of their ability all legal avenues of appeal to prevent their return. Others, such as Dev (Bangladesh), Adel (Morocco), Aroleoba (Nigeria), and Buddy (Pakistan), had assessed their options from the confines of detention and opted to “give up” struggling with the Home Office and “comply” with their administrative removal.

Aroleoba (Nigeria), for example, chose, after observing others stagnating in detention for months, to participate in a “voluntary” return scheme that was available to immigration detainees at the time. This scheme—called the AVR programme operated by the third sector organisation, Refugee Action—offered financial incentives to encourage detainees to “go home,” including money for setting-up businesses in the “home” country.⁹ For Aroleoba, the AVR programme helped him to avoid going back to Nigeria empty-handed. More specifically, the £500 he received at the airport, and the further £800 he received after submitting his receipts, enabled his onward migration to another African country to study.

It is important to note that several informants indicated their apprehension about speaking about their post-deportation experiences because they did not want to be seen as “victims” of the UK’s immigration system. They did not want to be considered only a “deportee” instead of individuals with nuanced histories, presents, and futures. Such considerations draw our attention to and remind us of participants’ agentic responses to their experiences and situations.

LIFE AFTER EXPULSION

The situations to which my informants returned varied, although fortunately none returned to active war zones. The majority had family in their home countries who provided accommodation and/or financial support, although some had to travel onward from the arrival airport to other villages and cities. Three participants reported, in the words of Levi (Jamaica), “coming home to nothing,” which made starting again more challenging and their (re)integration more isolating. This was especially the case for those like Levi and Olawale (Nigeria) who had spent roughly half their lives abroad and for others like Beata (Namibia) who had fled their home countries. The notion of “reintegration” thus incorrectly assumes that these informants, and migrants, more generally, are

“integrated” to begin with. However, the responsibility for such problems, and the challenges and pains of deportation, are placed onto individual returnees, their families and communities, and the countries to which they are returned. Upon each successful deportation, the British state absolves responsibility for what happens next.

In what follows, I highlight emergent themes on life after deportation as reported by my informants. These themes highlight the difficulties of (re-)establishing oneself and the resilience necessary to cope with the numerous losses—inancial, occupational, familial, relational, cultural, social—associated with deportation from the UK, along with the need to carry on. Even though several informants noted some of the “positive” aspects of being back—the food, weather, and catching up with family and friends—the predominant experience of life after deportation is one of difficulty.

Being Deported from Detention

Being deported from detention posed significant problems for all informants. Even those who had the support of their families upon their return found life difficult, particularly because they could not prepare themselves from the confines of detention. As Adel (Morocco), explains:

There’s nothing prepared for you. There’s nothing. Because already you built all your life up to spend it there [in the UK], at least for, like, a couple of years. So you just suddenly come back without... with no money, with no papers... You’re not even expecting to go back, so those [first] two, three months were very hard surviving.

The sudden, unpredictable jolt of being disappeared from their life in the UK and put in immigration detention meant there was little that informants like Adel could do to prepare themselves for going back. From detention, Adel could not retrieve his “papers”—the original educational certificates and other paperwork—from his flat. These documents, he told me, were necessary for him to (re-)establish himself in Morocco, such as proving his credentials in order to get a job. Adel pointed to a Euro-centric presumption on the part of the British state that deportees, such as him, could easily replace such vital documents lost through detention and deportation in their countries of origin. Dev (Bangladesh) also described having lost most of his belongings, including valuable clothes, shoes, and electronics, because of the luggage restrictions on his

removal flight. Such experiences were especially frustrating and worked to structurally disadvantage those being deported from immigration detention.

The situations from which informants were expelled from the UK also impacted how they dealt with their return. Levi (Jamaica), for instance, was distressed about his deportation from detention after the way his immigration case in the UK was handled. He was very angry at the British system and for how he was sent back. “I didn’t want to come to Jamaica this way,” Levi said, referring to having returned empty-handed while being separated from his wife and children, even after spending £20,000 fighting his immigration case.

Likewise, Beata (Namibia) remained significantly affected by her experience seeking asylum in the UK:

I think about it [detention] all the time. And it’s the reason why I’m going through what I went, what I’m going through now. There are things that I have forgotten, but I cannot forget that part.

She was horrified at the treatment she received after being placed in Britain’s Detained Fast-Track asylum system. She felt humiliated and discriminated against by a racist immigration system that locked her up in immigration detention when she had come to the UK seeking help and did not believe her. The manner in which deportation occurs thus has important implications for how individuals experience this challenging temporal and spatial rupture and their ability to (re-)establish themselves.

Experiencing Deportation to a Third Country

Zahir (Pakistan) is the only informant who was not returned to his country of origin. After having his claim for asylum refused in the UK, he was administratively removed to Italy as per the Dublin III Regulation and left destitute. Without friends or family and encountering an asylum system that was, in his words, “a total mess” due to the lack of shelter or support given to asylum seekers—and which failed him the first time around—Zahir relied on the small amount of money he had saved while working at the British detention centre in which he was confined.¹⁰ Not wanting to beg, he worked “illegally” distributing advertising flyers for Pakistani business owners whom he says helped him but also took advantage of him by paying him very little for his work (e.g., €30 for 14 hours of work).

Approximately six months after being deported to Italy, Zahir met other asylum seekers who encouraged him to go to Germany. He took this advice and migrated there, with great difficulty, where he once again applied for asylum, still in search of a state that would finally accept responsibility for him. After five long years in Europe seeking asylum in multiple countries yet being restricted by having his “fingerprints” taken (as per the Dublin III Regulation) in Italy, Zahir hoped that Germany would give him the protection and regularised status that would allow him to build a life. As he waited in Germany for a decision on his asylum claim, Zahir wondered how he could have better spent the past five years and what he might have accomplished instead of irregularly migrating around Europe looking for sanctuary and a place he could call home. Zahir’s experience highlights the unique challenges facing non-European migrants deported within Europe under the Dublin III Regulation, rendering them vulnerable as responsibility is passed from state to state.

Stigmatisation and Mistreatment

The experience of detention and expulsion was something most participants tried to keep to themselves, which may contribute to the experience of isolation and social or cultural estrangement. Their attempts at secrecy underscores the stigmatising and criminalising effects of these policies and practices (see also Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Golash-Boza 2013; Schuster and Majidi 2015). Adel (Morocco), for instance, only told a few trusted family members, all of whom agreed not to tell his mother. He also worried how the broader community would perceive his experience, explaining that “it’s not good when you say to people that ‘I was abroad in France or in England and then I was detained and deported back home.’” Since detention and deportation are not typically well understood but still associated with wrongdoing and illegality, they are difficult practices to explain. Simply, they do not look like “good” things to experience and those subject to them are guilty by association. Adel thus worried that the “stain” of detention and deportation could impact his future career prospects if members of his community found out.

Beata (Namibia) also kept her experiences quiet upon her return:

I never told anybody that I was actually locked up since the first day I arrived in the UK and was thrown on a plane by English immigration officers who regard coming here to deport Namibians as a holiday, and casually discuss how they are going to enjoy it.

Such experiences were not anticipated by most informants and did not align with preconceived visions of the UK as a stronghold of human rights, particularly for those seeking asylum. Beata's treatment both humiliated and angered her, and highlighted unequal relations of power between the UK and Namibia, and between British citizen (on holiday, free to move) and non-citizen deportee (rejected, forcibly removed), and contributed to her sense of injustice about the experience. By choosing to keep quiet, she tried to manage the shame and stigmatisation associated with her detention, deportation, and failed asylum claim.

Feelings of anger and humiliation were also experienced by other informants. Buddy (Pakistan) said that he was "treated like a criminal" and that the British government dealt with him unjustly, particularly after he had spent nearly ten years legally working there as a skilled migrant. His comment about being treated like a criminal is indicative of the stigmatising impacts of detention and deportation as being associated with wrongdoing and illegality, something Buddy viewed as mistreatment. Levi (Jamaica) also perceived his deportation as inherently unfair as he had grown up in England and had not been back to Jamaica for 19 years. "How is it justified?" he asked. "How can they send someone back to somewhere they don't know?" In addition to his perceptions of mistreatment by the British state, Levi also reported that people in Jamaica, including members of his family, "treat [him] like a piece of shit" because he "didn't come back like Santa Claus" (i.e., with lots of money and gifts). As a so-called "criminal deportee" and "migration failure," Levi did not live up to the expectations of a successful migrant as he returned to Jamaica with nothing after nearly two decades in the UK. Such testimonies point to the stigmatising impacts of deportation and how feelings of mistreatment are common experiences of being detained and expelled from the UK.

The Gendered Implications of Deportation

The gendered implications of life after deportation also emerged through several participants' narratives, reflecting the findings of previous research (e.g., Golash-Boza 2013). Dev (Bangladesh) explained that as the eldest son in his family, it was both his "time to give back" as well as "stand" on his own—responsibilities that were difficult after experiencing deportation and returning with none of the resources (e.g., a UK college degree, money, etc.) that would enable him to assume this gendered role.

Likewise, Buddy (Pakistan) told me:

I'm trying to stand up again, trying to build things from scratch because as a man it's my job to make something out of it. I have to survive.

Buddy's gendered and heteronormative responsibilities "as a man" were tied to the breakdown of his marriage, a process that began in the UK when he and his wife were detained and deported, and ended in divorce in Pakistan. He explained that his wife asked for a divorce because of the immigration troubles they experienced in the UK—troubles that were indicative of his gendered failure to provide for his family. Similarly, Adel's (Morocco) engagement with his fiancée was called off because detention and deportation were unacceptable "marks" on a future son-in-law, presumably signalling a lack of worth as a man and future provider. Such losses underscore both the emotional tolls and the stigmatising consequences of these practices.

In contrast, Bruna (Brazil) did not experience her deportation as stigmatising but it brought the issue of reproduction to the forefront, including the roles of wife and mother. When I asked her what she wanted to do after being back in Brazil, she told me: "I want to have family. I want to build my family. I want to have kids." Unlike Buddy and Adel, Bruna's deportation did not result in the loss of her intimate relationship. Her desire to have a family also precluded remigration as an option for post-deportation life. The intersections between gender, reproduction, and migration are noteworthy here; due to the challenges of living life irregularly in the UK, Bruna delayed having children, while being deported Brazil helped prioritise her desire for a family.

Experiencing Isolation

Several informants reported a solitary existence after deportation—a feature of life that was, for some, self-imposed and, for others, occurred through social and/or cultural estrangement. Aroleoba (Nigeria), for instance, said that he lost touch with most of his friends in the UK but this was his choice. At first, he says he shut himself away "to get [his] head straight" (i.e., mentally and emotionally process his situation) and then when he felt ready, he started socialising again. However, interacting with his African peers occasionally made him feel badly because of

what he lost through his deportation from the UK. Buddy (Pakistan) also felt “antisocial” because of his experiences, including the breakdown of his marriage, explaining that he chose to focus on work rather than spending time with others. He described how his family did not understand what he went through, which contributed to his sense of isolation.

After being deported from the UK, Beata (Namibia) reported (via email) that she was both isolated and stigmatised:

I did not only experience rejection from family but also from my community at large and some of my friends. Everybody was treating me as if I was a murderer or some sort of a demon.

This estrangement left her feeling rejected and depressed. Overcoming the experiences of detention, the failed asylum claim, and deportation were made much more difficult due to the seclusion and stigmatisation Beata encountered upon her return.

Similarly, Levi (Jamaica) said he did not have any friends except for one man he met in immigration detention and was also deported to Jamaica but lives at the opposite end of the island. He was also extremely disappointed with members of his family in Jamaica who offered no support: “Everyone I thought I could rely on isn’t there [for me].” In response, Levi distanced himself from his family, saying: “I’m alone, by myself.” He explained that post-deportation life was a “hard, hard situation” to deal with by himself, which increased his feelings of disillusionment and anger both towards his family and the UK immigration system.

Olawale (Nigeria) also experienced isolation on account of his sexuality and fear of being “outed” as bisexual in a country in which homosexuality is illegal. He worried about failing to live up to normative conceptions of masculinity in Nigerian society and was cognisant that by not having a girlfriend, he was not conforming, which increased his risk of being found out. Yet, at the same time, he did not feel this was a sustainable solution; he needed to come out eventually. “I’ve lost so much,” Olawale told me, “not just time, [but] losing my life because I don’t live my life, I’m living someone else’s.” Staying away from others helped him protect himself, but also increased his susceptibility to suspicion for failing to conform to masculine and heteronormative cultural norms.

Coping with Distress

Life after expulsion was, for some, therefore characterised by significant psychological distress, linked to both the reasons for migration (e.g., asylum-seeking) and the social, material, and financial situations to which they were returned. While there is not enough space to detail the mental health consequences of the sort of indefinite immigration detention that participants experienced prior to their deportation (see e.g., Bosworth 2016), it is important to note how detention can produce new vulnerabilities or compound pre-existing ones while generally being a traumatising experience. Returnees' experiences of detention can thus shape how they cope with the distress of deportation.

Beata (Namibia), who, as noted above, had sought asylum in the UK and was detained immediately upon arrival, was having a difficult time when I interviewed her:

I really try to get back to just the way it was... I tried, but I seem to be going downhill. I just can't pick up... it's now almost two years, and just nothing is working. Everything is going from bad to worse.

Estranged from her family and having lost her job and belongings due to the reasons she left Namibia to seek asylum in the UK, Beata returned to "nothing." Initially, she found a job but was let go because of her deteriorating mental health.

Sometimes I feel like I don't... I'm not thinking of taking my life, but sometimes I feel that I'm really dying. And sometimes I don't sleep because I'm afraid I might die in my sleep, just, just like that; that maybe it can just happen. I've lost so much weight. And I'm not getting my period any more. I haven't got my period in something like more than half a year, because I've lost so much weight. And sometimes I feel sick, just sick.

Beata was suffering from clinical depression yet had limited access to psychological counselling or to a social safety net that would provide her support while she dealt with her mental and physical health issues. She coped with the assistance of anti-depressants and by smoking cigarettes.

Olawale (Nigeria) worried about returning to old habits, including drinking alcohol, to survive his situation. He worked out at the gym to burn off the stress associated with his failed asylum application and having been returned to a context in which he could not be himself as a

self-identified bisexual man. The toughest part, Olawale said, was the realisation that “there’s no way out of this.” Coping with the distress of deportation was especially challenging due to feeling of being “stuck” in the situation, pointing to the sense of powerlessness associated with this lived experience for some participants.

Barriers to Remigration

Given the challenges facing returnees, it is perhaps unsurprising that onward migration—actual and/or imagined—was a common response to post-deportation life. For most informants, their forced return meant they were not able to accomplish their aspirations through their migration to the UK—what de Regt and Tafesse (2016) term the “good sides of migration”—such as completing their education, being granted asylum, or obtaining permanent resident status. This increased in some the desire to try again. For instance, Buddy (Pakistan) sought opportunities for further migration as a skilled migrant worker in the Middle East, but was not able to find something comparable to the job he had in the UK. Dev (Bangladesh) also wanted to remigrate to work or study in another Western country and would ask me via Facebook as to whether being detained and deported were likely to negatively impact his future visa applications. However, the major impediment to him remigrating was having enough money for the visa application, particularly after his family had spent considerable amounts getting him to the UK on a student visa in the first place.

As noted above, Aroleoba (Nigeria) used his AVR money to move to a nearby country to pursue his education, reworking the unhelpful AVR scheme to his advantage. After spending a few months in Nigeria after his deportation, his decision to remigrate was a way of responding to his new situation and gave him the opportunity to focus on himself and his education so he could, in his words, “bounce back.” However, the desire for further migration was in Aroleoba’s mind. He did not want to live in Africa. Europe or North America were his ideal destinations because of the higher standard of living. Like Dev (Bangladesh), Aroleoba left Nigeria when he was an adolescent (age 17) and similarly viewed his most formative experiences as occurring in the UK and Europe, not Africa. Yet, despite wanting to remigrate, he told me that he was “done struggling,” referring to the challenges of migrating to the Global North and having lost all that he had worked for during his time in the UK.

Likewise, Bruna (Brazil) recognised the difficulties associated with migration to a Western country, particularly for those with limited access to regularised channels like migrant work visas. She viewed her inability to pursue an education as a result of her time spent living irregularly in the UK. Yet, Bruna and her husband tried again, remigrating to Canada after obtaining work visas shortly after being deported to Brazil. They spent about seven months in Canada before going back to Brazil due to an illness in the family. Regarding further migration, Bruna said: “I’m tired... We’re not young any more, you know, to have adventures.” With aging parents and the desire to have a family, remigration was not a feasible option for her.

Remigration to the UK was very much desired by Levi (Jamaica), who wanted to find a way to get back to his wife, children, and extended family. Yet, he felt stuck: “I don’t know how I’ll get out of Jamaica.” The lack of financial resources to move on, combined with his criminal record and ten-year ban on re-entering the UK due to his deportation, presented significant obstacles. Similarly, Olawale (Nigeria) spoke about the challenge of being returned to a place in which, in his words, there was “nowhere to go” (see also Coutin 2010). The feeling of being stuck was thus a common experience among informants as the barriers to remigration stacked up. Even as some informants were returned to conditions that sparked their original migrations (see Schuster and Majidi 2015), the impediments to remigration were too great for most, at least in the short-term.

Ties to the UK

Several informants also noted both the emotional and practical challenges of managing their transnational ties to the UK after deportation. Dev (Bangladesh) explained that:

[s]till now, I always listen to [...] *Capital FM*, and watch the news, watching the *X Factors*, the UK shows. I’m just evolving here, like gradually [...] I can’t get rid of these things.

He still felt connected to the English city where he had lived, following the news and watching British television shows online. Dev told me that it was hard to speak Bengali properly at first, which marked him as an outsider. Yet he used his English language skills—what Golash-Boza (2016) terms “foreign-earned capital”—to get a job at a call centre.

Dev's identity and sense of belonging was very much tied to the UK and it was hard for him to (re-)adapt and let it go. Indeed, at time of writing, his Facebook profile indicates he still lives in the UK. Dev's new life in Bangladesh was very much "defined in relation to the (im)possibility of returning legally" to the UK (Coutin 2010, p. 206), something that pained him.

Expulsion from the UK also meant the separation of informants from their family, friends, and communities. For Levi (Jamaica), deportation separated him from his wife and children, as well as other family members, including cousins whom he had helped migrate to the UK. Similarly, Aroleoba (Nigeria) was separated from his then British girlfriend and his British-born son. Bruna (Brazil) missed her friends in the UK and her younger sister who was also living irregularly there. These relationships were either lost through the rupture of deportation or had to be managed virtually through telephone or social media. Deportation thus does not singularly impact the individual and her or his sense of belonging, but extends to family and friends as well, generating new transnational ties to the UK in its wake.

CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion highlights the variety of experiences and situations that characterise and shape life after expulsion for my informants. The findings echo previous research on post-deportation experiences and outcomes such as emotional distress, financial hardship, stigmatisation, gendered expectations, and desires for remigration. In this chapter, the diversity of locales to which informants were sent, their different backgrounds, reasons for migration, and length of time in the UK, and their varying access to familial support and resources, offers nuanced insight into life after forced return for a small sample of informants.

This chapter stresses two important aspects associated with informants' experiences of expulsion and life after deportation. First, it shows the lasting impacts of immigration detention. Being removed from immigration detention prevents people from preparing for their return, precluding even the most basic steps they could take to help minimise some of the difficulties and challenges associated with deportation, such as selling belongings to raise funds, or retrieving original documents necessary for obtaining employment in the home country. The experiences of detention also impact how people adjust, compounding the emotional distress of deportation. It is also through deportation that some of the

carceral logics of detention extend to the country of origin (or return), which can become a site of confinement for returnees (Coutin 2010).¹¹ As Coutin (2010, p. 205) observes, even as they “enjoy the right to exit their countries, this right is not particularly meaningful if there is nowhere to go.” Although they are no longer detained, returnees face being stuck with no money to go elsewhere and restrictions on their ability to do so (e.g., bans on legal re-entry).

Second, informants’ narratives emphasise the challenges of starting their lives again after deportation. As noted above, although none of my informants was sent to active war zones, all were sent back after transformative migration experiences and had to (re)start their lives while lacking the necessary preparation and resources to do so. All were returned to countries with little to nothing in the way of social safety nets that could assist them in (re)building their lives. Most relied on family and friends to meet their basic needs (i.e., shelter, food) and/or to gain employment. Significantly, these data show that all informants are trying to (re)construct their lives, foregrounding issues of agency and the resilience to carry on, even in difficult situations not of their choosing and whilst having to manage psychosocial distress.

It is essential, therefore, to consider returnees’ agentic responses to their post-deportation lives—including my informants’ wishes to be portrayed as whole human beings, not as “deportees” or as “victims” of the UK immigration system. Failing to recognise returnees’ agency and humanity risks missing the nuances and complexities of the lived experiences of deportation. The data presented here are only moments in time. Longitudinal research with individuals who have experienced detention and deportation would help improve understanding of how they put their lives back together, while attending to people’s agency, resilience, and strengths. Above all, these data show that deportability, actual expulsion, and life after deportation are very much structured and mediated by global inequalities characterised by unequal access to avenues for regularised migration, impoverishment, and limited access to social security, along familiar lines of race, gender, and socio-economic status.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the women and men who participated in the study. Thanks also to Shahram Khosravi, Mary Bosworth, and Ines Hasselberg for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. The research upon which this chapter is based was generously funded by the European Research Council under Mary Bosworth’s Starting Grant (2012–2017) no. 313362.

NOTES

1. All informants were given a pseudonym, either one they picked themselves or one I chose for them.
2. An “enforced removal” is defined as an instance “where it has been established that a person has breached UK immigration laws and has no valid leave to remain within the UK. The Home Office enforces their departure to ensure they leave the UK” (Home Office 2016, n.p).
3. In the UK, administrative removal and deportation are separate legal processes and categories. Although both involve the expulsion of individuals to another country and restrictions on re-entry (ranging from one year to ten years’ duration), deportation refers specifically to individuals who are subject to expulsion due to their criminal convictions and is now mandatory for those receiving sentences of imprisonment greater than 12 months. However, in this chapter, deportation is used throughout to denote the forced removal of a migrant from a state’s territory.
4. Such experiences range from the upset associated with being taken the airport or onto an aeroplane only to have the flight cancelled at the last minute and being returned to detention, to the trauma of screaming and/or physically resisting removal on a commercial aeroplane—both of which are experiences described to me by informants in my larger study. See also the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2016) for an assessment of escort and ticketing processes for enforced removals.
5. A common pathway into detention—and then to deportation—is being detained when reporting at one of the Home Office’s immigration reporting centres. Informants in this study were also arrested during immigration raids at their homes or places of work.
6. The Dublin III Regulation stipulates that only one EU Member State is responsible for determining an asylum application. Consequently, an individual may be returned to the Member State deemed responsible for her or his application (EUR-Lex 2015).
7. There is not space here to delve into the nuances and problematics of the term “home” and how it is experienced both legally (e.g., as in being denied residency or citizenship and hence the right to claim a certain place as “home”) and emotionally (e.g., through the act of being expelled from what may be considered “home” to the “home” the British state has determined).
8. Detained Fast-Track was, at the time of research, a scheme that enabled the Home Office to detain those whose asylum claims it deemed quickly determinable to an expedited process that also limited opportunity for appeals. This process has since been suspended due to its unlawfulness (see Phelps 2016).

9. In 2013, during the early stages of fieldwork, the, then, UK Border Agency and the IRC operators pushed the AVR programme, which was contracted to the British charity, Refuge Action, within IRCs. In addition to financial incentives, this programme offered eligible participants the chance of a more “normal” return flight, such as flying without private security escorts, and a larger luggage allowance. However, the Home Office changed the eligibility criteria for the programme, excluding those in immigration detention and reclassifying this population as undeserving of this option. See Webber (2011) and Black et al. (2011) for more on “voluntary” return programmes.
10. In the British system of immigration detention, detainees are frequently employed (typically for £1 per hour) as kitchen assistants, food servers, cleaners, litter pickers, and activity orderlies, although the privilege to work may be withheld by the Home Office for detainees who are non-compliant with their immigration cases or contravene the centre rules. See Burnett and Chebe (2010).
11. Thanks to Mary Bosworth for drawing my attention to this point.

REFERENCES

- Aas, Katja Franko. 2007. Analysing a World in Motion: Global Flows Meet ‘Criminology of the Other’. *Theoretical Criminology* 11 (2): 283–303.
- . 2011. ‘Crimmigrant’ Bodies and Bona Fide Travelers: Surveillance, Citizenship and Global Governance. *Theoretical Criminology* 15 (3): 331–346.
- Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Anderson, Jill. 2015. ‘Tagged as a Criminal’: Narratives of Deportation and Return Migration in a Mexico City Call Center. *Latino Studies* 13 (1): 8–27.
- Athwal, Harmit. 2015. ‘I Don’t Have a Life to Live’: Deaths and UK Detention. *Race & Class* 56 (3): 50–68.
- Bashford, Alison, and Carolyn Strange. 2002. Asylum-Seekers and National Histories of Detention. *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 48 (4): 509–527.
- Black, Richard, Michael Collyer, and Will Somerville. 2011. *Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible?* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Blue, Ethan. 2015. Strange Passages: Carceral Mobility and the Liminal in the Catastrophic History of American Deportation. *National Identities* 17 (2): 175–194.
- Bosworth, Mary. 2008. Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State. *Social & Legal Studies* 17 (2): 199–215.
- . 2014. *Inside Immigration Detention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- . 2016. Mental Health in Immigration Detention: A Literature Review. *Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research Paper Series*. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2732892>.
- Bosworth, Mary, and Mhairi Guild. 2008. Governing Through Migration Control: Security and Citizenship in Britain. *British Journal of Criminology* 48 (6): 703–719.
- Brotherton, David C., and Luis Barrios. 2009. Displacement and Stigma: The Social-Psychological Crisis of the Deportee. *Crime Media Culture* 5 (1): 29–55.
- . 2011. *Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Burnett, Jon, and Fidelis Chebe. 2010. Captive Labour: Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Employment in UK Immigration Removal Centres. *Race & Class* 51 (4): 95–103.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Theorising Return Migration: The conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 6 (2): 253–279.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2010. Confined Within: National Territories as Zones of Confinement. *Political Geography* 29 (4): 200–208.
- . 2015. Deportation Studies: Origins, Themes and Directions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 671–681.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (1): 419–447.
- de Regt, Marina, and Medareshaw Tafesse. 2016. Departed Before Experiencing the Good Sides of Migration: Ethiopians Returning from Saudi Arabia. *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 9 (2): 228–242.
- Drotbohm, Heike. 2011. On the Durability and the Decomposition of Citizenship: The Social Logics of Forced Return Migration in Cape Verde. *Citizenship Studies* 15 (3/4): 381–396.
- . 2015. The Reversal of Migratory Family Lives: A Cape Verdean Perspective on Gender and Sociality Pre- and Post-Deportation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 653–670.
- Drotbohm, Heike, and Ines Hasselberg. 2015. Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 551–562.
- EUR-Lex. 2015. EU Asylum Policy: EU Country Responsible for Examining Applications. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1450882502440&uri=URISERV:23010503_1. Accessed 23 Dec 2015.
- Fekete, Liz. 2005. The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asylum and Human Rights. *Race & Class* 47 (1): 64–78.
- Galvin, Treasa M. 2015. ‘We Deport Them but They Keep Coming Back’: The Normalcy of Deportation in the Daily Life of ‘Undocumented’ Zimbabwean

- Migrant Workers in Botswana. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 617–634.
- Gibney, Matthew J. 2008. Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom. *Government and Opposition* 43 (2): 146–167.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2013. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- . 2015a. Targeting Latino Men: Mass Deportation from the USA, 1998–2012. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (8): 1221–1228.
- . 2015b. *Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor, and Global Capitalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- . 2016. ‘Negative Credentials,’ ‘Foreign-Earned’ Capital, and Call Centers: Guatemalan Deportees’ Precarious Reintegration. *Citizenship Studies* 20 (3–4): 326–341.
- Gündoğdu, Ayten. 2015. *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hagan, Jacqueline, David Leal, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2011. Social Effects of Mass Deportations by the United States Government, 2000–2010. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (8): 1374–1391.
- Hagan, Jacqueline Maria, Nestor Rodriguez, and Brianna Castro. 2015. Deporting Social Capital: Implications for Immigrant Communities in the United States. *Migration Studies* 3 (3): 370–392.
- Hasselberg, Ines. 2016. *Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and the Everyday Life*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Hernandez, David M. 2008. Pursuant to Deportation: Latinos and Immigrant Detention. *Latino Studies* 6 (1/2): 35–63.
- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2012. Geopolitical Reverberations of US Migrant Detention and Deportation: The View from Ecuador. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 293–311.
- Home Office. 2016. Removals and Voluntary Departures. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2015/removals-and-voluntary-departures>. Accessed 6 July 2016.
- Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. 2016. An Inspection of Home Office Outsourced Contracts for Escorted and Non-Escorted Removals and Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation, July–November 2015. <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICIBI-report-on-Outsourced-Contracts-and-Cedars-Final.pdf>. Accessed 13 May 2016.
- Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency. 2014. An Inspection of the Emergency Travel Document Process, May–September 2013. <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/An-Inspection-of-the-Emergency-Travel-Document-Process-Final-Web-Version.pdf>. Accessed 13 May 2016.

- Khosravi, Shahram. 2009. Sweden: Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers. *Race & Class* 50 (4): 38–56.
- . 2016. Deportation as a Way of Life for Young Afghan Men. In *Detaining the Immigrant Other*, ed. Rich Furman, Douglas Epps, and Greg Lamphear, 169–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nyers, Peter. 2003. Abject cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement. *Third World Quarterly* 24 (6): 1069–1093.
- París-Pombo, María Dolores, and Diana Carolina Peláez-Rodríguez. 2015. Far from Home: Mexican Women Deported from the US to Tijuana, Mexico. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. Published online before print (5 Aug 2015). doi:10.1080/08865655.2015.1068208.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Phelps, Jerome. 2016. Ending the Detained Fast Track? *Border Criminologies*, February 15. <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/02/ending-detained>. Accessed 13 May 2016.
- Phuong, Catherine. 2005. The Removal of Failed Asylum Seekers. *Legal Studies* 25 (1): 117–141.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- . 2015. Deportation Stigma and Re-Migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 635–652.
- Stumpf, Juliet. 2006. The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power. *American University Law Review* 56 (2): 367–419.
- Wacquant, Loïc. 2008. Extirpate and Expel: On the Penal Management of Postcolonial Migrants in the European Union. *Race/Ethnicity* 2 (1): 46–52.
- Walters, William. 2002. Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens. *Citizenship Studies* 6 (3): 265–292.
- . 2016. The Flight of the Deported: Aircraft, Deportation, and Politics. *Geopolitics* 21 (2): 435–458.
- Webber, Frances. 2011. How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns? *Race & Class* 52 (4): 98–107.
- Weber, Leanne, and Benjamin Bowling. 2008. Valiant Beggars and Global Vagabonds: Select, Eject, Immobilize. *Theoretical Criminology* 12 (3): 355–375.
- Welch, Michael. 1996. The Immigration Crisis: Detention as an Emerging Mechanism of Social Control. *Social Justice* 23 (3): 169–184.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2011. *Space of Detention: The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis Between Los Angeles and San Salvador*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Helping Women Prepare for Removal: The Case of Jamaica

Alice Gerlach

The concept of preparedness in return migration studies refers to the level of preparation an individual has prior to their arrival in their home nation, and the way in which the aspects of this groundwork interacts with their ability to resettle (Cassarino 2004). In Jean-Pierre Cassarino's introduction to the concept of preparedness, he categorises return migrants by three levels of preparedness, high, low, and no preparedness and argues that the group within which an individual is situated influences their ability to successfully reintegrate. Those in the high level of preparedness, Cassarino argues, typically have strong incentives and motivation to return home, alongside having met their migration objectives. Immigrants with low level of preparedness more typically return home earlier than planned due to failure to meet migration objectives or due to family circumstances. Those who return with no preparedness are typically those who are removed from their host country against their will. In this chapter, I explore the experiences of women who would expect to fall into the lowest level of Cassarino's categories: those who are expelled from a country, and thus have no preparedness to return.

A. Gerlach (✉)
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

The chapter focuses on the relative preparedness of former prisoners in the UK and that of those who spent time in immigration detention, and presents evidence that suggests women who have spent time in prison are better prepared for their return to Jamaica than those who overstayed visas and returned via Immigration Removal Centres. I begin by providing reasons why women leave Jamaica in the first instance, before turning to their experiences of prison or the detention centre system before returning to their lives upon return.

The fieldwork for my research took place over two visits to Jamaica, between March and August 2015. Twenty-six women were interviewed for the project, with each woman interviewed once. Half the women interviewed (13) had been removed from Jamaica after spending time in prison in the UK, and half had been removed due to immigration infringements. Interviews were arranged with the help of two local research assistants who contacted each woman, explained the project and arranged a public space to meet. Most discussions were between 30 minutes to an hour and a half long in duration.

WHY DO PEOPLE LEAVE JAMAICA ANYWAY?

The reason why women leave Jamaica in the first instance provides important context to their experience of preparedness in the UK, and upon return. Women who had immigrated to the UK and were not involved in the carriage of drugs were often in a better position than their prisoner counterparts before they left Jamaica. These women moved from Jamaica to go in search of jobs or education so that they were able to better themselves and send home money to their children. In most cases, women had family in the UK who were able to help buy their fares and initially support them on their arrival. Tanish,¹ for example, had a disabled daughter and moved to the UK in the hope she could eventually send for her child:

I have my sick daughter, I was trying to get a future for her, like, if me did get me stay, I would have tried to come, if me could have carried her over and so forth. Because you know over there, they have better opportunity with those kids.

Tanish had spent five years in London; she stayed with a friend and cared for that friend's daughter in return for money to travel around London.

Whenever she could, she would send money to her sister in Jamaica, who was caring for her child while she was away. Tanish was arrested by immigration officers who had come to the house where she was living in search of someone else. They asked Tanish to show her passport, and requested she also prove her right to be in the UK. She was unable to and, thus, she was taken to immigration detention and removed to Jamaica soon afterwards.

Most of the women who had arrived in the UK on tourist or student visas, staying on after these had elapsed, were unprepared for their return to Jamaica. These women were often caught out by chance. However, there were also cases of unpreparedness where women had tried to renew their visas, but were unable to complete the process. Their failure to regulate their stay was usually due to a lack of understanding of how the system worked, or of how to proceed with the Home Office if something went wrong. Brook, for example, described to me how she had lived in the UK for eight years before she was deported in 2009. Brook had moved to the UK to live with her sister, who had arranged her passport and initial visa. When time came for her visa to be renewed Brook's sister sent off her passport as required. However, attempts by postal workers to return her passport failed when no-one was home to receive the package. Brooke described to me multiple efforts to retrieve the passport, and despite attempts to contact the Home Office she was never successful in securing the return of her documents. After eight years, she was detained when immigration came to her home looking for her housemate, but finding Brook instead. Brook spent 6 months in detention fighting to stay in the UK before she was returned to Jamaica.

Women who had spent time in prison in the UK appeared more prepared for their return than those who were removed from the country on immigration grounds. The women I interviewed had typically been caught with contraband on arrival in the UK, spent between two and four years in prison, and were removed once they had served the compulsory prison time their sentence required.² Women in this study who were deported due to criminal offence had usually carried drugs to the UK. They told me they did so because of financial desperation. They described how they were struggling to feed themselves and their children, and that when they were offered a large sum of money for their involvement they felt compelled to participate.³ Though most women admitted knowing what they were doing was wrong, they were unaware

of the potential criminal or physical consequences involved. Olivia spent three and a half years in prison in the UK for trafficking illegal substances. She was a single mother of 6 children when she carried drugs overseas, she explained:

Well, I couldn't find meals for the kids, couldn't find clothing for the kids and I didn't want to turn to prostitution, you know? Or to steal anything from anybody, so I got the offer, so I took the offer. Because the equipment, they didn't say it was like a danger, that you will get caught in the situation.

Olivia told me that she was not aware she was transporting drugs, though she described swallowing pills⁴ before the flight. She was also not aware of the dangers to herself if the drug packages had burst inside her body. Women like Olivia were removed following their imprisonment as they had no legal status in the UK.

THE COMMON STRUGGLES FOR WOMEN RETURNED TO JAMAICA

Labelling and Stigma

Regardless of the reason for their initial departure from Jamaica and level of preparedness on return, those who are forcibly returned from the UK face a hostile welcome. The population of returned migrants are labelled “deportees,” and stigmatised, based on this label, by people within the Jamaican community. The long history of drug trade and gangs in the Caribbean, and return of a number of well-known gang leaders and members for their involvement in criminal activities related to this trade (Miller 2012), has resulted in the “criminalisation” of individuals returned to Jamaica. There is a wide spread perception among people in Jamaica that “deportees” have committed crime overseas and that they will continue to commit crime on their return to Jamaica. Irrespective of the reason for deportation, either for a criminal or administrative migration offence, all those returned are labelled by local communities as criminal (cf. Headley 2006). Although there is no evidence to support this claim, national newspapers continue to reproduce the stigma (see Golash-Boza 2015).

Cassandra had spent 14 years in the UK before she was returned to Jamaica. For most of this time she had a valid student visa and lived off the 20 hours work a week she was allowed to do alongside her studies. She was detained and ultimately removed in 2014 after she tried to change her student visa to an “unmarried partner” visa. Cassandra explained to me the reaction of people in her community about her deportation:

You know when I tell people they have a funny reaction about deportee or something. You can't tell everybody because they will start to label you as that. Cause even if they know your name, they won't call you by your name. They say “deportee, deportee”. They call plenty people like that.

Women in the study usually returned to the same communities they had lived in before leaving for the UK. During interviews women recounted being shunned, looked down on by their former communities, for being a “deportee.” As will be described later in this chapter, women who had been abroad were expected to appear wealthy after their time away from Jamaica. If women reappeared from an extended stay abroad without meeting these expectations they were easily recognisable as someone who had been unwillingly returned.

Women usually relied on the help of friends and families to get by before their trip to the UK, and found this avenue of support closed to them soon after return. Naomi had spent approximately three years in prison in the UK. Like Olivia, she was struggling to earn money and was approached with an offer to carry drugs. Naomi also told me she was unaware what the packages she was asked to swallow contained. On her return from the UK in 2003, Naomi described how former friends treated her differently, no longer offering the help they once did. She described making telephone calls to former friends when in search of something for her dinner:

I was calling a gentleman to ask him for two cabbage to steam for my dinner and he give somebody else his phone to answer to me. Yeah. And I know he is there. He give it to somebody else to answer.

The feeling of being ignored by former friends was stressful for the women in this study. There were also accounts of direct and harmful reactions by former friends who were verbally aggressive. Women who

had spent long periods overseas were expected by the local community to have earned relatively high wages compared with their Jamaican counterparts. The women in this study were accused of wasting their opportunity, and consequently they received less help from their community to resettle in Jamaica. Anna, who had been in the UK for two years before she was held by immigration in 2005, described how she isolated herself on return to avoid hard questioning about her situation:

They say, oooh, you up foreign and you come back in here, they want me to get them something, give them that. So I just stay to myself. If they going to ask me for something that is what they is going to say after. [They asked me] was there wasting your time, why did you overstay in the first place?

Women who isolated themselves did so to protect themselves from the harsh judgements of those in their communities, and to avoid the emotional consequences of their treatment by others. Nyesha, for whom migration was a way to escape an abusive relationship, spent 11 years in the UK, returning to Jamaica in 2012. She explained her frustration at being badly treated by people around her and how this affected her sense of dignity:

I know people know within themselves that's what happen, because they said, you go away for so long, why you come back here to just sit down like this, and they will question you. How much did you pay for your fare? How much did you do that and, so I know they have it in them. That I am deported. And they thinking, sometimes they say, you can't even buy this here, and you been away for so long? Can you buy me this? And you don't even have money, you can't even do your hair, you can't even.. you know.. which is very undignified. To me. You understand?

On return, Nyesha was forced to return to the home of her former partner, though they were no longer in a relationship. Nyesha spent most of her time indoors and had little contact with anyone outside her immediate family.

Lack of Income and Employment

Once labelled and stigmatised as a deportee, many women found it difficult to find secure employment. In July 2015, when the interviews for this project took place, the unemployment rate in Jamaica was 13.1%. For women in Jamaica this rate was substantially higher at 17.7%, and has since risen to 18.4%, as reported in April 2016 (Statistics Institute of Jamaica 2016). In this already difficult jobs market employers were unwilling to hire from a population “considered undesirable”. Women also felt they were discriminated against due to age. In Jamaica, employers are able to advertise for employees within an age range, and for women this range was typically under 35 years old. This finding is supported by other researchers, who found employees in Jamaica between 45 and 65 were more likely to be fired, and less likely to be hired in the first instance (Mujtaba et al. 2004, 2006).

Very few women who participated in this research had secure employment, with most surviving from hustling, where they make money outside the formal market. In Jamaica, hustling practices range from the selling of goods on the street, wiping windscreens at red lights, assisting tourists to carry their luggage, to more creative service provisions such as the braiding of tourists hair or similar. Women in the study described how they had to build up their stock of goods over time. They would start with one or two items, such as a bottle of shampoo or roll of toilet paper and when these items sold they would use the profits to slowly accumulate a larger collection of goods for sale. The items were sold from blankets and carts on Kingston’s busy streets. There were a small number of women in the study who were more successful vendors, and ran market stalls or shops. These women were able to make enough money to find accommodation and feed themselves and their family, though increasing competition and economic instability meant women had to top up their earnings by taking on additional work such as laundry or other service opportunities. While the practices of hustling and small-scale vending allowed women a source of income, it was rarely enough to cover all their needs and so this practice was supplemented by begging to friends and family.

Begging was a source of shame for women in this study. Those who had lived in the UK, in particular, had become accustomed to their role as provider for their children in Jamaica. These women were used to being independent and were proud of the help they could provide.

Begging was an overwhelming, though necessary, departure from this role and caused a great deal of distress.

Chronic Deprivation and Poverty

The inability to secure meaningful employment and income for most of the women in the study resulted in circumstances of prolonged deprivation and poverty. An ongoing fight for survival was the overwhelming theme in the interviews. Joanne was 65 years old when I interviewed her. She had spent approximately 11 years in the UK before she was deported in 2014. In the UK she survived by catering for small parties with the help of family and friends there. Joanne stressed her inability to manage her new life in Jamaica, comparing her situation in England when she was independent, and able to provide for her family by sending money home. Joanne felt pained by the loss of her autonomy, especially when she resorted to begging for help. Furthermore, accommodation was difficult to find and expensive if women were unable to stay with family and friends. Joanne described to me her current accommodation in Jamaica:

The place? It's like... it's not clean. The place is not clean. The drain blocked. Insects. Rubbish. You come in like dump, and you have to be squeezing in those kind of places. I cannot manage it, you understand me?

Some women returned to Jamaica were fortunate enough to have homes to come back to; however, most were returning after many years abroad and found their homes in various states of disrepair. Jocelyn had spent 4 years in the UK, first as a visitor, and then as a prisoner after being held for her involvement in “helping” an acquaintance.⁵ She had left her house in the care of her adult son and his cousin, and on return had found they had stolen anything of value and left the rest in disarray:

Oh, I'd have my house that I leave. But everything was mash up. Everything. Jewellery, passbook, everything. Cause they never keep the place, them mash up my furniture and everything.

In addition to accommodation problems, it was not unusual for women to go without food. Joanne who was introduced earlier was initially living with her twenty-four-year-old son, but was asked to move from the one-bedroom home in Kingston by her son's girlfriend. Her son continued to support her. However, he had since lost his job:

Now he's not working. He would like help from me, but I can't even help myself... I don't remember sitting and eating anything warm for a month cause I don't have the money and he don't have it either.

Women found the struggle for food hard, particularly in relation to their former lives in the UK. Earlene had spent 10 years working in London at various cleaning jobs. She had left four children in Jamaica, aged between 7 and 13 years old, and sent back money for them when she could. She discussed with me the stress she felt when remembering what her life was like in the UK:

Sometime now looking in my fridge, the only thing I see here is a water bottle. You know? Sometimes I feel like I drink some milk, and I think, oh my God, back in England you can get a big jug of milk for a pound. And out here, a little small box cost you JMD 50 [Jamaican Dollars; about £0.30] and you can't even buy it.

Earlene and others continued to wonder if their lives would have been better if they had remained in Jamaica in the first instance, and this caused anguish. The economic situation in Jamaica was perceived to have deteriorated in their absence, disadvantaging anyone who had not remained in employment throughout.

Responsibilities as Mothers

The situation for women who had children was complicated by their roles and responsibilities as mothers. Many mothers could not afford to feed their children. Women described how they had to choose between feeding their children or sending them to school. Shantel had spent 9 months in prison in the UK for carrying drugs. She had accepted the drugs with the idea to stay in the UK after, and to send back money for the two children she had at the time, the youngest of which was a baby. Since her return Shantel has given birth to three more children, and described to me why she felt unable to send them to school:

You have to have lunch money for them, cause you can't send them with empty stomach. It's better that they outside and they hustle a bit and get some dumpling and butter, then they go to school. You understand?

When you send them [to school]...they not taking in the lesson because it's too much empty in the stomach.

Women were aware of the importance of education for the future of their children attending school, and inability to facilitate this caused distress. Many of the women had limited education themselves, and wanted a better future for their children. The inability to provide schooling for their offspring was also linked with feelings of shame and guilt, especially if women were able to provide for their children's education before going to the UK, or during their time in the UK but not after they had been deported.

THE BENEFITS OF PREPAREDNESS

Education

As mentioned above there was a difference between preparedness for return between those who were deported for criminal offences and those who were removed due to administrative migration offences. One main factor for this difference was education. Women often had limited education on arrival to the UK. However, those who had spent time in prison had benefited from the education provided by the UK prison system. This group of women improved their English and maths skills, and attended courses on life skills and decision-making. Women told me with pride about the courses they undertook while in prison. Seanna, who had left school at 14 when she fell pregnant with her first child, was bursting with excitement when she recalled the courses she attended in prison:

Computer, social and life skills, I do maths, English, I did a teaching course. I did a gym course, in netball and basketball, to be a coach and I work as well in craft shop, making post card and all of that. I did all, history test, I passed the history test and exam, with all honours!

Not all former prisoners undertook the mass of courses recounted by Seanna, but even a basic education was useful. Daloris had spent three years in prison in the UK before she returned in 2001. She was 21 and described herself as a party girl when she accepted the offer to carry drugs to the UK. She had a 5 year old son at the time. While Daloris was in prison she focused purely on her reading and writing. I asked her if the skills she had learned from the courses had been helpful since she had come home:

Yes, because before I went there I drop out of school very early... but going there for 3 and a half years came down reading and all of them things there, teach me and I come back home now, it's good.

Many of the participants in the study emphasised the importance of learning to read and write. Most jobs required numeracy and writing skills as a minimum, and those women who were unable to fulfil this criteria found their employment opportunities further restricted.

The education gained in prison did not, unfortunately, ensure employment on return to Jamaica. However, it did seem to help women with their self-esteem. Olivia, who was introduced earlier, stressed the usefulness of life skills when I asked if her education in prison had been helpful on return:

Yeah, me a better person, me a better person. And I used to be very ignorant and those things, cause I went into even this, um, this seminar, like seminar for awareness. Yeah.

Some of the women also discussed how they had used their new-found skills to encourage others to better their situation. Seanna had spent four years in prison for carrying drugs. Since her return, she had become involved helping other women and men returned to Jamaica:

Um, most, you know what I implement the most? Anger management. I did a course because I was a very angry person, and I have implemented that, and oh I did a course called enhanced thinking skills, and this is what changed my life forever now, to this person that I can, um, mentor others and motivate others.

Women who had not been in prison in the UK were less likely to have benefitted from additional education during their stay. As an example, Grace was 16 years old when she left Jamaica for the UK with the intention to study. However, on arrival she was declined entry. She was told her sponsors had insufficient funds to support her. Grace was sent to a hotel near the airport for the night and told to return the next morning for a flight back to Jamaica. She left the hotel and went to her mother's home in London instead. Without her passport, she ended up working informally in a bar:

It was hard at first, because you know you have to have your passport to go to the college, and I didn't have my passport, so that was difficult... that was kinda [the] end of it for me. I had to get work.

Most women worked in the UK without papers, and described to me the difficulties they faced in so doing. Women were only able to take jobs in the informal sector of the labour market in the UK, and were therefore often working in low-status and poorly paid positions.

Help to Prepare for Removal

Women in prison benefitted from a more established system to help them prepare for their release from prison and return. The help typically came from services provided by Hibiscus, an NGO based in London. Hibiscus provides practical assistance to foreign-national women affected by criminal and social justice issues.⁶ Yasmin had carried drugs to the UK under duress; she was intercepted on arrival and spent 4 years in prison in the UK. She described the practical and emotional benefits of help provided by a member of the Hibiscus team:

[A woman from Hibiscus] come and talk to us, if you have no one in the UK to offer us anything or tell our problem... she send some clothes for us or whatever, yeah, when we are going home. Anyone foreign national she will send some things for them to wear home.

Hibiscus was the only NGO women regularly talked about by women during interviews, and mostly in the context of prison. Hibiscus is present in some UK detention centres; however, many women I spoke with were not aware of their detention-based service. In my own research published elsewhere (Gerlach forthcoming), the biggest barrier to preparation for removal for women in immigration detention was their perpetual hope for a last-minute injunction. These interventions meant women were unwilling or unable to accept they would genuinely be removed from the UK, and therefore were reluctant to engage with Hibiscus or other services. There were, however, some positive examples of help gleaned from Hibiscus in removal centres. Earlene, introduced earlier, was made aware of Hibiscus through a friend she had made in the removal centre. They offered her £100 in cash, or to pay for an additional suitcase to take more of her belongings home. She chose the

additional suitcase of belongings. Women in detention were also likely to have spent any savings they had, or used up the goodwill of friends and family to hire lawyers in order to resist their removal. This means that nothing is left for them when they return. Women are sometimes able to work in immigration detention centres, however, the roles available are limited and payment is as low as £1 per hour. Prisoners, alternatively, were able to work during their time in prison and could return with a small amount of savings.

“Keeping up Appearances”

Earlene’s decision, above, to return with additional belongings in place of cash reflects the complex relationship between the physical appearance, such as the clothing choices and personal care, of women on their return to Jamaica, and their ability to resettle effectively. As with preparation for removal and education in prison, the appearance of women on return was influenced by their relative experience in detention or prison. Women were often taken into immigration detention in the UK without warning, and at best were given minutes to pack their belongings. Depending on the situation of the individual, this could be rectified while in immigration detention by asking a friend to deliver their belongings to the removal centre, or airport. However, delivery was often difficult to organise due to cost, and the location of removal centres, which were often far from family or friends. Then, regardless of whether friends were kind and able to access and deliver belongings, women were restricted to a single suitcase of weighing approximately 23 kg, as per standard economy flight rules and regulations. Women are able to pay for an additional suitcase; however, the high cost of this is obstructive. The loss of belongings caused great angst to many women, particular for women who knew the value of their loss in their new situation. Malene had been in the UK for 11 years prior to her detention in 2011:

They didn’t give me back my stuff that was really the trouble. If I got my stuff, cause you know, in Jamaica, if you have things, if you don’t even want to wear them, you can sell them and get yourself some money. You understand? But I just lose everything. That was my problem.

Malene had been working as a cleaner for a church in the UK, and sent money to her daughter in Jamaica when she could. She returned to Jamaica with nothing but her handbag and two pairs of tracksuit bottoms and t-shirts given to her at the detention centre. She told me she was too ashamed to leave her house in Jamaica because of her clothing.

Women were upset by the loss of their personal effects, particular as it resulted in an inability to meet the expectations of their community on return. To go “to foreign” is associated with opportunity and wealth, and it is perceived that when one comes home from foreign they will share their wealth with family and friends. While overseas most women in the study were sending back money for their children, which made a substantial difference to their welfare. Even from prison, women were able to make a difference to their childrens’ lives, often with the help of Hibiscus.

The return of women to Jamaica resulted in the loss of a valuable source of income that many children and other family members were relying on to survive. The difference between the women deported due to administrative offences and the women deported due to criminal offences is that the latter group had been in prison and their families were aware of their date for release, and of their impending removal. These women and their families were able to prepare for their return. In contrast, women in immigration detention were often detained and removed suddenly, with no time or ability to warn their families or prepare for their return.

Of the women who were interviewed, those who were able to “keep up appearances” on their return were coping better than their counterparts. Daloris had spent three years in prison after she was caught with drugs on arrival to the UK. She described to me how she managed to hide the circumstances of her return from people in her community:

You could not tell that I have been deported. Because I come with a suitcase and I was properly dressed and at the prison, I buy like shampoo, conditioner, soap and all these stuff so I carry those back with me as well so I would be able to give out too, so people wouldn’t know [that I am a deportee] if I don’t tell them.

When I asked Daloris if it made a difference how a woman looked on return, she explained how people would judge returning migrants on their appearance. If people looked unkempt, untidy or were wearing old

or ill-fitting clothing, they were classified as a “deportee” immediately. Joanne described to me the outfit she was wearing when she went to the Home Office to report and was detained: brown jeans, jacket, and shoes. This outfit was normal in the UK, but made her look out of place in Jamaica. She did not have a change of clothes when she was removed in 2001 after spending 11 years in the UK. She described the reaction of her community:

They heard that I was in foreign. And they don’t see me look like someone who has been in foreign. So, you have some people around there starting to set on me, because I’m not moving like a foreigner. You understand me?

With “moving like foreigner,” Joanne referred to the behaviour and self-confidence expected from people who had been abroad, who are expected to have gained experience and wealth.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has covered some of the struggles women face when forcibly returned to Jamaica from the UK. Research participants had trouble securing the most basic of necessities, such as suitable accommodation and food. The labelling and subsequent criminalisation and stigma endured by women made reintegration challenging emotionally, through rejection by communities when women were most in need of their assistance, as well as practically when trying to secure employment. Many of the women were, in addition, likely to resume the role of sole carer for multiple children on their return. Then, finally, women were expected to appear “wealthy” and share their assumed “wealth” with their friends, family, and broader community.

Life is hard for women returned to Jamaica. However, what this research has shown is that there are ways in which women can prepare to return that offset some of the challenges they face. As shown by Cassarino (2004), individuals in this study who had higher levels of preparedness were better able to mobilise resources on their return, and thus reintegrate into the Jamaican community more effectively. While this finding is not particularly surprising, the comparison in preparedness between those who were deported from the UK on criminal grounds and those who were removed for administrative reasons raises questions.

The evidence here suggests that women who are removed from the UK on immigration grounds, who have no criminal convictions, are less prepared for return to Jamaica than their former prisoner counterparts. In his article on detention in Sweden, Shahram Khosravi (2009) makes a useful comparison between prisons and immigration detention centres. Modern prisons, he states, are centres of reformation where the goal is to transform offenders into productive members of the community. Immigration detention centres, alternatively, are spaces for punishment and removal of undesirable populations. Given the now long standing rejection of inhumane treatment of prisons in the UK, it seems peculiar that the outcomes of a deprivation of liberty, due to administrative rather than criminal offence result in individuals who are less prepared and able to be productive members of the global community.

Cassarino (2004) calls researchers to investigate in more detail the variables which impact on return migration. This chapter has gone some way towards this and has shown that individuals expelled from a country do not fit uniformly into his three neat levels of preparedness. We know very little about the lives of people once they have been forcibly removed from a country. Women's testimonies on the impact of incarceration on their resettlement after deportation reveal need for more research on this topic. This will then establish what impact expelling countries have on the ability of individuals to return to their countries of origin and establish the basic standard of living we would expect for our own citizens.

NOTES

1. All names are pseudonyms.
2. This is typically half the initial prescribed sentence, which aligns with parliamentary legislation in the UK whereby offenders with a prison sentence of 12 months or more spent the first half in prison, and the second half 'on licence' in the community.
3. This finding is reflected in research on women and drug trafficking more generally (see Bailey [2013] for an in-depth discussion on the topic).
4. By pills Olivia is referring to small packages of drugs made up in the shape of large pills, making them easier to swallow.
5. Jocelyn was not clear on what 'helping' involved, but referenced how she loved to help people, and this is how she came to be in trouble.
6. See <http://hibiscusinitiatives.org.uk/> for full details.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, Corin. 2013. Exploring Female Motivations for Drug Smuggling on the Island of Barbados: Evidence from her Majesty's Prison, Barbados. *Feminist Criminology* 8 (2): 117–141.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 6 (2): 253–279.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2015. *Deported: Immigration Policing, Disposable Labour, and Global Capitalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Gerlach, Alice. Forthcoming. The Effectiveness of Immigration Detention in Preparing Women for Release or Removal. PhD dissertation, University of Oxford.
- Headley, Bernard. 2006. Giving Critical Context to the Deportee Phenomenon of Blame. *Social Justice* 33 (1): 40–56.
- Khosravi, Shahram. 2009. Sweden: Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers. *Race & Class* 50 (4): 38–56.
- Miller, Alexander. 2012. Deportation as a Process of Irreversible Transformation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (1): 131–146.
- Mujtaba, Bahaudin, Frank Cavico, Rose Marie Hinds, and Cuneyt Oskal. 2006. Age Discrimination in the Workplace: Cultural Paradigms Associated with Age in Afghanistan, Jamaica, Turkey, and the United States. *The Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship* 11 (1): 17–35.
- Mujtaba, Bahaudin, Rose Marie Hinds, and Cuneyt Oskal. 2004. Cultural Perspectives on Aging and Older Individuals. *Journal of Business* 2 (12): 31–44.
- Statistics Institute of Jamaica. 2016. *Unemployment Rates by Age Group*. <http://statinja.gov.jm/LabourForce/NewLFS.aspx>.

Back from “the Other Side”: The Post-deportee Life of Nigerian Migrant Sex Workers

Sine Plambech

At 6 am, two police officers picked up Ann in one of the larger detention centers in Copenhagen, Denmark. As part of my ethnographic research on Nigerian migrant sex-workers, I had been invited by the police to follow the immigration unit of the Danish police that morning as they executed the deportation of a Nigerian woman. We drove to a hostel in the Red Light District where many Nigerian women stay while they live and work in Denmark. Ann had to collect her belongings from the tiny room she had been sharing with another Nigerian woman. She placed her clothes, makeup, shoes, and cream bottles in a black plastic bag and a brown cardboard box, as she did not have a suitcase. We drove to the airport in a shaded police minivan. Ann was quiet and looked out of the window, occasionally texting on her cell phone. The two police officers carried her bags and the box, and she followed them into Terminal 3, where the police officers checked her in for the flight at the business counter. On her way to the gate, Ann exchanged a few Danish notes to

S. Plambech (✉)

The Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark

© The Author(s) 2018

S. Khosravi (ed.), *After Deportation*, Global Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57267-3_5

Euros (€) and made several phone calls. Ann had sold sex in the Red Light District in Copenhagen and was detained because she did not possess the legal documents to stay and work in Denmark. During her time in the detention centre, Ann had been interviewed by a social worker to clarify if she was a victim of trafficking and eligible for humanitarian assistance (which could provide her short-term residence permit and financial assistance upon return to Nigeria). However, according to the police officers this morning, the social worker did not find that Ann's situation was one of human trafficking so she was deported as an undocumented migrant.

The number of undocumented crossings into Europe from Nigeria is on the rise, and Nigerians now constitute one of the largest groups of undocumented migrants in Europe (Balaram and Pennington 2013; Bitoulas 2013; UNHCR 2016). Nigerians began migrating to Italy in the 1980s as a response to its high demand for low-skilled labour in agriculture and service sectors, including the sex industry (De Haas 2006). Nigerians are also among the largest groups of deported and returned migrants from the EU to Nigeria (Balaram and Pennington 2013). What is furthermore significant is that the ratio of women to men among Nigerian migrants and returnees is striking in comparison to the ratio among migrants from other parts of Africa (Kastner 2009). In 2014, 22,237 Nigerians arrived by sea to Italy, 25% were women. In comparison, 5826 Malian migrants arrived by sea to Italy and only 1% were women (UNHCR 2016).

The fieldwork in Copenhagen, where I met Ann, was part of a larger multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork on the return and deportation of Nigerian migrant sex-workers, which included Benin City in Southern Nigeria, in popular language called Benin.¹ During the past fifteen years, Benin has continuously emerged in media and among migration and anti-trafficking institutions as a city of out-migration of women to the sex industry in Europe. It is estimated that up to 85% of Nigerian women selling sex in Europe travelled from, but did not necessarily originate in, Benin (Carling 2005; Kastner 2009; IOM 2011). Indeed, in certain areas of Benin, a city of approximately one million people, it is difficult to find an extended family that does not have a family member, mostly women, who migrated to Europe (Kastner 2009). Yet, Benin is no longer just a place from where women (and men) depart—a city of migration. It is becoming a city of deportation—a place where women (and men) arrive, disembarking as deportees from Europe. A small

number of these deportees return in the context of humanitarian assistance programmes for women identified as victims of human trafficking.

Scholars have previously pointed to the ways in which anti-trafficking efforts and prostitution-abolitionist activism unwittingly support the deportation of migrant sex-workers under the guise of securing women’s protection (Chapkis 2003; Bernstein and Schaffner 2005; Agustín 2007; Plambech 2014). They further reveal how the interventions that take place in the name of protecting women migrants often complicate the women’s situation, or even work against their interest. The ethnographic fieldwork, on which this chapter is based, extends these insights by shedding light on the particular gendered aspects of this post-deportee phase of migratory trajectories, practices, and policies.

SEX WORKER DEPORTEES

The Nigerian migrant women sex-workers in this study migrated in search of better opportunities and while they were in Europe, they primarily earned a living by selling sex on the streets of European cities. Eventually all of the women were returned to Nigeria. I interviewed and did fieldwork in 2011 and 2012 (this has been followed up by fieldwork in 2016) among a core group of 30 Nigerian women between the ages of 19 and 35 and their families (twenty-eight of the women were former sex-workers in Europe, of which most had been there five to six years before their return to Nigeria). One woman was deported from Libya on her way to Italy, another from Austria after one day at the airport. The other women had been in, and were deported from, Spain, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Russia, France, Norway, Germany, and Denmark. Some women had entered Europe by aeroplane with counterfeit travel documents or a one-month tourist visa and then overstayed their visa. Others had traveled irregularly through the Sahara Desert and sailed across the Mediterranean Sea.

Among the 30 informants, almost half had migrated or had attempted to migrate to Europe more than once. Most of the women had, in different ways, tried to change their migration trajectory according to, real or imagined, intensified migration control. One woman migrated via Cote d’Ivoire instead of Niger to avoid being intercepted the border between Niger and Nigeria; another used Morocco as a transit country instead of Libya because of the conflict in Libya and to avoid migration

control in the Mediterranean; one applied for a visa to Hungary instead of France which she was told was easier to obtain; likewise, another applied for a visa to Turkey instead of Italy; one decided to work in Spain instead of France because there were fewer police; and another took a bus to Denmark from Spain instead of an aeroplane to Sweden where she had heard migration control in the airports was intense. Thus, migration control did not prevent them from going to, or travelling within, Europe. Rather, the restrictions and surveillance, real or imagined, only made them change the direction and prolonged the duration of their journeys. That is, for these women, migration control, understood in a broad sense, did not diminish their desire to migrate, or prevent or stop their migratory movements. Rather, migration control decelerated the speed, diverted their directionality, and regulated the time of migration (Papadopoulos et al. 2008 as invoked in Andrijašević 2010).

When I met the women in Benin, approximately half of them were officially identified as victims of human trafficking and had been returned through the so-called Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme, implemented to assist officially identified victims of human trafficking to return to their home country and managed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).² The other group of women was deported as “undocumented immigrants.” Yet, all of the women described themselves as deported—regardless of whether they returned through an AVRR programme or not. When I write that approximately half of the women had been returned through AVRR it is because some of the women had multiple return experiences, their return status was not always clear cut—some had been deported, later migrated to Europe again, identified as a victim of human trafficking, and then returned through AVRR. Gift, for instance, a woman I interviewed in Benin in 2012, had a typical story for those women not identified as victims of human trafficking. She had travelled through the Sahara Desert and sailed to Italy from Libya. After a few months, she took a bus to Spain and worked in the streets of Madrid for three years, before she was deported from Spain on a jointly financed European Frontex flight (the European Union’s agency for external border security) to Lagos.³

When I term the women “sex-worker migrants” it is because 28 out of 30 of them had experience working in the sex industry in Europe (of the two that did not sell sex, one attempted twice to go to Europe to sell sex but did not succeed, the other likewise planned to sell sex, but she was the one who got deported the same day she arrived in the

airport in Austria). In addition to selling sex, they did a variety of other work, including selling sport socks in tourist areas, working as nannies, cleaners, and home-helpers for elderly people, working in restaurants, and picking tomatoes. However, the majority of their working lives in Europe revolved around selling sex. Either they met their clients while strolling around in the Red Light Districts of European cities or they worked in brothels, primarily in the countryside.⁴

In Nigeria, I met some of the women officially identified as victims of trafficking through NGOs in Benin and Lagos. These women were from Benin, but stayed temporarily at a shelter in Lagos immediately after their return because they had arrived at the international airport in Lagos. Over time, I developed my own rapport with this group of women, and we met outside the realm of the NGOs in Benin or Lagos. I also met the deportees, who had not been in contact with anti-trafficking NGOs upon their return, through my research assistant’s personal networks in Benin. Since most of the women I met knew other deportees, I benefitted from a snowball effect over the time of my fieldwork. We regularly met at my apartment in Benin and talked about our different lives and experiences while eating meals, watching TV, occasionally going to church or preparing food in their homes. Besides interviewing the deported women and their families in Benin, I also conducted interviews with social workers, governmental anti-trafficking employees, and a group of Nigerian researchers in charge of a research programme on human trafficking in Edo State at the University of Benin City, as well as local pastors at the churches and the priests at the shrines that the women frequented.

Without exception, the women described their families as poor due to unemployment or underemployment, and only two of them had school experiences post-primary school—these women each held a college diploma, but were unemployed. Therefore, migration to Europe was, first and foremost, a livelihood strategy and although the women’s earnings might not flow steadily to Nigeria and might be less than the woman and her family had hoped for, the remittances still provided a livelihood and access to some kind of financial security. All of the women had differing levels of familial responsibilities in Nigeria and most of them remitted money consistently (ranging from US\$50 to several hundred US\$ per month). Yet, because of their return to Nigeria, these remittances were now impeded and the women had to explore new livelihood opportunities.

CRITICAL TRAFFICKING STUDIES AND POST-DEPORTATION

This chapter is grounded at the intersection of deportation and critical trafficking studies. Critical trafficking studies problematise the ways in which sex work-related migration is commonly conflated with human trafficking, muting the complexity of migration as well as the agency of the migrants in their pursuit of a better life. The problem being that viewing all sex work-related migration as human trafficking diverts attention away from the individual aspirations of migrants and the political economy of migration. Like other ethnographic work in many places across the globe documents the UN-Palermo Protocol's definition of human trafficking, which is the most common cited, is often challenged by empirical realities (see UN 2000).⁵

While the women in this study did not know all of the conditions and hazards involved in their jobs in Europe, they, all but one, knew that they were going to sell sex. They also knew they would work under a "madam," and they anticipated and accepted two to three years of hard work while repaying their debt to her. By then, they hoped to have repaid their madams and to start working for themselves. Thus, in most cases, it seems more precise to conceptualise this process as indentured labour—yet a state of indenture highly potentially exploitable. All of the women incurred debt in order to reach Europe. Before leaving Nigeria, the women decided to migrate, incur debt and travel as "indentured sex-worker migrants" because they felt their life-situation gave them no other choices. Yet, they did try, though often without success, to reduce the debt prior to migration. Two of the women had, for instance, insistently down-bargained the price from US\$100,000 to US\$70,000, arguing with the madam on the telephone from Italy that they knew of other women who did not have to pay US\$100,000 and that they were not willing to agree on that price. They explained to me that the consequence of agreeing to US\$100,000 would require them to work for the madam for "the rest of their lives" and they were not willing to do that. They were, however, willing to leave Nigeria knowing they would owe the madam US\$70,000.

Nigerian Sex-Worker Migrants and Deportation Studies

Deportation studies have increased significantly in recent years, often in the US context, discussing the deportation of long-term migrants who

had established a family, business, and life in their new country (Peutz 2006; Brotherton and Barrios 2011). Yet, few studies describe the long-term implications for people, who, like the Nigerian women, did not establish long-term family relations in the country of destination, or those who are deported in the context of reintegration programmes for victims of trafficking. Though important studies emerge, little attention has, furthermore, been paid to ways in which gender is a key factor in return and deportation, as it is in other phases of migration. Therefore, the question remains what the effects of deportations and AVRRE are in post-deportee life among this group of migrant sex-workers.

The literature on post-deportation in the Global South often centres on expulsions of young male convicts and gang-members returning from the USA to their native Mexico or Central American countries. The emphasis is often on the effects of such removals on violence and crime in the local communities as well as on the struggles for survival that deportees face upon return (Ellermann 2009; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Kanstroom 2012). The empirical literature on deportees from the USA to Latin America illustrates that deportees experience cultural estrangement, stigmatisation, high levels of violence, and low access to basic material needs. Some gang-members continue their involvement in criminal activities, locally or transnationally, and in general deportations are shown to put significant strain on both the deportees and the receiving home communities, who formerly received remittances from the migrants, but now are faced with the challenge to reintegrating the deportees (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Sørensen 2011).

Until recently, deportations have been studied as isolated and fragmented phenomena and rarely been connected as processes intrinsically linked to contemporary global migration governance. Instead of looking at deportation in fragmented ways, and as a local phenomenon, most research done in the recent decade shares an understanding of deportation as being a systemic regime and not merely an instrument of immigrant policy (Kanstroom 2007). These works conceptualise “deportation” within a global framework as *the deportation turn* (Gibney and Hansen 2005); *a deportation system* based on a growth in *social control deportation* (Kanstroom 2007); *the deportation terror* (Buff 2009); and *the deportation regime* (De Genova and Peutz 2010).⁶ Taken together, these strands of literature connect ways in which deportation is linked to a range of other removal processes of, e.g., poor people, native people,

people of color, Muslims out of fear of terrorism, political combatants, and sex-workers.

Deportation, seen from a liberal state perspective, generally has two distinct dimensions (Kanstroom 2007). First, deportation operates as a form of extended border control by deporting those who have entered illegally, visa over-stayers, and failed asylum applicants, or those found to be working illegally in workplace raids (Anderson et al. 2011). The second group are those who are noncitizens, but are legal residents violating criminal laws, in these cases the commission of crime has invalidated the lawful residence (Anderson et al. 2011). Yet, there is a third group to be included in this set of distinctions—the migrants participating in AVRR, such as victims of human trafficking. The terms commonly used to describe the process, such as return, assisted voluntary return, repatriation, removal or expulsion, mute what might actually be conceptualised as deportation and in this way remain embedded within the contemporary administrative practices of the State. Thus, “the language makes deportation strike us as less remarkable” (Walters 2010). Yet, such practices should be understood within the realm of removals and deportations (De Genova and Peutz 2010).

By definition, “deportation entails the loss of any right to reside and a complete severing of the relationship between the state and the individual, and the loss of all associated rights and privileges” (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 549). AVRR programmes are different from “punitive” deportation because they provide a temporary humanitarian phase in the migrant’s native country. While the migrants receive assistance, they are still attached to the state that returned them. In Nigeria, this temporary phase for reintegration for returned victims of trafficking runs from 3 to 12 months. Then, the return migrants are ultimately on their own. When the women categorised as victims of trafficking are returned, they are granted a range of temporary rights and privileges, such as reintegration assistance in Nigeria. So this group of migrants does not face, as is the definition of deportation, a complete severing of the ties between them as individuals and the state that returns them because they are still temporarily linked to the returning state. Thus, rather than understanding deportation as merely a system of unambiguous expulsion of migrants by the receiving state my empirical material shows, that there is yet another system of *temporary inclusions and long-distance inclusions* within the deportation regime for certain groups of migrants, such as those identified as victims of trafficking.

Taking this argument further, deportation is historically viewed as punitive and even forceful, yet the AVRR programme points towards a new model referred to, by some scholars, as “neoliberal deportation” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, p. 994). The women would also often explain how they felt forced to be voluntarily returned to accept the AVRR programme and the financial assistance under the threat of a forced deportation. The women’s experiences relate to the “neoliberal deportation” argument, as here “voluntary” does not refer to whether a migrant has been deported willingly or not, but instead refers to the ways in which enlisting the cooperation of migrants in their own expulsion is done through the provision of financial inducement (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, p. 994).

OBSERVING THE DEPARTURES

The deportation of Ann, whom we met in the introduction, was not unusual. I visited the airport in Copenhagen several times to observe deportations and learned to spot the signs of a deportation in process; the deportees (usually of colour) were waiting in line, commonly without suitcases, and checked in at the business counter with two police officers in civilian clothing by their side. Conducting this “anthropology of removal” (Peutz 2006), I observed the quiet maintenance of the immigration system and deportation as an everyday practice of sovereignty—performed discretely and framed by the police in “dignified” terms. In Denmark, deportees are escorted by two police officers in civilian clothing primarily through the back doors and corridors of the airport in order not to attract attention from the public, and, as the police explained, to “protect the dignity” of the deportee.⁷ The other passengers never seemed to notice what was occurring in front of them. The deportation of Ann and deportations in general, are carried out silently, discretely and repetitively at the airport. The deportees, like businessmen waiting to board, enter the aeroplane either as the first passengers or the last. Though deportees are not seated in the business section of the aeroplane, checking in deportees at the business counter reflects the irony of how two so distinct groups of travellers—the business travellers and the deportees—both require the discretion and efficiency that business class check-in provides. A migrant is considered deported when the police officers hand over the deportee’s documents to the chief pilot and

visually confirms that the aeroplane leaves the gate and takes off—a so-called *observed departure* (Danish National Police 2010).⁸

As I observed Ann's departure, I thought about how the women I had met previously in Nigeria after their deportation described their thoughts on the aeroplane as emotional and contradictory. Some cried because their years in Europe did not give them what they had hoped, and as they sat on the deportation aeroplane, they knew that the chance was perhaps lost forever and their anxieties about the future in Nigeria were overwhelming. They described deportation as going backwards in their lives, where the initial migration was a feeling of moving forward. Some were exhausted after years of permanently waiting in detention camps, some had applied for asylum on grounds of human trafficking, which was difficult to obtain and had now finally been declined. Others felt a sense of relief after living with the constant fear of being detained and deported while working undocumented on the streets. Those with children, whom they had left behind in Nigeria, were excited to see them again, some after five to six years abroad. Others were desperate because they were deported without their children, as they decided to leave their children, who were born and were legal residents in Europe with friends or family members in Europe hoping to get back to them one day. Regardless of their individual experiences, the women all described their deportation as a life-changing and dramatic event. To understand what happens next in the lives of deported Nigerian women, we have to travel to Benin.

BENIN CITY: FROM MIGRATION TO DEPORTATION

The loudspeakers in the airport in Benin play Dolly Parton and Kris Kristofferson. We are four people waiting—three Chinese men and me. It is a small airport—one entrance, one exit, and two small shops selling books, newspapers, soda, and candy. Outside is a parking lot, and a dusty road leads to the city centre. Approximately twenty security guards are standing outside with AK47 guns. I am waiting to be picked up by Cynthia. Cynthia is 28 and was deported in 2010, for the second time, from Denmark. She worked in a brothel in the countryside. Before Denmark, she sold sex in Italy and Spain. Back in Benin, she lived in a rented apartment, which was partially paid for by her Danish boyfriend. The apartment belonged to a woman who lives in Italy and runs a brothel.

The airport and Cynthia’s situation provide the contours of the larger political economy in which Benin is embedded here at the fringes of the often conflict-ridden oil-producing Niger Delta. Militancy, kidnapping, armed robbery, and menace are not uncommon. Chinese companies have signed major contracts with the Edo State government to build a cement factory and establish industries in the agricultural and communications technology sector (Mayaki 2007; Harambe 2011). Chinese investments, unemployment, security guards, women’s migration to the sex industry in Europe, and houses financed by remittances have, over the past fifteen years or so, become the social reality of Benin.

Although Benin is highly influenced by the out-migration of women (and men), it is also just a typical Nigerian city with families struggling to get by in their everyday lives and with high rates of unemployment. Nigerian migrants with residence permits in European countries frequently visit Benin. These visits present important opportunities to exercise agency and identity. Travelling home, bringing money, and wearing new clothes allow the migrants to reconfigure their, at times, difficult life situations in Europe and at the same time project a solid identity of the successful migrant. These trips back home are expensive. Yet, increasingly it is not a visiting diaspora, but deportees that return to Benin.

Because of the deportations, Benin is undergoing a rapid change. Through deportations and specifically the anti-trafficking return programmes, Benin has become linked to a number of European countries that return Nigerian women migrants. A highly visible sign are the cars in the parking lot at NAPTIP’s (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Matters) main office in Benin carrying the names of their European governmental donors: “Funded by the Norwegian government” or “Donated by the Italian people,” and so on, and so forth, written in gold or black on the new cream-white minivans. In this way, long-distance responsibilities and humanitarianism for the returned women from Europe are on everyday display in Benin.

The local Nigerian NGOs, administering the reintegration programmes, explained that the returned women’s reintegration process could not begin before the NGO had received the funds to finance her reintegration from the country from which she had been returned. The “reintegration money”, of which the maximum amount available per reintegration plan was €1200 in 2016, can be used to pay rent, vocational training, medical assistance, school materials for children, and to set up small businesses such as tailors, hair saloons or food stalls for the

women to re-establish their lives (IOM 2016). Often the women had to wait for quite some time before the money was transferred to Nigeria. This frustrated the NGOs in Benin and the returned women alike. Typically, the women would explain that it was better to be deported from Germany than from Italy, because Germans were more efficient, as were other Northern European countries generally. Through such discussions, the women displayed their expectations towards the country that deported them and their sense of attachment to that country, through their official identification as victims of trafficking.⁹

POST-DEPORTEE MEETINGS IN PUBLIC SPACE

A few days after my arrival to Benin in 2012, I met up with Grace, a woman deported from Italy through a return programme for victims of human trafficking. I met her in 2011 at the local NGO in Benin that administers her reintegration money. When I am not in Nigeria, I call her frequently and we talk about her life. Today we meet at a fast food restaurant in the city centre of Benin. It is newly-opened with glass facades, a parking lot, and an indoor playground. It sells fried chicken, pizzas, and Italian ice cream. The women I know consider this place very expensive and out of their reach. It is for rich people, as they say. However, Grace has told me, that since her deportation, she misses Italian pizza and ice cream and, as we have not seen each other for a year, I decide to invite her to the restaurant for a pizza.

The fast food restaurant is the only one of this kind in Benin and located across from my apartment. Grace arrives, dressed up—makeup, earrings, black leather cap, stilettos, and tight jeans. While waiting for our pizza, Grace recognises a woman sweeping the floor. Grace greets her and explains to me that the woman has also lived in Italy. They met at the NGO in Benin that assisted both of them upon return. We go to the table so the women can continue their talk. Still standing with the broom, the women start talking a mix of Italian, English, and Bini. They talk about the NGO; in particular, they complain about their dissatisfaction with the long wait for the “reintegration money” they had been promised prior to their return from Europe. After eight months, Grace’s friend is still waiting for her money. She says that she has given up on receiving the reintegration money and is now occasionally sweeping floors at the pizza place to make a living. She still goes to the NGO occasionally to ask if the money has arrived. Grace and the woman also

gossip about the Nigerian nuns at the NGO, whom they felt did not talk nicely to them. I ask what the nuns are saying to the returned women. Grace explains, “It is like they think we don’t understand anything.” Indeed, during my interviews with the nuns at the NGOs, they would often tell me, that it was difficult for the returned women to understand how the reintegration programme worked and the nuns had to spend a lot of time trying to explain how the programme was organised. After a few more comments, the woman starts sweeping the floors again and our pizza arrives. Yet, while Grace greeted the woman deported from Italy at the pizza restaurant, at other times the women encountered other deported women in the streets of Benin whom they had met in Europe, but ignored them if these women were not from their neighbourhood. The embarrassment of deportation, which I will return to, the women explained to me, is too much to handle in public space. Hence, while both living deportable lives in Europe, and back in Benin, deportation is a key structural and social factor in the lives of these women.

LIMBO AND UNBELONGING IN EVERYDAY POST-DEPORTEE LIFE

The general overall question for the women was typically whether migrating again should be their livelihood strategy, followed by a persistent feeling of unbelonging in Benin. Usually, the women explained their need to return to Europe because of disrupted plans, to join their children, boyfriends, and unpaid debt, but primarily unemployment and family responsibilities in Nigeria. One of the merits of the literature on return and reintegration within refugee studies lies in its deconstruction of essentialised notions of the easy and “natural” homecoming that brings “uprooted” and involuntarily displaced people back to a sedentary lifestyle in their familiar socio-cultural habitat, thus “healing the social body” (Eastmond 2007). This resonates with the experiences of the returned Nigerian women because, no matter if the women had access to reintegration funds or were deported as undocumented migrants, they were enmeshed in the paradox that the families the women are imagined to return to in order to “heal the social body” are often also the reason behind the women’s desire to migrate abroad again.

The women’s lives upon return were characterised by multiple questions and much uncertainty in terms of livelihood strategy. For those with access to reintegration funds, how should the money be spent? When would the money from Europe arrive? How should they get by,

while waiting for the money to arrive? Should they (re-)marry to bring in a provider? Should they try to get by without a man? Should they sell sex on the outskirts of Benin, at the tollgates where truck drivers from Northern Nigeria or the Niger Delta pass by? Should they, as some explained, wait indecisively for divine intervention? The questions the women grappled with were manifold. Thus, their post-deportee lives were often about enduring a frustrating limbo—a phase characterised by waiting for a decision to be made either by themselves, by others, such as the institutions transferring the reintegration funds, or just waiting for the overall situation to change. Uncertainties of livelihood and belonging evolved for a few whose contact to their families had been so limited that it was even difficult to locate them upon return. This is reflected in one of the tasks that the reintegration NGOs provides—family tracing prior to or upon return. This is to notify the family members of the return and prepare them to receive the returnee.

Yet, the families were not the same as before the women left. Friends were married and moved away, children and siblings grew older, people died, and it was with uneasiness that some of the women moved back into their parents' houses after several years abroad. The women, too, had changed and some felt like experienced adults upon return. Furthermore, the flow of remittances is impeded when the women are deported and, thus, the woman and her family have to reconfigure their livelihood strategies. Upon return, the women were faced with the same or more breadwinner duties as they faced while abroad. The difference is that in Europe the women had access to money and goods to remit. Back in Nigeria, the resources become extremely limited, also because during the time the women were in Europe, the consumption patterns of some families had changed in light of the money they received from abroad. The dilemma was often that while the family put a strain on the women in terms of expectations, it was often simultaneously the only social network that the women had upon return to provide for them.

Feelings of (un) belonging were further confused and divided across geographic spaces—between Nigeria and Europe. For instance, Beauty had a child while in Spain, but she decided to leave her son, who had Spanish citizenship, in Spain with family members before her deportation to give him better opportunities and access to school and health care. Her plan was to return to Spain to be with her son. When I met her in Benin, she had made two new attempts to return to Spain through the Sahara Desert. The first time she was intercepted at the Niger-Nigerian

border. With the second attempt, she managed to cross the border to Niger on a motorbike, but in the soft sand in the desert, she fell off the motorbike and severely injured her arms and legs and could not continue the journey.

Cynthia, who picked me up at the airport on my first day of field-work, also felt that she and her son did not belong in Benin. The father of Cynthia’s child was in Denmark and she would have to wait two years before her deportation order could be reconsidered so she could perhaps return to Denmark (though she was not even sure the Danish man would want to invite her to Denmark) or wait until her son got the Danish citizenship. Another woman, Tessy, had begun a skill training programme in the UK, but was deported after five years, before it was finished; a young woman, Esther, was picked up by the police in her new Danish boyfriend’s home, she was deported after two years in Denmark just as they were beginning to plan for the future, perhaps even marriage; others simply felt that their time in Europe was not done (also because some still had debt to their madams), they still aspired for what they called “greener pastures” and a better future—and staying in Nigeria could not fill this void. Some of the women who already had children with Nigerian men before they left for Europe, did not consider re-marrying. They already had too many men in their lives, they would explain, referring to former husband(s), male clients in Europe, and other men who had disappointed them. Rather, they would rely on their mothers, sisters or other female relatives to build some more or less stable livelihoods.

While creating a sustainable livelihood strategy through migration was certainly the primary reason for migration, it was not only the lack of income or the families that frustrated the women after deportation. For instance, the day Cynthia arrived to pick me up at the airport she arrived two hours later than planned, because the car had broken down and she had run out of credit on her cell phone and could not call me. She had to wait for a neighbour to finish another job before he could take her to the airport, but he was out of petrol and they had to walk to another neighbour to borrow a can of petrol. Those kinds of everyday problems are manifold in Nigeria, and while Nigerians, and the women, often took this with laughter and learned patience, it consistently frustrated the women upon return, who would often compare it to how well-functioning they had found such structures in Europe. In this way, now that they could compare life in Europe with life in Benin, they would often talk

about the lack of “comfort” Nigeria provided, and that, despite numerous struggles while abroad, they still felt that, in Europe, they led more “comfortable lives.” Thus, for the deportees Benin seemed even more “uncomfortable” than to those who never had experienced “the Other side” as Europe was termed.

Some of them had never run a business in Nigeria before, and now, for those that were part of reintegration programmes, they were offered the opportunity to open a small income-generating business, such as a hairdressing salon, a tailoring shop or run a small convenience store, based on skills that were often briefly learned in a business market in Benin, which was unknown to them after several years abroad. They were well aware of the sex markets in the Red Light Districts in Europe, but the market here in Benin seemed distant and competitive. As returnees, the women are competing against more solid anchored businesses in Benin, and occasionally confronted with stigmatisation from customers who preferred not to have their hair or tailor jobs done by a deported sex-worker. This was not an issue I encountered a lot and facing stigmatisation was even less among women who worked as street vendors, who did not need to establish a clientele.

Their overall situations often constituted an assemblage of problems whether for those opening shops or those deported without reintegration funds. Problems could come in many different shapes, but every so often, they were interlinked, unpredictable, and random. The women explained the way in which the overall situation could change instantly. For instance, Grace said, “I was OK, until problems [*Wahala*] came.” *Wahala* literally means suffering. When I asked the women what constituted *Wahala* they would explain *Wahala* as problems that continuously interrupted and hindered their plans and dreams. *Wahala* was everything from power outages, unemployment, lacking access to housing, unpaid bills, armed robberies, sickness, problems with family and children—an assemblage of problems creating a grid that seemed almost impossible to trespass.

The women would often explain that they felt alone with solving these issues. This solitariness stands in contrast to discourses of support and the long-distance humanitarian reintegration embrace promoted by the AVRR programmes. Much is happening to these women upon return, which has little to do with “trafficking” at the precise time in their lives when they are counselled by specialised anti-trafficking NGOs to reintegrate, “turn the chapter” on their former lives, and

move past their purported memories of sexual trauma abroad (Warren 2010). Furthermore, much attention was paid to their work within the sex industry by organisations they encountered in Europe. Likewise, the focus upon return was, from the organisations’ side, on the reintegration process and the counselling of the women because of their experiences in the sex industry in Europe, the women would explain that the deportation was a bigger problem for them than the sex-work, and that it was more embarrassing for them to be deported, than to be former sex-workers. When I visited one of the deported women at her home, neighbours and friends would come by, and as I got to know them, there were usually men or women who had been deported from Europe. Though it seems that deportation is increasingly perceived, among the deportees and their families as a collective experience rather than an individual failure, it is still highly stigmatised in Benin, and a topic the women considered a “sealed lips” issue, as they termed it (Plambech 2016). When compared, deportation appeared to be more embarrassing and stigmatising than sex-work because deportation does not hold the potential or concrete result of upward social mobility. Deportation is unambiguously perceived as downward social mobility.

THE GOOD RETURNEE

There are a few women, categorised as victims in Europe, who succeed in starting a little business or shop using their assistance money. Eghe is the one woman in this study who did not want to return to Europe. Eghe was 35 years old when I met her in 2012 and she travelled to Italy in 2004. Eghe’s husband was a bus driver and he was killed in an accident on the highway outside Benin, one of the most dangerous roads in Nigeria. She gave birth to her five children without any assistance in a small house, close to where she lived. She and her husband provided for their five children until he died, and within one year Eghe was on her way to Europe to work. Her mother took care of her children while she was abroad. Eghe was officially identified as a victim of human trafficking and on grounds of that, she applied for a temporary residency, which is available for victims of trafficking in Italy. She waited several years in a detention centre in Italy, but her application was declined and when she was offered the AVR programme, she saw it as her final chance. She decided to use it to her advantage—a new opportunity. Eghe writes in her diary that I gave to her in Benin City in 2012 as part of my research:

In Italy, Caritas [what the women term most NGOs], started giving me a helping hand and guidelines on what to do and what not to do. They checked if I was inflicted with sickness, and thank God, I was not. After that, I started visiting the organisation as my organisation. I started schooling with them and they continued to advise me. It was not very long after that I was deported by the Italian police. That was how I found myself in Nigeria...Thanks to the organisation in Italy I came across this organisation [the NGO in Benin who helped Eghe upon return] in Nigeria, and I went to them. They helped me set up a business. Life is not easy for a jobless person when taking care of five children. I used this as an opportunity.

Upon return, Eghe found a spot for her shop, in an area close to her mother's house, so that her mother could still look after the children while Eghe took care of the shop. In this area, she knew a few people from her school and a few of them, mostly men, were deported from Germany. She decided to sell beer, and hence everyday a group of men would sit around drinking, but also as she explained, the men could protect her from robberies. Eghe describes herself as a strong and entrepreneurial woman, and indeed Eghe created the best possible circumstances for her shop and she made use of every possible opportunity to grow her store. Selling herbal infusions and firewood was one of her newest ideas. She found an old mattress so that she could sleep in her shop and protect it from robberies. Eghe is considered a success story by the NGOs—the one the local NGO would introduce to their donors.

As Elena Shih (2009) found among former sex-workers, some identified as trafficked, in reintegration projects in Thailand, for some women these projects simultaneously become an income-generating job and a performative job, in which the women display their best behaviour, act responsibly, write neatly in their account books, and visit the NGOs who have assisted them frequently in order to stay connected, hoping that more financial assistance might turn up. They have to present themselves as “a good victim” in order to make the most out of being “rescued.” As Eghe explained, “I hope they see how good I am in keeping my shop, all my provisions are lined up neatly, every time they see this, I hope they [people from the NGOs] will help me more.” In this way, “keeping the shop” becomes a way to prolong the connections to the NGOs and a way to extend the relationship beyond the months (usually 3–12 months) of monitoring required in the AVRRE programme.

Finally, Eghe’s experience mirrors what some studies show about returned women who decide to stay in their native country, typically slightly older women (she was 35 when she returned to Nigeria) who, after deportation, “retire” as migrants (Plambech and Lisborg 2009). They feel that they tried their best without success in Europe and, upon being detained and having their asylum application rejected, decide to return home to their children. These women accept “voluntary removal” because they do not want to endure detention any longer. The victim category is good for some of these women and can be of great importance. This is particularly true for women who want to go back to Nigeria anyway. For them, the victim status and the return become a new window of opportunity, the same kind of opportunity they hoped for when they initially migrated to Europe. Yet, Eghe was the only woman in this study who, after two years of her return, still had a well-functioning business.

While Eghe saw a business opportunity in returning to Nigeria and had a somewhat stable family situation with her mother and five children, most others did not have such a steady base. The situation in each family was different and the ambiguities towards the family and the solitariness the women explained they felt, despite being back among their families, were experienced differently for each of the women.

CONCLUSION

The post-deportee lives of migrant sex-workers provide insights into the workings of post-deportation in the context of trafficking, but also the ways in which deportation might increasingly change the social landscape of the communities most affected by deportation. In particular, how deportation might increasingly move from being understood by the deported migrants, as an individual failure to a collective experience and shared feeling among the deportees of expulsion from Europe. I tried to show through my empirical material that within the deportation regime there is system of *temporary inclusions and long-distance inclusions* for instance for victims of trafficking. Despite this temporary inclusion and the subsuming idea in the politics of return and reintegration of women migrants that they return to the comfort of their family—rather than doing sex-work in the streets of European cities—the women often felt very alone and isolated, and were faced with many difficult questions

and decisions. As a result, even though many of the deported women have had exhausting and rough experiences in Europe, all of them, except one, wished to return to Europe at some point in the future. Such post-deportee reflections stand in contrast to the idea of sedentariness, subsuming the practice of deportation and perhaps even more so the practice of AVRR, which implies that the women return to their home to stay.

NOTES

1. While Benin City is in everyday language termed Benin, it should not be conflated with Nigeria's neighbouring country (to the West) the Republic of Benin.
2. AVRR in IOM's own definition; "is the program[me] which returns and manages the reintegration of migrants, who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin, such as identified victims of trafficking" (IOM 2012).
3. Frontex is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. It is responsible for coordinating the activities of the national border guards to ensure the security of the EU's borders with non-member states. The main role of Frontex is to protect EU external borders from undocumented immigration and human trafficking as well as counter-terrorism.
4. To be precise, when I use the term "Europe" or the EU it is to indicate that the migrants had been to one of the countries in the European territory or one of the EU member states. The migrants typically use the term "Europe", "the Other side", or "that side" rather than pointing to one specific country. Thus, my use of the term Europe does not imply that I understand Europe as one entity, or that it is not crucially important to include legal aspects and other specificities regarding each European country or member state.
5. See for instance Skilbrei and Tveit (2008); Andrijasevic (2010); Kempadoo (2015).
6. A much-cited and comprehensive analysis of deportation has been provided by De Genova and Peutz (2010). In their book, they argue that inherent in global immigration politics is a second system of exclusion and expulsion.
7. The Danish police have developed a set of specific guidelines on how deportations should be executed in a dignified and sustainable way (Danish National Police 2010).

8. The process of getting access to observe the deportation was bureaucratically and ethically challenging and reflected why empirical accounts of the process of deportation remain scarce and why deportations are so relatively understudied and unnoticed. As a general procedure, I was only notified the day before the deportation and I was not allowed to meet Ann or interview her in the prison beforehand.
9. Rutvica Andrijasevic (2010) showed how the EU hierarchically organises migrants’ (in her case sex-workers) access to its labour market through citizenship. Yet, the returned sex-workers in Benin turned this organising upside down as they, by contrast, hierarchised EU countries determined by the countries’ ability to assist their “victims” —the sex-workers—upon return.

REFERENCES

- Agustín, Laura María. 2007. *Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry*. London: Zed Books.
- Anderson, Bridget, Matthew J. Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti, eds. 2011. Boundaries of Belonging: Deportation and the Constitution and Contestation of Citizenship. Special Issue, *Citizenship Studies* 15 (5): 547–563.
- Andrijasevic, Rutvica. 2010. *Migration, Agency and Citizenship in Sex Trafficking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Andrijasevic, Rutvica, and William Walters. 2010. The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (6): 977–999.
- Balaram, Brhmie, and Jenny Pennington. 2013. *Homecoming—Return and Reintegration of Irregular Migrants from Nigeria*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Bitoulas, Alexandros. 2013. Asylum Applicants and first Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: Third Quarter 2013. Population and social conditions, Eurostat 16. Belgium, Brussels: European Commission. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4168041/5948845/KS-QA-13-016-EN.PDF/0d5aedee-fb25-4c9b-9818-407372bb0870>. Accessed 8 Feb 2017.
- Bernstein, Elizabeth and Laurie Schaffner, eds. 2005. *Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity. Perspectives on Gender*. Routledge. New York.
- Brotherton, David C., and Luis Barrios. 2011. *Banished to the Homeland—Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buff, Rachel Ida. 2009. The Deportation Terror. In *Nation and Migration: Past and Future*, ed. David G. Gutierrez and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, 21–49. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Carling, Jørgen. 2005. Trafficking in Women from Nigeria to Europe. *Migration Information Source*, July 1, 2005. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trafficking-women-nigeria-europe>.
- Chapkis, Wendy. 2003. Soft Glove, Punishing Fist—The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. In *Regulating Sex—The Politics of Intimacy and Identity*, ed. Elizabeth Bernstein and Laurie Schaffner, 51–66. New York: Routledge.
- Danish National Police. 2010. The Legal Basis for Police Work in Connection with the Return of Asylum-Seekers and the Practicalities of Return. Journal. no. 2007-5141-27. Denmark: 30.
- De Genova, Nicholas, and Nathalie Peutz, eds. 2010. *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- De Haas, Hein. 2006. International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in Countries of Origin. The case of Nigeria. Working Paper, Migration and Development series, International Migration Institute James Martin 21st Century School. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Eastmond, Marita. 2007. Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (2): 248–264.
- Ellermann, Antje. 2009. *States Against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibney, Matthew J., and R. Hansen. 2005. *Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc.
- Harambe. 2011. Harambe Farmland, Agri News, 1 November 2011. <http://www.harambefarmland.com/?p=1414>. Accessed 19 Nov 2013.
- IOM. 2011. *Why Benin City? An Assessment of Edo State and Benin City Endemic Areas in Nigeria*. Benin City: IOM.
- . 2012. Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/by-theme/regulating-migration/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration/>. Accessed 16 Oct 2012.
- . 2016. Strengthening the Delivery of Reintegration Assistance to Returning Nigerian Migrants from Europe Under the Auspices of AVRR Programmes: RESTART NIGERIA PROJECT. <https://nigeria.iom.int/restart-nigeria>. Accessed 20 Dec 2016.
- Kanström, Daniel. 2007. *Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kastner, Kristin. 2009. Moving Relationships: Family Ties of Nigerian Migrants on Their Way to Europe. *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 3 (1): 17–34.
- Kempadoo, Kamala. 2015. The Modern-Day White (Wo)Man's Burden: Trends in Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Slavery Campaigns. *Journal of Human Trafficking* 1 (1): 8–20.

- Mayaki, John. 2007. Edo Community Gets Cement Factory. *The Nation Online*, 23 May 2007.
- Papadopoulos, Dimitris, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos. 2008. *Escape Routes Control and Subversion in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Plambech, Sine. 2014. Between Victims and Criminals: Nigerian Migrant Sex Workers and The Politics of Rescue. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 21 (3): 382–402.
- . 2016. Sex, Deportation and Rescue: Economies of Migration Among Nigerian Sex Workers. *Feminist Economics*. Published online 17 May 2016: 1–26.
- Plambech, Sine, and Anders Lisborg. 2009. *Going back—Moving on—A Synthesis Report on the Trends and Experiences of Returned Trafficking Victims in Thailand and the Philippines*. Bangkok: International Labour Organisation.
- Shih, Elena. 2009. Humanitarian Work: The Production and Consumption of Jewelry Made by Trafficked Women. Master’s thesis, University of California.
- Skilbrei, May-Len, and Marianne Tveit. 2008. Defining Trafficking Through Empirical Work: Blurred Boundaries and Their Consequences. *Gender, Technology and Development* 12 (1): 9–30.
- Sørensen Nyberg, Ninna. 2011. The Rise and Fall of the ‘Migrant Superhero’ and the New ‘Deportee Trash’: Contemporary Strain on Mobile Livelihoods in the Central American Region. *Border-Lines—Journal of the Latino Research Center* vol. V: 90–120.
- UN. 2000. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. New York: United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en. Accessed 13 Feb 2017.
- UNHCR. 2016. Table 3. Demographic Breakdown of Sea Arrivals in Italy, per Country of Origin, Selected Years UNHCR. data.unhcr.org/mediterranean.
- Walters, William. 2010. Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 69–100. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Warren, Kay B. 2010. The Illusiveness of Counting ‘Victims’ and the Concreteness of Ranking Countries: Trafficking in Persons from Columbia to Japan. In *Sex, drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflicts*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M Greenhill, 110–126. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Paying to Go: Deportability as Development

Michael Collyer

Public policies that involve paying migrants to leave the country have a long history in Western Europe, dating to initial attempts in Germany, France, and Belgium following the financial crisis of the early 1970s. Over the last 50 years, the profile of migrants targeted by these policies has changed. They were initially aimed at legally resident migrant workers but particularly since the 1990s new policies have targeted undocumented migrants or failed asylum seekers, often under the label AVRR (Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration) programmes. These schemes have come in for a great deal of criticism from migrants' and refugee rights advocates. The most established critique of AVRR schemes questions the "voluntary" nature of the movement (e.g., ECRE 2003). A related line of argument highlights the political construction of "return" as it is used in these schemes, calling for a much clearer separation from "expulsion" and "removal" (Cassarino 2004). This chapter considers the third element of the AVRR construction, "assistance". Using original empirical research on returnees to Sri Lanka, the paper

M. Collyer (✉)
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

questions the use of assistance to incentivise “return” and the construction of “development” that is fostered by such programmes.

The critique of the voluntariness of AVRR highlights situations in which the decision to return is at least partially imposed. The European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has argued that where individuals have no legal basis for remaining in the country their return can never be considered “voluntary” but only “mandatory” if they consent to it, or “forced” if they do not (ECRE 2003). The notion of return is similarly limited. Although AVRR schemes usually involve an attempt to ensure individuals return to the region or town where their migration originated, it is the international element of the return that is most challenging. Return programmes are inevitably driven by the geopolitical priority of (re-)allocating individuals to their country of citizenship (Collyer 2012). Yet Cassarino’s (2015) critique of return goes beyond this, arguing that the central concern of return schemes is not return at all but frequently simply “removal” as approaches to return have become combined with deportation objectives. The alternative label of “pay-to-go” schemes reflects this critique, since it is frequently not “return” that is the central objective of these schemes, but simply “going.”

The distinguishing feature of mandatory, as opposed to forced return, is that migrants have at least made a decision to engage in a return programme. Their choice to do so is inevitably highly constrained. Recent research across a substantial sample of returnees has highlighted a broad range of motivations for engaging with pay-to-go programmes (Koser and Kuschminder 2015). The most significant reasons are related to the living conditions of migrants in destination countries, including four individuals who chose “voluntary” return because they were “tired of being in a detention centre” (Koser and Kuschminder 2015, p. 41). This highlights the role played by more coercive forms of removal, indeed an overview of pay-to-go schemes more generally found that they are only effective where there is a viable programme of forced returns in place (Black, Collyer, and Somerville 2011). Not all migrants targeted by deportation choose to return in these schemes. Nevertheless, this underlines how pay-to-go schemes could not function without the atmosphere of concern and uncertainty caused by the realistic possibility of deportation, what De Genova (2002) has called “deportability.”

Pay-to-go schemes typically combine this reliance on deportability with a development focused reintegration component. Some schemes still cover only an individual’s travel and facilitate their obtaining the necessary

documents to allow them to take scheduled flights, although additional post-return support is now very widespread. The reason for this additional support is uncertain. Most research finds that the “payment” element of AVRR programmes was of only marginal significance in influencing migrants’ decision to join such programmes (Black et al. 2011). This is now relatively well established, indeed the earliest French co-development programmes from the 1970s introduced substantial financial incentives, but found that those taking them up had planned to go anyway.

This is not to suggest that return migration cannot bring very substantial development benefits. There is plenty of evidence to demonstrate that in certain circumstances, return migrants can have a very significant impact on improving services, generating employment, and supporting investment in the places to which they return (McCormick and Wahba 2003; Black and Castaldo 2009; Démurger and Xu 2011). The key question for the migration and development literature is no longer whether migrants can produce these positive changes, since it is clear that under certain conditions they can. Rather, research must help clarify what those circumstances are and whether migration and development policy can help to bring them about. This chapter uses an empirical study of pay-to-go schemes between the UK and Sri Lanka from 2002 to 2008 to investigate this question. I argue that, although positive impacts do occur through the post-return support of pay-to-go schemes, they are relatively rare and actually highly predictable. The circumstances under which pay-to-go schemes operate are much more likely to result in failed development initiatives.

This raises a wider set of questions about pay-to-go schemes as development initiatives. If payments neither offer a clear incentive to migrants to take up the schemes, nor provide a reliable form of post-return development support, why are they an increasingly popular tool in wealthy states migration management approach? It is possible that additional money for reintegration helps overcome other barriers, not related to the migrants themselves (Blitz et al. 2005). It increases the public legitimacy of return schemes and helps to facilitate the international agreements that are necessary for their smooth running. Development is being used as a justification for deportability. This chapter develops these ideas through the following three sections. The first considers the development element of return migration and how this is related to the post-return support offered by pay-to-go schemes. The second section elaborates on the context of the Sri Lanka case study and the third turns to the experiences of those who returned during the period of research.

THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF MANDATORY RETURN AS DEVELOPMENT

The view of migration as a one-way movement between a point of origin and point of destination dominated investigations of migration until the 1980s and resulted in ongoing return movements being completely overlooked. At that time, return migration was not a significant focus of study (King 1978). The transnational paradigm that has dominated investigations of migration for the last two decades shifts attention to the ongoing interconnections that migration produces (Vertovec 2009). It is now common to see return migration not as some final end point of the initial migration but simply as a stage in the ongoing mobility initiated by the first migration experience. Nevertheless, return marks a change in the relationship between the migrant and their place or origin and the people who live there. The nature of this relationship determines how beneficial that move may be for all concerned and influences the likelihood of future mobility. The potential benefits of the return and the likelihood of further migration are now very widely studied and both are of direct concern to pay-to-go schemes.

The literature on migration and development recognises two ways in which return can potentially benefit the areas to which individuals are returning. First, individuals may return with substantial savings and second, they may return with new skills. Both of these potential benefits are influenced by the geography of return, which helps determine where the benefits will be experienced. The limited evidence on the geography of return is very mixed. McCormick and Wahba (2003) find that more than 90% of returnees to Egypt opted to live in the same location as before migration, whereas returnees from the USA to Mexico appear to prefer relocating to cities (Woodruff and Zenteno 2001). The reason for return influences location. Those returning for retirement are more likely to return to their pre-migration “home” but those with new investment projects may prefer a specially selected location, more often an urban area.

The impact of returning with savings on the broader social and economic environment depends on how individuals choose to spend those savings. Entrepreneurial activity, such as establishing a small business, is often seen as the ideal in terms of broader development impact. This appears to be relatively common amongst return migrants. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) found that more than half their sample of

returnees from Germany to Turkey established micro-enterprises on return. A European Training Foundation (ETF) survey of return migration to Morocco found that returnees were twice as likely to be employers than non-migrants (Collyer et al. 2013). Similarly, in a study of internal migration, Démurger and Xu (2011) found that return migrants to rural China were more likely to be self-employed than non-migrants. Much research has therefore focused on the determinants of such activity. Several studies agree that the likelihood of establishing a business increases with the sum of money that individuals return with (McCormick and Wahba 2003; Démurger and Xu 2011). Black and Castaldo (2009) found that returnees to Ghana were significantly more likely to establish a micro-enterprise if they returned with more than US\$5000, though at the time of their study (2001) this was a very substantial sum in Ghana, approximately 20 times the per capita GDP (World Bank 2016).

There is also substantial agreement that the skills that returnees possess, the second significant factor in influencing the development impact of return, also has an influence on the likelihood of entrepreneurial activity. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) found that better educated were more likely to be active following return. Black and Castaldo (2009) differentiated education from work experience and found that relevant work experience was actually a more important determinant of entrepreneurial activity amongst Ghanaian returnees. Démurger and Xu used the frequency of job changes while away from home as the key variable and found that this was positively related to the likelihood of self-employment on return. In the ETF study we evaluated both non-formal and formal skills development and found that where the migration process involves substantial skills development, development impact is enhanced, post-return. Concerns about “brain waste” arise in situations where migrants engage in occupations which do not develop or even require their existing skills. In these contexts, entrepreneurial activity after return is less likely (Collyer et al. 2013).

All of these studies consider return that for the large majority of returnees, was voluntary, in ECRE’s (2003) understanding of the term. That is, individual returnees selected the time of their return and had realistic opportunities for remaining legally resident in the countries from which they returned. In our research in Morocco, only 9% of more than 2000 respondents reported that they had returned against their will (Collyer et al. 2013) and other studies have focused exclusively

on voluntary forms of return. In all cases, return was to low or middle income locations without major civil disturbance or conflict. These conditions are built into many of these studies as initial assumptions. For example, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) were careful to model the duration of migration (i.e., the decision when to return home) jointly with the choice of activities to engage in after return. When these conditions are met, and where work appropriate to migrants' skill levels is performed abroad, it is clear that return migration can have a significant, measurable impact on job creation. The migration process provides the important stimulus for entrepreneurial activity by overcoming limitations in access to capital and in necessary skills or experience.

Pay-to-go programmes seek to replicate these conditions under situations of mandatory return. Yet mandatory return is substantially different and several of the fundamental assumptions of this research do not apply. The notion that return migrants choose when to return and what to do following return as part of a single, related process, that Dustmann and Kirchkamp considered fundamental to their modelling is not applicable in most cases of mandatory return. This has important implications, reducing or eliminating opportunities for advance planning of post-return activities. These difficulties are further exacerbated by the prevailing political, social, and economic climate in countries to which mandatory return is common. Certain pay-to-go schemes, including the UK's Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) examined in this chapter, focus on individuals who are or have been rejected from the asylum system. Asylum applications, including those which are rejected, are far more likely to be made by citizens of countries experiencing war or large scale civil unrest. The return context for such pay-to-go schemes is therefore likely to be far more challenging for returnees. This is supported by Koser and Kuschminder's (2015) research, which found that the majority (almost 70%) of rejected asylum seekers in their survey had not been able to reintegrate on return. In some cases this affects their basic survival and it certainly makes the success of new entrepreneurial ventures far less likely.

The explicit policy objective of pay-to-go schemes is typically framed as "sustainable return" rather than explicit development objectives. The meaning of "sustainable return" is uncertain. For policy makers, Cassarino's critique of the reductive nature of return is particularly relevant: "return narrowly defined in the lexicon of governmental and intergovernmental agencies as the act of leaving a destination country"

(Cassarino 2015, p. 219). In these terms, “sustainable return” is defined by the absence of post-return movement, at least back to the country paying for the initial departure. Still, more critical approaches to sustainable return have long viewed further mobility as a perfectly legitimate part of the development process (Black and Gent 2004). The similarly policy-orientated goal of circular migration presents regular return and remigration as a desirable policy objective. UNHCR define sustainable return as “the ability of returning refugees to secure the political, economic, and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood, and dignity” (UNHCR 2004, p. 6). This all-encompassing objective is an important step in recognising that returnees concerns are far wider than the primarily economic objectives that are addressed in pay-to-go schemes.

Although such schemes have been operating relatively widely across Europe in their present form since the early 1990s, there is still an extremely limited evidence base on the conditions of returnees after return, making the impacts of sustainable return very difficult to judge. Since individuals returning under pay-to-go schemes are much more likely to return to situations of generalised violence or war, the most significant barrier to sustained research is access. It is common for states to return foreign-nationals to countries that they advise their own citizens not to visit due to the dangers they would face. Even where access is possible, research faces major issues of identification of returnees. This is common to all research on return, since returnees are not easily identifiable in the larger population, but it is significantly exacerbated for returnees on pay-to-go schemes.

The few studies of post-return highlight a pattern of fairly predictable difficulties faced by returnees under pay-to-go, or related schemes. Several studies were conducted purely for the purpose of evaluating schemes, conducted by IOM, which also administered the schemes (e.g., IOM 2004, 2011). The lack of independence of these surveys obviously undermines the broadly positive evaluation of the schemes which they provide. Several other studies have been commissioned by the UK Home Office as part of the evaluation of the VARRP (e.g., Transparency Research and Evans 2010; Wilson and Evans 2010) based on interviews with participants in pay-to-go schemes before they left the UK. Such reports highlight important elements of motivations for return, but cannot shed any light on the post-return situation of returnees.

The few more independent studies of post-return on pay-to-go schemes provide much more critical assessments of their overall impacts. The largest such study involved interviews with 273 individuals at different stages of the process of return through pay-to-go schemes (Koser and Kuschminder 2015). A total of 157 individuals had returned and were interviewed back in one of eight countries of origin (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Vietnam). In this research, Koser and Kuschminder developed a new framework for defining and measuring sustainable return involving three dimensions: economic, socio-cultural, and safety and security. Overall, just over a third of the individuals interviewed for this report were deemed to have reintegrated, though this varied from country to country. Although the small numbers of respondents in each country does not allow for statistical analysis, only 16% of returnees to Iraq were considered to have integrated, rising to a maximum of 64% in the case of Vietnam. Of the 19 returnees to Sri Lanka involved in the research, only five were considered to have reintegrated (21%), making Sri Lanka the most challenging context for reintegration, after Iraq.

Several studies highlight the greater difficulties faced by returnees on pay-to-go schemes. In a conceptual move that bears some resemblance to Dustmann and Kirchkamp's connecting of the return decision and post-return activity, Koser and Kuschminder link the decision to engage with a pay-to-go programme with the opportunities for post-return reintegration. They emphasise that lack of integration in a destination country is a key factor in the decision to return through a programme. This lack of integration highlights experiences of "brain waste" and therefore reduces the chances of reintegration on return. This means that the *same factors* that make return on pay-to-go schemes more likely also make reintegration after return less likely. Schuster and Majidi (2013) highlight a similar pattern in the post-return fate of deported Afghans. They argue that in cases of non-voluntary return, the difficulties of reintegration are exacerbated since not only are the circumstances which encouraged the initial migration likely to continue, but they are often complicated even further. The need to repay debts, the existence of new transnational ties and the social stigma attached to a perceived failed return are all factors which may make post-return reintegration less likely.

Although research evidence on return migration highlights the situations in which return migration can have very positive benefits to the

areas to which people return, the very few studies of post-return on pay-to-go schemes highlight the opposite. It appears that return on pay-to-go schemes is systematically less likely to have any positive development impact. This chapter now turns to an empirical study of return from the UK to Sri Lanka. This involved interviews with 50 individuals who returned under the VARRP. Individuals arrived back in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2008 and they had been in the country for at least a year when they were interviewed. Interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2009.

THE CONTEXT OF MANDATORY RETURN DURING THE SRI LANKAN CIVIL WAR

The 25-year civil war in Sri Lanka came to a brutal end in May 2009, with the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and deaths of an estimated 40,000 civilians in the final months alone. A ceasefire agreement, signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in 2002, had led to a brief period of optimism that a peaceful solution was in sight. Isolated incidents of violence began in 2005 and slowly intensified. After several years of undeclared war the government officially withdrew from the ceasefire in 2008 and fighting intensified further. Following the end of the military conflict in May 2009, the government, led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, acted to consolidate their control over the North and East of the country. Policies of reconciliation with the Tamil and Muslim minorities were rejected and dissent was severely repressed. The political climate changed with the election of President Maithripala Sirisena in January 2015 and a new government in August 2015. Amongst many important symbolic changes, the new government permitted publication of a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), in September 2015 that documented killings and disappearances from 2002 to 2011, continuing well beyond the end of the war (OHCHR 2015).

Deportations from the UK to Sri Lanka had continued in small numbers throughout the conflict but mandatory returns of failed asylum seekers increased with the introduction of the VARRP in 2002. The Sri Lankan ceasefire of 2002 meant that the VARRP was significantly promoted to the Sri Lankan community through targeted adverts. In 2003, more Sri Lankans returned under VARRP than any other nationality,

although this was only 68 individuals (IOM 2004). Returns from the UK to Sri Lanka under the VARRP increased substantially in 2004 and 2005 reaching a peak in 2006, when 267 individuals returned. This declined in 2007 and 2008 as the conditions in the country deteriorated rapidly. During the August 2008 European Court of Human Rights case *NA v. UK*, it was reported that the UK had suspended deportations for 342 Sri Lankans currently in detention. Nevertheless as the UN Human Rights Commission report makes clear, even during the cease-fire disappearances and politically motivated killings were very common in Sri Lanka and the situation became increasingly fragile from 2005 (OHCHR 2015).

The data on which this chapter is based cover the 2002–2008 operation of VARRP returns to Sri Lanka. All individuals interviewed returned during this period, which was characterised initially by optimism, but, from 2005 onwards, by gradually worsening levels of violence in Sri Lanka. Over this period 920 people returned to Sri Lanka, more than 90% of them men. A research collaboration between the research team I coordinated at the University of Colombo and the Colombo office of the IOM allowed supervised access to this database, providing the unusual opportunity to sample the entire population of returnees. Almost half of these individuals returned to parts of the country which were under LTTE or military control, when research began in 2007, making access extremely problematic or impossible. A total of 509 returnees lived in districts which were easily accessible and visits could be arranged without attracting unnecessary official scrutiny. A sample of ten percent of returnees to each of the accessible districts was generated randomly, giving a total sample of 50 individuals. Individuals were then contacted by IOM Colombo to request permission for their details to be passed to researchers. If permission was not granted, they were replaced by individuals from the same district. Where permission was given to the IOM office, their contact details were passed to the research team and the individuals were contacted to arrange interviews. This is a substantial sample, but more significantly it is genuinely representative of all returnees over this time period.

Interviews were held in a location of the interviewees choice, most frequently their own homes. I conducted all interviews myself, with the assistance of an interpreter where necessary in the language of the interviewees' choice, English, Tamil, or Sinhala. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed. Interviews were conducted between January

and October 2008. In order to ensure that individuals had had some time to become re-established in the country following their return, interviews were arranged so that all individuals had been back in Sri Lanka for at least a year when their interview took place. Returnees had come back to Sri Lanka between June 2004 and July 2007. Of the 50 people interviewed, only four were women, though this reflected the total population of returnees, approximately ten percent of whom were women. The amount of time that individuals had spent in the UK varied from a maximum of just over ten years to two individuals who were arrested on arrival, claimed asylum then spent their entire time in the UK in detention, so essentially had no experience of life at liberty in the UK at all. The mean period of time spent in the UK for those interviewed was just under four years. There was no clear relationship between the time spent in the UK and experiences after mandatory return. Individuals who left Sri Lanka later, as the political situation deteriorated after 2005, were typically more desperate to leave and faced greater immigration restrictions so paid more to agents, often incurring debts. Those who arrived later tended to have borrowed more and so required more time in the UK to clear these debts.

In common with other research into pay-to-go schemes (e.g., Koser and Kuschminder 2015) none of the returnees interviewed reported that the availability of post-return support was a factor in their choice to engage with the programme. Nevertheless, the majority of individuals did receive post-return support, mostly for entrepreneurial initiatives. Two individuals in the sample had actually returned under a related programme Assisted Voluntary Return of Irregular Migrants (AVRIM), which was for individuals who had not applied for asylum in the UK and did not provide any reintegration support. Two other individuals had opted for support for a training programme on return. The remaining 46 returnees, including all four women, had selected reintegration support through business development. This is an unusually high proportion, globally about half of returnees select training, although the high tendency towards entrepreneurial activity amongst returnees to Sri Lanka reflects previous research. In 2004, IOM conducted research in seven countries, including Sri Lanka (IOM 2004). All of the 21 individuals interviewed in Sri Lanka took the business option, the only country where everyone had done so.

The exact amount of this business support provided to these 46 individuals fluctuated, depended on when individuals returned. In addition

to payment for their return flights, individuals received between £1500 and £4000. There was no real pattern to this sum, according to IOM London it depended purely on when individuals decided to engage with the programme, sometimes varying from one month to another. All individuals were given an initial payment of £500 immediately before return. The remaining amount, between £1000 and £3500 was paid through support in kind after return to Sri Lanka. The amount was not related to projects that individuals proposed and the variation was not designed to encourage them to participate, since they were only informed of the exact sum after they had engaged with the programme. Nor did the variation have clear development intention, indeed the limited evidence that exists suggests that even the highest level of support would not have had a determinant impact on development. Although the success of entrepreneurial activity has been found to increase with the sum invested, Black and Castaldo (2009) used a threshold of US\$5000 in their 2001 research in Ghana, approximately 20 times the GDP per capita at the time. It is clearly very difficult to develop a comparison, but in purely GDP related terms, in 2008, when this research was conducted, Sri Lankan GDP per capita was just over US\$2000, although the comparison can only be made in very general terms, this would give a threshold of more than US\$40,000, considerably more than the £4000 of the most significant support offered under the VARRP to Sri Lanka. Yet the size of the sum offered bore no relationship to the chances of success of the entrepreneurial activities that returnees selected. Overall, the development impact of post-return support was extremely limited.

THE LIMITED DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF PAY-TO-GO TO SRI LANKA

Overall, 46 returnees had chosen to receive financial support to start a business on their return to Sri Lanka. This group included 42 men and four women. They had returned to Sri Lanka from the UK between June 2004 and July 2007 and they were interviewed having been in Sri Lanka for at least a year. This allowed sufficient time to judge the impacts of support for their entrepreneurialism. There is no specific logic for the selection of a year post-return, but previous work on return has suggested that a year is an appropriate amount of time to make a judgement on the sustainability of return (Black and Gent 2004) and therefore its

potential development impact. Over this period, the development impact of this programme was extremely limited. Of the 46 small businesses supported, 22 had closed and a further 20 were operating at or below subsistence levels. Only four were generating any profit for their owners.

Far from being a surprise, the limited level of this entrepreneurial success is highly predictable. It reinforces findings that individuals experiencing mandatory or forced return face much greater obstacles than those who choose the time and circumstances of their return in a genuinely voluntary way (Schuster and Majidi 2013; Koser and Kuschminder 2015). These additional obstacles were sufficient to explain the failure of the large majority of new business ventures. They are exacerbated by the challenges associated with the design of the VARRP and its target population of current or failed asylum seekers in the UK. Individuals were also returning to a gradually deteriorating political context in which generalised violence, individual human rights abuses and a climate of official impunity were all becoming an increasingly prevalent fact of life in Sri Lanka.

The deteriorating political climate in Sri Lanka had the most immediate impact on returnees, although none of the returnees reported that conditions in Sri Lanka were a significant factor in their decision to return. In common with other recent investigations, this research found that the most common reason for return was related to deportability. Most returnees were motivated to engage with the pay-to-go scheme due to an inability to continue living in the UK. For some, this arose over a long period of time as they realised that they would never be able to make a decent life for themselves in the UK. For others, a sudden event, such as the rejection of their asylum claim, their arrest and detention or even just a change in circumstances of family members who had supported them provided an urgent stimulus for their decision. There was often a secondary reason related to family life in Sri Lanka, such as the intolerability of long-term separation from spouse and children. For some, family was the main factor motivating their return, but this was usually only in cases of emergency, such as sudden illness of immediate family members.

All but one of the 50 individuals interviewed had left the country before the February 2002 ceasefire; the single exception left only two months afterwards. They all claimed that they were informed about Sri Lankan politics before returning. These claims seemed credible. Interviews involved specific reference to the political context at the time

of return. The period 2004–2007, when individuals returned, saw significant political changes in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, all returnees were able to refer to the President, Prime Minister, and often several ministers at the time of their return. They simply expected that the ceasefire would have made a significant difference to the fears they had felt before leaving.

The particular threats that individuals faced related to whereabouts in the country they came from (and were returning to), what languages they spoke and their ethnicity. Conflict in Sri Lanka has had a highly polarised geography, resulting in Sri Lanka's unusual position for a relatively small country enjoying a thriving tourist industry while enduring a civil war. The South and East of the country were relatively stable throughout this time, with the exception of occasional bomb attacks and high rates of political disappearance in Colombo. In contrast, the East and particularly the North experienced forced recruitment by the LTTE and increasingly widespread fighting involving mass displacement and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including bombing raids by the airforce. These conditions meant that research was not possible in these parts of the country. Several returnees reported that individuals who they were in touch with had returned to the North and left for Southern India soon afterwards. In other cases, return was followed by internal displacement.

The nature of returnees' experiences was also strongly influenced by individual characteristics, particularly ethnicity. At the national level, according to the 2011 census, the majority of the population (75%) is Sinhalese. The minority Tamil population is currently categorised as either Sri Lankan Tamil (11%) who are concentrated in the conflict affected North and East, or Indian Tamil (4%). Muslims in Sri Lanka are considered an ethnic, rather than a religious group and make up nine percent of the population. The ethnic breakdown of the research sample did not reflect the national picture at all. The 46 individuals who had opened businesses included 28 Tamils (64%), 16 Muslims (32%), and two Sinhalese (4%). Given the random nature of the sample, this is representative of all returnees to the South and East of the country, though those returning to the North of the country were not included in the sample, suggesting that Tamils are especially over-represented amongst returnees. Ethnicity is closely related to language. Muslims typically speak both Tamil and Sinhala but some Tamils speak only Tamil. Since the vast majority of state officials (including police officers) in the South

of the country cannot speak Tamil, any Tamils who are unable to speak Sinhala are seriously disadvantaged on return. Inability to speak Sinhala often gives rise to immediate suspicion, since it is assumed that the individuals come from the conflict-affected North.

The research did not investigate the circumstances that motivated individuals' initial departure from Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, some referred to this unprompted as it had a bearing on their security situation after return. One of the 46 entrepreneur returnees reported that he was internally displaced, due to the threats he continued to experience on return to the East of the country. He was a 42-year-old Tamil man who had left for the UK in 2000 and returned in 2006. Although he returned to the East, we were able to interview him in Colombo as, unusually, IOM had a record of his mobile phone number and so were able to keep in touch with him after he had left his recorded home address. His business had collapsed following his departure and he was living in friends' houses in Colombo due to his fear of returning to the East. Although this was the only such situation amongst those that were interviewed it is likely that this is a more common experience, since in most cases the research team would not have been able to contact internally displaced returnees.

Security had become a dominant concern for many returnees. Inability to speak Sinhala was a particular concern for those who were joining family members who had themselves been internally displaced since their departure. One man, 33 years old at the time of interview in 2008, had left the country in 1994, at the age of 19. At that time his parents lived in Jaffna but like many people they moved away to escape the fighting during the 1990s. While his family picked up enough Sinhala to manage official exchanges when he returned in 2005, he still spoke only Tamil. He established a small business with the VARRP support but gave it away to a friend since he was unable to make it function. He said "Now, since getting back, I don't really like to go outside. I stay at home. I help my mum and dad." His language ability affected all his experiences around his return and provoked his fear at the idea of coming back at all "I called them [his parents], I told them please come to the airport, because I'm so afraid." A 44-year-old Tamil man who had returned in mid-2007 reported that the security of return was a key factor influencing his decision to engage with the programme, since he was concerned about what would happen if he was deported and handed over to Sri Lankan authorities directly at the airport. In the IOM system, "the money is secondary," he said, "what is encouraging is the security."

Unfortunately, he had faced sustained abuse and regular threats after return, both from the police and from unnamed other sources: “They [IOM] can’t guarantee security [after return] if they could many more people would want to come back.”

Security was a concern for large sections of the population in Sri Lanka during the years when individuals returned. This was particularly the case for Tamils and Muslims. In an increasingly Sinhalese nationalist political climate, acts of violence against minorities were overlooked, legitimated and even encouraged by leading public figures. Nevertheless, returnees experienced an additional set of security concerns, as returnees, and particularly as returnees from the UK, which gave them additional cause for concern. The UK was typically seen by Sri Lanka authorities, including the police as a significant base for transnational LTTE activism. By association, Tamils returning from the UK were assumed to be at least tacit supporters of the LTTE. This was further exacerbated by the assumption that, having spent time in a wealthy country with high salaries, they must have returned with very substantial savings. Of course, there was plenty of evidence across Sri Lanka of the return of wealthy individuals, but very few of those experiencing mandatory return came back with more than a few thousand pounds they received through the VARRP. Several returnees attributed the failure of their businesses to this additional pressures. A 43-year-old Tamil man reported: “People are always coming and asking for money; always ‘money, money, money’ thinking that you’re rich. I closed the shop because of it.” In some cases this amounted to corruption or extortion. Another Tamil man described the closure of his shop:

The police could come and say ‘Hey, you have one phone for me. Give me this phone.’ If I said I had no money they laughed and said ‘London people, you’re rich!’

These additional security concerns reinforce the idea that returnees faced additional barriers to establishing small businesses that would not have been the case for those who had never left. A few returnees reported that they did indeed return with larger sums, or had sent back sufficient money while they were away to develop; indeed, three of the four individuals with successful businesses were in this situation. Yet, there were also individuals whose migration had set them back financially. One of the only women interviewed had left with her husband in 2002. They

had owned a house, which they had sold for 2.5 million Sri Lankan rupees (approximately £14,000), which they used to pay an agent to smuggle them into the UK. Her husband had been forcibly returned in 2005 and she had opted to return on the VARRP immediately afterwards. They had closed the business financed by the programme since it never made any money and they were living with family members, trying to save enough money to rent their own place. Once again, these individuals returned in a much more desperate situation specifically because of their migration.

This woman had chosen to open a communications store, investing the money that she received through the VARRP in a photocopier and a computer. Unfortunately, this was one of many other such stores in the small town in the South of the country to which she returned. Duplicating existing provision, which has very low margins even if successful, was clearly a poor business decision. Although migrants are more likely to be dynamic and innovative individuals, the assumption in built-in most pay-to-go programmes that anyone can become a successful entrepreneur is not born out by this kind of reality. The VARRP should have involved an element of training, but this is extremely difficult to provide and a short training programme cannot turn individuals with no business experience into successful entrepreneurs, especially when the climate is so challenging.

It is telling that three of the four returnees with successful businesses on return had owned businesses before leaving and in two cases had continued investment with remittances while they were away. The fourth successful business was managed by one of the two Sinhalese returnees who had expanded thanks to lucrative personal and family contacts with civil servants and public officials who had channelled public contracts to his new business. Such opportunities were not available to most Tamil and Muslim returnees. In all four cases, successful businesses were not created solely from the support provided through the VARRP, but relied on substantial previous experience and additional help. One of the owners of these businesses, who employed six other people at the time of interview, commented on the general impact of businesses financed under the VARRP:

Yes everyone is very failure, [one friend] bought a shop in xxxxx town that is very expensive and now he is doing three wheeler, so, like, so many cases because they don't have a knowledge of Sri Lanka. You need a knowledge

and you need to find the environment and you need to research the customer needs and what are the category of customer in this area. Many people are thinking ‘I know the paint’ or ‘I know this experience’ so I am going to feed the customer, you have to search customer needs, then customer categories. [...] that is their only failing, most of the time.

The individual approach pursued by pay-to-go schemes relies on an entrepreneurial model of development. Entrepreneurial activity is most likely to succeed if individuals have relevant experience and failing that, some training and support. This highlights once again the predictability of the very high failure rate of businesses supported under the VARRP.

The cost of these failures is very high and not only in terms of unrealised development potential. Mandatory return to a context of increasing violence and deteriorating security such as Sri Lanka from 2004 onwards is unlikely to be sustainable, in the terms of equality of opportunities for returnees. At an individual level this may lead to internal displacement, widespread security concerns and significant vulnerability of individuals targeted specifically because of the nature and geography of their migration experience. Remigrating was a financial impossibility for the vast majority of returnees. One Muslim man, whose clothing business had failed, reported that he had paid 500,000 Sri Lankan rupees (at the time about £2500) to get to the UK in 2001. He returned under the VARRP in 2005 and when interviewed, in 2008 concluded that “Now it costs 25 lakhs to get to the UK [about £14,000 at 2008 prices]. If I had that money, I would go.” The failure of his business meant that he could not come close to raising that money, nor was he ever likely to do so. Yet his decision to remain in Sri Lanka, like his decision to return there, could not be framed as “voluntary.” Although further mobility is recognised as an important part of sustainable return, the frustration expressed by many returnees about their limited potential for further migration was intensified by their experiences in the UK.

CONCLUSION: DEPORTABILITY DOES NOT SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT

AVRRPs have been widely criticised for the limitations they place on the notion of ‘voluntary’ (ECRE 2003) and the term ‘mandatory’ return is a more accurate description. The notion of “return” has also been criticised as politically constructed, when the key policy objective

is merely one of departure (Cassarino 2015). They are more accurately ‘pay-to-go’ schemes. This paper has examined the nature of the assistance offered by such schemes. There is now a solid body of evidence highlighting the circumstances under which return migration is likely to have a positive impact on development of the places to which individuals return: where returnees (1) have work experience appropriate for their skills while away; (2) return with substantial capital, and (3) are able to plan for their return, that return is likely to have broader positive impacts.

Pay-to-go schemes can only ever attempt to replicate the second of these conditions, though it appears that even there, they do not provide sufficiently substantial financial contributions to make a genuine difference. Where individuals have previous experience of entrepreneurial activity, ideally in the country which they left, their chances of success are significantly increased. But pay-to-go schemes inevitably undermine the third factor, on the returnees’ choice of timing to return. This means that returnees on mandatory return schemes face a range of additional barriers to reintegration, highlighted by the few studies of post-return (Schuster and Majidi 2013; Koser and Kuschminder 2015). In the case of returnees to Sri Lanka returnees’ vulnerability is increased by their perceived political position and wealth, having been in the UK.

The widespread failure of pay-to-go schemes to enhance development of migrants’ country of origin undermines a key claim of these schemes to support sustainable return. Of course, the empirical research that this chapter is based on is specific to Sri Lanka during a particularly troubling period in that country’s history. Nevertheless, the situation of increasingly generalised conflict and widespread human rights abuses in Sri Lanka between 2004 and 2008 is not particularly unusual amongst countries with significant pay-to-go schemes from the UK and other European countries. In common with other recent investigations, this research has found that the financial assistance of pay-to-go schemes does not provide a significant incentive for migrants to engage with these schemes. If the “assistance” element of AVRR schemes neither promotes development after return, nor encourages migrants to return in the first place the question of what function it serves remains important. As Blitz et al. (2005) have argued, there are clearly important domestic motives for promoting return that are quite independent of migrants’ post-return situation, but this does not explain why it is necessary to retain the element of post-return assistance at all.

An answer to this question is partially beyond the scope of the chapter. However, this research has once again highlighted the important role played by the UK's "hostile environment" in undermining the integration of failed asylum seekers in the UK and encouraging them to engage with these schemes. The form of facilitated self-deportation that pay-to-go schemes provide appears unpalatable to many in liberal democracies. The development component of pay-to-go schemes effectively legitimises deportability as resulting in positive impacts in the country of origin and supporting some form of sustainable return. This chapter has argued that, at least in the case of Sri Lanka, deportability does not result in development but actually makes such positive change far less likely.

REFERENCES

- Black, Richard, and Adriana Castaldo. 2009. Return Migration and Entrepreneurship in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire: The Role of Capital Transfers. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 100 (1): 44–58.
- Black, Richard, Michael Collyer, and Will Somerville. 2011. *Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programmes: Is Scale Possible?*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Black, Richard, and Saskia Gent. 2004. Defining, Measuring and Influencing Sustainable Return: The Case of the Balkans. Migration DRC Working Paper T-7. Migration DRC, University of Sussex, Brighton http://www.migration-drc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T7.pdf.
- Blitz, Brad, Rosemary Sales, and Lisa Marzano. 2005. Non-voluntary Return? The Politics of Return to Afghanistan. *Political Studies* 53: 182–200.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 6 (2): 253–279.
- . 2015. Return Migration and Development: The significance of Migration Cycles. In *Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies*, ed. A. Triandafyllidou. London: Routledge.
- Collyer, Michael. 2012. Deportation and Micro-politics of Exclusion: The Rise of Removals from the UK to Sri Lanka. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 276–292.
- Collyer, Michael, Ummuhan Bardak, Eva Jansova, and Outi Kärkkäinen. 2013. *Migration and Skills in Armenia, Georgia and Morocco*. Turin: European Training Foundation.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant 'illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 419–447.
- Démurger, Sylvie, and Xu Hui. 2011. Return Migrants: The Rise of New Entrepreneurs in Rural China. *World Development* 39 (10): 1847–1861.

- Dustmann, Christian, and Oliver Kirchkamp. 2001. The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity Choice after Re-migration. IZA Discussion Paper 266, IZA, Bonn.
- ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles). 2003. "Position on Return" PO1/10/2003/Ext/MP. Brussels: ECRE.
- IOM. 2004. *Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) Reintegration Self-Evaluation Results*. Geneva: IOM.
- . 2011. *Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. Annual Report of Activities 2011*. Geneva: IOM.
- King, Russell. 1978. Return Migration: A Neglected Aspect of Population Geography. *Area* 10 (3): 175–182.
- Koser, Khalid, and Katie Kuschminder. 2015. *Comparative Research on the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Migrants*. Geneva: IOM.
- McCormick, Barry, and Jackline Wahba. 2003. Return International Migration and Geographical Inequality: The Case of Egypt. *Journal of African Economies* 12 (4): 500–532.
- Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2015. *Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka*. September 16, 2015. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx>. Accessed 20 Jan 2016.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- Transparency Research, and Olga Evans. 2010. *The Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) 2006: A Process and impact Assessment*. Home Office Research Report 39.
- UNHCR. 2004. *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2009. *Transnationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Wilson, Brenda, and Olga Evans. 2010. *The Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) 2007*. Home Office Research Report 40.
- Woodruff, Christopher, and Rene Zenteno. 2001. Remittances and Microenterprises in Mexico. UCSD, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies Working Paper, San Diego.
- World Bank. 2016. Economic Data 2016. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/GH?page=2&display=default>. Accessed 20 May 2016.

Deportees Lost at “Home”: Post-deportation Outcomes in Afghanistan

Nassim Majidi

INTRODUCTION

Deportation, defined as “the physical removal of someone against their will from the territory of one state to that of another” (Schuster and Majidi 2013), is treated as a tool, by states, to manage migration. Yet, the “normalcy of deportation” (Bloch and Schuster 2005; Galvin 2015) hides the fact that little is known about its post-deportation outcomes. Consequences can be extreme, at times leading to torture and death. Authors have argued that its impact could be equated to *refoulement*¹ (Di Cataldo 2016). This chapter shows two additional elements—the changing demographics of deportation, with minors and families deported to war-torn locations; and the continuous fear that accompanies deportees and prevents them from turning their return into a positive experience, thus leading to negative psychosocial impacts. The chapter argues that even if return does not lead to direct persecution, the fear itself—of failure, harassment, and the inability to cope with a return

N. Majidi (✉)

Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Paris, France

to life at home—leads to psychosocial stressors that put deportees’ future at risk.

Beyond the normalcy of deportation is the abnormal: the resurgence of ‘mass deportations’ (Gomberg-Munoz 2016) in the Global South. From the involuntary returns from Kenya to Somalia of about half a million Somali refugees (Human Rights Watch 2016), to the forced returns of a possible three million refugees from Pakistan to Afghanistan (*Al Jazeera* 2016) and to the deportations of—annually—half a million migrants from Iran to Afghanistan, the Global South is marred by examples of involuntary, forced returns, and deportations. Europe is adding its own pressures in Afghanistan, with the EU’s tentative target of 80,000 returns from Europe to Afghanistan in coming years, as announced in October 2016 (EU Council 2016).

Taking the case of Afghanistan, specifically, this chapter reviews the challenges for individuals and families in the immediate post-deportation phase. Building on a longitudinal study carried out in 2008 and 2016 with over 1500 respondents along the Afghan-Iranian border, this chapter presents an increasing trend in deportations of unaccompanied minors and undocumented families from Iran to Afghanistan. By comparing 2008 and 2016 data, this research methodology allows the data to speak for changes across a decade of deportations from Iran to Afghanistan. It goes beyond a European lens of forced returns to follow the highest numbers of deportations to Afghanistan, namely those from Iran, accounting for close to 400,000–500,000 people annually (IOM 2016). It also goes beyond an asylum lens to a broader migration lens as the factors leading to migration to Iran are a mix of structural and individual factors for a better life—be it economic, physical, or social.

Theoretical Framework

The era of mass deportations (Gomberg-Munoz 2016) has led to a “global circuit of deportation” (Khosravi 2016), in reference to the interaction between states deporting individuals, and individuals challenging state authority through remigration. The global circuit can be broken down further to fully understand its trends and risks. This article identifies a regional circuit between Iran and Afghanistan, monitored through field research between 2008 and 2016 (Samuel Hall 2017).

This longitudinal research alongside the Iranian-Afghan border shows worsening conditions of deportations and three evolutions of concern to the humanitarian and human rights debate.

Findings are analysed through the prism of psychosocial wellbeing, understood as a state of mental, emotional, social, and spiritual wellbeing that allows individuals to reach their desires, potential and capabilities, and full enjoyment of their rights. The argument is made that when such a state is not reached, decisions and actions by deportees can lead to harmful consequences. In line with Cassarino’s emphasis on preparedness as a key to sustainability of return, the deportees are unprepared. Although conscious of the threat of deportation, and of their “state of deportability,” the sudden outcome of it—for some just as they had not even reached their final destination—leaves them unprepared to face the reality of return. Their lack of financial resources further undermines their preparedness. As a result, return is often short-lived.

The requirements for psychosocial wellbeing, as presented by DeBono, Rönnqvist, and Magnusson (2015, p. 158), include (1) agency, autonomy, and control, (2) participation and involvement, (3) social relationships and networks, and (4) safety. This research shows the incapacity of deportees in Afghanistan to fulfil these criteria and hence their inability to reach a state of psychosocial wellbeing that could, tentatively, allow them to resume their lives in their society of origin.

Key to our understanding of deportees’ psychosocial wellbeing is the fact that deportation is not just a physical removal or a single administrative event. It is a process built in fear and in the pressure of an intangible threat and high levels of risk. Deportation starts well before the border with experiences of detention, as in Iran; it is then further acted at the border through physical removal, and continues after the border with the inability to simply return “home” empty-handed. While scholars have focused on the impact of deportability on asylum seekers, migrants and their families (DeBono, Rönnqvist, and Magnusson 2015; Hasselberg 2016), much less is known about the fears that continue to shape post-deportation outcomes. What has changed since a decade ago, when in 2008, I started researching Afghan deportees?

First, the trend in changing demographics and categories of return highlights a story of fear among minors and women. Increasingly, it is no longer the “young fit adult male” (Fekete 2005) who experiences deportation: children are being deported, unaccompanied and

separated minors, along with families who are threatened and ultimately deported. Identities of the deportees are transformed: from a “voluntary migrant,” “migrant worker,” or “undocumented refugee” to the “deportee” (Miller 2012), the added change is now a demographic one. The “deported minor,” the “deported family,” are now frequent features in forced returns. Fear is common to all of them. While unaccompanied minors are willing to receive assistance and be “taken care of,” women and families’ reactions show that fear turns into mistrust and isolation. They are emotionally lost at the border in the initial post-deportation phase.

Second, upon being forcibly returned, individuals realise the limited choices, networks, and resources available to them. They reflect on their feelings of exclusion and loss of power. This is due, in part, to the fact that deportation is the result of an exclusion that many continue to fear in their homeland. Afghans who cross international borders live with the knowledge of deportability (De Genova 2002, 2005), of human rights abuses (Fekete 2005), and of the possibility of “superexploitation” (Heyman 1998) on the other side. The sentence “*we deport them but they keep coming back*” (Galvin 2015) is applicable to Afghans crossing the Western border in the hope of security, jobs, and more (Majidi, van der Vorst, and Foulkes 2016). Even in the face of such threats, fewer and fewer deportees go back to their hometowns after their deportation. In 2013, in an article co-authored with Liza Schuster (Schuster and Majidi 2013), we identified three causes: levels of debt, the shame of failure, and the stigma of contamination. In 2016, data collected among deportees from Afghanistan showed an increasing state of limbo. Deportees found themselves living between the dreams of migration, the reality of the border areas where they had been forcibly returned to, and for some, the impossibility of returning “home” to a home that may no longer exist, or in which the context may have deteriorated too widely to return.

Third, and last, the few who make it home portray a state of social and economic loss that impacts their sense of safety and security. They are unable to resume their lives the way they would want and find themselves forced to migrate again. The phrase “*I do not want to but have no choice*” is commonly heard among those who may be happy to be reunited with their loved ones, but live and relive the pressure to migrate. Remigration turns into forced migration.

Methodology and Context

Deportation is best understood through life stories (Atkinson 1998; Fekete 2005), while to speak of deportation trends, a longitudinal assessment² is needed. This chapter presents both. This research uses a mixed methods approach building on both qualitative and quantitative data extracted from two research projects—conducted in 2008 and again in 2016—focusing on Afghan deportees from Iran specifically. Altogether, across these two phases, over 1500 deportees were interviewed in the Western provinces of Afghanistan bordering Iran, in Herat, and Nimroz. They were interviewed using a three-phased approach with interviews at three sites of high frequency by deportees: the Western border points of Islam Qala, in Herat, and Zaranj, in Nimroz province (on the day of return), the urban capital nearest to the border (within a week of return), and upon return home (for those who made it home in the provinces alongside the Western border).

The research team was composed of Afghan researchers and enumerators engaged in a quantitative data collection exercise, alongside two international researchers. The quantitative research was matched with case studies and qualitative interviews with deportees—covering all demographic groups: men and women, minors, and families. The main prism for the research was one of action research, to identify protection needs among deportees to inform a response by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan. From this action research, a focus on protection allowed the research team to identify harmful practices, health concerns, coping strategies upon return, access to basic services, and indicators to assess post-deportation risks.

At the end of 2016, the IOM recorded over 436,000 deportations of Afghans from Iran, with an estimated 10% requiring humanitarian assistance (IOM 2016). In comparison, about a quarter million deportations were recorded from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Although the Pakistani government has announced its willingness to deport more Afghans in the future, the largest number of deportations come from Iran. The Norwegian Refugee Council (2016) states that “since 2008, little (or no) research has been conducted on the situations of the hundreds of thousands of deportees every year, from Iran and/or Europe. Yet the largest numbers are crossing the border back into Afghanistan from Iran—at an average of 300,000–400,000 a year. Significant numbers are unaccompanied minors” (Norwegian Refugee Council 2016,

p. 4). Most of these returns occur through two border crossing points; one in the Northwestern province of Herat at Islam Qala, the second at the Southwestern province of Nimroz in Zaranj. A comparison of these locations across a decade shows worsening conditions of detention, deportation, and post-deportation outcomes.

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS OF DEPORTEES FROM IRAN: CHILDREN, WOMEN, AND FAMILIES AT THE BORDER

The scale of deportations from Iran to Afghanistan has remained constant over a decade, with over 400,000 deportations per year. Broken down, this represents about 33,000 deportations per month, or 1000 per day. These steadily high figures hide a demographic evolution in the profiles of those being deported. In 2008, a study on Afghan deportees from Iran (ILO-UNHCR 2008) referred to a temporary and cyclical labour phenomenon mainly composed of single adult males constituting 99% of all deportees from Iran. Their migration was motivated by economic and labour considerations, as a means of subsistence for poor families in Afghanistan. The research in 2016 shows that other drivers play a decisive role, including the resurgence of conflict in Afghanistan. In the sample interviewed, some had left Taliban prone areas, while others were unable to find jobs because of the economic impact of conflict. They ventured into Iran for work, they strived for an economy not damaged by conflict, although they recognised that unemployment among Iranians was high, and that their main added value would be one of cheap labour costs. They knew exploitation would be part of their journey, alongside long working hours, harsh living conditions on their workplace, and a continuous hidden presence to avoid police harassment. This is the risk that Afghan migrants are ready to take given the lack of work and stability in Afghanistan.

This chapter goes beyond the demographic most often talked about in the context of cross-border movements between Afghanistan and Iran—the single adult men who form part of a working class of Afghans in Iran, presented above—to speak of the growing numbers of underage minors migrating to Iran and being deported from Iran. In our 2016 sample, out of 760 respondents surveyed, 123 deportees at the border were under the age of 18. Close to one out of five deportees was a minor. One out of ten was separated *en route* from their family but

the rest were unaccompanied minors who had left Afghanistan and were deported. The majority of them are not in contact with their family. The youngest minor we interviewed was 10, the oldest 17. Although there are some cases of deported minors below the age of 12, these are the rare cases. The largest number of minors is aged between 15 and 17, falling in the youth category, often being the eldest son of the household sent by the family to find additional support and income in Iran. Their deportation story is one of autonomy and isolation—at a very young age—and of the need for assistance and care.

This chapter also provides insight into the lives of women and families deported from Iran. They are the “undocumented Afghans,” in UNHCR’s terminology, living in Iran without refugee cards either because they were not properly registered by authorities and by UNHCR, because they lost their status, were unable to renew their refugee card, or were living in areas outlawed by the government. The “No Go Area Policy,” passed in 2007 by the National Security Council, declared some Iranian provinces and cities as forbidden for foreign nationals, including refugees. They were given a deadline to relocate to authorised locations or to return to Afghanistan. Those who did not opt for either option became unlawful and were susceptible to being deported to Afghanistan.

Minors: Between Autonomy and Assistance

“Hello, it’s me. I have been deported. What should I do?”—a 12-year-old calling his family home, through a cell phone lent by our research team in Islam Qala, Herat.

Minors’ growing tendency and capacity to migrate showcase their autonomy as migrants; on the one hand, the state response shows the incapacity to adapt to the needs of children. This chapter builds on the forced return as a form of forced migration literature (Gibney 2013) and argues that the treatment Afghan minors are subjected to, in their deportation process, goes against the rights of the child, harming their development.

The majority of minors migrate to Iran for work, sent by their families to earn an income and support their basic subsistence needs. As a result, they are treated as irregular migrants in Iran, having crossed the border through means outside of the legal system. Beyond the borders of Afghanistan, they are rarely in touch with their families, and do not

have the possibility to call them once they have been arrested. They are stripped of their belongings in detention facilities where they spend days, a week, or more before being deported. This is a first concern to their psychosocial wellbeing as their ties to their network are severed. Authorities handle minors in the same manner as adults, with no attention paid to the vulnerable character of a child, or to other requirements laid out in international legal instruments. The process of deportation has, as a result, traumatising effects on them.

Abuses against minors are more common than those against adults in the deportation process. When it comes to verbal abuse, 78% and 81% of minors in Nimroz and Herat respectively recall having been yelled at or threatened during their arrest and detention, as compared to 70% and 64% of the adult men. Minors are as often detained as adult males: 67% of minors in Herat (compared to 64% of adult males) and 31% in Nimroz (compared to 33% of adult males) were detained prior to their deportation.

Mohammad, 15 years old, is a Pashtun from Logar province, in the East of Afghanistan. He was in Iran only for ten days before his deportation and did not even make it to his final destination, which was Tehran. He is the eldest son of a family of nine. He said, “My mother is sick so I left to be able to help her.” Beyond a mobile phone and livestock, his family has no other assets. The only skill he has is in agricultural work, learned from his family. He has received no training and no schooling. He is illiterate. His siblings have had a better fate as they all go to school and none of them works. He is the only one in this situation because he is the eldest, with the burden of family responsibilities falling on him. It is positive in his view, as his siblings do not have to make the same sacrifices as him. He is determined to succeed to protect them. When interviewed at the border, we asked what his immediate needs are he says, “Cash—only cash—I need to pay my way back into Iran, pay a smuggler and get to work.” On second thought, he said, “also health care for my mother.” When we asked him, “who will help you find a job now?” he says, “myself!” He only counts on himself. He, unlike the other minors we spoke to, seems decided to go back to Iran. His mission has been tampered with, and he is angry about it. He does not want to go to the transit camp, Camp Ansar, located near the city of Herat, where IOM provides assistance to deported minors; and he does not want to be escorted back home, to Logar at the opposite end of the country, in Eastern Afghanistan. He wants to go back to Iran. He is still

close enough to be able to cross the border, he says. He is on a mission to migrate to Iran, and to earn an income. He wants to succeed, for his mother’s sake. Mohammad tells us, “I left to be able to help her.” His biggest concern, after having been detained, and deported, in the middle of the month of August, is to find a way out of the government’s and international agencies’ control and cross the desert to Iran again.

Mohammad was deported on the same day as Obaid, 17 years of age at the time of his deportation, 16 when he originally migrated. He is from Ghazni province, in central Afghanistan. He is also a Pashto speaker and the two quickly became close, thanks to their shared experience of a failed migration, having travelled alone to Iran on behalf of their family. Yet, their experiences differ. Obaid comes from a family of eight, but he is the only son, so the “natural choice” for migration. He left his home because of the very poor economic situation of his family, but also because the “Taliban will not let us work freely.” His village has increasingly come under Taliban control over the past year. He had never been to Iran before; this was his first time, and the first time he experienced deportation. He does not want to go back, ever again, he says, traumatised by the working conditions and by detention. He, unlike Mohammad, actually did work in Iran for a quarter of the year, but he never received any of his salary for the three full months that he worked. He is convinced that his employer called the police to inform on him and have him arrested. Obaid had started to ask questions, at first several times a week, then daily, about his salary, as he was growing anxious to earn money and send it back to his family. He now understands that he had been too vocal, and that his employer had never intended to pay him in full.

During his time in Iran, Obaid recalls seeing Hazara families sacrifice one of theirs, in Iran, to go fight in the Syrian war, in the hope of paperwork from the Iranian authorities. He remembers, in Tehran, one day seeing neighbours, an Afghan family, celebrating. He asked one of the children what the reason was. He recounts the little girl explaining to him that her Afghan father’s death in Syria was their freedom to stay in Iran, as they received a letter confirming that the government of Iran would issue them residency papers to lawfully remain. He felt then that Afghans had to surrender to extremes, sacrificing their lives to be worthy of being accepted in Iran. He could not comprehend how fellow Afghans could reach such levels. So when he returned to Afghanistan, he was traumatised not only by his own experience of detention, but also

by the exploitation of Afghans—as workers, as fighters, as human beings. On the day of our interview at the border, he stepped off the bus and would not talk for the first hour of his return. He followed the NGO workers who escorted him to some warm tea, a warm lunch. Then he looked at the only woman in the centre, me, wanting to talk. His first words were that he was glad to be back, that he felt a sense of welcome on Afghan soil. However, the next day, he felt that the care was too constricting. IOM had given him a bed for the night, new clothes, and was planning an escort to take him home to Ghazni. He was getting nervous. He did not like the waiting period. He began to show signs of fear. Fear that they would take him somewhere else, fear that they would travel at night, fear that something would go wrong. The initial reassurance turned into repeated nightmares, and mistrust. He realised that he did not want to go back home. “There is so much insecurity now in Ghazni: the Taliban have come back. They have long hair and long beards. They are going to ask me ‘why don’t you have a beard?’ then I will have to tell them that I went to Iran. They will ask me ‘Why Iran? Stay here and serve us. Join our ranks.’ I will try my best to stay away from them... the least they will tell me is ‘next time do not shave in Iran; refuse to shave, be a good Muslim.’” He was visibly scared to go back, although he denied it. He did mention that the Taliban “take young kids to mad-rassahs [religious school] from a very young age, and then, they disappear, you never see them again.”

Mohammad and Obaid are eager to be left on their own. They consider that their age should not make them “less capable” to succeed, and that choices should not be made for them. They appreciated the immediate food, attention, and care they received from the IOM upon their arrival in Afghanistan, especially in contrast to their treatment in Iran, but beyond the immediate, they would much prefer to be left on their own. “We were able to go to Iran on our own! From here we can surely take care of ourselves,” says Obaid. They are no longer used to being taken care of as minors, as the children that they are, so much of their experience going to Iran, and in Iran, being out of the norm for children. “I know kids who are 13, 14 and who are working in Iran. If we did not have problems here, we would never leave! But now we have to.” They still consider having been part luckier than other minors deported from Iran, by the simple fact that they were returned in the Northwestern crossing point of Islam Qala. They recount hearing that those who are deported in the Southern point, in Nimroz, are worse off.

They go through the Zahedan detention centre in Iran, known for its brutality. They also say that those deported from Pakistan are worse off than from Iran. “Pakistanis separate men and women on the road and they say ‘we will allow the women to go straight to Iran and to their destination, you will meet them there’ but in reality they take them elsewhere and do bad things. They lie.” Mohammad and Obaid’s testimonies are filled with rumours; hearsay accounts of experiences of other men, women, and children deported from Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan.

Families and Women: Fear and a Lack of Trust

Among the most vulnerable of the deportees are women and minors: they are more vulnerable to the risks and dangers of migration and deportation than male adults are. The research team spoke to 14 women in Herat, and 16 women in Nimroz, who arrived without their families over the course of one week. Female deportees are usually always over the age of 18, there are no female unaccompanied minors according to a field report from the organisation, War Child. Additionally, over 100 families (35%) stated requiring medical assistance, 71% food and water, and 60% clothing—all immediate needs expressed at the border. Undocumented Afghan families outnumber registered refugees in Iran. The Government of Iran has insisted on repatriation as the preferred solution for the undocumented Afghans residing in Iran. In 2002, a voluntary repatriation process agreed upon in a tripartite agreement, among the Governments of Iran and Afghanistan, and UNHCR, led to the return of over 5.8 million refugees from Iran and Pakistan. The rate of voluntary returns among refugees from Iran to Afghanistan has, however, dropped, reaching an almost null figure in recent years. Against this drop, the trend of forced returns has risen, to include undocumented families who left for Iran at the onset of conflict in Afghanistan.

Families, and women among them, are visibly marked by the experience of deportation and of an unexpected, unwanted return. When families and women arrive on Afghan soil, stepping off loaded buses, they are free to walk away, should they choose to. At the border, officials and NGOs are instructed to provide free transportation to women and a temporary shelter at a nearby transit centre, where they also receive food and non-food items. In discussions with one Afghan official, we were told, “sometimes, ten families will be deported together. However, if one

woman among them decides not to listen to us, all of them will leave. If one of them rejects the assistance we offer, then we know we have lost all chance to get the other women, men, and children to come to us.” Women’s priority is to avoid being trapped, harassed or bothered to such an extent that some will refuse the assistance offered to them by the government or aid agencies. The experience of deportation has led to a lack of trust in authority, a lack of willingness to rely on external support, even in their own homeland, making them reject any form of authority or assistance. This form of agency, as they are capable to go against the readiness of male relatives to accept the assistance, can jeopardise their own safety. Their own choices, made out of fear and of the harm experienced in the journey, bias their reaction upon return.

The deportation process—from arrest, to detention, deportation, and arrival in Afghanistan—shows a complete lack of any female authority figure that female deportees may be able to trust or turn to, such as social counsellors or nurses. Women and families are taken by men, treated by men, and returned by men. The lack of a female presence on the Afghan side of the border further enhances women’s sense of fear and mistrust, leading them to make decisions based on the perception that they may be hurt or taken advantage of, misled or misunderstood. One of them turned to me and said, “I am scared. I do not want to get any help. I don’t trust these people.” She was a 24-year-old woman deported with her brother. He was ready to get support, she was not. Minutes after her brother had accepted the assistance being offered at the border by Afghan officials, she insisted that they should leave. He listened to her and followed her lead. She was in a position to make a decision for herself and her brother, but that decision came out of fear, enshrined in her through deportation. The experience of deportation has traumatised these women to the extent that they do not trust (male) Afghan officials, or aid representatives.

CHANGING CONTEXT POST-DEPORTATION: WHERE IS THEIR “HOME”?

This section reviews the multiple losses that deportation entails: first, a loss of one’s ability to regain a home; second, the loss of control, autonomy, and participation; and third, a loss of markers, or points of reference. From the physical to the emotional, these losses impact psychosocial wellbeing.

Loss of Their Home and the Creation of New Networks

For minors, families, and women, the first “home” they will find upon return in Afghanistan is a transitory one. A temporary shelter, set up by the Afghan authorities, UNHCR and IOM, called Camp Ansar in the Western province of Herat, which serves specific vulnerable categories. Deportees fitting UNHCR’s *People with Specific Needs (PSN)* category are transferred to a transit camp upon arrival for emergency assistance—while the majority of deportees, single adult males, are left to themselves. Yet, resources are lacking and there is no government policy to assist deportees. Left to find their own way, the majority of deportees leave the border as quickly as they arrived, and meet a network of middlemen that either assist them or pass them on to the smuggling agents to renew their attempt to travel to Iran within a day or two.

The middlemen are prepared for the deportees’ arrival, lined up outside of the secured border areas in the town of Islam Qala or in Zaranj and provide the first link to the city. While they are prepared to receive them, the deportees are unprepared, causing an uneven relationship between those supplying support and those who need it. There is no other choice for deportees who return, systematically, empty-pocketed from Iran. In Iran, their belongings were stripped from them, having been arrested in the street or on their workplace, and they were not given the chance to recuperate their belongings or savings. With no money to pay a cab, deportees rely on the middlemen who fill a void that no other fills.

“The propensity of migrants to become actors of change and development at home depends on the extent to which they have provided for the preparation of their return. (...) There exist various degrees of return preparation that differ in terms of resource mobilization and preparedness” (Cassarino 2004, p. 271). With deportees, either of those terms is non-existent. The deportees from Iran are sent “home” without any money, belongings, and only the clothes on their back. The resources mobilised are not available to them and the preparedness is absent when return has been sudden and forced. On the other hand, resources and preparedness are on the side of a network of middlemen who act as a much-needed lifeline for deportees.

At “point zero,” referring to the border, taxis embark five deportees per car on average and take them to the city. There, they are

introduced to hotel owners who can host them for the night. Hotels are organised by province of origin. For example, a Hazara from Bamyan will rely on hotel owners from the same ethnicity and area, and will be brought to the “Central Highlands Hotel” or to the “Four Seasons Bamyan Hotel,” located in Herat city. On the other hand, a deportee originally from the North will be taken to the “Mazar Faryab Hotel,” which will broadly be home to those whose nuclear or extended families live in the Northern provinces. Once in the hands of hotel owners, they will be housed and fed. They become a constant source of clientele for the hotels, providing a roof above the heads of those who have just left detention and deportation. Beyond ethnic affiliations, the main reason for this distribution is financial. Hotel owners rely on a network of focal points in the target provinces of origin to help locate the families and obtain cash from them to pay for their services. Taxis and hotel owners then provide a link to the families, or a moment of respite to pull themselves back together and figure out what to do next. If the families cannot pay, the situation then turns into a risky one for deportees. They will have to work their way through their stay, which can turn into situations of bonded labour for some; or they are handed over to traffickers or other less well-intentioned individuals.

Taxi drivers and hotel owners fill a void that has been neglected by the government and the humanitarian community alike: although some of the hotel owners are also accused of taking advantage of the vulnerability of migrants, creating a business out of their deportation, they would not be doing so if there were not a need. They also serve a purpose: to get deportees from the border to a shelter, and eventually back to Iran or back to hometown. Without these hotels and taxis, migrant workers would be either stranded at the border with no transportation available to them and, once in the city, they would be sleeping in the streets with no food or water or hygiene facilities.

There are reported cases of deportees being handed over by taxi drivers to hotel owners, and from there to smuggling agents, brokers or, at worse, to traffickers. There are rumours that abound on the role of hotel owners, who are seen as profiting from a business of forced returns, while others portray themselves as the only lifeline available in the immediate post-deportation days. A hotel owner in the city of Herat was quick to explain his concern over the official treatment of

deportees in his province, presenting his action as a response to state inaction. He said:

These people need basic support—they need clothes. Some of us in Herat are collecting what we can for them—clothes but also sometimes money. However, it is not enough. Their numbers keep growing and the government is not doing anything for those who do not have cards registered as refugees. Don’t believe what they tell you about Camp Ansar—they only help those who have refugee cards.

He said this in front of a man who had arrived at his hotel the same morning, visibly distressed by his experience, crying during his interview. The hotel owner sought to reassure us by saying, “He is not totally lost, he will not go astray, he will get to his family.” Through these comments, he wanted to confirm that he, as the hotel owner, could reach out to the deportee’s family and second, that he was aware of the impact of deportation on the ability of deportees to make rational choices.

Loss of Control: A Changed Security and Financial Context

“Afghanistan has changed, the Taliban are back,” a deportee from Ghazni, deported three years after moving to Iran.

Situations of high stress are expressed in post-deportation interviews. Adult men responsible for entire households feel a loss of control, a lack of networks and safety that lead to a state of anxiety. Concerns over physical safety and threats to their lives are common. Juma Gul, 42 years old, speaks at a hotel where he is staying in one room with a group of seven other men. They all travelled together from Afghanistan to Iran, and were deported together. Juma Gul explains: “When I left eight years ago, Baghlan city was safe. Today, it is in the hands of the Taliban. How am I supposed to go and live there now? How am I supposed to pay to leave again?”

Another man chimes in: “We are in touch with our families and are debating what to do: go home? Go back? It’s war where we come from. Baghlan city has been recently taken over by the Taliban. Nothing for us to do there, no work, no security. What should we do? We have been here for two days already. Baghlan is at war. If one day you don’t work there, you starve. So I left and my only network abroad was in Turkey. I don’t know anyone in Iran. I would not have left if I didn’t have to,

for my life: Why would I put myself at the hands of the Pakistanis, of the Iranians, in detention otherwise? Look at my clothes, they are all ripped apart.”

Beyond the insecurity is the economic viability of returning to one's hometown. The reasons for leaving in the first place are still present or have been exacerbated: namely insecurity, lack of employment, and the need to provide for basic subsistence needs. Deportee families hold on one last economic thread: waiting for money to come from their employer in Iran. Having been deported without having been given the time to recuperate what they owned, their hopes turn to the hopes.

Migration to Iran is interrupted and short-lived for some. Yet, in the limited time that they are there, they earn better wages than they earn in Afghanistan. Relationships to employers differ. Some pay regularly and can lead to monthly income levels of US\$450–600, of which a large part is sent home.

“In Iran, I worked in the construction sector in Shiraz, I was there for only six months, but the employer was good to me. Every week we had our pay. Monthly, I would earn 1,400,000 tomans (roughly US\$450), of which I maybe spent 200,000 tomans and sent the rest home (1,200,000 tomans or US\$380). In Afghanistan, I would have earned maybe a third of that.”
—Besmellah, 27-year-old, originally from Mazar-e-Sharif. He left to Iran after his fourth child was born.

For others, payments stall, and are irregular. Working conditions for Afghans in Iran have deteriorated in recent years, and relationships between employers and workers as well. The lack of contract and irregular payment methods point to situations of exploitation in Iran. Yet, they still hope, once returned, that a phone call to their employers will allow them to recuperate what they have earned. Once deported, those who did not receive their salaries are contacting their employers and other Afghan workers in Iran. For some of them the journey in Iran was particularly harsh, working not only in unskilled construction sector positions, but also, for some, also in the mining sector, going underground daily. They may want to go home but their focus is first on getting their money back. The financial motivations are strong and the benefits important for Afghan migrants who support, through their labour, their families' subsistence needs, their children's education, access to services such as healthcare, and so forth. The money will allow them to either

travel back to their hometown or travel across the border to Iran to resume their work. They hope to be able to pay for their stay and depart from the hotels, their temporary accommodation, *if* and *when* their employers send their money back. When will that be?

“It is hard to say, he is Iranian, we are just Afghans...so he might never actually send us anything. I realise that now. My family has nothing to send to me, they can’t help me financially, as I was the one helping them financially! We have no assets to sell either...Afghans will always be needed in Iran, they deport us but they leave the border open to get a good income from us, they trade on Afghans,” explains Assad, 28-year-old Pahstun, interviewed in Herat.

None of the deportees the research team spoke to was able to obtain their payment remotely, from Afghanistan, showing the potential of lost hopes, but more importantly, how limited deportees’ room for manoeuvre is upon return. Their emotional stability is often hanging by a thread.

Loss of Reference Points and Shrinking Options

“I need a doctor, I am lost.” —Najib, 27, lived six months in Iran. He spent five days in detention centres in Iran before being deported on August 13, 2016, in Islam Qala. He was visibly shaken, emotional, tired, and in a state of shock. He requested a referral to a doctor during his interview.

Deportee men interviewed in the hotels within days of their deportation are visibly very shaken, emotional, tired, and in a state of shock. They voice concerns about feeling lost, not knowing what to do next, or how to go about their lives. These are partly the consequences of their detention in Iran, from three to five nights in a row, before being loaded on buses to cross the border. They are also moved from one centre to another, from local detention centres they will be sent to the main, Sang Sefid, detention centre in Iran, from where deportations are organised. The shock is threefold. First, the disbelief of having been “arrested like that,” with their money left behind. They are stripped of their most important asset. Second, the disbelief at the numbers of Afghans in detention centres, and the numbers of police officers tracking them down in Iran. Deportees spoke of new teams in Iran that are mandated to roam the streets of Tehran, for example, and are dubbed by Afghans

as the *Nerooye Afghan Begir*, a term that means “a team that catches Afghans.” Third, the shock of being stripped of the little they have, a sense of humiliation and dispossession. “They took my money, clothes, phone—I was not allowed to make a phone call. What did I see while I was there? Physical assaults, injuries, including two Afghans who threw themselves out of the bus so that they would not return to Afghanistan. I also saw some kids, maybe ten to eleven years old, alone in these centres,” continues Najib.

The humiliation of being in the same clothes for a week, being dispossessed from financial and material resources, not allowed to take a shower by Iranian authorities in detention centres, and being cut out from the outside world, lead to a feeling of loss—material and mental.

Let me go home. I am tired, give me a week. I need to collect my thoughts and figure out a way. I don't have answers to all of your questions, Najib, 27.

Violence is not only experienced upon return. It is part of their entire journey. The migration to Iran, being irregular for most, results in risks that families take, sometime with the accompanying children. On the road, children are slower than adults are. Some begin hitting their children, under the pressure to survive the trek. Violence is common on the road. Najib continues remembering the difficulties faced on the road, starting from the outward journey to Iran:

There was this one place, at the cross section of Pakistan and Iran, where on one side you had Pakistani forces on their feet and on the other Iranian forces by air, all started shooting at us and killed one woman and two youngsters. Dead. Just attacked on both sides. Guns from airplanes killing them in front of me.

This is the mental state many come back in—how many is difficult to quantify but the visible and invisible traumas of migration, detention, and deportation are present in their testimonies. They do not have the time or space to process their experience, until the moment they are deported and their migration plans are stopped. The immediate post-deportation phase is filled with signs of psychosocial distress.

The choices are restricted for deportees in Afghanistan. Returning to their families can mean returning to conflict. “If I don't get any money,

then I will go to Iran. And if I go back, the Taliban will ask me to join their ranks. That is the choice I have,” continues Rajabali, 42, from Baghlan province. The question of limited choice leads to a feeling of entrapment. Rajabali continues:

We have no one else but ourselves and our families for support, we trust our family only, everyone else is corrupted and after their own interests. Each for their own. Let’s see what “*gharib kari*” or casual labour in agriculture/livestock we find. Where we are there is war, the Taliban just took over the city. Our children go to school there, let’s see for how long in the hands of the Taliban!

None of them has any expectations beyond their families. They do not expect the government to assist them. While in 2008, respondents mainly named the government as their source of planned support to find jobs, in 2016, pessimism has stepped in. “What can the Government of Afghanistan do for us? Nothing,” says Juma Gul. He has no expectation of a government that cannot maintain security in the country.

Because of the multiple losses, only a minority of deportees actually goes back to their hometown or village. The rates of deportation are high, and they are cyclical: many deportees, rather than returning and re-integrating in their home provinces, decide to remigrate again. These have been trends for over ten years and whereas immediate needs exist, the lack of focus on the psychosocial needs of deportees means that the bigger picture of their trauma and their ability for re-integration is missed. According to the research conducted in 2008 and 2016, the number of those who have experienced multiple deportations has doubled along the Western border.

CONCLUSION

Deportations to Afghanistan are on the rise, from Iran, Pakistan, Europe, and beyond. This chapter raises two concerns. First, a demographic shift in deportations leading to the return of unaccompanied minors and separated children, of families, and women. Interviewed at border points, their feelings of stress and anxiety are strong. Second, in a context of resurgence of conflict, deportees are faced with limited options: stay in Afghanistan or cross the border back to Iran. Some may not have the resources to finance either of these choices and remain in a state of limbo

in Afghanistan, populating hotels in the border provinces and becoming vulnerable to bonded labour and possible trafficking. The lack of preparedness of forced returns, the loss of control, networks, and safety, put them in a state of psychosocial instability that lead them to feeling “lost,” as seen through terms such as *gij hastam* and *gom hastam* repeatedly used by deportees interviewed in 2016 in Herat and Nimroz provinces.

NOTES

1. Refoulement refers to the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to persecution. It is forbidden under international and EU law. See Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for a full definition.
2. A longitudinal study is defined as a quasi-experimental research that seeks to obtain observations of the same variables across time, preferably with a longer term view. They are often used in sociology to study events across a lifetime or generations. In this case, a longitudinal approach was taken to measure deportation trends and protection needs across a decade.

REFERENCES

- Al Jazeera*. 2016. A Hard Winter: Afghan Refugees Return from Pakistan. 24 November 2016.
- Atkinson, Robert. 1998. *The Life Story Interview*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Bloch, Alice, and Liza Schuster. 2005. At the Extremes of Exclusion: Deportation, Detention and Dispersal. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (3): 491–512.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Theorising Return Migration: A Revisited Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants. EUI Working Papers, RSCAS No. 2004/02. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
- DeBono, Daniela, Sofia Rönqvist, and Karin Magnusson. 2015. *Human and Dignified? Migrant's Experiences of Living in a State of Deportability in Sweden*. Malmö: Malmö University.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 419–447.
- . 2005. *Working the Boundaries: Race, Space and ‘Illegality’ in Mexican Chicago*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Di Cataldo, Alessandra. 2016. Post Deportation Monitoring in The Rights in Exile Programme. Oxford, UK: International Refugee Rights Initiative.

- <http://www.refugeelaidinformation.org/post-deportation-monitoring>. Accessed 30 Sep 2016.
- EU Council. 2016. Joint Commission-EEAS Non-paper on Enhancing Cooperation on Migration, Mobility and Readmission with Afghanistan. European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS).
- Fekete, Liz. 2005. The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asylum and Human Rights. *Race and Class* 47 (1): 64–78.
- Galvin, Tresa. 2015. ‘We Deport Them but They Keep Coming Back.’ The Normalcy of Deportation in the Daily Life of ‘Undocumented’ Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in Botswana. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 617–634.
- Gibney, Matthew. 2013. Is Deportation a Form of Forced Migration? *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 32 (2): 116–219.
- Gomberg-Munoz, Ruth. 2016. Criminalized Workers: Introduction to Special Issue on Migrant Labor and Mass Deportation. *Anthropology of Work Review* 37 (3): 3–10.
- Hasselberg, Ines. 2016. *Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and Everyday life*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Heyman, Josiah. 1998. *Finding a Moral Heart for U.S. Immigration Policy: An Anthropological Perspective*. Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society, Monographs in Human Policy Issues.
- Human Rights Watch. 2016. *Kenya: Involuntary Returns to Somalia*. 14 September 2016. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/14/kenya-involuntary-refugee-returns-somalia>.
- ILO-UNHCR. 2008. *Research Study on Afghan Deportees from Iran. ILO-UNHCR Cooperation Towards Comprehensive Solutions for Afghan Displacement*. Kabul: Altai Consulting.
- IOM. 2016. *Return of undocumented Afghans*. Weekly Situation Report, 18–24 December 2016.
- Khosravi, Shahram. 2016. Deportation as a Way of Life. In *Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global and Transnational Issues*, ed. Rich Furman, 169–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Majidi, Nassim, Vivianne Van der Vorst, and Christopher Foulkes. 2016. Seeking Safety, Jobs, and More: Afghanistan’s Mixed Flows Test Migration Policies. *Migration Information Source*. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/seeking-safety-jobs-and-more-afghanistans-mixed-flows-test-migration-policies>. Accessed 25 Feb 2016.
- Miller, O. Alexander. 2012. Deportation as a Process of Irreversible Transformation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (1): 131–146.
- Norwegian Refugee Council. 2016. Post-Deportation Protection Assessment (Herat and Nimroz), Request for Quotation, PR Reference number 6514: 3–4. Kabul, Afghanistan.

- Samuel Hall. 2017. *Deportations of Afghans from Iran: A Post-Deportation Protection Assessment*. Research Study Commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council, Afghanistan.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens after Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2014. Deportation Stigma and Re-migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 635–652.

“My Whole Life is in the USA:” Dominican Deportees’ Experiences of Isolation, Precarity, and Resilience

Tanya Golash-Boza and Yajaira Ceciliano Navarro

INTRODUCTION

In January of 2010, the first author of this chapter rode in a car with migration officials and military officers to the cargo area of the airport in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. When we arrived at the airport, a white, unmarked aeroplane landed between two cargo delivery aeroplanes. The cargo aeroplanes were bringing bottles of water and other supplies for a relief mission to Haiti, which had just suffered a devastating earthquake. The white aeroplane transported two US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees and 30 deportees. The imagery of the deportees arriving into the cargo area alongside plastic bottles of water from abroad speaks volumes about the perception of deportees as disposable.

T. Golash-Boza (✉) · Y.C. Navarro
University of California, Merced, USA

© The Author(s) 2018
S. Khosravi (ed.), *After Deportation*, Global Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57267-3_8

One of the military officers boarded the aeroplane and explained to the deportees the process they were about to undergo. He called each of them by name and they got off the aeroplane, one by one, onto a Dirección General de Migración (DGM) bus. The bus was normally used to transport prisoners, and thus had bars on the windows to prevent the passengers from escaping, and bars shielding the driver from the passengers, in addition to the protection of several soldiers. The bus arrived at the Deportee Department of the DGM office in downtown Santo Domingo at 5 pm. Once there, the deportees were escorted upstairs, and given their possessions—a change of clothes for some, books, photos, deodorant, and shoelaces for others.

A DGM officer asked the deportees to have a seat, and separated them into two groups—those deported for being undocumented and those deported on criminal grounds. It was a relatively small group of deportees—two women and 28 men. Eleven of the deportees had been deported for immigration reasons and the rest on criminal grounds. The noncriminal deportees were processed first. They went, one by one, to be fingerprinted and have their names and information recorded both by the DGM and the Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones (DNI)—the Dominican version of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As there were only eleven noncriminal deportees, that process took about 40 minutes. The noncriminal deportees were released once they were processed. Then, it was time to process those who were deported on criminal grounds. They went through the same process. However, once that process was over, they were not released, but taken to the police station in Villa Juana, to be booked again by the police and the drug control division.

At the police station, officers fingerprinted and photographed the deportees and created a file with information that included names, criminal records, and home addresses. Once this process was completed, deportees were released to a family member, who had to bring a photocopy of their national ID card—the *cedula*—to prove that they were indeed related. Deportees were only released to family members, and were not permitted to leave the police station until a family member came for them. The official in charge of processing deportees assured me they were not being held captive, but that this procedure was for their own safety.

Deportation from the USA to the Dominican Republic is thus a lengthy process, which begins with a deportee being released from a detention centre in the USA. It can often take upwards of 24 hours for a deportee to get from the detention centre to the aeroplane that will

take them to their country of birth, due to them being transported on different buses among different detention centres in order to fill the bus destined to take them to the aeroplane. After flying for several hours, the processing in the Dominican Republic can easily take a further eight hours until the exhausted deportee is finally released to family members.

In the Dominican Republic, once people deported on criminal grounds are released into the community, they must report once a month to a police station. At each visit, they meet with a psychologist and discuss their recent activities. In addition, a police officer makes field visits to deportees’ houses to find out how they are adapting. On those visits, they talk with the deportees, their family members, and their neighbours to find out how the deportee is coping. After six months of good behaviour, deportees are eligible to receive their *carta de buena conducta*—their criminal record, which states, “This person has not committed any crimes in the Dominican Republic, either before or after their deportation.”

When people are deported on noncriminal grounds to the Dominican Republic, their deportation records are not made public. In contrast, those Dominicans deported on criminal grounds have their names recorded in a government database. To secure a job in the Dominican Republic, prospective employees are required to show their *carta de buena conducta* to employers. Deportees are not issued this document for the first six months they are in the country. Moreover, once they complete their six months, their *carta de buena conducta* indicates that they have been deported. There is no limitation on this reporting—the deportation shows up on the *carta de buena conducta* even years after the person has been deported.

Ethnographic research on Dominican deportees reveals that Dominican deportees face official as well as informal stigmatisation upon arrival in their country of birth. Sociologists Yolanda Martín (2013), and David Brotherton and Luis Barrios (2011) argue that the traumatic experience of deportation, as well as stigmatisation can lead some deportees to the use of drugs (Martín 2013) or even to suicide (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). The deportees discussed in those studies faced devaluation, dehumanisation, and extreme marginalisation. This chapter, in contrast, focuses on the survival mechanisms deportees use to get by in the Dominican Republic. We ask: How are deportees able to overcome the obstacles they face in order to continue their lives in their country of birth?

This chapter explores what happens after deportation, as well as the challenges deportees face. Although most deportees despair upon

arrival in their country of birth, those who have strong family ties in the Dominican Republic have an easier time. Deportees can survive by finding precarious and informal work, as they are nearly always locked out of the formal labour market. Their dreams of returning to the USA and reuniting with their families are often what keep them going.

WHAT HAPPENS POST-DEPORTATION?

This chapter contributes to the small but growing literature on what happens to people after deportation. Ethnographic accounts of the post-deportation experience highlight several themes: (1) a sense of unfamiliarity with the land of citizenship, (2) profound despair about their future, (3) the salience of state power in the lives of deportees both in the USA and abroad, (4) the stigma associated with being a deportee, and (5) the desire to return to the USA (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Coutin 2010; Golash-Boza 2013; Headley 2006; Peutz 2006; Schuster and Majidi 2013; Precil 1999; Zilberg 2007, 2004). The deportees discussed in this chapter share many of these experiences.

Scholarship on the reincorporation of deportees reveals that deportees often experience stigma and isolation upon return to their country of birth, due to negative stereotypes of deportees (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). Jamaicans blame deportees for the rise in violence in the capital city (Headley et al. 2005); Dominicans associate deportees with transnational drug circuits (Brotherton and Barrios 2011); Central Americans link deportees with rising gang-related violence (Coutin 2010; Zilberg 2007).

The reception of persons deported from the USA to Latin American and Caribbean countries is highly dependent on the cultural context and laws of each country. The Brazilian government, for example, does not view deportees as a social problem, and deportees face relatively few obstacles to re-integration (Golash-Boza 2015). However, in other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, deportees face several difficulties in re-integrating in different areas of everyday life (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). The process of deportee reception is characterised by an upsetting and traumatic stigmatisation, which leads those deportees to situations of extreme social exclusion. Their lack of access to *car-tas de buena conducta* adds to a work context that is characterised by patronage and clientelism, making it even more difficult for deportees

to re-establish themselves in the labour market (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). These issues raise the question of how deportees are able to survive, and this chapter draws from interviews with deported Dominicans to explore their survival strategies.

METHODOLOGY AND INTERVIEW SAMPLE

The first author interviewed 47 deportees in the Dominican Republic between November 2009 and February 2010. Interviewees were located through a snowball sample with two primary points of entry into the community—a local research assistant and a deportee with many local connections. The second author returned to the Dominican Republic from June to July 2016 to conduct follow-up qualitative research.

All of the interviewees were male, except one. Nearly all Dominican deportees are men, so the interview sample reflects the overall population. The first author sought women to interview, but was unable to find more women willing to be interviewed. At the time of the interview, the youngest of the deportees was 31 years old and the oldest was 66 years old. The average age was 48. Of the 47 deportees, 20 emigrated to the USA before the age of 21. It is important to clarify that some of them emigrated first to Puerto Rico and then to the mainland USA. The first deportee migrated in 1964 and the last in 2001. Although this migration spans multiple decades, 1988 and 1990 had the most migrations, with 5 and 6 cases, respectively. In the remaining years, migration is distributed more evenly, with one or two cases per year between 1964 and 2001. Overall, participants migrated to the USA at an average of 22 years of age and lived there for an average of 16 years, suggesting that these deportees had developed strong ties to the USA. All 47 deportees claimed to have social ties in the USA, and 36 said they had at least one child in the USA.

The participants’ mode of entry into the USA was as follows: 2 entered under a false identity, 3 entered through Mexico, 5 were stowaways on a ship, 18 travelled on a *yola* (fishing boat) to Puerto Rico and entered the USA from there, 8 entered with Legal Permanent Resident visas, 7 with temporary visas, and the remaining 4 with sports and student visas. The 17 respondents who migrated through Puerto Rico reported that they spent between 2 days and 8 years in Puerto Rico. This shows the double migration which some Dominicans experienced in

order to reach the USA, which has important social, personal, and economic implications for these immigrants. In this group of respondents, 44 of the 47 deportees were deported for criminal reasons, the other 3 for immigration reasons. Of the 47 deportees, 5 said they had not completed primary education, 12 only completed primary school, 16 had not completed secondary school, and 14 finished secondary school. As for university studies, only one had completed post-secondary education.

When deportees arrive in the Dominican Republic, they are greeted by Dominican migration officials and the police. The government also set up a “Deportation Unit” in 2013 that aims to guide and facilitate the process of social integration of deported Dominicans. This office, however, is often viewed with suspicion given the government’s general stance on deportees. Some loosely organised social organisations have also emerged that support deportees. Churches, for example, have, for limited periods, offered meals to deportees. There was also an organisation called “Bienvenido Seas” that does not appear to be operational as of this writing. Deportees also know each other informally and sometimes may pass on information regarding employment. From the standpoint of Dominican deportees, however, there is little community or support for them. Thus, they must figure out how to make it on their own.

SURVIVING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter addresses the question of how deportees overcome the obstacles they face in their country of birth, starting with the initial shock of arriving in an unfamiliar place.

ARRIVING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

When deportees were asked how they felt upon arriving in the Dominican Republic, almost universally, they responded that they felt “bad,” “sad,” “alone,” “frustrated,” or “scared.” Having lived in the USA for between one and 36 years, the return to their country of birth was often unexpected and unwelcome. Joselo, for example, described his feelings when he first arrived:

I felt scared, and bad. Because I had not been here before and I never liked it. I am going to the Consulate to try to leave.

Joselo had lived in the USA since he was 15 years old. Moreover, he had strong ties to the USA as his grandparents were Puerto Ricans. Through these family ties, Joselo's family was able to flee the Dominican Republic in 1965, when the country was undergoing political turmoil following the assassination of President Trujillo. Joselo's father was a US citizen, but his mother was not. For this reason, Joselo travelled to the USA as a legal permanent resident and not as a US citizen. Had both of his parents been US citizens when he was under the age of 18, he could have obtained "derivative citizenship."

When Joselo arrived in Brooklyn, he enrolled in high school. He lived with his father and stepmother until he was drafted into the US Army in 1969. When he was released from the Army in 1973, Joselo qualified for US citizenship and could have applied for naturalisation. Like many Dominicans, he never applied and thus remained a legal permanent resident. Joselo explained to me that he thought he was a US citizen because his father was a citizen, and he had served in the army. He explained:

I was in the army; I thought I was a citizen. I was told that when you go to the army you become an American citizen but that was not the case.

After his release from the army, Joselo found a job in a plastics factory in Brooklyn. He worked there for fifteen years, until it closed in 1988. The closure of this manufacturing plant was part of a broader pattern of de-industrialisation in the USA (Harrison and Bluestone 1990). Joselo found himself unemployed, with a wife and seven children. They were able to get by due to his wife's income from her job as a social worker, alongside Joselo's unemployment benefit. Nevertheless, the stress and life changes led Joselo to experience depression in addition to financial insecurity. Joselo was caught with a small amount of cocaine in 1989, but was released without serving prison time, as it was a first-time offence. Despite his ongoing mental health and economic issues, Joselo stayed out of trouble until 1998, when he was caught with US\$10 of crack cocaine. This time, he was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. He was released in 2000, and deported to the Dominican Republic.

When Joselo arrived as a deportee in the Dominican Republic, he had no family to receive him. His wife travelled to Santo Domingo from New York to ensure that he found a place to settle down. She found

him housing in a motel, and then returned to New York to attend to their children. Joselo has since found more stable housing. He receives his army pension, and survives with that income—nearly US\$1000 per month. However, he does not like it in the Dominican Republic. He left the country when he was fifteen, and has not been able to readjust to living in the Dominican Republic. His family has come to visit him. His wife has come twice, as have his daughters. They speak on the telephone daily. Still, Joselo dreams of returning to the USA, the country where he spent 35 years and where all of his family lives.

The minimum wage in the Dominican Republic is about RD\$11,000 per month, which is roughly equivalent to US\$220. According to a report from 2015 in the newspaper *Diario Libre*, one family with this income will need 96 percent of that just for food; so other necessities (such as water, electricity, telephone, and detergents for washing) are not covered (Nivar 2015). Joselo's income of US\$1000 per month was among the highest of all deportees interviewed, and is enough for him to cover his basic needs.

Nevertheless, Joselo has lost everything meaningful to him, and thus feels depressed in the Dominican Republic and has a strong desire to return to the USA. This feeling—that everything important to him is in the USA—was common among deportees and only enhanced their feelings of isolation and alienation. Even though Joselo had a steady income, this was not sufficient to allay the effects of his isolation.

Maxwell expressed similar feelings of loss upon arrival. Maxwell travelled to the USA when he was 16 years old. Unlike Joselo, Maxwell had no family connections that would allow him to travel legally to the USA, and he stowed away on a boat that took him to Puerto Rico in 1988. Maxwell lived and worked in Puerto Rico for seven years before travelling to New York, where he moved in with his sister. In 1988, Maxwell married a US citizen and obtained legal permanent residency. Maxwell's wife was in the military and he worked for a food bank, which distributed non-perishable goods to needy families throughout New York.

One day, a Dominican friend asked Maxwell to go with him to his sister's house in New Jersey. Maxwell agreed. Soon after they crossed over into New Jersey, their car was stopped. The police officers found a half-kilo of crack cocaine in the car. Although Maxwell denied that he had any idea there were drugs in the car and told the interviewer he never had sold drugs in his life, he was found guilty. Maxwell served 18 months in prison before being deported to the Dominican Republic

in 2008. His wife has come to visit him twice in Santo Domingo, but she is not willing to move to the Dominican Republic. Maxwell wants to return to the USA as well. When asked how he felt upon arrival to the Dominican Republic, he responded:

I was not feeling good because America is my life; I was young when I left for the USA; ... My youth is there, not here, my generation is not here; ... I belong there. My people are not here, my friends, my white friends, the boricuas [Puerto Ricans], the blacks; you know the 'life' we had during the summer. In my company, we used to do many good things... I feel depressed here, because my life... I don't feel it is good, it is not the same, I feel frustrated... I feel that my whole life is in the USA.

Having lived in the USA since he was 16 years old, and deported at age 36, Maxwell feels strongly tied to the USA. In addition, he longs to be with his wife and to start a family with her. For Maxwell, his life, his youth, his generation is all in the USA and he does not feel at home in the Dominican Republic. Maxwell is proud of his humanitarian work while in the USA and the connections he was able to make through that work. When he was interviewed, he had been deported about a year earlier. He still hoped to be able to get a pardon to be able to return. The likelihood that he could get a pardon, however, is very low. Pardons can be granted by the President of the USA or by the Governor. These, however, are rarely granted, and even less common in the case of previously deported persons. Nevertheless, whenever asked about his plans, Maxwell said that eventually he would return to the USA.

Although nearly all deportees expressed similar feelings of sadness and loss, two interviewees did not express these feelings when describing their arrival into the Dominican Republic. Unlike Joselo and Maxwell, these two interviewees arrived when they were older and had weaker ties to the USA. Darius, for example, travelled to the USA in 1980, when he was 36 years old. He lived in New York for 18 years before being deported. He was 66 years old when he was interviewed:

Well, I felt fine because I arrived to my country again, and all the people in my neighbourhood, where I was born and raised were here. When I left I lived two blocks down the street, now I live two blocks up.

Having lived as an undocumented migrant in New York for 17 years, deportation was the first time Darius was able to return home. Darius

had emigrated to the USA in 1980, leaving his wife and two children in Santo Domingo. In 1988, his wife and children were able to join him in New York City, and they had a third child together. Soon after his third child was born, Darius was arrested on drug charges. He was in and out of jail for the next decade before finally being deported in 1994. Despite saying he was happy to be back, Darius regrets being separated from his family, especially his youngest daughter who he barely got to know due to his time in prison and subsequent deportation. He is hopeful that one day his daughter will come visit him in Santo Domingo or that he would have a chance to travel to New York to see her.

Paulo also expressed that he was happy to be back in the Dominican Republic. When I asked him how he felt after being deported, he told me: "I felt good. I was in my homeland." Paulo was born in 1969. He went to the USA when he was 23, in 1992. His wife was planning to go the USA as a legal permanent resident, facilitated by her father, who was living in the USA at the time. Paulo did not want to wait for his paperwork to be processed, which could have taken years. Instead, he decided to take a *yola* to Puerto Rico, and then travel by aeroplane to New York City. He and his wife moved into his father-in-law's house and he secured work in a bodega. Frustrated because he was earning so little, Paulo turned to selling drugs. He was arrested in 1985 for drug selling, spent 18 months in prison, and was deported. Paulo's child, who was born in the USA in 1994, now lives with him in the Dominican Republic.

Nearly all the interviewees (45 out of 47) expressed negative emotions when asked how they felt about their return to their home country. They missed the financial security they had in the USA, but most of all, they missed their families. Nevertheless, few, if any, of these deportees will be able to return to the USA due to the near-impossibility of returning legally and the high cost of returning illegally from their island nation. Thus, they must figure out how to survive in their country of birth.

Darius and Paulo were content to be back in their homeland whereas Maxwell, Joselo, and many other deportees feel as though the USA is their homeland and are thus devastated with regard to their forced exile. For this reason, we see such a strong difference in their reactions. Whereas Darius said, "Well, I felt fine because I arrived in my country again," Joselo says, "I have not been here before and I never liked it." Of course, legally speaking, the Dominican Republic is their homeland.

Nevertheless, for many Dominican deportees, it certainly does not feel like home. Faced with these circumstances, Dominican deportees must figure out how to survive.

As pointed out above, depending on years lived in the USA, some deportees experience this feeling of coming “home,” but for others, home is in the USA, where they have family, and where they have made their lives. The idea of home, in this case, will depend on where the deportees have spent most time and where they have their roots, usually those related to children, family, and friends.

SURVIVING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

To survive in the Dominican Republic, deportees need access to cash. Some deportees are able to earn money by working, while others rely on remittances from abroad. Some rely on their family members in the Dominican Republic and still others receive a pension—from either the Dominican or the US government. None of the Dominican deportees interviewed for this project managed to recreate the lifestyle they had achieved in the USA. Nevertheless, many secured employment, primarily in the informal labour market. The most common form of employment they reported were odd jobs, working on the docks, and working as drivers.

Thirty-seven of the 47 respondents indicated that they were working; 10 said that they were not working. Of the 37 who were working, 34 had informal jobs and 3 had formal work. Only 7 reported having papers or a letter of good conduct—the *carta de buena conducta*. The letter of good conduct is a prerequisite for gaining access to formal work, since this letter indicates whether a person has a criminal record. One reason that few deportees possess these documents is that they cost RD\$330, a significant amount for an unemployed deportee. Another reason is that they may believe the *carta* will not do them much good insofar as it indicates their deportee status.

In any case, informal jobs do not require these formal documents. These data are consistent with the information of the Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada (CONEP 2013), which states that the labour market in the Dominican Republic is characterised by informality, as 3 out of 4 jobs are informal and this number is increasing. Between 2000 and 2012, employment in the formal sector grew by 19.8%, while the

informal sector grew by 41.5% (CONEP 2013). Deportees who work in the informal sector described some of the work they do as follows: tourist guide at the pier; call centre employee; taxi driver; manager of someone else's business without a contract; coach; car salesman; landlord; valet [car parker]; painter; repairman; construction worker; messenger; street vendor; upholsterer; farmer; garbage collector; and car washer.

Despite the average age being high at 48 years, only one of the deportees said that age was an impediment to his access to the labour market. However, this may be because many get informal jobs or are self-employed, where age is not such a critical factor. Darius, for example, who is introduced above, explained that he gets odd jobs: "I work doing alterations, fixing things, I paint, I do any job."

Phrases such as "I do any job" or "whatever appears" are expressions that show the level of job uncertainty to which deportees are exposed. The jobs they find are temporary and therefore income is quite unstable. Goldin (2016, p. 55) defines human capital as "the stock of skills that the labour force possesses. It encompasses the notion that there are investments in people (e.g., education, training, health) and that these investments increase an individual's productivity." Despite the presumption that higher human capital would lead to higher wages, this was not always the case as deportees had few opportunities to use what limited human capital they had. Very few deportees were able to put what they learned in the USA to use in the Dominican Republic. One exception to this involves deportees who worked in call centres, who were able to use their English skills to secure employment.

When respondents were asked about the value or utility of what they learned in the USA for their new life in the Dominican Republic, they mostly expressed moral rather than technical learnings, i.e., they learned to work hard and dream big. Many deportees lamented the differences in the labour market that exists in the USA and in the Dominican Republic, in terms of the technical qualities that are appreciated in the USA.

Those deportees who secured work as drivers seemed to do well, at least insofar as they had daily work. Juan Carlos (47 years old lived in the USA for 10 years) explained that his work as a driver allowed him to maintain his dignity. Florentino (48 years old lived 11 years in the USA) elaborated on this point, saying:

I am a driver. I make my life in this way. I do not have a problem. I am 'clean.' I do not have to ask anybody for 10 or 100 pesos, or anything like that.

Although many of these jobs require a *carta de buena conducta*, these deportees were able to secure positions as drivers without this piece of paper. Raimundo, who was 43 years old and had lived in the USA for 8 years, explained that he did not need a *carta de buena conducta*, in part, because he is working for a friend of his sister’s family. Having a sister who would vouch for him was sufficient.

Not all deportees, however, were able to secure employment. Juan Pablo, for example, cites his lack of access to the *carta de buena conducta* as a significant obstacle:

I have troubles in this country. My family is helping me to survive, because here to work you have to have the *carta de buena conducta*, and since I came as deportee [five months ago], ... I don’t have the *carta de buena conducta*, and I have to have one to work in this country. I cannot work, because if I go to work I have to bring the *carta de buena conducta*, and no one is going to give me the *carta de buena conducta*, so I think no one is going to give me a job, because I tried to find a job and they ask you for the *carta de buena conducta*.

Juan Pablo had travelled to the USA in 1993, when he was 20 years old. He lived and worked in New York until he was arrested on drug charges in 2006. He served time in prison on those charges and was deported in 2009. When we spoke, he had been in the Dominican Republic for five months, and lived with his mother, who he had not seen since he left. He will eventually get his *carta de buena conducta*, but he still may not secure employment, as his *carta* will mark him as a deportee.

Deportees face stigmatisation in the Dominican Republic, a situation accentuated by the media that reinforces this stigma with headlines such as “Ex-prisoners arrived in the country...,” (Castro 2015) and “The USA repatriated ex-convicts” (Castro 2016). Because of this high level of stigmatisation, entrance into the formal labour market becomes an uphill battle, especially because many workplaces ask for the *carta de buena conducta*. Deportees were well aware of this stigmatisation. When asked, “What do people think here about deportees?” Darius replied: “Bad, for jobs, they scare them, they think they are criminals, that they are going to do something bad, but we all are not like that.”

Carlos’s (61 years old, who lived 31 years in the USA) testimony reaffirms this idea that stigmatisation comes from the media, and the police

often stop deportees and try to blame them for crimes. Deportees have become the scapegoat for many of the social situations in the Dominican Republic. Carlos said:

Yes, they look badly at you, they believe that everything bad happens here because of deportees, and it is not true, maybe someone does something but not everything, they want to blame deportees, and it is not like that, the police said that, anything happening it is because deportees and they start to look for the deportees but it is a mistake.

Faced with bleak prospects in the formal labour market, deportees were often forced to rely on others for their survival. This reliance, however, can be threatening to their sense of masculinity and their desire to be providers. In both cases, we see that deportation has generated not only feelings of loneliness, but also depression, perhaps due to their inability to support themselves. This became clear in Emanuel's interview.

The first author met Emanuel in the restaurant of a large store in central Santo Domingo. He was not completely comfortable with the idea of doing the interview, but agreed when assured it would be confidential. He was primarily concerned about the possibility of returning to the USA, and did not want to do anything to jeopardise a potential future application. Emanuel was born in 1956, in San Francisco de Macorís. Primarily his grandmother raised him, as his father moved to the USA when he was 8 years old. When Emanuel was 18 years old, he moved to the USA to join his father. That was in 1974. Emanuel finished high school in the USA and then secured a job as a taxi driver. In 1980, Emanuel decided to join the army, where he served for two years. While Emanuel was in the army, he purchased a gun for his personal use. When he purchased it, he lived in North Carolina and had a permit for the gun. However, he took the gun with him to New Jersey, and did not seek a permit. One day in early 1996, when Emanuel was driving his car in New Jersey, a police officer pulled him over and asked to search the car. Emanuel agreed. The officer found the gun and arrested Emanuel. He was sentenced to one year in prison for illegal possession of a firearm. He served nine months and was released back to his family. Emanuel began working again, but had to report to the parole officer each month. On one occasion, he showed up for his meeting with the parole officer, who turned him over to immigration, and he was deported to the Dominican Republic in 1998.

Emanuel left a wife and daughter in the USA. His daughter was born in 1996, just before he was arrested. They keep in touch by telephone and through internet video calls. In the interview, Emanuel explains how much his deportation has affected him and his family:

Everything happened so suddenly. You have your home, your work, and then you are separated from your family. After it happened, I could not see my daughter... that it is a very hard thing for the family ... everything was broke, everything ... sending me over here ... broke my marriage.

When Emanuel was asked about the possibility of re-uniting with his partner, he expressed feelings of vulnerability and economic uncertainty that prevented him from taking care of his family, if they were to return to live with him in the Dominican Republic. Asked "She did not think to come here?" and "What does she do for work now?" he replied:

... here I had nothing, what could I give her here? I could not give anything to her here.

I don't know, she worked as an auxiliary nurse caring for elderly people, disabled people... but she had a hard time because I was not there. I was the breadwinner, she worked but she did not have to pay anything, I paid for everything, it is a hard situation.

From Emanuel's point of view, he has nothing to offer his wife and children at this point. In his interview, he expresses some anger when he points out that he and his wife had a good relationship, which ended because of the deportation and its consequences: the separation of the family and his consequent inability to be there for his family, emotionally, financially, or physically.

Maxwell, introduced above, was hoping to secure a *carta de buena conducta* so that he could get a job in the docks, but had not yet been successful. He is able to get by because he lives with his sister and mother, and he relies on remittances from his wife. He is not happy about his newfound dependence:

Yeah, my wife helps me. ... I know how you are used to living in the USA. I know how you work, what people earn per hour. People here don't earn the same ... I don't like to bother anyone over there because the work there is hard.

Juan Pablo and Maxwell had been in the Dominican Republic for relatively short amounts of time. The short period means that they are still recovering from the shock of being deported. It also means that family members in the USA are still willing to help. Moreover, it means that they have not yet established a local support networks that help them fend for themselves.

The extreme difficulty deportees face in securing work and providing for themselves and their families exacerbated their feelings of isolation, loneliness, and helplessness. Despite these obstacles, they were able to survive due to two primary sources of income: help from family members in the USA and the Dominican Republic, and informal work. The most common strategy was reliance on precarious employment or entrepreneurship, such as working as drivers, handymen, or on the docks. Nevertheless, entering the labour market, even in this very limited way allows Dominicans to reintegrate gradually.

PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

Despite the difficulties deportees face when asked about their plans for the future, they were relatively optimistic. Three themes stood out from their responses: their desire to re-unite with their families; their intention to return to the USA; and their desire for economic stability. It would be practically impossible for most deportees to return to the USA. Those who have a criminal conviction have no option to return under current law. Moreover, those who were deported on noncriminal grounds face significant legal hurdles to returning. In addition to the legal hurdles, those applications that have even a small chance at success will cost thousands of dollars. There is the possibility to return illegally, but this costs even more and involves substantial risk. Despite these obstacles, some deportees may be able to return to the USA—usually through illegal, dangerous, and costly routes (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). With this glimmer of hope, many deportees recounted that they plan to return.

Maxwell, introduced above, is one example. He explained: “As I told you, my plan is to return to the USA.” Maxwell did not explain how he planned to do this, yet he remained hopeful. It is highly unlikely that Maxwell will ever be able to return legally, due to his criminal conviction. Although some deportees may be able to gain entry to other countries, only one deportee expressed a desire to emigrate to a country other than the USA. Fermin (who is 46 years old and had lived

10 years in the USA) explained that he planned to travel to Italy to work. With no deportation on his record from Italy, he may actually be able to make that plan work. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 2010 report, countries like Puerto Rico, Spain, and Italy, and, of course, the USA are the most common destinations for Dominican emigrants.

Miguel (65 years old who lived 15 years in the USA), makes it clear why most Dominican deportees from the USA desire to return there. For Miguel, the USA is where his family is and it is the country he loves best: “I think that when my kids file my paperwork, I am going to be the happiest man on earth, because I will be in the country I most like and will be back with my family.” Miguel was 65 when he said this and had been deported 26 years prior. Nevertheless, he still held onto that dream of returning to the USA to be with his family. Carlos, introduced above, was deported on criminal grounds, and would be arrested if caught trying to re-enter. That did not deter him from making plans, because his daughter had asked him to return.

In addition, more succinctly, by Emanuel: “I will go back to the USA. It is my priority be with my daughter.” The years that had passed did not weaken these deportees’ perception of their family connections in the USA. Carlos had been living in the Dominican Republic for eight years and Emanuel for 12 years. Nevertheless, they dreamed of returning to live with their families, despite their “relatively advanced age” and the near-impossibility of their (legal) return. Carlos was 61 years old and Emanuel was 59 at the time of these interviews.

Despite a strong desire by most deportees to return to the USA, many of them also recognised that they could try and make things work in the Dominican Republic. Florentino, for example, said that his plan is to try to survive: “I am thinking about building a little house here. I don’t want to pay too much for a house, actually I am not thinking of going back to the USA, I don’t think so.” German (48 years old, who lived 34 years in the USA) was similarly practical:

My plans for the future are settling down here and being part of society, economically and socially, someday travel again, maybe to the USA, Europe, wherever and continue with my life forward because I have to live it.

The interviewees expressed extreme disappointment with the fact that they did not have the same opportunities they once had. Additionally,

they lamented the family separation they experienced as well as the traumatic experience of being jailed and deported. However, they also expressed a clear sense of being “free” once they were returned to the Dominican Republic. They were free insofar as they were no longer in jail. However, others spoke of a more subjective sense of freedom as they could do things like have a beer in the park that they could not do in the USA. Nevertheless, many deportees held out hope that they one day would be reunited with their families.

CONCLUSION

In this study, Dominican deportees clearly expressed emotions related to deportation, such as loneliness and despair, similar to what other scholars have found (Siulc 2009; Martín 2013; Brotherton and Barrios 2011). In addition, they described their experiences of being stigmatised, particularly in terms of job placement, and the challenges they face in order to survive. To survive, they turned to self-employment, informal jobs, and help from family and friends. Despite the difficulties deportees face, they are able to survive in their country of birth. For some, their ability to work and to contribute to society allows them to feel useful again. For others, their plans to return to the USA or to make a life for themselves in the Dominican Republic allow them to get out of bed each day.

Deportees’ exclusion from formal work, nevertheless, is disheartening. It is true that many of these deportees had committed crimes in the USA, mostly related to the drug economy. However, the fact that they sold drugs in New York City does not mean that they would engage in criminal activity in Santo Domingo. Placed in a different milieu, especially one where they have social and financial support, they would be unlikely to turn to illegal drugs for comfort or for financial security. In fact, pushing them out of the formal labour market is more likely to push them towards drugs and towards the illegal economy. The requirement that their deportation appear on their *carta de buena conducta* is a clear barrier to their participation in the formal labour market.

This exclusion from the formal labour market means that deportees who learned valuable skills in the USA, such as English-language or construction skills are unable to put these skills to use in their home country. Allowing deportees access to the formal labour market would not only enable them to attain financial self-sufficiency, but also would permit them to feel as if they are making a positive contribution to society. At

present, many deportees feel as if their life is being wasted away. They are unable to find meaningful work. Their consequent dire financial straits prevent them from making financial contributions to their family, which makes them feel bad about themselves. This inability to be a provider for themselves and their family often leads to distress and depression, in part due to gendered expectations of what it means to them to be a man (Rivera and Ceciliano 2003). It is difficult for Dominican deportees to embrace their lives in the Dominican Republic and to focus on building their future there, in part, because they feel strong ties to loved ones in the USA and in part, because there is little hope for them to remake their lives in their country of birth. In short, deportees, like most other people, cherish opportunities to make positive contributions to society and to their families. Insofar as current policies in the Dominican Republic and the USA prevent them from playing that role, these policies are detrimental to deportees, their families, and their communities.

REFERENCES

- Brotherton, David, and Luis Barrios. 2011. *Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Castro, Rafael. 2015. Llegan a RD otros 95 dominicanos deportados de EEUU. *Listin Diario*, Sep 16. <http://listindiario.com/la-republica/2015/09/16/388358/llegan-a-rd-otros-95-dominicanos-deportados-de-eeuu>. Accessed 11 Sep 2016.
- . 2016. Unos 115 exreos llegaron al país hoy en el primer grupo de deportados de EE.UU de este año. *Listin Diario*, Jan 6. <http://www.listindiario.com/la-republica/2016/01/06/402727/unos-115-exreos-llegaron-al-pais-hoy-en-el-primer-grupo-de-deportados-de-ee-uu-de-este-ano>. Accessed 11 Sep 2016.
- CONEP. 2013. Análisis del Mercado Laboral en la República Dominicana y lineamientos generales hacia su formalización. Accessed 19 Feb 2016.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2010. Confined within: National Territories as Zones of Confinement. *Political Geography* 29 (4): 200–208.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2013. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- . 2015. *Deported. Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Goldin, Claudia. 2016. Human Capital. In *Handbook of Cliometrics*, ed. Claude Diebolt and Michael Hauptert, 55–86. Heidelberg: Springer.

- Harrison, Bennett, and Barry Bluestone. 1990. *The Great U-turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Headley, Bernard. 2006. Giving Critical Context to the Deportee Phenomenon. *Social Justice* 33.1 (103): 40–56.
- Headley, Bernard, Michael Gordon, and Andrew MacIntosh. 2005. *Deported: Entry and Exit Findings. Jamaicans Returned Home from the US*. Kingston: Stephenson Litho Press.
- Martín, Yolanda C. 2013. The Syndemics of Removal: Trauma and Substance Abuse. In *Outside Justice: Immigration and the Criminalizing Impact of Changing Policy and Practice*, ed. David C. Brotherton, Daniel L. Stageman and Shirley P. Leyro, 91–107. New York: Springer.
- Nivar, Amílcar. 2015. El salario mínimo no alcanza ni para comer en República Dominicana. *Diario Libre*, May 20. <http://www.diariolibre.com/economia/economia-personal/el-salario-mnimo-no-alcanza-ni-para-comer-en-repblica-dominicana-HVDL1156221>. Accessed 28 Sep 2016.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2010. *Perspectivas Económicas De América Latina 2010*. <https://www.oecd.org/dev/americas/45660833.pdf>. Accessed 11 Sep 2016.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Precil, Privat. 1999. *Criminal Deportees and Returned Teens: A Migration Phenomenon, a Social Problem*. Pétionville: Panos Institute of the Caribbean.
- Rivera, Roy, and Yajaira Ceciliano. 2003. *Cultura, masculinidad y paternidad: las representaciones de los hombres en Costa Rica*. San José: FLACSO.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.
- Siulc, Nina. 2009. *Unwelcome Citizens, Criminalized Migrants, and the Quest for Freedom: Deportees in the Dominican Republic*. PhD dissertation, New York University.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2004. Fools Banished from the Kingdom: Remapping Geographies of Gang Violence between the Americas (Los Angeles and San Salvador). *American Quarterly* 56 (3): 759–779.
- . 2007. Gangster in guerrilla face: A Transnational Mirror of Production between the USA and El Salvador. *Anthropological Theory* 7 (1): 37–57.

Making It as a Deportee: Transnational Survival in the Dominican Republic

Evin Rodkey

Antonio¹ had been in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, less than two years before I met him while walking around a Free Trade Zone, outside the call centre where he worked as a customer service agent for a US company. Nearing thirty-two years old when I first met him in 2008, he had moved to New York City as a legal permanent resident at age seven and faced deportation at age thirty after conviction for a drug charge he had incurred several years before. He was later arrested for a minor crime he did not commit and from which he was quickly absolved. However, in this process, his drug charge—from 1996, about a decade prior, when he was nineteen—surfaced and he faced deportation after twenty-three years in the country, despite no further trouble, working full-time, and raising his two children. Though he did not know it at the time, Antonio's fate had been sealed the very year he had initially been arrested—1996, the year the momentous Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)² was signed into law.

E. Rodkey (✉)

Casper College, Casper, Wyoming, USA

© The Author(s) 2018

S. Khosravi (ed.), *After Deportation*, Global Ethics,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57267-3_9

Since the passage of IIRIRA, the rate of deportation of non-citizens, which includes long-term legal permanent residents such as Antonio, has increased over eight-fold, reaching 438,421 people in 2014 (the most recent year for which data is available) up from 50,924 in 1995, the year prior to IIRIRA³ (US Department of Homeland Security 2016, Table 39). In 2014, removals for criminal offences represented over 40% of the total: 167,740 people of the 414,481 total people deported (US DHS 2016, Table 41). Focusing on the Dominican Republic, in 2014 the US deported 2,045 Dominican-born residents; 1,631—over 79%—were due to criminal convictions (US DHS 2016, Table 41), mostly drug-related, like Antonio. Now living in the country of his birth, but not his home country, Antonio tries to make his way in what is, despite the reification of his birth certificate, a strange land.

In this work, I examine the deportation of long-term legal permanent residents of the USA, Antonio and others like him, who were sent to their country of birth, the Dominican Republic, after facing conviction for a crime. My main objective is to demonstrate how, amid a structure of challenging circumstances, many deportees nevertheless resolve to employ transnational survival strategies, linking them back to their homes in the USA, yet further confounding their place of belonging. In this examination, I attend to the “interface between the structural oppression and individual action” (Bourgeois 1995, p. 12) with an approach consistent with Stephen (2007, p. 31), who strives to “weave together the personal histories and narratives” of her research participants with “the larger structures that affect their lives and to highlight their creative responses.” In particular, I examine how, by working as tour guides for American visitors to the island or as call centre agents for US businesses that have outsourced this work, deportees draw on transnational connections and deploy transnational survival strategies to negotiate the challenges they face.

For a total of about six months from 2008–2011, I spent time with deportees in a variety of settings, including homes, public spaces, and workplaces, engaging in conversation, and conducting interviews, which included covering the circumstances of their work in customer service for US companies, and working with tourists. Only one was female and all deportees I discuss in the present work are male. The first deportee I encountered, Marcos, who is discussed later, I met when a tour guide introduced me to him. Marcos spent a great deal of time

hanging about in a busy tourist area, selling works of art. The guide knew Marcos worked with tourists and could maybe help me. I spoke to him over the course of a few days; eventually he divulged to me that he was a deportee. From there, I met more of the deportees I came to know mostly through networking. Virtually all were willing to share their stories with me and spend time with me as I observed their current life circumstances.

Dominican deportees are a diverse group coming from a wide variety of backgrounds and circumstances. They vary in age, how long they were in the USA, how long they have been in the Dominican Republic, and a number of other conditions. Nevertheless, they share something: They all have to face the economic, political, and cultural landscape of an at least relatively new country, negotiating their displacement. They have to make their lives in a new home. They have to survive.

Though leaving the USA, these deportees share something with immigrants who came to the USA as well. As Stephen (2007, p. 23) points out, in addition to the transnational experiences immigrants face, they also cross “ethnic, cultural, and regional borders within the USA.” Those deported after residing in the USA since childhood encounter this “transborder experience” as well—though upon arrival in their place of birth. Though technically immigrants, with near lifetimes in the USA, their transnational experience is often most noticeably encountered upon deportation, rather than moving to the USA as children. In addition, after long-term residence in the USA they arrive in the Dominican Republic culturally American and must then navigate a new cultural landscape in addition to the national border they have crossed. As Antonio observed:

I actually considered myself to be more, like, American. I was Dominican, but I learned how to speak real good Spanish here. And people would make fun of me when I came back, like, ‘Oh, you talk so funny.’ I was, ‘Yo, I don’t know what to tell you. Over there all I spoke was English. I worked in English, I studied in English.’ I just spoke words, you know. And when I said a word, sometimes it came out a little messed up. Yea, I mean people here, they still don’t consider me to be like a Dominican. I think, maybe, I don’t act like them so much. Even though I’ve been here for so long, it’s just not me, it’s not the way I was raised. And I’m already thirty-three, so it’s gonna be hard for me to be going and changing and stuff. I am who I am, that’s it.

Part of this new cultural landscape entails circumscribed employment opportunities resulting from the stigma of deportee status (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). With a focus on the agency of deportees and how they draw on knowledge and skills gained from living near-lifetimes in the USA, this work illuminates the other side of the deportation story, the transnational life ways that long-term legal permanent residents convicted of crimes, people such as Antonio, forge after facing deportation.

TRANSNATIONAL SPACES: WORKING IN CALL CENTRES FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES

Early during my first research trip to the Dominican Republic in 2008, I discovered that many deportees find employment in call centres for US businesses that have outsourced this work. With their fluency in English, which for many was more proficient than their Spanish, and certainly more so than Dominican Spanish specifically, along with the cultural sensibilities of a US upbringing, this was a job in which deportees could thrive. In Santo Domingo, call centres can be found in several parts of the city and, as it turns out, provide opportunities for deportees to engage in transnational practice to earn money to survive. Though it does not appear that people are deported in order to provide this labour, undeniably, these deportees bring valuable skills with them, which is nevertheless beneficial to companies with call centres abroad.

In order to examine the transnational practices entailed in this scenario, in 2011, I found employment in a call centre located in Santo Domingo and completed a one-month training program for a US television service provider. From attending to responsibilities as a trainee, I cannot reasonably estimate the number of employees who were deportees, though I knew of several. Due to my position as an employee, I did not conduct interviews on site. My purpose was to note the transnational nature of the job and the interactions of employees, some who were deportees and some who were not. Elsewhere (see Rodkey 2016) I have analysed the call centre business with regard to the relationship between deportation and outsourced labour, drawing from this experience and interviews with agents from other call centres. In this section of this chapter, I elaborate on how the particular outsourced call centre where I worked engenders transnational connections, creating a space where deportees reconnect with their American culture to earn money to survive.

“Outsourcer:” the Business Operation as American Extension

First, aspects of the business itself revealed several general transnational connections. As early as the interview process, prospective agents encounter strong connections with the USA. In order to be hired, one must complete an exercise over the telephone called the Versant English Test, which is a product of the US publishing and testing company, Pearson. While discussing handling time zone differences across the USA, a trainer evoked Benjamin Franklin and his role in the inception of daylight savings time. He even quoted the Franklin aphorism, “Early to sleep, early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.” After the “Early to sleep, early to rise” part, most of the class joined in and finished the quotation. He continued with commentary on how business works and relating this to the USA with such comments as, “Which cupcakes sell more, Hostess or ‘what-the-fucks?’” in an effort to relate the importance of branding. In another example reiterating the effectiveness of branding, he noted that, “You are a walking billboard,” when donning US clothing brands Hollister and American Eagle.

Other aspects of the business made the transnational linkages even clearer. Part of the training included a presentation from the Service Delivery Manager. This included a visual presentation with a slide asking, “What Type of Business Are We?” The answer: “Outsourcer.” With no references to television service or any of the other services, the company provided support for, this made clear the business’ position as merely an extension of US business.

A Hotdog and a Coke: American Symbolism and Appearance in the Call Centre

Around the call centre walls were several posters of the famous image of Uncle Sam pointing at you. Though instead of telling you he wants YOU for the US Army, he was asking the agents, “What’s YOUR AHT?” AHT is an abbreviation for Average Handling Time, the average time an agent spends with each customer who calls in; the icon of American patriotism is reminding agents that AHT should be low, to facilitate managing high call volume. On 4 July, the door to the call centre floor donned a picture of a waving American flag; on the wall inside hung a larger image of a flag featuring a superimposed bald eagle. For

lunch, all agents received a ticket for a free hotdog and Coke in the cafeteria, which had been decorated with red, white, and blue balloons.

Like many places of business in the USA, the call centre allows for “casual Fridays,” when agents may wear jeans, shorts, t-shirts, and the like (as compared with the usually required dress pants and button down shirts for either sex, or skirts and blouses for women). The fourth of July in 2011 was on a Monday, and employees were allowed to dress in casual Friday clothes on that day and throughout the whole week in celebration of the USA’s independence. Regarding dress, there were also occasional themes common in American workplaces and schools, including “beach week” (even in a coastal Caribbean city) when employees could wear sandals and shorts. Clearly, the people and business practices of the call centre are inextricably linked with US culture, in particular symbols of national pride.

“Real Football:” American Points of Reference in the Call Centre

Several additional, often more subtle reminders of the connection to the USA were all around, mostly centred around the comments and references personnel would make. For example, one of the agents spoke of missing the restaurant “Boston Market,” with a particular longing for the creamy spinach. One of the trainers reminisced on the many “Ray’s Pizza” locations all around New York City. Further, he emphasised that “*real* football” is American football, not what Americans call soccer—precisely the opposite of what most Caribbean or Latin American folks (and virtually everyone else around the world) would say. He also played American football on Sundays in an informal sort of league.

During lunch or dinner breaks people typically ate onsite at the cafeteria and socialised, mostly in English, while US news channels, usually CNN, played in the background. One of the trainers, known for his energy and strong sense of humour, related a story of a call in which he had to place a woman on a lengthy hold in effort to resolve her problem, which he was not able to do. When he came back, she asked him if he had found the problem. He said, “No, but I did just save 15% by switching to Geico,” and followed up with his usual over-the-top laughter. The

joke and the story of it relied on knowledge of a well-known series of television commercials for a major US insurance company. Moreover, while telling this story, in a prominent New York dialect, he was wearing a t-shirt with the names of famous New York City landmarks and locales such as Brooklyn, China Town, Manhattan, Statue of Liberty, and so on. References to food, sports, and general US culture abound and served to keep this Dominican-based place of employment closely connected to the US upbringing of many of those working there.

In some cases, rather insensitive comments regarding “race” and ethnicity surfaced in the workplace. More than one agent, when referring to telephone conversations with personnel in the Philippines’ office, recounted the conversation with mocking imitations of a stereotypical Filipino dialect. One agent referred to men with South Asian dialects as “Hindu” and even “Habib,” complete with animated impersonations. The same agent erroneously pronounced “Arabic” like “Air-*rab*-bic” when referring to a language option offered in a particular television-programming package. When rebuked by another agent on the mispronunciation, she replied, “Sorry, a Habib-y,” reflecting the usual ignorance that tends to accompany such comments in the USA.

More than one agent referred to “black” women with the general term, “Shaniqua.” Other agents, on more than one occasion, joked about foods often associated with “black” people, including collard greens, fried chicken, and watermelon. Another agent once wrote on the dry-erase board “Axe ≠ Ask” as an admonishment to those who tended toward such linguistic constructions more typical among “black” speakers. These comments regarding “racial” categories, as well as ethnic characterisations, reflected such designations typical to the USA.

From innocuous references to US television advertisements to less savoury US racial and ethnic discourse, agents in the call centre clearly brought a US perspective to the place. Serving as points of reference, conventions drawing on US patriotism, food, sports, television, and general culture abound in the call centre experience. These transnational connections allow deportees to draw from their American culture and facilitate generating income and promoting their survival in their new home.

TRANSNATIONAL SURVIVAL STRATEGIES: WORKING
WITH AMERICAN TOURISTS

While many deportees find work in call centres, many others do not, or at least not steadily. Without steady work, some deportees rely on remittances from family members in the USA. Unfortunately, some deportees also add to Santo Domingo's already substantial homeless population. However, many others make money to survive working with some of the thousands of American (and other) tourists who visit the country each year. I found this by spending time in the *Zona Colonial*, an old area of Santo Domingo defined by *El Conde*, a pedestrian mall lined with shops and teeming with people. Many deportees spend a great deal of time there socially; this area also provides opportunities for them to work, one way or another, in tourism. As a case study in the profound shaping process of globalisation, the *Zona Colonial* is a fascinating place, bringing together two related eras of global conflict.

On the one hand, this region is the site of origin for economic conflict on a fully global scale, having been established by conquering native peoples not long after the orthodoxy of the Spanish Inquisition made its way across the Atlantic. The fact that the politics, economics, language, religion, and general culture of this land are profoundly defined by this encounter is hard to forget. In the aptly named *Zona Colonial*, nearby ruins of a variety of colonial-era structures, Spanish-style architecture, narrow streets named for Catholic saints, and the first Catholic cathedral in the Western hemisphere reinforce this. A prominent statue of Christopher Columbus in a park named for him makes the point particularly clear.

On the other hand, in addition to being the site of origin for massive colonial expansion over five hundred years ago, this area is also home to the results of its contemporary legacy. All-inclusive resorts and Free Trade Zones for manufacturing or assembling have proliferated in the country, marking the current era of conflict rooted in global economic imbalance. Today the Dominican Republic finds itself a highly socio-economically stratified country with certain sectors benefitting from tourism and trade while many live in poverty. In the *Zona Colonial*, one can find ubiquitous tourist shops, tourists seeking entertainment, and locals without formal employment wandering around looking for money-making opportunities, often begging for change and sometimes barefoot and in tattered clothes. Nearby, Santo Domingo's elite can purchase a

Jaguar luxury car, such as the one I saw advertised for US\$69,900 (the price was listed in US\$). This contrast brightly illuminates the economic imbalance that defines this place in the contemporary era.

In the *Zona Colonial*, travellers from all around pass by for photographs with the massive Columbus statue, scarcely seen without pigeons atop, in *Parque Colón* (Columbus Park) on the east end of the pedestrian mall, *El Conde*. Visitors and locals alike occupy the tables of the restaurants adjacent to the park, a “Hard Rock Cafe” among them. Merchants selling all sorts of things approach you, especially if you appear likely to be a visitor, as I do. Children play and ride bikes, sex workers roam, and perhaps some nuns pass through. It is a fascinating place. The remnants of colonial expansion and the economic balance it brought about manifest in the modern era of a tourist industry situated in a highly stratified urban centre.⁴

Tour guides, as well as taxi drivers, are always ready to take you away. Some tour guides are those trained and licenced by the country and wear the official blue button-up shirt and lanyard. Some are not, and many deportees join the numbers of the unlicenced. Embodying US culture with fluent English and American demeanour, deportees can draw on transnationalism to earn money by working with tourists from their former home.

Serving as a tour guide may mean simply showing people the sights around the *Zona Colonial* and taking them out to eat. In other cases, guides serve as an assistant of sorts: running errands, arranging transportation, arranging for recreation and accommodations, and helping with other tasks. Moreover, in some cases, they could even be hired to drive or otherwise accompany tourists around the country, visiting destinations in the interior or beach communities on the north, northeast, or southeast coasts. Still others found work at one of the all-inclusive resorts that have proliferated in the region.

Whatever the nature of the job at hand, Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital, in the form of advantages bestowed by language skills and knowledge of US cultural conventions, which is also harnessed for jobs in the call centre business, is put to use to get it. Regarding finding work, one deportee mentioned:

A few people, they think like me, like most of the people you see working, like places like Punta Cana and Bávaro and Puerto Plata. Like hotels, resorts—most of those people are deported. You know, they know the language and stuff.

In addition to deploying cultural capital, drawing again from Bourdieu, deportees construct social capital as well, in the form of building networks based on trust and reputation, to further their money-making opportunities in the realm of tourism. Following are accounts from five deportees illuminating how cultural capital is harnessed and social capital developed to facilitate working with American tourists, and even me, as a researcher.

Hernan and Frank: Making Connections in the Streets

Several deportees pulled from their American upbringing to draw themselves closer to those they would work with, including me. For example, Hernan was a deportee I occasionally ran into who had moved to New York City at age five and faced deportation at age forty-one after incurring a number of misdemeanors related to gang-activity. He had been in the country for about five years when I met him at age forty-six in 2008. He had no children and, unfortunately, no family support in the Dominican Republic or coming from the USA. Hernan was amiable and generally good spirited, though a little bedraggled from wandering the streets of the *Zona Colonial*.

In the few conversations we had, he repeatedly spoke of the New York of his teen years in the 1970s, including the infamous blackout, the accompanying severe heatwave, and the string of murders by David Berkowitz, better known as the “Son of Sam.” References to this era continued as he also pointed out multiple times his perceived likeness to the actor Al Pacino, adding impressions from some of his career-defining early films. I did not find his likeness particularly strong, though I definitely could see how it would have been stronger in healthier days. The impressions were not poor in quality though. Most importantly, they connected Hernan and me culturally and contributed to our rapport.

Frank was another deportee I met making his way in the streets. Frank told me he left the Dominican Republic at age seven with missionaries who had adopted him and lived in New Jersey until facing deportation just two weeks prior, in 2008, at age thirty-two. Just as Hernan above, Frank had no family support as he made his way as a deportee. He was a little difficult to talk to and nodded off here and there during conversation; I was not able to get a clear answer for why he was deported. I first met Frank in the *Zona Colonial* when he called out to me, “Hey,

American!” and indicated that he, too, had lived in the USA. When I asked him why he thought I was an American he told me he could tell by the way I was walking. He then impersonated me, pointing out the evident confidence he feels Americans display when walking as compared with his account of Europeans, whom he also impersonated, though rather unflatteringly from my point of view. This was likely the point—to essentially compliment me and situate him with me culturally. If so, he was successful.

Being culturally American can indeed provide these helpful connections. I once saw Frank sitting outside a *colmado* (which are ubiquitous small open-air groceries that typically have plastic tables and chairs out front) eating a meal from a disposable container. He told me a “gay black American” had just bought him some food. However, being culturally American—and marked as a deportee—can also bring about problems. Frank added that the previous night, security guards had beaten him up for sleeping where he was not allowed. Nevertheless, both Hernan and Frank drew on their American upbringing to situate themselves with me culturally. In doing so, both were able to obtain money from me for food to survive in the streets as we developed our relationships—relationships built on American cultural connections.

Arturo: Cultural Capital as Blessing and Curse

Arturo’s experiences build on the double-edged sword of how being culturally American can both help and hurt. Arturo had moved to the USA at age two and was deported in 2000 at age twenty-six. Arturo spoke in a particularly strong New York City dialect and referred to *El Conde* with an American-English accent: “The *Cahn-dee*.” He left behind a son, who was about one year old, when he went to prison for five years for engaging in a “shootout.” This gun-fight took place with his sister’s husband (who also survived); Arturo was estranged from his family and received no support from them, though occasionally stayed with a grandmother who lived about one hundred miles from Santo Domingo. He then faced deportation, which was just over ten years before I met him in 2010. In the Dominican Republic, Arturo had worked in call centres here and there, but mostly roamed the *Zona Colonial* looking for opportunities to “hustle,” as he put it. He often had no place to stay. Sometimes he rented a room if he could.

Antonio, whose story opened this chapter and who himself was doing relatively well financially with his call centre job; spoke to the problems with surviving he had observed among several deportees:

It's kind of bad, because bringing all those people over here, you know, there's a lot of people that they don't find jobs. Maybe they didn't learn nothing over there; they come back with nothing, and to go nowhere.

Arturo spoke directly to these issues as well, explaining his personal experiences regarding getting along with local Dominicans and authorities and finding work with local business owners:

They don't let us work out here, try to do our thing out here, you know. Basically, they don't let us *live* right down here, man. They treat us wrong. You know, and we come down here, we don't get no jobs, they don't let us have no jobs. We got that deportation stuff on us, so we can't get no jobs out here. Everybody treats us different. We get locked up every day when we're walking around on the street. They see me every day walking around with a tattoo, 'Oh, he's a deportee, let's lock him up. 'Cause he got thrown out of the United States or something,' or whatever.

When asked, "You get locked up almost every day?" Arturo replied:

Yea, raids. Watch, you'll see; oh man, listen, you don't know man. I just came out the day before yesterday.

In response to the question: "How long were you in?" Arturo replied:

Na, they just take us in for the night. Yea, I might be walking down here on the, strolling or whatever, trying to hustle or whatever, and they're like, 'Oh, look at the deportee. Grab him up.' Sometimes I don't even make my motel room and I just walk around, I stay in the parks, like the *Parque Duarte*, and sit down in the park with all the guys there, we listen to music or whatever until whatever time they leave. Sometimes I just nod on the bench. Sometimes I sit in the pothole [a broken out spot in the concrete], in the cafeteria in the front. I sit there and I just go to sleep, whatever, you know. That's how I do, yea. Stuff like that, man. It's this country, man. They send us back here, man, it's just like, we don't got nothing else to do. You don't know how it feels, man, to get kicked out of your, a country. Let's say you're American, right, let's send him to China.

Arturo's accounts of targeted harassment of deportees in Santo Domingo are consistent with accounts in Brotherton and Barrios (2011), who point to sweeps and investigations based largely on hearsay. In an interview, the Director of the Department for Deportees even admitted, "Whenever there is a crime in an area where we have deportees, we begin interrogating them. This is already a matter of police procedure" (Brotherton and Barrios 2011, p. 204).⁵ Regarding working as an unlicensed tour guide, Arturo told me that the licensed tour guides get jealous because people like him speak English so well, they steal business from the licensed guides. He told me some planted drugs on him, for which he did a year of jail time. The *cedula*, or Dominican ID card, does not indicate deportee status; deportees such as Arturo who face this harassment are apparently identified by cultural indicators such as demeanour, clothing, and, of course, language.

In addition to confrontation with law enforcement, the stigma of deportee status can further complicate the experience of deportees with local citizens as well. Indeed, Golash-Boza (2014) has identified such stigma as among the five most common experiences that deportees share. A local man I knew remarked overhearing a bus driver comment, "No, these deportees, they're coming over here, taking jobs." Another man I knew, upon learning of my research, said directly to me, "They just come here and make crimes." A woman I met and spoke with in the *Zona Colonial*, again, upon learning of my research, elaborated a bit more: "We're concerned about it because they come here to be criminals, drug dealers. If you check Dominican newspapers, we follow the deported issues." Such stories were easy to find, as articles regarding deportation were published weekly in the pages of major Dominican newspapers (Brotherton and Barrios 2011). Coutin (2007) reported the same for the high number of deportees taken to El Salvador as well.

As Arturo's case demonstrates, proficiency in English, though a valuable skill for generating income, marks many deportees to the police as potential "drug sellers and violent gangsters" bringing back deviance from the US streets (Brotherton and Barrios 2011, p. 207). Even Dominican return migrants who are not deportees can be seen as "venal agents of 'transculturation' bringing foreign customs, language, and habits into the national body" (Derby 1998, p. 476). In other words, transnational connections to the USA can hurt at least as much as they help. Nevertheless, such US connections serve as the basis for livelihood, favourable or unfavourable, as Arturo and others make their way as deportees.

Julio and Marcos: Cultural Connections and Tourist Vice

Some of the services for tourists deportees provide are of a more provocative nature and could generate semi-regular income. In the area, female sex workers, and men who can take one to female sex workers, wander around. One day, I bumped into a deportee I knew, Julio, who was one of many men in the area who could set one up with local women.

Julio had moved to Ft. Lauderdale, Florida when he was five and at twenty-four, almost three years prior to my meeting him at age twenty-seven in 2008; he was deported after facing drug charges. He had two daughters, ages thirteen and ten; he was only fourteen years older than his eldest daughter was, both were back in Ft. Lauderdale, and he had minimal contact with his family there. When I saw him, he said he could not talk. He told me, "I got some business going on." Not long after, I saw him walk by with a man who almost definitely was American and a Dominican woman who almost definitely was a sex worker.⁶ Julio engaged men touring the area in conversation on a regular basis; his American cultural connections facilitated building rapport and, ultimately, arranging sexual liaisons for American tourists.

Marcos, who I knew much better than Julio, had the steadiest flow of regular clients of anyone I knew engaging in this arrangement for US tourists and women. Beginning in the early 1970s as a teenager, and more prominently throughout the early and mid-1980s, Marcos engaged in many sorts of illegal enterprise, including dealing drugs and guns, culminating at the dawn of the crack cocaine era when he was arrested in a sting. He had moved from the Dominican Republic to New York with his family at age six. At about age thirty, the father of five, including newborn twins, began serving an approximately sixteen year prison term at a series of prisons around the USA. Upon his release, which had been about five years prior to my meeting him in 2008, Marcos was deported. He had occasional contact with his children, but provided for himself financially by selling works of art by local, often Haitian, artists to tourists—and helping tourists in other ways as well.

On a particular occasion when I was spending time with him, he began working as an interpreter and guide for two men on a Tuesday and said he would probably be working with them through Sunday. On another day, I met a couple of people probably in their late forties or early fifties visiting from Philadelphia, Fred and Philip. Marcos had

helped Fred previously with women he had met through the website *Latin Euro*, a popular resource site for American, and other, men to get in contact with foreign, to them, women. Both Fred and Philip are parole officers. Marcos referred to other men he assisted as “agents” and “marshals” and pointed out that various members of US law enforcement were frequent visitors to the country for such indulgences. As it turns out, Marcos somewhat specialised in assisting members of US law enforcement.

One federal agent, based in Atlanta, called Marcos every day. When I asked, “You mean, literally *every* day,” right then, the man called; I suppose the odds of that occurring were not so bad. The conversations were not long. He usually checked on how things were going. The intervals between actually being there to speak to him in person were not long either—he, along with various friends, visited Santo Domingo once per month. Marcos would help him with accommodations and translating. He told me this sometimes entailed waiting in a car for hours while the men were away. The “street smarts” Marcos had developed over the course of his US residence allowed him to connect with these American men and build their trust. These relationships provided Marcos with additional income to aid his survival.

CONCLUDING: “HOME?”

Deportation is a growing phenomenon that, in turn, can continue the immigration process for those who began it as children, and is increasingly shaping the site of return as well, building what (Kanstroom 2012, p. 8) refers to as an “unplanned *diaspora*” made up of former American residents forming in countries where deportees are sent. For legal permanent residents of the USA deported after long-term residence since childhood, rather than a personal choice or even an unwanted choice conditioned by circumstance, this return is forced. Indeed, following deportation, drawing on US experience, deportees engage in a process of “forced transnationalism” (Golash-Boza 2014, p. 63).

As deportees deal with living in a new place where they have been forced to live, they also tend toward employment opportunities that draw on their skills cultivated by a US upbringing, linking them back to the USA in an economic, political, and, indeed, cultural relationship. Working for a company contracted with a US business or with American tourists provides transnational linkages that keep alive and put to use

their US upbringing. In this process, deportees exercise their agency and improve their financial opportunities. Those working in call centres and with tourists find scenarios in which their US cultural capital provides an advantage they can use to earn money and even build a career. Furthermore, many deportees of the *Zona Colonial* draw on their transnational connections and build social capital as well generate income and, ultimately, to survive.

This, nevertheless, also complicates their lives by widening their “peripheral vision,” providing “frequent reminders that one’s situation is unstable in comparison to those on the other side,” a condition more common among those whose “daily lives are influenced by globalisation” (Zavella 2011, p. 8). They can “see” elements of the life they used to have and develop a transnational subjectivity that Zavella (2011, p. 9) characterises as feeling “that one is neither from here nor from there, not at home anywhere.” Though relying on transnational strategies in this scenario, an inherent emotional conundrum emerges; the deportees rely on these strategies to survive, yet, simultaneously, the strategies are a constant reminder of the alienation and exclusion they face (Golash-Boza 2014).

These deportees neither settled in the USA by choice, nor returned to their country of birth by choice. Nevertheless, within these structural conditions they assert their agency and even draw on these structural conditions to provide for themselves. However, these processes play out on a field of imposed structural conditions profoundly shaping how they construct “home.” Adapting Menjívar’s (2006) notion of “liminal legality” regarding those living between the legal categories of documented and undocumented, these deportees, though legal permanent residents nevertheless lived in a rather extended liminal position. Their deportation clearly demonstrates that their legal status was tenuous. For those deported, the process they go through shows them they are owned, in a sense, by legal constructs. Furthermore, regarding identity, they are removed because they legally belong to another country; yet when they arrive in that other country; they are often seen as from the USA (Coutin 2007).

Deportees indeed are agents of economic, political, and cultural change linking their new home with their old. Yet, in providing for themselves, they also create an even more conflicted notion of “home” than the one imposed upon them by both immigration and deportation. While immigration took them from their place of birth, deportation took

them from their place of belonging. Under such circumstances, where is “home?”

NOTES

1. All names are pseudonyms.
2. Since IIRIRA, any non-citizen, regardless of legal permanent resident status or long-term residence faces mandatory deportation if convicted of a crime that carries at least a one-year sentence. These crimes, known as “aggravated felonies” for non-citizens, include misdemeanors for citizens. See Morawetz (2000) for an analysis of the ramifications of IIRIRA.
3. These are “removals,” which the Department of Homeland Security distinguishes from “returns.” Returns are deportations not based on an order of removal, such as apprehending people crossing a border. For many years, going back to the late 1970s, this number was near or over one million, higher by several hundred thousand than the number of removals. After mostly steady growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in 2001 the number began to drop and within a few years began to drop considerably, nearing the number of removals. Finally, in 2011, the number of returns (those apprehended and sent back) fell below the number of removals (those formally deported) for the first time since 1941 and has remained lower. In 2014, the number was 162,814 or only 39% of the number of removals at 414,481 (US DHS 2016, Table 39). Though a relatively new trend, far more people are formally deported (“removed”) than apprehended and sent back (“returned”).
4. See Gregory (2007) for an ethnographic analysis of globalisation, including tourism, in the Dominican Republic.
5. Siulc (2009), in an unpublished dissertation, discusses in more detail the role of police and local Dominicans in shaping the experience of living as a Dominican deportee and what this means for criminalisation.
6. See Brennan (2004) for a detailed account of the sex tourism boom in the Dominican Republic.

REFERENCES

- Bourgois, Philippe. 1995. *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brennan, Denise. 2004. *What’s Love Got to Do with It?: Transnational Desires and Sex Tourism in the Dominican Republic*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Brotherton, David C., and Luis Barrios. 2011. *Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2007. *Nations of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of Citizenship in El Salvador and the United States*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Derby, Lauren. 1998. Gringo Chickens with Worms: Food and Nationalism in the Dominican Republic. In *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand and Ricardo Donato Salvatore, 451–493. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2014. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- Gregory, Steven. 2007. *The Devil Behind the Mirror: Globalization and Politics in the Dominican Republic*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kanstroom, Daniel. 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Menjívar, Cecilia. 2006. Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the United States. *American Journal of Sociology* 111 (4): 999–1037.
- Morawetz, Nancy. 2000. Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms. *Harvard Law Review* 113 (8): 1936–1962.
- Rodkey, Evin. 2016. Disposable Labor, Repurposed: Outsourcing Deportees in the Call Center Industry. *Anthropology of Work Review* 37 (1): 34–43.
- Siulc, Nina. 2009. *Unwelcome Citizens, Criminalized Migrants, and the Quest for Freedom: Deportees in the Dominican Republic*. Dissertation, New York University.
- Stephen, Lynn. 2007. *Transborder Lives: Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2016. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2014 Enforcement Actions, Tables 39 and 41. <https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2014-enforcement-actions>. Accessed 21 Sep 2016.
- Zavella, Patricia. 2011. *I'm Neither Here nor There: Mexicans' Quotidian Struggles with Migration and Poverty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Post-Deportation Movements: Forms and Conditions of the Struggle Amongst Self-Organising Expelled Migrants in Mali and Togo

Clara Lecadet

In Sokodé in 2008, Togolese migrants were looking for a name for their association. Their initiative was unprecedented in that country. It aimed to unite migrants in the central region of Togo, mainly those expelled from Germany, and to organise self-help. The budding association was supported from outside the country by *Die Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und Migrantinnen*, a German network that was very active in the struggles of undocumented migrants. While surfing the Internet looking for a name, Razak Aboubacar, the founder and coordinator of the association, came by chance upon the site of the *Association Malienne des Expulsés* [the Malian Association of Expelled Migrants] (AME). He had not known of its existence, but he felt drawn to this association, created in Bamako in 1996 by Ousmane Diarra, a Malian shopkeeper expelled from Angola, who

C. Lecadet (✉)

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Ecole des Hautes Etudes
en Sciences Sociales, Institut Interdisciplinaire d'Anthropologie du
Contemporain, Paris, France

© The Author(s) 2018

S. Khosravi (ed.), *After Deportation*, Global Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57267-3_10

187

had wanted to create solidarity amongst all expelled migrants in spite of their differences and their sometimes-diverse situations. Aboubacar thought that the same thing was needed in Togo, and so his budding association was named, following the example of its Malian brother, the *Association Togolaise des Expulsés* [the Togolese Association of Expelled Migrants] (ATE); it was to be apolitical and with the aims of offering assistance to migrants and defending their rights (Basaran and Eberl 2009).

The link between these two associations is not merely anecdotal: while their connection seems initially to have been accidental, it in fact revealed a phenomenon common to expelled migrant organisations in several West African and Central African countries. In Mali, many expelled migrants associations have started up since the creation of the AME in 1996; amongst the most important are the *Association des Refoulés d'Afrique Centrale au Mali* (ARACEM), which aims to organise migrants from Central African countries expelled from Algeria to Mali, and the *Association Retour Travail et Dignité* (ARTD), created following the events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2006. In Benin, there has been, since 2009, the *Association des Béninois revenus de la France pour l'auto-emploi* (ABRF), an association aimed at supporting immigrants returning under the voluntary return process that was part of the setting up of an agricultural project. In Yaoundé in Cameroon, *Welcome Back Cameroon* was founded in 2006 and the *Association des Rapatriés et de Lutte contre l'Emigration Clandestine du Cameroun* (ARECC) in 2008.

In Sokodé, the creation of ATE had an immediately contagious effect, for shortly afterwards, another association with similar aims and objectives was formed, named the *Union des Jeunes Rapatriés Togolais* [Union of Young Repatriated Togolese]. The reciprocity between these associations was acknowledged: ATE saw itself as the brother association of AME, which it judged to be the pioneer in this kind of action and whose experience was a source of inspiration for its members, and the *Union des Jeunes Rapatriés Togolais*, having been inspired by the creation of ATE, considered itself to be its offspring. In 2010, two members of AME, Mahamadou Keita and Alassane Dicko, went to Sokodé to advise the young Togolese association. This throng of attendant initiatives, often linked, but also sometimes wholly ignorant of each other, seems to suggest the emergence and construction of a specific movement of expelled migrants in Africa. It sheds new light on the post-expulsion period. While the process of expelling undocumented foreigners is synonymous with invisibility for those affected by it, the creation of associations and the launch of movements

within Africa by self-organising expelled migrants seem to mark the transition of these migrants from absence to their emergence as political subjects.

This chapter thus aims to show the existence of various forms of gatherings and mobilisation that occur after expulsion amongst self-organising expelled migrants. Policies on the expulsion of undocumented foreigners have led to studies on the measures for their detention and their return to the country from which they came (Fischer 2013; Makaremi 2007), but the impact of these measures in their countries of origin, or in the countries through which they travel, remains difficult to evaluate. The post-expulsion experience, an unexplored field which has only recently been defined (Peutz 2006), has been seen in relation to the social stigma attached to migrants on their return, leading to reprisals (Fekete 2006), together with social marginalisation and/or criminalisation (Drotbohm 2012; Kanstroom 2012). However, few studies concentrate on the forms of collective reorganisation, which occur after expulsion (Brachet 2009). The agency of migrants following expulsion has social and political consequences. The social dimension of this agency lies in the kinds of reception and solidarity created by expellees in an attempt to reduce the often dramatic effects of their expulsion. The political dimension can be found in the kinds of protest against migration policies that emerge after expulsion. The chapter aims to understand the symbolic dimension of this move to collective action by expelled migrants, as well as the conditions for the spread of such mobilisation depending on national context, starting from the cases of Mali and Togo. It is based on investigations carried out between 2007 and 2016 amongst associations created by expelled migrants in Mali and Togo in relation to the kinds of reception organised by and for migrants, social and legal action and also movements led by these associations.

The emergence of the associative movement created by expellees in several African countries demonstrates the need for an alliance felt by migrants faced with the harsh realities of European migration policy as well as with the regular expulsion practices within the continent of Africa. The formation of associations seems to be the minimum to which expelled migrants can lay claim in order to begin a debate on the political questions raised by expulsion and to try to find concrete solutions to the consequences of expulsion on the life of each individual. It is difficult, however, to see it as a unified movement. While these associations seem to be part of the increased visibility of the figure of the expelled migrant in Africa and of issues in the struggle against expulsion as put forward

by AME from the 1990s onwards, they also weave a complex web that leads directly to the issue of collective action, and the ways in which this can or cannot take place in the public arena. While the democratisation taking place in Mali from 1991 seems to have been a context favourable to the emergence of the most marginalised groups in society on the political and social scene, and to the development of mobilisation around the issue of their lack of representation, the failure of the transition to democracy in Togo in the same period seems, on the other hand, to have stifled public protest. The spreading, or the failure to spread, of the expelled migrants' voice and the difficulties involved in this, reveal both the nature of political power, the degree of organisation involved in civic life, and also the kinds of grouping and expression accepted within a country. The very position of collectivised expelled migrants trying to find a place and to (re)create a space of their own in their country of origin or in the country to which they have been expelled, exemplifies that tension between the subject and the state about which Foucault (1994) wrote when describing new kinds of opposition to the state. Is associative action in this sense in itself a political act, through which a group asserts itself in the face of strong rejection by the state, and do these activities inevitably become a form of protest? Can these associations become a unified movement despite the disparate socio-political contexts to which they belong?

RE-ENTERING POLITICS AFTER EXPULSION: THE *ASSOCIATION
MALIENNE DES EXPULSÉS* [MALIAN EXPELLED MIGRANTS'
ASSOCIATION], A PIONEERING INITIATIVE

The political significance of the expulsion of foreigners¹ is generally looked at from the point of view of the countries in which expulsion is decided upon, institutionalised, and finally put into action (Kanström 2010; Ngai 2005; Noiriel 1991). The social and political reorganisation brought about by deportations in migrants' countries of origin or of transit, where over the last fifteen years or so, in different West and Central African countries, former expelled migrants have come together to organise reception and aid as well as to protest against the hardening of migration policies, or to raise awareness amongst young people of the dangers of this adventure,² seems still to be a neglected field.

While enforcing countries see the expulsion of foreigners as a suspension of the prerogatives of politics, the gathering of some expelled migrants into associations demonstrates a degree of politicisation during and after the experience of expulsion. “Expelled migrants,” as they call themselves as they move to collective action, thus emerge as political subjects and agents in their countries of origin and transit,³ capable of calling into question the measures to which they are subjected by states, and also of making demands in their country of origin, notably in relation to their protection abroad from the humiliation and the brutality of the expulsion process, for the recovery of property lost or confiscated during expulsion, and for the respect of the rights of migrants in the face of the brutality inherent to the expulsion process (Gary-Toukara 2013).

This move to collective action takes strength from its name. The name of the *Association Togolaise des Expulsés* is inspired by its Malian homonym. The process of self-designation underlying the existence of these associations is what gives shape and existence to expelled migrants on the public stage. The generic use of the term “expelled migrants,” which is a clear, performative statement (Austin 1970), is not merely a way of presenting their collective existence, it also signals a political positioning. Those who have been affected by these measures anchor the legitimacy of their self-designation and their association in a re-appropriation of the expulsion experience. For them it is a way of stepping outside the traditional framework of mediation and political representation in order to state their existence as a political entity. This positioning and these struggles transform political constraint and exclusion by the state into a source of protest and enable a new collective identity to emerge and to be formulated (De Certeau 2008; Von Busekist 2008). The choice of name thus becomes also a way of choosing their struggle. It is, furthermore, important to consider the meaning of this self-designation, which echoes the analyses by Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961) of the way in which colonised populations internalised the categories used to subject them, and identified themselves with these categories and subordinate positions. The expelled migrants’ need to find a name for themselves thus raises issues relating to the establishment of a collective identity, linked to the need for the recognition of an experience that was politically denied. Is the re-appropriation of the term used to reject them a doubling of their alienation, or is the term “Expellee,” which subjectivises the limited relationship of the expelled individual to politics, an issue in the struggle and therefore a necessary stage in the emancipation movement? How

do expelled migrants manage at the same time to define a gap, a hiatus between states, and to reaffirm on the political stage their non-existence as political subjects?

The shift brought about by collective action from the absent, almost shameful figure of the expelled migrant to the actor capable of taking part in public debate, is due to the pioneering action of AME (Lecadet 2015, 2016). The creation of AME in 1996, armed with the collective name of those who incarnated in a radical way expulsion outside the country, also, and perhaps above all, aimed to organise reception centres, to find temporary accommodation, to ensure medical aid, and to help to protect the rights of those who, in the main, arrived with nothing and without support (Dünnwald 2010). This initiative was explicitly related to the *Sans-papiers* protest movement, which was taking place in France at the same period, and which reached its peak with the expulsion from the Saint-Bernard church (Blin 2005; Cissé 1999; Diop 1997). AME benefitted from the support of the media and of several parties from the Malian left wing, as well as from an African and European network of associations and NGOs. The establishment, shortly after its creation, of a much politicised support group helped to legitimise its existence in Malian public life. Everyday action, in the form of reception and aid centres, was accompanied by political protest, which was not only spread but also inspired, fed, and supported by the slogans of European networks opposed to the intensification of methods for the expulsion of undocumented migrants. African social forums, public debate days organised annually by AME since 2007, workshops on the question of human rights in Africa, and the Internet have all played their part in creating this critique and spreading it outside Mali. All of these have contributed to giving AME a wider voice, but mobilisation has mostly taken place within Mali (Lecadet 2012). This mobilisation took on momentum when, in 2008–2009, AME and FORAM⁴ led a campaign against the signing of readmission agreements between France and Mali (Soukouna 2011); they consisted of readmission clauses governing foreign *sans-papiers*, which were included in economic partnerships related to development aid policy, and which aimed to facilitate the issuing by Malian consulates abroad of the passes that were needed for the expulsion of Malian nationals (Touunkara 2013). Many such partnerships have been signed between countries, but nowhere has protest against the migration clauses been so outspoken. This protest had a significant impact, weighed in favour of the Malian government's refusal to sign these agreements the following

year, and helped to legitimise AME's status in political activism and dialogue. In 2011, the association was consulted over the elaboration of a National Migration Policy (PNM) by the Malian government.⁵

The Malian movements, the public and highly mediated nature of which increased the visibility of expelled migrants in the public arena and transformed the taboo of expulsion into a fully political issue, were reinforced by a two-fold critique of the state, stigmatising repressive immigration policies while also denouncing the abandonment of, and absence of, state protection for its expelled citizens. The spread of this critique of the state upheld by AME was helped by Mali's transition to democracy in 1991 and by the liberalisation of the media in this period (Daum and Le Guay 2005). Acceptance of AME by the Malian state as a legitimate actor in public life is explained by the more general recognition of the contribution made by migrants to national history and also of the ordeals they had experienced.

THE ORGANISATION OF EXPELLED MIGRANTS IN TOGO, AN UNINTERRUPTED HISTORY OF POLITICAL MILITANCY

The conditions for the existence of such movements, against a background of agreement- disagreement with the state, did not exist in Togo, where expelled migrants were primarily seen by the Eyadéma's dictatorship as people having fled the regime and hence as political opponents, and where even the recognition of migration as contributing to the development of the country was not a political issue. In Sokodé, Togo, where ATE was formed in 2008, the mobilisation of expelled migrants is linked to a history of political militancy that goes back to opposition to the power of President Eyadéma, set up in 1990. A *Conférence nationale souveraine* [national conference], held in July 1991, brought about a liberalisation, unprecedented in political life, which immediately turned into the creation of associations, trade unions, and political groupings opposed to the one-party regime. The national conference failed, however, to launch the hoped-for transition to democracy or to consolidate the foundations of civil society (Iwata 2000). The repression that followed this liberal outburst was all the more vicious. It was in this context that most of those who are today involved with ATE chose political militancy, becoming active opponents of the governing regime. Understanding the genesis of ATE and the narrow margin of manoeuvre

at the association's disposal in Togolese public life involves looking at three factors:

- The departure of political opponents in the 1990s.
- The role of the diaspora in opposing Eyadéma's political regime.
- Expelled migrants' fear of returning, some having taken up political militancy again, while others stopped all political activity for fear of reprisals.

In Togo, expulsion was a counterbalance to the migration of many of the inhabitants of Sokodé and its surrounding area to Germany and other neighbouring countries in the early 1990s. The second largest city in the country, situated in the centre of Togo in the Tchoundjo region, Sokodé is mainly Muslim in an essentially Catholic country, and is seen as the main centre of opposition to the regime. Under Eyadéma's dictatorship, that lasted until 2005, only to be replaced by his son who then took power after highly contested elections, the reasons that led many people to leave were both economic and political. The fear of arbitrary arrest and unexplained murders made some choose exile while others were simply looking for a better life. In the early 1990s, many of ATE's members were involved in trade unions, associations, and opposition political parties such as the *Union des Forces pour le Changement* [Union of Forces for Change] (UFC),⁶ the *Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau* [Action Committee for Revival] (CAR),⁷ the *Parti des Démocrates pour le Renouveau* [Democratic Party for Revival] (PDR), the *Union Syndicale des Chauffeurs routiers au Togo* [Trade Unions of Drivers in Togo] (USYNDICTO),⁸ or the *Association Togolaise de Lutte contre la Manipulation des Consciences* [Togolese Association against the Manipulation of Conscience] (ATLMAC), created in 1990 to denounce all forms of intimidation and blackmail by the dictatorship. After the failure of the transition to democracy in 1991, many fled to escape the reprisals against those who represented a threat to the regime.

This exodus did not silence protest. The political opposition continued its work, not only within the country, even though militants felt let down by successive rallying calls from the leaders of parties opposing the ruling power, but also abroad. Thus, the Togolese diaspora, notably through the *Diaspora togolaise pour la démocratie et le développement* [Togolese Diaspora for Democracy and Development] (DIASTODE), played an active role in maintaining opposition. In France and Germany,

a group of Togolese in exile demonstrated their anger at official visits by the President of Togo.⁹ Associations representing the diaspora such as Tchaoundjo Renaissance in Germany, or the Collectif pour la démocratie au Togo [Collective for Democracy in Togo] in Canada, also took part in criticising the regime, which became highly suspicious of nationals abroad. The high tension between Eyadéma's regime and the Togolese diaspora explains the particular fear felt by those liable to expulsion from their country of exile, as well as the interrogations and harsh treatment meted out to expelled migrants on their arrival. On their return to Togo, they were confronted by the harassment, corruption, and arbitrary actions, which had made them leave the country.

On arrival at Lomé airport a large number of expelled migrants who were sent back in the 1990s were placed under arrest, interrogated, and thrown into prison for terms of up to 6 months or a year. Only those who still had some money were able to negotiate unofficial "bail" that allowed them to go free, or could use their connections. In the ATE, those who were expelled towards the end of the 1990s spoke of the harshness of conditions for expelled migrants on their return. Razak Aboubacar, the president of the ATE, explains that: "The former president was in power, things were very hard. If you arrived at the airport with no protection, they sent you straight to prison."¹⁰ Being expelled meant being immediately classed as a political opponent, he continues: "It wasn't easy to express yourself, because if you said that you were an expelled migrant, people knew your position. You were against the ruling political power." Expelled migrants, whether they were pushed to leave Togo for economic or political reasons, were wary of institutions, he adds: "People were even afraid to approach any state services." Expulsion led to many personal dramas, he continues: "The lives of expelled migrants became really difficult. Some separated, some went mad [...] Some just couldn't take it."

The freedom to associate with one another, or to set out their claims, was denied by political authorities because of the very fact that they had left. Labelled as political opponents, they were almost totally denied freedom of expression. While some gave up all militant activity on their return and refused to belong to ATE, others continued to fight in opposition parties such as the *Alliance Nationale pour le Changement* [National Alliance for Change] (ANC), which hoped for a change-over in political power and played a major role in the opposition movement organised by the *Collectif Sauvons le Togo* [Save Togo Collective]

before the general election of October 2012. Opponents of the regime, expelled migrants who had again become opponents after their return to Togo; the backgrounds of the most politicised members of ATE illustrate the most critical forms of relationship to the state, between opposition and undesirability.

The creation of an expelled migrants' association in the Togolese context cannot therefore be reduced to a simple response to the hardening of migration policies by Europe. It is one of the consequences of the political situation within the country, which pushed numerous Togolese into exile and then imposed on them a return to the very country they had left. The case of Togolese refugees in Benin forced to return to Togo, and the fact that some of them became members of ATE, shows that the idea of an association of expellees and a collective identification with the situation of expelled migrants cannot be reduced simply to migration constraints applied by Western countries, but rather brings together complex, heterogeneous situations linked to conflicts and political disturbances within Africa. The place that the members of ATE are trying to create for themselves is a limited one because of the vice-like grip that restricts mobilisation.

DEPORTEES' MOVEMENTS AND THE DIFFERENCES OF POLITICAL REGIME

Mobilisations initiated by expelled migrants' associations take on a different meaning and form according to each national context. They adapt to the possibilities for public expression and collective action allowed by each political regime. The choice of issues raised during meetings of these associations, the capacity for formulating a political critique of states, are telling of the very nature of their political environment. The fact that the issue of the "voiceless" became important in the process of democratisation in Mali (Camara 2005; Perret 2005), with the creation of the newspaper *Les Echos*, in 1989, by the historian and politician Alpha Oumar Konaré and of Radio Kayira, in 1992, by members of the opposition party *Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance* [African solidarity for democracy and independence] (SADI), such as Cheick Oumar Sissoko and Oumar Mariko, dedicated to the "voiceless" ("sans voix"), was one of the factors that contributed to the emergence of a protest among expellees in Mali. No such public expression

by minorities or oppressed population existed in Togo and this directly influenced the statements of ATE. If the expression of a political dissensus was authorised by the existence of democratic debate in Mali, the repression of forms of public mobilisation in Togo pushed ATE to consensual topics of discussion. In public pronouncements, ATE tried, therefore, to raise the issue of the representation of the Togolese diaspora rather than, in this very sensitive context, focusing attention on the expelled migrants alone. In order to induce the government to begin taking the situation of expelled migrants into account, ATE chose to state the need to make immigration a theme for public debate and to make the existence of Togolese nationals abroad more visible. It was not until 2010 that Togolese abroad were represented within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, probably under the influence of the African Union, which committed African countries to setting up representative authorities and associations for their diasporas (Likibi 2010).¹¹ Indeed, for several years now there has been a progressive move towards considering diasporas by the Togolese government other than as a recalcitrant group to be distrusted. At a workshop on migration issues organised in Lomé, in April 2012, by Attac Togo and the Visions Solidaires association, the coordinator of ATE, who was meeting the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Tourism for the first time in an official capacity, committed them to further the institutionalisation of the diaspora by creating a ministerial post dedicated to Togolese abroad.

Turning the expelled migrant from being seen as a potential enemy of the regime into a national citizen needing the protection of the state was all the more difficult since the Togolese government had always subscribed to the sovereignty of receiving countries as regards their policies and practices in relation to Togolese nationals. ATE's place remained in doubt for a long time, as is demonstrated by the fact that the major issue of obtaining recognition was not achieved by ATE or the *Union des Jeunes Rapatriés Togolais* [Union of Young Repatriated Togolese] until 2014, which left these new associations in legal limbo for several years. They were not clandestine organisations: every meeting, every appearance in the media, had to be authorised by the city mayor and be given the go-ahead by the Prefect, but their existence was discrete and they were careful when raising issues publicly. ATE seemed not to be prepared to organise public protests like its older brother in Mali, but it was a part of the movements and association meetings organised by Attac Togo and the Visions Solidaires association in Lomé, whose first social forum in

Togo, organised and financed by Attac Togo on 17–18 December 2010, was the first notable event. Attac Togo, with other associations that were part of the alter-globalisation movement, such as Visions Solidaires, helped to set up debates and meetings between people involved in civil society and state representatives. While these associations were not directly engaged in political protest,¹² they appear, nonetheless, to have established a relative opening up of the regime for individuals to become involved in civil society. Furthermore, the ATE was able to organise a public celebration for the International Migrants Day on 18 December 2015 and 2016, where people demonstrated in the streets of Sokodé with banners, such as “Sauver la vie des migrants” [Save migrants’ lives], or “Séjour et visa aux migrants” [Give migrants visa and freedom of stay]. In the declaration concluding this day, the ATE defended the principle of freedom of movement and called the African government to reduce poverty presented as a key factor in migration. The final wording of this declaration is “Together let’s respect the right to leave and the right to remain.”

The establishment of associations and the possibility of protest by expelled migrants against the harshness of deportation policies and for the defence of migrants’ rights vary from one country to another and clearly reveal the structure of civil society as well as the nature of the political scene. The spread of the movement launched by AME in Mali since 1996 offers a striking background to an understanding of the difficulties faced by ATE. While AME has turned most of its action—and has thus acquired notoriety—to testimonies in the media from expelled migrants and by spreading political criticism of expelling countries and its own government, the possibility of expressing and spreading the views of expelled migrants in Togolese public life seems restricted by both the suspicion of political opposition to the regime that is still felt towards expelled migrants on their arrival in the country and continues to haunt those involved in the association, and the ongoing political engagement of its members against the ruling regime. This is no doubt the reason why ATE in its many activities (conferences and debates every summer with students from Kara and Lomé who have returned to their families in Sokodé for the holidays, radio programmes, participation in workshops organised by Attac Togo in Lomé, etc.) puts the accent on more unifying, consensual themes than AME. It tries, for example, to show the major contribution made by money sent from the diaspora to the economy of the country, and to make this into a real political issue, so as

to re-evaluate the value of migrants to the state and the need for them to be protected against expulsion measures. It insists on the link between migration and development and in organised debates where it offers advice to young people on legal migration.

Nevertheless, the individual experience of deportation, however much anger and protest it arouses, still remains a private story, as people are too reticent to speak out in public. The German association *Karawane*, which encouraged the creation of the ATE in 2008 and several of whose members attended the first general assembly of ATE, wanted to interview expelled migrants in public in order to collect their testimonies, but came up against strong personal resistance, as the co-ordinator of ATE explained in an interview in Sokodé in August 2012: “We tried doing this in public, and we saw that people were reluctant to talk about their problems in Europe prior to expulsion [...] If you meet up with them at home, they’ll tell you everything.” Indeed, when I carried out an investigation in August 2012 amongst members of ATE, I was systematically invited to go to the homes or places of work of those whom I wished to interview: home, a private or sometimes a professional space, considered safe, seemed to be a sanctuary where they could speak confidentially and freely. While ATE, like AME, lays great stress on the idea that it should be “those directly involved,” that is, the expelled migrants themselves, who talk about themes related to migration, it has not been able, nor has it tried for those very reasons, to ferment public protest through such accounts, as in Mali.

OVERCOMING THE DISPARITY OF NATIONAL CONTEXTS THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL MOBILISATION?

The existence of joint movements by expelled migrant associations in Africa does, however, provide an opportunity where needed for overcoming the disparities and difficulties involved in different national contexts. Joint actions stem from the participation of some of these associations in the alter-globalisation movement, their partnership with anti-racist networks in Europe, and the networks that they have built up within the African continent. Such occasions are rare, because associations develop initially at a local or national level, and deal with urgent situations generated by the particular problems arising from expulsions in their own country. Even so, the organisation of social forums

in Africa enables these associations to meet together and to devise different forms of public action on themes related to borders, free circulation, and expulsion. This action thus operates on both a national and transnational level and in doing so tries to upset and subvert the barriers placed in the way of those on migration routes. These movements aim to challenge borders. The caravan that left Cotonou for the world social forum in Dakar in February 2011 was conceived as a way of representing a border to be crossed and to be defied. The associations working together in this operation used each stage of their journey to denounce the corruption endemic in the practices of border guards and the rackets to which migrants are prey (Andersson 2014). This targeted action brought together issues of circulation and mobility with the multi-site, transverse character of migrant movements. Here, ATE and AME met in communal action, leaving aside for a while their individual actions in their respective countries and the difficulties posed by their emergence as political entities. The 20th anniversary celebrations of AME in Bamako in November 2016 were also an occasion for a communal assessment of the state of the struggles by self-organising expelled migrants in diverse national contexts.

CONCLUSION

The very idea of a movement specifically for expelled migrants, therefore, seems to be a critical point of tension in countries with different political contexts, promoted by an important organisation in the associative field and helped by conditions favouring the emergence of collective protest. A highly significant point in considering such initiatives is the fact that the capacity of expelled migrants to mobilise themselves via associations, the kind of claims that they make, or even if they do not go as far as that (a claim suggests calling into question the established order, which is not always an aim of such associations), then the message that they intend to convey by coming together, all depend upon these very varied political configurations.

The creation of a space for expelled migrants in Africa cannot therefore be only seen as a form of protest; the themes that the migrants want to put forward also depend on the obstacles that are put in the way of the creation of their associations and on the degree of acceptance of these associations by their country. In any case, the link between these associations, and their relationship with international initiatives in

favour of migrants, bring a transnational dimension to their local role and develop themes for common action. Thus, while in Togo expelled migrants find it very difficult to have their voice heard in the public arena, the deployment of certain movements on a transnational scale still manages to give value to their existence and their demands. The emergence of a movement specifically for expelled migrants in Africa thus seems to be emblematic of both the effects of the hardening of migration policies by Western countries and within Africa, and the structural capacity of the migrants' countries of origin to accept these movements or, on the other hand, to render them invisible. Such movements therefore also reveal the policy of each country of origin in relation to their nationals who are threatened or affected by expulsion measures, as well as their position on the migration regime that Western countries want to impose on them through a "shared" policy, which makes migration control one of the conditions of development aid (Ellermann 2008).

NOTES

1. A recent current of historical and critical works establishes a link between expulsion measures and the makeshift statutory distinction between foreigners and citizens in the structure of Western countries.
2. In general terms, these associations are characterised by extremely varied and sometimes-contradictory positions, an analysis of which would, on its own, be rich in information on the interweaving of self-help initiatives and action by humanitarian and political institutions. Amongst the expelled migrants' associations that have been created in Africa, there are varied and even contradictory positions between those who want to protest against existing policies and to demand change, like Association Malienne des Expulsés in Mali or Welcome Back Cameroon in Cameroon, and those who prefer an approach based on information about the risks run by migrants and on dissuading people from setting out with no respect for legal forms of migration, like Association des Rapatriés et de lutte contre l'Emigration Clandestine au Cameroun in Cameroon.
3. This concerns those who are expelled into a country that is not their own. Thus, the Association des Réfoulés d'Afrique Centrale au Mali shed light on the specific situation of foreigners expelled into Mali. The creation of this association in 2006, however, revealed a more general phenomenon of the short or medium term settlement of expelled migrants of various nationalities in border zones, as is the case in Tinzawaten, on the border between Mali and Algeria, or of Kye-Ossi in Cameroon, on the border with Equatorial Guinea.

4. The Forum for a Different Mali (FORAM) is a centre for discussion and reflection on migration issues founded in 2006 by Aminata Dramane Traoré. An essayist and a former Minister of Culture, she has contributed to the spread of a critique of European migration policy in the Malian and international media. Several of her works denounce the neo-colonialism at work in the establishment by Western countries of repressive measures in relation to *sans-papiers*.
5. The adoption of a new migration policy framework in a country known for its lack of interest and its permissiveness on such issues was strongly encouraged by the EU and the IOM, whose representatives took an active part in the development in 2011 of a project that was subsequently to be submitted to the Malian parliament.
6. UFC, created in 1992, was a federation of political parties affiliated to the Committee for Togolese Unity, the party that worked for the independence of Togo.
7. Presided over by Yaovi Agboyibor, this was the main opposition party in the general election of 1994.
8. Created in 1974 to protect the workers' interests, it is the oldest drivers' union in Togo.
9. F., a member of ATE, took part in these demonstrations in France and Germany, which made him even more fearful of the idea of returning to Togo.
10. These interview extracts are taken from a survey of ATE members in Sokodé in August 2012.
11. In 2002 the OAU became the African Union and decided to set up a strategic framework for a migration policy in Africa, the final text of which, "Report of the Commission on the strategic framework for a migration policy in Africa" was adopted in Banjul, Gambia in 2006.
12. We note, however, that it is not here that political protest is to be found in its radical form. The *Collectif Sauvons le Togo* [Save Togo Collective] (CST), which was responsible for several street demonstrations that were violently repressed in June and August 2012, is in fact principally made up of political parties, not associations.

REFERENCES

- Austin, John Langshaw. 1970. *Quand dire c'est faire*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Andersson, Ruben. 2014. *Illegality, Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Basaran, Aylin, and Hans-Georg Eberl. 2009. Im Land der Abgeschobenen: Soziale Realitäten und Selbstorganisation von unten in Togo. *Hinterland Magazin* 10: 5–15.

- Blin, Thierry. 2005. *Les sans-papiers de Saint-Bernard: Mouvement social et action organisée*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Brachet, Julien. 2009. *Migrations transsahariennes: Vers un désert cosmopolite et morcelé (Niger)*. Paris: Éditions du Croquant.
- Camara, Many. 2005. Radio de proximité, promotion musicale et réflexivité: l'expérience de Kayira FM Bamako, Mali. Vol. 4: 117–137.
- Cissé, Madjiguène. 1999. *Parole de sans-papiers*. Paris: La Dispute.
- Daum, Christophe, and Céline Le Guay. 2005. Le Mali, sa démocratisation et ses émigrés. *Hommes et Migrations* 1256: 103–114.
- De Certeau, Michel. 2008. Pour une nouvelle culture: Le pouvoir de parler. *Études* 408: 628–635.
- Diop, Ababacar. 1997. *Dans la peau d'un sans-papiers*. Paris: Seuil.
- Drotbohm, Heike. 2012. 'It's Like Belonging to a Place that has Never been Yours.' Deportees Negotiating Involuntary Immobility and Conditions of Return in Cape Verde. In *Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Renée Schröder and Ruth Wodak, 129–140. New York: Springer.
- Dünnwald, Stephan. 2010. Destination Bamako: Die Arbeit der Association Malienne des Expulsés am Flughafen. *Hinterland Magazin* 15: 22–23.
- Ellermann, Antje. 2008. The Limits of Unilateral Migration Control: Deportation and Inter-state Cooperation. *Government and Opposition* 43 (2): 168–189.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1952. *Peaux noires, masques blancs*. Paris: Gallimard.
- . 1961. *Les damnés de la terre*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Fekete, Liz. 2006. The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asylum and Human Rights. *European Race Bulletin* 51.
- Fischer, Nicolas. 2013. Negotiating Deportations: An Ethnography of the Legal Challenge of Deportation Orders in a French Immigration Detention Centre. In *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation*, ed. Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti, 123–142. New York: Springer.
- Foucault, Michel. 1994. Le sujet et le pouvoir. *Dits et écrits* IV: 222–243.
- Gary-Toukara, Daouda. 2013. La gestion des migrations de retour, un paramètre négligé de la grille d'analyse de la crise malienne. *Politique africaine* 130: 47–68.
- Iwata, Takuo. 2000. La conférence nationale souveraine et la démocratisation au Togo du point de vue de la société civile. *Africa Development* XXV 3–4: 135–160.
- Kanström, Daniel. 2010. *Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
- . 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lecadet, Clara. 2012. Expulsions et prises de parole au Mali: quand le politique se réécrit en ses marges. *Le sujet dans la cité Actuels* 1: 113–127.

- . 2015. La voix de l'expulsé. *Plein droit* 107: 7–10.
- . 2016. *Le manifeste des expulsés: Errance, survie et politique au Mali*. Tours: Presses Universitaires François Rabelais.
- Likibi, Romuald. 2010. *L'Union africaine face à la problématique migratoire*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Makaremi, Chowra. 2007. Vies 'en instance': Le temps et l'espace du maintien en zone d'attente. Le cas de la 'Zapi 3' de Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle. *Asylon(s)* 2. terra.rezo.net/rubrique126.html.
- Ngai, Mae M. 2005. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Noiriel, Gérard. 1991. *Réfugiés et sans-papiers*. La République face au droit d'asile XIXe-XXe. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Perret, Thierry. 2005. Médias et démocratie au Mali: Le journalisme dans son milieu. *Politique africaine* 97: 18–32.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241.
- Soukouna, Sadio. 2011. L'Échec d'une Coopération Franco-Malienne sur les Migrations: Les logiques du refus malien de signer. Master's thesis, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.
- Toukara, Mamoutou. 2013. Les dimensions socioculturelles de l'échec de la migration: cas des expulsés maliens de France. Thesis, Université Paris-Est.
- Von Busekist, Astrid, ed. 2008. Voice! Identités et mobilisations. Special issue, *Raisons Politiques* 29.

Ripples Across the Pacific: Cycles of Risk and Exclusion Following Criminal Deportation to Samoa

Leanne Weber and Rebecca Powell

DEPORTATION AND THE EXPORTING OF RISK

Deportation has assumed a prominent place in the contemporary arsenal of governmental technologies directed towards the mitigation of risk. While visa violators and rejected asylum seekers are often presented as a risk to the integrity of border controls, the welfare state, or the economy, non-citizens convicted of criminal offences are liable to be constructed as serious and ongoing risks to community safety (Grewcock 2011, 2014; Rimmer 2008). With security a major preoccupation of contemporary governments, noncitizens convicted of criminal offences, therefore, have become a prime target for deportation. In the USA, for example, a policy of prosecutorial discretion has focused enforcement action on convicted felons who have no opportunity to challenge their expulsion, with

L. Weber (✉) · R. Powell
School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

US-citizen children and family members who are left behind becoming the “collateral consequences” (Zatz and Rodriguez 2015). In Australia, although numbers are miniscule in comparison with the mass expulsions from the USA, deportations on criminal grounds have been increasing steadily since the 1990s, when guidelines were amended to favour community protection over the personal circumstances or length of residence of offenders. The numbers rose sharply in 2014, when deportation was made mandatory for those sentenced to a 12-month prison term or longer, and grounds for appeal were restricted, bringing the Australian system into closer alignment with the USA. Public opposition to these policies has focused on the inhumanity of deporting long-standing residents who may have little knowledge and few support structures in the country to which they are returned (Grewcock 2014). There is no academic literature as yet on criminal deportation from New Zealand, the third developed nation contributing to deportation across the Pacific.¹

The exporting of risk is an inherently supra-national practice, not least because governments are forced to deal with officials in countries of return in order to effect these expulsions (Weber and Pickering 2012). Beyond this, however, it appears that little thought is given by governments to the impact of deportation within receiving countries. From the perspective of the expelling country, deportation following a criminal conviction may appear to be a solution to crime and disorder problems. However, seen from a transnational perspective it can magnify social harm, particularly where deportation occurs with scant regard for human rights. Peutz (2010, p. 378) claims that governments relinquish accountability for their acts of deportation, while stripping deportees of their legal rights. A similar point is made in a report by UNESCO on deportation to the Pacific: “The deportation experience makes an impact at the local, national and the international level demonstrating that deportation is not the end of a ‘problem,’ but the start of a new and on-going dilemma for individuals, families and the wider community” (Pereira 2011, p. 11). Rather than being a “discrete event”, Coutin (2014, p. 4) has argued that the transnational impact of deportation “continues long after an individual is returned, through the difficult process of readjustment, the ripple effects on family members and the continued prohibition on re-entry.”

In addition to the state-centric perspective adopted by deporting governments, migration scholars have also been accused of paying too little attention to the experiences of deportees in countries of return. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011, p. 19) lament the false dichotomy

they observe within the migration literature that is exemplified by “a clear divide between scholars who are concerned with what happens to immigrants once they arrive in a new place and those concerned with what happens in the places where they come from.” They argue instead that “[t]hese processes were never disconnected and they are certainly not today” (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011, p. 19). While their observations relate to the study of migration, an identical claim could be made with respect to the study of forced return, where the analytical focus is often on the legal processes leading to expulsion rather than the interconnection between places of migration and return. However, an emerging literature on post-deportation research is beginning to acknowledge the transnational nature of the deportation phenomenon and document the cultural isolation, loss of status and economic security, and lack of community acceptance experienced by many deportees (Coutin 2014; Golash-Boza 2014; Peutz 2010; Schuster and Majidi 2015).

Inspired by this emerging body of multi-disciplinary work, we claim that, rather than a one-way exporting of risk, criminal deportation is better understood as a complex “transnational trading of real, supposed, and indeterminate risks” (Weber and Pickering 2012, p. 125). In this chapter, we argue that criminal deportation can generate novel threats to the human security of individual deportees as they confront the challenges of setting up a new life in often unfamiliar or even hostile surroundings, burdened by the taint of their criminal label. Moreover, where serious criminality has not been effectively addressed through the justice process, deportation may sometimes displace genuine risks to receiving communities, exacerbate the factors that led to offending in the first place, and, under certain conditions, foster transnational criminal connections that may generate regional security threats. The sovereign act of deportation, far from mitigating risk, may instead send ripples of risk across the globe.

LOCATING SAMOA

Our discussion focuses on deportees forcibly returned following criminal convictions to the small Pacific nation of Samoa (formerly Western Samoa). Samoans are Polynesian peoples whose capacity for undertaking sea voyages is legendary. In pre-colonial times, inter-island mobility was highly valued and exemplified by the cultural practice of *malaga* (Lilomaiva-Doktor 2009a). Western Samoa was the subject of imperial struggles between Britain and Germany during the early part of the

twentieth century, with New Zealand subsequently taking on the role of colonial administrator until independence in 1962. Since that time, opportunities for both permanent and temporary migration to the advanced economies of the Pacific Rim have been severely restricted, with patterns of regional mobility strongly shaped by former colonial relationships. Some opportunities remain for permanent migration of Samoans to New Zealand through special quota systems. With the exception of those who meet the rigid skills criteria, long-term residence in Australia is only available to Samoans who have first obtained citizenship in New Zealand, after which they can benefit from open-ended entry to Australia (Tazreiter et al. 2016). Samoans have most often found their way to the USA via cultural and familial connections to Hawai'i or neighbouring American Samoa (which remains an overseas territory of the USA), supported by strong church-based networks (Lee 2009). This has created distinctive diaspora communities delineated by both cultural heritage and religious affiliation (such as Samoan Mormons in Utah). Despite the many barriers put in place to control their movement across the Pacific, Samoans have continued to navigate the "Polynesian triangle" defined by Australia, New Zealand, and the USA (Lee 2009), and it is estimated that around half the total Samoan population now resides overseas (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b).

Whereas Jamaica is a key destination within the Caribbean for criminal deportees from the UK and USA (Golash-Boza 2014), Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji have come to hold a similar status in the Pacific, albeit on a smaller scale. At least 124 criminal deportations to Samoa and Tonga reportedly occurred between 1998 and 2008, a figure that is likely to be a significant under-estimate (UNDP 2011; see also Pereira 2011). Of the 56 criminal deportees who participated in a UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) study, 81% were deported from the USA, with the remainder coming from New Zealand (16%) and Australia (3%) (Pereira 2011). These proportions cannot be considered representative, and the numbers from New Zealand, in particular, are likely to be larger than this. The relatively low numbers of deportations from Australia directly to Samoa is offset by much larger numbers of criminal deportees of Samoan origin who are expelled instead to New Zealand, since they hold New Zealand citizenship (Weber, McKernan, and Gibbon 2013).²

In this chapter, we present previously unreported data and apply theoretical insights from two nationally funded projects; one investigating the human security needs of temporary migrants in Australia and the other examining Australian deportation practices.³ The first project included a case study on Samoan migration to Australia. While the majority of data was collected within Australia, the research design included a one-week field trip to Samoa in October 2013. Seven interviews were conducted during this time with an NGO supporting deportees, a senior government minister, local and regional law enforcement personnel, a victim support agency, an international aid agency, and a former migration academic (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of interviews conducted). A regional perspective was adopted in this aspect of the study, so that discussions were not limited to deportations from Australia. Four additional interviews were conducted outside Samoa (two in Australia and two in New Zealand) with individuals who had significant first-hand experience of deportation within the Pacific region, one from a law enforcement background, and the others performing youth and community support roles.

Finally, a small focus group was convened by the deportee support agency mentioned above, which was attended by four group members (themselves deportees) and two organisers. Three of the participants had been deported from the USA some years previously, while the most recently arrived group member had been deported from New Zealand. Although these individuals are likely to differ from most other deportees due to their level of engagement with this support network, their readiness to identify as criminal deportees, and their capacity to reflect on their deportation experiences, the focus group added some first-hand accounts of experiences on return from individuals who ultimately experienced positive outcomes. All interviews were conducted in English. In the case of participants for whom English was not their first language, this has resulted in some non-standard forms of expression that are reported without correction (but sometimes with clarification) from the interview transcripts.

This small corpus of primary data is supplemented by reference to the larger UNESCO study that has already been cited, in which 56 convicted individuals who had been deported to Samoa and Tonga from Australia, New Zealand, and the USA between 1998 and 2008 were interviewed about their post-deportation experiences and ongoing needs (Pereira 2011).

FITTING (BACK) INTO A TIGHTLY KNIT SOCIETY

After being physically excluded from their countries of residence due to the insurmountable risks they are deemed to pose to public safety, criminal deportees may experience ongoing social exclusion in the places to which they are expelled. Previous scholarship, including many contributions to this volume, has established that even unconvicted deportees can experience animosity in the country of return for undermining shared understandings about the purpose and promise of migration. Deportees may be “suspected of carrying with them the pollution contracted abroad while also remaining anomalies at home, their forced return subverting the mythologised immigrant success story” (Peutz 2010, p. 385). Moreover, in collectivist cultures, where whole families and communities typically invest in projects to send selected members abroad, deportation “becomes everyone’s business” (Schuster and Majidi 2015, p. 641). For this reason, in the highly communitarian Pacific, where levels of return migration are generally low, it has been observed that even voluntary return can be interpreted as “an admission of failure” (Lee 2009, p. 27).

Our fieldwork in Samoa quickly uncovered a widespread lack of sympathy for deportees, and indeed, for any members of the Samoan diaspora who were considered to have squandered the opportunities offered to them abroad. When one of us visited a Samoan university to present research findings on the extreme cultural and economic stress we had detected among Samoan expatriates living in Australia, the response was unexpectedly hostile (see Tazreiter et al. 2016; Weber et al. 2013 for detailed accounts of these findings). The student audience seemed to hold an idealised image of the comfortable life that was available abroad, and displayed little appreciation of the challenges being faced by their compatriots who were striving to succeed, often in the face of significant obstacles, within competitive and individualistic societies. Despite the impact of economic and cultural globalisation, the majority of Samoan people still live a relatively traditional, collectivist life based around the extended family, or *aiga*, governed by strict cultural rules known as *Fa’ā Samoa*, and largely reliant on a village-based subsistence economy. For most Samoans, the prospect of living outside that kin-based support system must be unimaginable, and it is no surprise that banishment serves as the ultimate traditional punishment for violating the strict rules of community life. Finding acceptance within this tightly knit social structure following the shame of criminal conviction and expulsion from the country of emigration, therefore presents a significant challenge.

One employee from a UN agency, interviewed in Samoa, explained that the organisation's interest in working with criminal deportees within the Pacific region originated from their concerns about rising levels of social exclusion. Another informant, a police-community liaison officer interviewed in Australia, argued that problems with reintegration of deportees were much greater in his native Tonga, which he considered to be even more collectivist than Samoa. On the one hand, Samoa was seen by two informants (an NGO employee and a senior member of the Samoan government) to have a positive record of successfully incorporating minority groups, despite their putative status as "cultural outsiders." However, less flexibility was expected in relation to returning ethnic Samoans for whom there is pressure to assume or resume their place within the strictly demarcated kinship system of the village: "The only people not happy here are the people not support the culture. So it's quite important for them to get back and try to learn something. Get with the people around and make them understand culture. Especially back in the village" (Interview INSG208, local police officer).

Studies from elsewhere have documented significant cultural hurdles for people who are forcibly returned to "traditional societies." Deportees can be marked as outsiders by their different language, clothing, and demeanour (Peutz 2010), and the stigma arising from forcible return may put deportees at risk of discrimination and loss of status (Schuster and Majidi 2015). Signs of cultural difference that suggest criminal associations may identify deportees as particularly suspect. As Coutin (2010) shows in her study of Salvadorans deported from the USA: "Those who have tattoos and wear baggy clothing typical of US youth cultures are especially stigmatised. Employers may be reluctant to hire such individuals, neighbours may reject deportees, and even relatives are not always welcoming" (Coutin 2010, p. 363). It is not surprising, then, that the organiser of Samoa's only support service for criminal deportees reported that individuals who openly bore a criminal identity because of their physical appearance, struggled the most to fit into village life:

Especially some of them, because they've been in prison, they have a lot of tattoos, they've been in gangs before, and so they stand out. They stand out in a village and so sometimes they just don't gel well with their support systems, their family ... And the other thing is your support systems will be penalised by the village if you do something to put the village in disrepute. (Interview INSG201)

Providing service to the *matai* (chief) of the village and the village as a whole was said to be one way to regain community respect. However, the process of cultural adaptation could be severely hampered where deportees were unwilling to submit to the authority of the *aiga* (the extended family). The UNESCO research concluded that many deportees still considered the country from which they had been expelled to be “home” (Pereira 2011), a psychological stance that is unlikely to facilitate the (re-)acculturation process. The organiser of the deportee support group explained that deportees who were not born in Samoa (and yet lacked citizenship in their country of residence), or had left at a very young age and had little memory of Samoan culture and language, had the most difficulty adapting to the unfamiliar environment.

Due to both citizenship restrictions and relatively low levels of cultural preservation, criminal deportees from the USA were considered particularly likely to have few remaining familial or cultural ties to Samoa: “So, the deportees from the USA are hard to integrate because they don’t want a connection to here” (Interview INSG205). In the opinion of this informant, a senior government minister, this contrasted sharply with the cultural connection that was still evident in relation to deportees from New Zealand, where Pacific Island cultures were supported by government policy, actively nurtured in Samoan expatriate communities and could facilitate integration into the kinship system on return: “Usually the ones from New Zealand, we know the families, so their families will be waiting for them at the airport. They can speak Samoan, especially from New Zealand ... where they go to church and speak Samoan, compared to the ones from the USA” (Interview INSG205).

The reception of criminal deportees in the village was said to vary, but was generally expected, at least initially, to be hostile. According to the organiser of the detainee support group, elders in one village were seeking to modify community practices, to be more supportive of deportees. He said that “a partner of ours is trying to get us to be involved with her village. She wants to call it a friendly village, where [there are] no judgements. Just come in if you need help, we’ll help you out, which is great” (Interview INSG201). More often, it was left to individuals to “prove themselves” by showing their willingness to work within the existing culture. One deportee said in the focus group that, having escaped from the influence of US gang culture, he had “found himself” in Samoa because

of the disciplines imposed by the strong institutions of community and church. The deportee support group organiser knew at least one deportee who had redeemed himself sufficiently through this route to earn *matai* status within his village. In contrast, another focus group participant said he had re-established himself by starting a new family in Samoa (having left behind his partner and children in the USA), but had chosen to move away from the confines of his familial village in order to make a new start.

The small number of hand-picked deportees who attended the focus group broadly accepted their deportations, which in all but one case had occurred some years previously following fairly substantial histories of offending. However, participants considered the practice unfair where the offences were minor or the deportee had no meaningful connections in Samoa: “I think it’s just not fair if you uplift that person just because of the law he broke and send him to Samoa, where he has no support, no family, no nothing and let him fend for himself” (Group interview INSG206). Despite the ultimate acceptance of their plight, this group had all suffered acutely from separation from immediate family members who had remained abroad. One participant said he had initially fought to stay in the USA, because he was “very close” to his family. Another deportee who was also positive about the outcome of his forced return, but had left children behind in the USA, reported feeling ongoing guilt that he had “left everybody.”

One important coping strategy adopted by these men had been to build solidarity with other deportees and establish new identities that cut across traditional kinship lines: “[W]e are all from different families, but we all get along, because we all know we’re deportees. And all of us deportees, we have this thing, we try to stick together, you know; when we go out, have some drinks or something. We all try to stick together, we call each other up, we’ll meet here” (Group interview INSG207). In contrast to the findings of the larger UNESCO study cited earlier, all the members of this group said they now called Samoa home. This difference may be because a wider range of hard-to-reach deportees were contacted through sustained outreach work in the UNESCO study, whereas the small numbers of deportees interviewed for this study were members of a mutually supportive group that actively pursued their successful absorption into Samoan society.

TRYING TO GET BY IN A LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY

As well as the cultural and emotional costs already discussed, forced return often generates economic hardship for affected individuals and families both in countries of former residence and countries of origin and/or deportation. Criminal deportees in Samoa were said to face major challenges adjusting to traditional lives that consisted of hard manual work carried out for a low or non-existent wage on collective land, as explained here by the coordinator of the deportee support group: “Once they come here they are just a fish out of water. They have no idea what it’s like to work the plantations 10 hours a day, and you’re getting 20 Tala⁴ if you’re lucky. And remember, you have to give all that to the *matai* of your family” (Interview INSG201). Rather than rely long-term on family-based employment, the only recently-deported interviewee who attended the focus group said he aspired to attain financial independence: “My main support is my family ... They asked me to come and work for them, but I feel I want to work somewhere else ... support myself and look after myself, so I don’t have to rely on somebody all the time” (Group interview INSG206).

Previous researchers have found that individuals unable to sustain themselves financially after deportation may become reliant on family members who remain in the country from which they were deported. In many cases, this represents a two-fold reversal of the usual expectation that migrants will be breadwinners for their immediate families in the country of residence and a source of remittances for the wider family in the country of origin. In relation to male deportees to Jamaica, Golash-Boza (2014) found that being forced to relinquish the provider-role due to lack of earning opportunities after deportation carried an enduring stigma that was additional to the general shame of being a deportee. Peutz (2010) came to a similar conclusion in relation to financial dependency among Somali deportees. And the UNESCO research cited earlier identified that criminal deportation to the Pacific could place added burdens on the families left behind due to loss of income and of male authority figures within the family (Pereira 2011).

Despite this, for one focus group participant in our study, the financial burden on his US-based family was considered by all to be a price worth paying for the opportunity to escape the criminogenic environment in which he had been living:

I was raised up in the States, so I didn't really know what to do for work. But ... my sisters would always tell me, 'Don't worry about money wise, anything you need you can always call us and we'll send you money. All we need you to do is to go to Samoa for a change.' Because they didn't want me to spend the rest of my life in prison. (Group interview INSG206)

REAL AND IMAGINED THREATS TO COMMUNITY SAFETY

Regardless of the extent of their offending or the efficacy of their subsequent rehabilitation, individuals deported on criminal grounds carry a powerful label that travels with them and can magnify the perception of the risks they pose to receiving communities (see e.g., Peutz 2010; Sheik 2008). As Grewcock (2011, p. 69) has noted, deportation practices transform “lawful subjects” into “deviant deportees.” The recently arrived deportee who took part in our focus group had been unable, at first, to shake off his criminal label and described himself as being “suicidal” because his time spent in a New Zealand prison was common knowledge within his community (Group interview INSG206).

In addition to the enduring shame of the criminal label earned in the country from which they are deported, deportees are liable to be held responsible for crime in the places to which they are sent. For example, mass deportations of convicted persons—primarily from the USA and UK—have become a significant political issue across the Caribbean because of the crime risk the deportees are deemed to pose. In what he dubs an “ironic inversion of the ‘alien invasion’ thesis”, Bowling (2010) notes that deportees tainted by “foreign criminality” have been blamed for surges in violent crime in Jamaica, despite the fact that their convictions are most often for minor drug offences. This theme of crime risk on return has also been reported in the media for convicted New Zealand citizens deported from Australia. Media stories have reported significant re-offending statistics on return amongst convicted deportees from Australia and claims of those who committed crime in Australia linking up to commit more crime on return (Jones 2016; Marwick 2016; *Scoop* 2016; Tait 2016).⁵

Participants in our study also reported that criminal deportees were often seen as bad influences after their return to small Pacific Island nations: “[T]he locals fear that their own sort of home-grown children are going to follow their [deportees’] ways ... those were the very real

fears that the deportees [who] are returnees from the States would be blamed for the rise in underage drinking, and all these young children going into nightclubs, and all this kind of stuff" (Interview INSG406, New Zealand immigration liaison officer). Deportees to Samoa were sometimes said to be responsible for real or supposed increases in crime, although there are no reliable statistics available to support or refute these claims. According to the Samoan government minister interviewed in our study, deportees have been implicated in serious and high profile crimes, most notably Samoa's first-ever armed bank robbery (also documented in UNDP 2011). However, a senior New Zealand police officer interviewed for this study, who had considerable experience of law enforcement within the Pacific, criticised the automatic blaming of deportees for increasing crime, noting that not all of them had serious criminal histories. In fact, he attributed an observed increase in firearm offences in Samoa to a "love affair with firearms," which were easily obtained from US-administered American Samoa through channels that, in his view, had nothing to do with deportees.

According to the senior New Zealand police officer cited above, criminal convicts deported from New Zealand to Samoa were predominantly sex offenders who had been sentenced to at least six-year's imprisonment. Those from the USA typically had drug-related convictions and were deported at a much lower sentencing threshold and with far less due process. Participants in the UNESCO study had convictions for property, violent, and sexual offences, and much of their offending was believed to have arisen from immersion in US gang-culture (Pereira 2011). In ongoing research conducted by one of the authors, amongst the 248 convicted individuals from New Zealand or the Pacific who contested their deportation from Australia between 2005 and 2015,⁶ the majority had their visas cancelled for aggravated robbery offences (23%), serious assault (22%), common assault (22%) or aggravated sexual assault (8%). Visas were also cancelled for less serious offences, including driving whilst disqualified (1%), property damage (1%), and theft of a motor vehicle (0.5%). Notwithstanding the variability in the offending histories of criminal deportees, and lack of systematic assessments about their individual risk of re-offending, the whole basis of their expulsion serves to label these individuals as ongoing risks to community safety. With banishment reserved as the ultimate punishment within traditional Samoan social systems, deportees may arrive already stamped as incorrigibles and dangerous outcasts.

Since criminal deportees are liable to be seen as ongoing criminal threats, this raises questions about the resources available to prevent further offending. Samoa's fledgling victims' support agency is heavily focused on violence in the home, and reported having had no direct contact with criminal deportees or the agency formed to support them. Nevertheless, the organiser described criminal deportees as "vicious" and as bringing a "different mindset" into their extended families that could cause problems for a whole village. Whereas deportation was viewed as "normal," she suggested, criminal deportation was said to be "scary" because offenders "know the in and out of crimes" (Interview INSG204). A youth worker with considerable expertise in dealing with criminal deportees, who was interviewed in Australia, expressed a more selective view, identifying sex offenders specifically as the group that posed the most salient risk. In contrast to the highly visible former gang members who displayed their identities openly through their tattoos and American-style clothing, and thereby became obvious targets for police and community attention, this informant argued that sex offenders typically kept a low profile and were largely unmonitored. In her opinion, this posed a much greater threat to the community.

According to this youth worker, some Samoan churches had condemned criminal deportees as "damned." Moreover, an employee from a major NGO based in the capital of Samoa, Apia, noted the widespread view that "these people are bad people and they got what they deserved" (Interview INSG202). The settlement needs of the deportees were therefore constantly subverted to security concerns: "[F]rom the human rights perspective, whether or not they get access to health services and training and things like that, nobody was interested" (Interview INSG202). Explaining the events leading up to the formation of the deportee support group, a senior government minister explained the political difficulty, but also the practical (rather than human rights) imperative, of providing resources for this stigmatised group:

The public, from reading the paper and hearing people and what they're saying—you should be helping the poor people from poverty and humiliation, rather than doing this for these people, because they've had their chances overseas and we didn't, and they blew it. Why should we help them? ... For me, I saw it as an emerging issue. If we don't tackle it now, it is going to become a big problem in the future. So my priority was safety for our country. (Interview INSG205)

CYCLES OF CRIMINALISATION AND EXCLUSION

Rather than having “chances overseas,” however, it could be argued that the harsh social and economic circumstances in which many Samoans had lived while abroad are likely to have encouraged their offending. This was the conclusion reached by one of us following previous research into Samoan nationals living in Australia (Tazreiter et al. 2016; Weber et al. 2013). Adult participants in that research were found to experience socio-economic marginalisation and excessively long working hours, exacerbated by deliberate policies that restricted access to many essential services and made citizenship virtually unattainable, thereby creating a cycle of social exclusion that could be anticipated to lead ultimately to offending and criminal deportation, particularly amongst their children.

The UNESCO study, cited earlier, also established that many criminal deportees returned to Samoa or Tonga had migrated as children and had faced prolonged socio-economic marginalisation, language barriers, absentee parents who worked long hours in poorly paid jobs, and loss of community support structures compared with the tightly controlled pattern of Samoan village life. Particularly in the USA, exposure to violence in homes and neighbourhoods was said to lead young people to invest their loyalty in neighbourhood gangs, placing them on pathways to convictions and ultimate deportation (Pereira 2011).

As mentioned earlier, for one focus group participant in our study, deportation, although traumatic at the time, had provided a circuit breaker that enabled him to escape the risky environment in which he had been raised:

When I was in the States, all my sisters and my brothers ... they'll just wait for that phone call from the hospital or the police station to come and identify me in a morgue or something. So that's what they were worried about every day. But now they know that I'm in Samoa and I'm safe here.
(Group interview INSG206)

Because of this link between circumstances in countries of residence and the criminal offending that leads to deportation, several research participants argued that the onus should be on the countries in which people had offended to deal with their offending behaviour. A Samoan police officer noted: “Their experience, they got it from there. So they [the authorities] should do something before sending them back to their

home countries” (Interview INSG208). Another participant who coordinated Samoa’s victim support group assumed this was being done: “The systems over there, they have good systems. If people commit offences over there, the judicial system, the police system, everybody that is involved in it, and there’s a lot of other organisations that will come together” (Interview INSG204).

However, a senior minister in the Samoan government who participated in our study was aware that deportable offenders were being denied opportunities for rehabilitation in overseas prisons and were effectively being “dumped” in their countries of origin. This was notably so in the USA, where deportation can be offered as an option for early release from prison sentences. Several focus group members in our study reported that their deportations had occurred on this basis. A senior New Zealand police officer interviewed in our study contrasted the use of deportation by the USA, New Zealand, and Australian criminal justice systems, arguing that deportation was used as a crime control measure in the USA, while both Australia and New Zealand insisted that prison terms still be served in full as a deterrent.⁷ Even so, commentators have criticised the lack of access to rehabilitation schemes such as prison education programmes and parole for inmates destined for deportation in Australia (Grewcock 2011).

Although it is often argued that prisons are less than ideal settings for achieving the rehabilitation of criminal offenders, the practices described here represent marked departures from the vestiges of rehabilitation that remain within contemporary prison systems. This indicates that the unilateral “exporting” of risk, as discussed earlier, rather than the prevention of further offending, wherever it may occur, is the driving force behind criminal deportation. Even in New Zealand, where recourse to deportation appears to be more limited than in either the USA or Australia (requiring much longer prison sentences, for example, to trigger deportation), our senior New Zealand police informant admitted that criminal deportation from New Zealand to Pacific Island nations could amount to “exporting a problem.”

Criminal deportees are therefore likely to have pressing needs for resettlement support, in common with many other deportees, but also unique and ongoing needs for rehabilitation that were not addressed in their former countries of residence. Many deportees in the UNESCO study were found to have pre-existing disabilities, mental health problems, and drug dependences that were not being dealt

with post-deportation, due to stigma and discrimination. This, in turn, was said to put them at risk of re-offending, ongoing drug misuse, and even suicide (Pereira 2011). A better system for exchange of information between deporting and receiving countries was often suggested as a response, particularly by law enforcement personnel interviewed in this study. However, this proposal raises questions about the tension between the surveillance and support objectives of transnational cooperation in relation to criminal deportees, which tends to be resolved in favour of the former.

For example, in his study of transnational policing in the Caribbean, Bowling (2010) found that monitoring the risks posed by criminal deportees had become such a high priority for local border policing officials that he described it as a moral panic. A similar response to deported offenders has been formalised in the Public Protection Orders⁸ recently introduced by the New Zealand government,⁹ which create a novel (and punitive) form of transnational parole. This controversial scheme follows a marked increase in criminal deportations to that country from Australia, and authorises the collection of DNA and fingerprints on arrival, along with the application of coercive orders to eligible deportees even where they have no conviction within New Zealand.

Although a systematic approach such as this had not been developed yet in Samoa, deportees to Tonga were said to be routinely fingerprinted and photographed by local police, even though their prison time had been served. This informant, a youth worker with considerable experience with criminal deportation, argued that monitoring should be limited to those presenting a serious and tangible risk and should be accompanied by strict protocols about transnational information exchange, with the main emphasis remaining on providing essential settlement support. According to our New Zealand police informant, a process of official handover was said to be in place between immigration authorities from deporting countries and Samoan police, which he believed was working effectively in relation to Australia and New Zealand, but had elicited less cooperation from US authorities.

The process sometimes resulted in a police interview on arrival, and coordination with the deportee support group to alert them of new arrivals was said to be improving. The coordinator of the deportee support group, no doubt anxious to prove the ongoing value of the scheme

to a sceptical public, also admitted to taking on a monitoring role aimed at preventing future offending: “Because sometimes they fall through the cracks at the police, so it’s best if I take on the role to try and rein them in” (Interview INSG201). The evidence suggests that the limited government support available, while seemingly successful in assisting at least some criminal deportees, operates in an environment where the risks these individuals are seen to pose are constantly threatening to take precedence over their resettlement needs.

REGIONALISING RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Research on the aftermath of criminal deportation is beginning to identify circumstances in which the exporting of risk can nourish transnational crime networks and create new regional safety risks. Zilberg (2011) found that the deportation of gang members from the USA to El Salvador could generate “transnational security spaces.” Similar observations were made by Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011, p. 19) regarding criminal deportation to the Dominican Republic, and by Bowling (2010) in relation to the Caribbean. The potential for the transnationalisation of criminal networks arises directly from the deportation of convicted offenders in the absence of rehabilitation and with no regard for the support they will need to re-settle. When faced with stigma, discrimination and lack of relevant skills that inhibit the establishment of independent lives in the countries to which they are deported, deportees can come to rely on extant support networks in their countries of former residence (Golash-Boza 2014; Peutz 2010). In cases where those support networks are criminal gangs, rather than families or noncriminal friendship groups, deportation can have the effect of internationalising those criminal networks (see Coutin 2010). Although there is, as yet, no scholarly research on the issue, similar fears have been reported in the media about the effects of criminal deportation from Australia to New Zealand (Jones 2016; Marwick 2016; *Scoop* 2016; Tait 2016).

While these complex questions were not the primary focus of our study, some participants offered observations to this effect. One youth worker informant argued that, in contrast to New Zealand, Samoan communities did not form in the USA that could nurture and sustain traditional Pacific identities. Some young people, therefore, took on

gang-based identities instead, which many of them would be prepared to “die for.” If unable to find employment and/or reconnect with a traditional cultural identity after deportation, she argued that these disconnected young people relied instead on their transnational gang-based networks as a source of both financial support and belonging. Senior Samoan police officers interviewed in our study recounted a similar concern, saying: “So they’re connected, and if these ones are sent back to Samoa they play a very important role in these organisational groups or gangs. From our perspective that connection will be continued, yeah” (Interview INSG208).

The extent to which these newly forged transnational links do, in fact, generate local or regional threats of serious crime is a different question, for which no firm evidence was obtained in the study. The local officers cited above were not aware of any truly transnational crimes that had been perpetrated on Samoan territory, and they believed there was insufficient local demand at the time for illicit drugs and other contraband goods that would be the likely focus of transnational gangs. Their reported monitoring of deportees who had been linked to gangs therefore seemed to be conducted speculatively based on their offending history, rather than due to any specific evidence of new offending of either a local or transnational nature. In effect, this highly visible group of deportees are being cast in the role of “presumptive offenders” (McCulloch and Wilson 2016), while police attention could be being directed away from less visible groups that might present more tangible risks to the community, as discussed earlier.

Unspecified regional security risks arising from criminal deportation have also been identified by inter-governmental agencies such as the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN),¹⁰ the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretariat, and United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2012). For example, the UNDP report on crime and Pacific youth identified concerns in Samoa about gang activity originating from both New Zealand and the USA (UNDP 2011). However, in our interviews, Tonga and Fiji were repeatedly assessed as having more serious problems than Samoa in this respect (Interviews INSG202, INSG203, and INSG205). Moreover, according to a senior government minister, criminal deportations to Samoa were identified as a potential source of transnational organised crime only after the PIF had brought the matter to the attention of the Samoan government:

I did realise that if Samoa doesn't do something about it, it can become a big problem in the future, particularly when we have a lot of returnees or deportees from the USA. And most of them have very little ties and connections to Samoa and they are sent here and, obviously, some of them may have connections to organised crime and they come here and they are not properly integrated into our society. They turn to crime again in order to survive and they will use their connections overseas. So that was the report from the Foreign Secretariat. (Interview INSG205)

Since criminal deportation has been identified by inter-governmental agencies in the Pacific as being a matter of regional security—whether currently or merely as a future threat—one might expect that regional solutions should be put in place. Although all law enforcement personnel interviewed in our study acknowledged the need to provide settlement support for deportees, their agencies were orientated towards monitoring and surveillance. Information about criminal deportees was said to be circulated through Interpol and the regional intelligence networks of the PTCN, with deportees deemed to be “high risk”—often sex offenders—flagged for the discretionary attention of local law enforcement officers (Interviews UNSG201, UNSG202, and INSG208).

In contrast to this regional policing effort, one small local support group with uncertain funding into the future, has been left to deal with the settlement (and presumably rehabilitation) needs of criminal deportees returned to Samoa. A leading international NGO with a base in Samoa was attempting to elevate the need for settlement support for criminal deportees across the Pacific as an important issue for regional action by flagging it as a human security issue. A representative of that organisation explained that the agency viewed criminal deportation as an emerging global problem and believed that support for deportees was “fundamentally important to building peace” (Interview INSG202). A more immediate human security benefit might be achieved if deporting countries ceased their practices of exporting risk through criminal deportation, in favour of pursuing pathways to a non-offending future following release. There are no indications as yet that this is occurring, although, according to the senior government minister who took part in our research, Samoan diplomatic missions were intervening actively to try to achieve that outcome. As it stands, criminal deportees arrive in their destination carrying the full burden of their real and perceived riskiness that, without appropriate settlement support, may be magnified still further.

CONCLUSION: RIPPLES ACROSS THE PACIFIC

We have argued that criminal deportation to Samoa in the absence of substantial support for resettlement and rehabilitation is creating ripples of insecurity at the individual, community, national, and regional level. There is much still to be learned about the dynamics of criminal deportation across the Pacific, and this analysis has only begun to skim the surface. Further research might identify the important role played by New Zealand as both a receiver and sender of criminal deportees; investigate the impact of forced return on families left behind; follow cohorts of deportees on their trans-Pacific journeys; and make a deeper analysis of claims that deportees pose an ongoing risk, both at the local level in countries of return and at the regional level through the strengthening of transnational criminal networks. Against a backdrop that is dominated by the summary exporting of risk from countries of residence, coupled with law enforcement responses in countries of return, another perspective is possible that gives much greater weight to individual human rights, including due process rights, the right to family life, the rights of children left behind, and to the promise of rehabilitation. An alternative approach is necessary to prevent the ripples of insecurity that are currently being set in motion across the Pacific from becoming a tidal wave.

APPENDIX I—LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Interviewee	Date interviewed	Where interviewed	Format	Interview number
Organiser of support group for criminal deportees	15 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG201
Senior employee of international development agency	15 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG202
Samoan journalist and former migration studies scholar	18 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG203

Interviewee	Date interviewed	Where interviewed	Format	Interview number
Organiser of support group for victims of crime	17 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG204
Senior Samoan government minister	9 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG205
Deportees focus group recording (1)	10 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG206
Deportees focus group recording (2)	10 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG207
Intelligence officers from local and regional police	18 October 2013	Samoa	In person - recorded	INSG208
Police liaison officer working with Pacific communities in Sydney	3 September 2012	Australia	In person - recorded	INSG402
Pacific liaison officer working with Immigration New Zealand	30 November 2012	New Zealand	In person - recorded	INSG406
New Zealand Police Officer formerly stationed in Samoa	27 September 2013	New Zealand (by phone)	By phone - not recorded	UNSG201
Officers from PTCCC Transnational Crime Unit	16 October 2013	Samoa	In person - not recorded	UNSG202
Youth worker and researcher	9 September 2013	Australia	In person - not recorded	UNSG203

NOTES

1. Associate Professor Elizabeth Stanley from the Victoria University of Wellington presented research in progress on this topic at the Australia and New Zealand Society of Criminology (ANZSOC) annual conference, Hobart (Stanley 2016).
2. This Pacific deportation route is being explored in PhD research currently being undertaken by Rebecca Powell.
3. *Fluid Security in the Asia Pacific*, ARC Discovery Grant DP1093107, Chief Investigators Sharon Pickering, Leanne Weber, Claudia Tazreiter, Marie Segrave with the assistance of Helen McKernan; *Exporting Risk: The Australian Deportation Project*, ARC Discovery Grant DP110102453, Chief Investigators Sharon Pickering, Leanne Weber, Mike Grewcock, Marie Segrave.
4. Roughly equivalent to US\$8 or €7.6 as of 21 December 2016.
5. The number of New Zealand citizens deported from Australia has surged since the strengthening of the *Migration Act* in December 2014 resulting in mandatory visa cancellations for those convicted non-citizens who are sentenced to a period of 12 months or more under s501 of the Act. The experiences of convicted non-citizens following deportation to New Zealand from Australia will be explored in the PhD research currently being undertaken by Rebecca Powell.
6. Source, unpublished PhD data analysed by Rebecca Powell. Please note that this may not be a representative sample of all criminal deportees as not all of them contest the Department of Immigration's visa cancellation decision at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
7. At the time of writing, there is anecdotal evidence emerging that early release may be being offered to deportable inmates in Australia. This will be subject to further exploration in Rebecca Powell's PhD project.
8. See <http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/d/deportation-of-offenders-to-new-zealand-after-serving-a-prison-sentence-overseas/problem-definition>, accessed 15 May 2016 and <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-19/nz-changes-laws-for-ex-criminals-deported-from/6956368>, accessed 20 September 2016.
9. This is the subject of research in progress by Associate Professor Elizabeth Stanley from the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
10. The Pacific Transnational Crime Network—formed in 2002 by Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, which is funded primarily by Australia and supported by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), New Zealand Police, US Joint Interagency Taskforce West—currently has its main operational headquarters (the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre) based in Samoa, with a network of Transnational Crime Units dotted across Pacific nations.

REFERENCES

- Bowling, Ben. 2010. *Policing the Caribbean: Transnational Security Cooperation in Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2010. Exiled by Law: Deportation and the Inviability of Life. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 351–370. Durham: Duke University Press.
- . 2014. Deportation Studies: Origins, Themes and Directions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 671–681.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2014. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma Among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- Grewcock, Michael. 2011. Punishment, Deportation and Parole: The Detention and Removal of Former Prisoners Under Section 501 *Migration Act* 1958. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 44 (1): 56–73.
- . 2014. Reinventing ‘the Stain’—Bad Character and Criminal Deportation in Contemporary Australia. In *Routledge Handbook on Crime and International Migration*, ed. Sharon Pickering and Julie Ham, 121–138. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Jones, Nicholas. 2016. Australian Criminals Linking Up in New Zealand. *NZ Herald*, May 5. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11633660. Accessed 26 Sep 2016.
- Lee, Helen. 2009. Pacific Migration and Transnationalism: Historical Perspectives. In *Migration and Transnationalism: Pacific Perspectives*, ed. Helen Lee and Steve Tupai Francis, 7–42. Canberra: ANU E-Press.
- Levitt, Peggy, and Deepak Lamba-Nieves. 2011. Social Remittances Revisited. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37 (1): 1–22.
- Lilomaiva-Doktor, Sa’iliemanu. 2009a. Beyond ‘Migration’: Samoan Population Movement (*malaga*) and the Geography of Social Space (Vā). *The Contemporary Pacific* 21 (1): 1–32.
- . 2009b. Samoan Transnationalism: Cultivating ‘Home’ and ‘Reach’. In *Migration and Transnationalism: Pacific Perspectives*, ed. Helen Lee and Steve Tupai Francis, 57–72. Canberra: ANU E-Press.
- Marwick, Felix. 2016. Higher Crime Rates Predicted as a Result of Australia’s Deportation of Kiwis. *News Talk KB New Zealand*, May 18. <http://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/news/politics/higher-crime-rates-predicted-as-a-result-of-australias-deportation-of-kiwis/>. Accessed 26 Sep 2016.
- McCulloch, Jude, and Dean Wilson. 2016. *Pre-crime: Pre-emption, Precaution and the Future*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Pereira, Natalia. 2011. *Return(ed) to Paradise: The Deportation Experience in Samoa and Tonga*. Paris: UNESCO. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001928/192858e.pdf>. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2010. 'Criminal Alien' Deportees in Somaliland: An Ethnography of Removal. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 371–409. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Rimmer, Susan Harris. 2008. The Dangers of Character Tests: Dr Haneef and other Cautionary Tales. The Australia Institute Discussion Paper No. 101. http://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/DP101_7.pdf. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2015. Deportation Stigma and Re-migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 635–652.
- Scoop, 2016. Horror Over Reported Crime Statistics of Deported Offenders. February 3. <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1602/S00043/horror-over-reported-crime-statistics-of-deported-offenders.htm>. Accessed 26 Sep 2016.
- Sheik, Irum. 2008. Racializing, Criminalizing and Silencing 9/11 Deportees. In *Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today*, ed. David C. Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas, 81–107. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stanley, Elizabeth. 2016. Interpreting the Detention and Deportation of New Zealanders. Unpublished Conference Proceeding, Australia and New Zealand Society of Criminology (ANZSOC) Annual Conference, Hobart, Australia, 29 November–2 December 2016. <http://www.anzsoc2016.com/2405>. Accessed 21 Dec 2016.
- Tait, Morgan. 2016. Deported Criminal Back Behind Bars After a Fortnight. *The New Zealand Herald*, July 6. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11669115. Accessed 26 Sep 2016.
- Tazreiter, Claudia, Leanne Weber, Sharon Pickering, Marie Segrave, and Helen McKernan. 2016. *Fluid Security in the Asia Pacific: Transnational Lives, Human Rights and State Control*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNDP. 2011. Urban Youth in the Pacific: Increasing Resilience and Reducing Risk for Involvement in Crime and Violence. http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/library/climate-and-disaster-resilience/Urban_Youth_in_the_Pacific.html.
- . 2012. Working with Deported Individuals in the Pacific: Legal and Ethical Issues. http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/CPR/UNDP_PC_Deported.pdf. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.
- Weber, Leanne, and Sharon Pickering. 2012. Exporting Risk, Deporting Non-Citizens. In *Globalisation and the Challenge to Criminology*, ed. Francis Pakes, 110–128. London: Routledge.

- Weber, Leanne, Helen McKernan, and Helen Gibbon. 2013. Trans-Tasman Denizens: Human Rights and Human (In)security Amongst New Zealand Residents of Samoan Origin in Australia. *Australian Journal of Human Rights (Special Issue on Human Mobility and Human Rights)* 9 (3): 51–78.
- Zatz, Marjorie S., and Nancy Rodriguez. 2015. *Dreams and Nightmares: Immigration Policy, Youth and Families*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2011. *Space of Detention: The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis Between Los Angeles and San Salvador*. Durham: Duke University Press.

“Non-admitted”: Migration-Related Detention of Forcibly Returned Citizens in Cameroon

Maybritt Jill Alpes

Nation-states' sovereign rights to control the entry and presence of third-country nationals in their territory have resulted in various types of forced returns coming into existence. Third-country nationals can return involuntarily to their countries of nationality if they become subject to deportation orders or are not admitted by police officers upon arrival at a European border. Airport and border officials refer to the latter category of individuals as “inadmissibles.” Having a visa in one’s passport does not guarantee entry into the territory of a nation-state, as border officials have discretionary powers to refuse permission to enter. Travel projects can thus end abruptly if border control officers claim that travellers have either not fully complied with entry regulations or are using travel documents issued by unauthorised actors.

In Collyer’s words, “Deportation involves the transfer of individuals from a state where they do not enjoy the benefits of citizenship to the state where they do” (Collyer 2012, p. 290). Yet, what does the enjoyment of

M.J. Alpes (✉)
VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

citizenship actually amount to in some emigration countries? Individuals should not automatically be assumed to have more safety and rights in their country of nationality. This chapter examines, therefore, what happens in the short, but important interstice in which returnees are no longer in the direct charge of European state agents, but have not yet been granted full access to the territory of their nation-state.

The rich body of literature on deportation (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015) generally focuses more attention on processes *before* and *during* rather than on dynamics *after* deportation (Collyer 2012; Drotbohm 2011; Lecadet 2013; Schuster and Majidi 2013), while the role of state agents in returnees' countries of nationality has so far received little attention. The focus of this chapter is on air borders,¹ with scholars being invited to look for resonances with processes in other emigration countries, where exits are increasingly securitised. Forced returns are seen here as comprising non-admissions, readmissions, and assisted return programmes for individuals who, for a variety of reasons, did not have a residence permit to continue their stay abroad.² The focus lies on cross-border movements from the Global South to the Global North.

After a theoretical and methodological exploration of borders and subjectivities, the chapter moves on, first, to examine the dynamics driving the production of (legal) norms in an emigration country. It does so by analysing the international and domestic factors that led to the emergence of the Cameroonian offense of "attempting to emigrate illegally." Second, a series of forced return cases is used as the basis for exploring the vulnerability of Cameroon returnees. While certain risk patterns of return types can be discerned, it is primarily social characteristics that determine power relations with police officers and actual exposure to monetary extraction, detention, and imprisonment. Third, the chapter draws on the narratives of two non-admitted travellers to highlight the financial opportunities flowing from the anti-fraud agenda for state agents in the Global South.

This chapter expounds the view that the externalisation of border policies in the Global North warrants an examination of how state actors in the Global South internalise legal norms, while it also illustrates how efforts to combat fraud fuel opportunities for corruption. Today's border controls and the related anti-fraud programmes suppress family-based forms of solidarity—amongst others by imposing state-managed forms of national identity, such as defined in birth certificates, ID cards, and passports. As a result, and instead of receiving remittances, families and

social networks in emigration countries are called on to mobilise financial resources in order to liberate returnees from police stations or prison complexes.

RESEARCHING GLOBALISED BORDERS

As McKeown (2008) has illustrated in his historical work, border controls and identity documentation are the product and continuation of 150 years of globalisation. Adopting an emigration perspective on the study of globalised borders reveals the increasing importance of different forms of exit controls. This chapter is based on data gathered predominantly between November 2013 and January 2014. The dataset includes observations from interviews with border agents at Douala and Yaoundé international airports, investigations at New Bell prison in Douala, a review of related case law from the Criminal Tribunal of the First Instance in Bonapriso (Douala), and border police registers at Douala airport. These datasets were complemented by twenty-three interviews with participants of assisted return programmes and three longitudinal case studies of Cameroonians (2007–2015), who involuntarily returned to their country of nationality.³

The analysis tries to adopt a neutral stance, which implies not reproducing statist’s evaluations of whether or not acts or objects are fraudulent or illegal. Travel documents enable authorised border crossings. Not all travel documents, however, are issued by actors who are authorised to do so by states. Consequently, in the article, the term “fraud” refers either to a discourse or to a policy agenda. Second, the article tries to resist moral judgments of mobile subjects by states. The fraud agenda leads to states framing mobile citizens from the Global South as potentially “fraudulent migrants.” Consequently, the article refers to individuals who are forced to return after decisions of non-admission as travellers.

The analysis is based on the working assumption that the externalisation of migration control and the criminalisation of emigration are connected (Cassarino 2009; Cuttitta 2008, p. 50). Research material on street-level agents involved in exit and entry controls at Douala international airport warrants putting forward this assumption for further investigation. Although more in-depth research on cooperation in this policy domain is necessary, a certain temporal correlation between European agreements and the enacting of legislation that criminalises emigration

in other countries of origin and transit can be identified. Algeria's laws on emigration, for example, were enacted in 2008 and 2009, following the signing and entry into force of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (2005) and bilateral readmission agreements with Germany (2006), Spain (2004), France (2003), Italy (2000 and 2009), Malta (2001), Switzerland (2007), and the UK (2007). A second example is Morocco's 2003 emigration legislation, which followed the signing of the 2000 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement and most of the bilateral agreements signed with EU member states, notably with Spain in 2003 and France in 2001, while Tunisia amended its legislation in December 2003 and March 2004, shortly after signing the December 2003 police collaboration agreement with Italy.⁴

EUROPE'S SOUTHERN BORDERS: EXTERNALISED AND INTERNALISED

Andersen asks how one can study bordered identities without taking for granted the prevalence of national identity over other identities (Andersen 2014). The article proposes to understand the construction of subjectivities in a post-colonial context by tracing connections between the externalisation and internalisation of border controls. With the internalisation of border policies, the article refers to individual state agents adopting and assimilating border discourses that emanate from state interests in the Global North.

Over the last 10 years, states in the Global North have increasingly externalised border controls. The EU and its members states, for example, have worked together since the 1990s in two directions: first, by externalising migration controls through the imposition of carrier sanctions and the deployment of international liaison officers and readmission agreements (McNamara 2013) and, second, by seeking to involve emigration states in border management, often indirectly by collaborating with the police, arranging workshops on fraud detection for police officers in emigration countries, and establishing funds for civil registry reforms in emigration countries.

In the wake of these developments, border controls over the past few decades have shifted geographically (i.e., to places of departures) and now involve a new set of actors (i.e., companies). Through carrier

sanctions, for example, Europe now holds airlines responsible for transporting people who do not comply with the legal requirements for entering the Schengen area, while airlines, and in turn, often outsource the requisite document checks to private security companies in travellers' countries of origin. This privatisation of border policing (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013) further reinforces the idea that identity controls are merely a technicality and have no political significance.

Legal scholars have analysed the serious challenges that the externalisation of migration control poses for the responsibility and accountability of the EU (Brouwer 2010, pp. 210–211), with political scientists even suggesting that these policy developments are attractive for states precisely because they short-circuit judicial constraints (Guiraudon 2002, p. 194). This externalisation and the new forms of collaboration mean that legal norms spread easily between different spheres (Klepp 2010, p. 20). Training programmes for identifying fraud, for example, allow international liaison officers in emigration countries to become familiar with the security company employees responsible for checking documents for carriers. These liaison officers are thus directly able to pass on the latest instructions that police officers at Schengen borders receive from their respective ministries.

The effects of the externalisation of border policies extend beyond questions of individuals' access to dynamics of human development, care, and social protection. The way in which individuals in the Global South balance different aspects of human development depends on how much they have internalised European border discourses. By the “internalisation of European border discourses,” I mean the dominance of the nation-state as the primary source of identification and social protection, as well—more broadly—as the dominance of connected normative positions, such as the primacy of national development over community development, and the positive obligation of states to collaborate with immigration states so as to prevent citizens' illegality abroad.

Different social groups in the Global South stand to gain or lose in different ways from the internalising of border and fraud discourses. Individuals from linguistic minorities who are discriminated against, for example, stand to obtain less security from their nation-state than individuals from socially privileged families with easy access to gatekeepers in ruling parties or well-positioned state officials.

CRIMINALISATION OF EMIGRATION: THE CASE OF CAMEROON

Travel documents that are classified by state actors as “fraudulent” are mostly financed with the help of travellers’ families and social networks for the purpose of enabling the social mobility of both the traveller and those who contributed to the travel project. Anti-fraud discourses criminalise people and organisations involved in facilitating travel projects that do not match the narrowly defined criteria of immigration states—amongst others, by insisting that only state-authorized people and organisations are able to produce legal travel documents. In this manner, anti-fraud discourses reinforce both the hegemony of state narratives of national identity (Paasi 2009, p. 230) and the idea that nation-states are communities of value (Anderson 2013).

Consequently, border controls are legitimated in terms of the values they are supposed to defend, regardless of whose development and well-being these values promote. In the wake of policy initiatives that externalise migration control, emigration states have begun to adopt a more security-driven approach to migration that disregards care needs and social risks of citizens in the Global South. Similar to the developments referred to above in respect of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, Cameroon has seen the emergence of a new offence of “attempting to emigrate illegally.” As a traditional sending state in sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon has had long-standing migration flows and connections with France as a receiving state. However, while emigrants’ remittances are important to Cameroon, they do not play the same role in its domestic economy as, for instance, in Ghana or Mali.

The political regime in place in Cameroon since 1982 has long regarded emigrants in the diaspora as potential sources of opposition to the country’s internal domestic order. The only person I found willing to openly criticise the crackdown by Cameroonian police officers on nationals deported to Cameroon in the 1990s, as well as current police practices *vis-à-vis* non-admitted nationals, was a human rights lawyer who was also a key figure in the opposition to President Paul Biya, President since 1982. Cameroonian attitudes towards migration also vary according to ethnic origins. Francophone Cameroonians, for example, are more likely to see illegal migration as tarnishing the country’s national image more than their Anglophone counterparts (Pelican 2012). Consequently, migration information campaigns seeking to prevent departure projects are always initiated by Francophone Cameroonians rather than Anglophone Cameroonians.

Since 2009, a bilateral agreement between Cameroon and France has provided a framework for coordinated management of migration flows and co-development between the two countries.⁵ This agreement covers four different policy domains. First, it includes a non-implemented clause on the circulation of people between France and Cameroon, while second, it sets out procedures for re-admitting people with an irregular status, including a requirement for migrants to be supported financially by the French state (*dispositif d'aide au retour*). Third, the agreement covers police cooperation between France and Cameroon,⁶ with the fourth and final part of the agreement comprising a varied series of measures under the heading of co-development. These measures range from voluntary return programmes for skilled Cameroonians in France to a heavily subsidised reform of the Cameroonian civil registry⁷ and the provision of much smaller amounts for facilitating migrants' remittances from France to Cameroon.⁸

A closer look at this bilateral agreement on migration and co-development reveals a bias towards facilitating return and combating fraud. This agreement forms part of a broader move towards transnational policy efforts to combat fraud. While talking to me at the exit and entry controls at Douala and Yaoundé international airports, Cameroonian police officers often gave accounts of opportunities to travel to France for workshops and fraud-detection training. In this way, bilateral cooperation has put fraud high on the agenda of state agents in Cameroon.

The fraud agenda has been influential in producing a new criminal offence in Cameroon, specifically the offence of “attempting to emigrate illegally.” This offence—based on a national law defining how nationals and foreigners are legally permitted to exit and enter the country, as well as a definition of fraud in the Cameroonian Criminal Code—derives from case law rather than legislation. In conversation with me, a state council (*procureur*) hinted at having received instructions from the Ministry of Justice to crack down on fraud and unauthorised migration.

The criminalisation of emigration becomes most visible when Cameroonian state agents receive returnees back into the national territory. The Cameroonian border police at Douala international airport maintain a registry of cases of forced returns, including deportations, assisted return flights for those who gave up in the course of their overland migration attempts, other assisted return flights (mostly from Europe), non-admissions, and boarding refusals at the level of the airport in Cameroon.⁹ In the two years between June 2011 and May 2013, France was consistently the country sending back the highest numbers

of deportees and non-admitted travellers, while other important source countries for forced returns were Spain, Cyprus, Belgium, the UK, and Germany. On average, the Cameroonian police registered 220 cases of forced returns each year during that period.¹⁰ The Cameroonian government only accepts a maximum of four returnees per commercial flight. Desiring to avoid political upheaval or negative media attention, Cameroonian authorities categorically refuse chartered flights for forced returnees. This poses a challenge to Spanish, but not so much to French authorities.

Most of the forced returns recorded by the Cameroonian border police were deportations and assisted return flights for those who had failed with their overland migration projects. Boarding refusals end up in the police files only when airline companies or private security staff choose to signal these cases to the police. This does not occur systematically. Non-admitted travellers are at much greater risk of detention and criminal prosecution than travellers who are denied boarding. Returns after decisions of non-admission are rarely studied, but quantitatively important. In the Cameroonian case, almost every third person involuntarily returning to Cameroon had not been admitted to the territory of his or her intended destination. The police registered 153 cases of non-admission between June 2011 and May 2013. For the EU, Eurostat recorded a total of 490 cases of non-admission and 755 cases of deportations for Cameroonians in 2012.

The reason that the number of non-admissions is relatively low is because carrier sanctions oblige airlines to conduct exit controls in the form of document checks before any passenger can board an aircraft heading for Europe. On the ground, employees of private security companies, such as International Airport Control and Safety Services Company (SICASS), are responsible for checking the travel documents, reasons for travel, and family ties of any individual wanting to leave Cameroon by air. Cameroonian nationals have little scope to challenge these decisions on the spot as they would then be liable to accusations of fraud or a boarding refusal on other grounds. SICASS is one of the parties in charge of document checks for flights from Douala airport to France, Belgium, Morocco, and Turkey; its staff estimated that they fail to prevent around three non-admissions each month.

Non-admitted travellers returning to Cameroon are identifiable to police officers because of “non-admission” stamps in their passports. As such, these returnees are vulnerable to monetary extortion, detention,

threats of imprisonment, actual imprisonment, and criminal prosecution. The police at Douala airport self-reported 142 cases of police hearings, 8 cases of prolonged detention, and 5 cases of criminal prosecution between June 2011 and May 2013. Except for two cases of boarding refusals, all police hearings, detentions and criminal prosecutions involved non-admitted travellers. In the event of suspected identity theft (i.e., usage of somebody else’s travel documents), Cameroonian police officers ask family members of the relevant person to verify and establish the individual’s “real” identity.

If the Cameroonian border police decide that a forced return requires criminal prosecution, the person is handed over to the judiciary police, who then transfer him or her to New Bell prison to await judgment. The criminal court located closest to the airport and prison is the *Tribunal Penal de Première Instance* of Bonanjo. The court’s register lists at least 50 cases of criminal prosecutions for “attempts to emigrate illegally.” The vast majority of these involved men, while only six cases specified additional charges such as identity theft, vagrancy, fraud, or lack of identification.

While Rumford (2007) stresses that border controls are no longer the prime derogative of nation-states, the above statistics suggest that this point requires qualification. Externalisation and outsourcing transform, but do not necessarily reduce, state power. Police officers, prison guards, and judges in Cameroon enforce European borders through criminal charges and judicial procedures. A criminal offence of “attempting to emigrate illegally” thus feeds into the proliferation of borders (Rumford 2007, p. 328), and creates new powers for state agents in emigration countries.

FORCED RETURNS AND RISKS IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

A focus on the actions of states and citizens in the Global South allow us to consider the remote impact of northern border controls on people with aspirations for geographic and social mobility. In theory, Cameroonian border officers primarily target unauthorised paper documents. In practice, however, returned individuals become suspect citizens when picked up during border controls at the domestic airport and subsequently escorted to the police station for investigation. People’s linguistic competences, ethnic origins, educational background, and general social standing shape power relations between police officers and returnees. In the following, I review return risks for a series of forced

returns, including departure projects that fail due to boarding refusals by both airline and ship companies, deportations, and assisted return programmes. Most forced returnees come, by far, from France and Spain, followed by Belgium, Germany, Cyprus, Denmark, the UK, Georgia, Switzerland, and Italy.

If intercepted by the police, individuals attempting to leave Cameroon without travel documents will be prosecuted for “attempting to emigrate illegally.” Hamidou and Bouba were both in their early twenties when I met them. From poor families and without any formal education, they had been unable to make a living in Cameroon and saw migration as their only escape from misery. Hamidou and Bouba were tried for the same offence, at the same time, after both had tried to emigrate from Cameroon by stowing away on a boat transporting wood to China. During his time in prison in 2014, I was able to interview Hamidou.

Hamidou comes from a family of 11 children. At the age of 19, he left his village in the north of Cameroon to join an older brother in Douala, who worked in transporting and trading goods at the Nigerian border. Hamidou was the only person in his family who had not been able to save up enough money to get married. Having suffered from tuberculosis for two years, he was heavily in debt and decided that trying to travel to Europe was the only way out of his situation. He knew the risk of being thrown overboard by the boat’s crew, but preferred taking this chance. Attempting to emigrate in this way was an alternative to his social death, meaning a total lack of any prospect to attain a minimum level of social visibility, respect, and status. Deprived of both material comfort and social standing, attempting to migrate by hiding on a boat was a suicide mission, but one that gave him the possibility of winning the lottery and thus improving his situation through migration.

After two days on board, Hamidou and Bouba came out of their hiding places. Each had sought refuge on the boat separately and discovered the other’s presence only when they came out of hiding. The crew first threatened to throw both men overboard, but then decided to alert the Cameroonian police, who came to get them because as they were still in Cameroonian waters. After a police hearing on the mainland, Hamidou and Bouba were sent to New Bell prison on 3 January 2014. Several weeks later, on 14 February 2014, they were both charged with “having attempted to emigrate illegally” and vagrancy (defined by the absence of a fixed income or a residence). Thus criminalised for both international and domestic mobility, both were sentenced to two months’ imprisonment.

Here, unauthorised travel documents were not at stake in the emigration trajectory as Hamidou and Bouba had simply attempted to leave the country *without* a valid passport, identity card, or visa. As they did not reach another country, they were dependent solely on their country of nationality for social protection. The Cameroonian prison system, however, is seriously underfunded, with detention being characterised by international organisations as inhumane and degrading (Amnesty International 2013).

Unlike non-admitted travellers such as Hamidou and Bouba, deportees have successfully crossed international borders. Indeed, many deportees may have lived in another state for several years. However volatile and temporal, these connections can serve as a source of minimal protection. In the 1990s, for example, a British asylum NGO commissioned a Cameroonian human rights lawyer to report on the imprisonment of deportees that was then standard practice in Cameroon. The report produced was subsequently used in support of potential deportees' asylum claims. Following this international attention, imprisonment practices have become rare since 2007. The human rights lawyer suggested that this was because the UK had put pressure on the Cameroonian government to end imprisonment practices so that deportations to Cameroon would be able to continue unchallenged.

Although imprisonment is no longer systematic, deportees may nonetheless face detention, monetary extractions, and threats of imprisonment. In principle, deporting states first contact the consulate of the country to which they want to deport a person. By issuing a *laissez-passer*, deportee-receiving states confirm the nationality of, and guarantee safe passage for, persons to be deported. As repressive practices by the Cameroonian state are still alive in public memory, many Cameroonian deportees prefer to call family members before being deported. These family members are then charged with locating contacts at the airport (preferably in the police) that, in return for some financial recompense, will guarantee safe passage and avoid preventive detention and the threat of imprisonment. Even if deportees have a *laissez-passer*, police officers may still ask them to “regularise their situation” by paying (Central African Franc) CFA 150,000, plus a further CFA 50,000 for the cost of detention at the airport (approximately €300 in total). When faced with the threat of the notorious New Bell prison, many deportees understandably prefer to pay rather than to risk rape, killings, or health issues due to unhygienic food and living conditions.

Miranda's case of deportation clearly illustrates the informality of power relations between deportees and Cameroonian state agents. Miranda is Anglophone and was deported from Belgium in 2010 after being intercepted in Germany and found not to have a valid visa in her passport. She arrived at Douala airport on Friday evening and was held in police custody until Monday morning before being able to speak to the commissioner. Miranda explained her situation as follows: "When they [the Cameroonian police] catch you there with a problem, no matter whether small or big, they will just frighten you to send you to prison. There are some people that when you arrive at the airport, they allow them to go. They do not trouble them. But sometimes if they catch you, then you have to spend some money before you go."

Miranda, herself, spent three days and nights in preventive detention at Douala airport upon arrival back in Cameroon. During this time, she was only allowed to wash and change her clothes once. She was able to eat only because her sister brought her some food¹¹ after a female police officer had agreed to lend Miranda her personal phone, so that she could contact her sister. "She [the sister] was doing all the negotiations. Otherwise I believe they would have sent me to prison."

The police accused Miranda of fraud, while her sister argued that Miranda's visas were valid. The commissioner asked Miranda's sister for the equivalent of €1000 for her release, which her sister was unable to raise. It was only thanks to intercession by an acquaintance who used to be a police commissioner that they were able to reach a settlement. In the end, Miranda's sister paid the equivalent of €300, later followed by a further €150. Although this allowed Miranda to leave the airport, the officer retained her passport as Miranda refused to give him a bottle of whiskey, in addition to the money already paid, in return for her passport. For a long time it was difficult for Cameroonians to obtain a passport from their state, and although passports have now become more readily available, visas are still a rare resource. Miranda wanted her passport back, because it contained the genuine visa with which she had been travelling before on her trip to Germany and, at the cost of a further €10, she was eventually able to retrieve it, a few weeks after her release.

Just like deportees, participants in "voluntary" return programmes are also vulnerable to spontaneous requests by state agents. Out of twenty-three interviews, two participants reported coming under pressure to pay police officers and being afraid of imprisonment upon arrival in Cameroon. Both were Anglophones in a predominantly Francophone

country. In line with the generalised discrimination against Anglophone Cameroonians in the country, Anglophone deportees are, upon return, more vulnerable to suspicion and extortion by police officers who are generally Francophone. 40-year-old Stefan, for example, gave CFA 400,000 (€600) to police officers on his assisted return flight to Douala airport. Wanting to increase his profit margin from his small-scale trade in Cameroon, he had travelled to France on a one-month tourist visa. When asked why he had given money to the Cameroonian police upon his assisted return, Stefan explained that the airport police officers had accused him of damaging Cameroon’s image abroad. During his interactions with the police officers, he was threatened with detention and ultimately a transfer to New Bell prison by the judiciary police.

Social networks are important resources for returnees. When talking about his return to Cameroon, 40-year-old Bernard explained that he did not experience any problems with the police because he had a friend who was a commissioner in Douala. Before leaving Italy, after 10 years of work without a residence permit, he had called this friend and requested his protection to avoid being sent to New Bell prison. Although Bernard was part of an assisted return programme, neither he, nor the commissioner in Douala, considered it safe for him to arrive at Douala airport without assistance. The commissioner therefore travelled to the airport and arranged for his friend’s release from the airport police station.

In a context where efforts to combat fraud are high on police officers’ agendas in both the Global North and South, the ever-present suspicions of fraud are transferred from migrants to citizens in countries with high emigration rates. Regardless of whether they have travel documents from authorised or unauthorised actors, forced returnees are regularly forced to pay money in order to avoid detention and imprisonment.

NON-ADMISSION AND FRAUD

Restrictive border controls undermine family-based forms of loyalty that may require cross-border movements, regardless of whether these movements are sanctioned by state authorities. At the same time, border controls and anti-fraud programmes create opportunities for actors with stakes in, or connections to, forms of state power. The following section draws on two cases of non-admission—Robert and Pamela—to analyse returnees’ vulnerabilities, as well as to highlight the profits that various agents can generate from combating fraud in migration trajectories. Both

cases examined were vulnerable because of Cameroonian state agents internalising the norms of border control officers in immigration states.

Robert's attempt to enter Turkey on a passport other than his own was criminalised by Cameroonian state agents and he consequently spent almost two months in prison. I met him in prison in Douala, Cameroon, and followed his court proceedings for several months. Robert comes from the Anglophone part of Cameroon and studied at university for a year, but had to abandon his studies due to lack of financial resources. After a period of unemployment in Cameroon, he worked on a construction site in Equatorial Guinea for over a year. With the money he was able to save there, he paid a broker to obtain documents that allowed him to travel to Turkey in 2011. Robert worked informally in Turkey for almost two years. When both his father and sister passed away in 2013, he decided to return to Cameroon for their funerals.

As an undocumented migrant, Robert knew that returning to Cameroon to attend family funerals exposed him to the risk of not being able to return to his new home and place of work in Turkey. After his visit, he tried to return to Turkey by obtaining a visa for Dubai and purchasing a Turkish Airlines flight with a stopover in Istanbul. His passport and visa complied with all the requirements when he left Cameroon. During the stopover in Istanbul, however, he attempted to enter Turkey with the passport of a Cameroonian friend, who did have a residence permit. The Turkish police noticed that it was not Robert's own passport and so refused him entry. They then confiscated the friend's passport and handed Robert over to Turkish Airlines' head of transit, who dutifully returned him—at the airline's expense—to his airport of departure, Douala.

Although Robert had attempted to enter Turkey on somebody else's passport, his departure from Cameroon had been entirely legal. He had had his own passport, as well as a valid visa and travel ticket for Dubai. Nevertheless, when he left the aeroplane in Douala in the middle of the night, he was intercepted by the Cameroonian border police, who noticed the “non-admission” stamp in his passport. The latter accused him, as Robert told me in a later interview, of “being Nigerian.” Although Robert speaks exceptionally good French for an Anglophone Cameroonian, he was vulnerable *vis-à-vis* the Francophone police officers for coming from a part of the country often associated with being more critical of the current political regime. Robert claimed that police officers

from the minority group of Anglophones would not have treated him in the same manner.

Robert was detained at the airport police station until the next evening. After a police hearing, the border police transferred him to the judiciary police in Douala, where he was detained for a further three days. It was only then that he was finally able to contact his family. Samuel, an uncle of roughly the same age, and whom Robert thus refers to as his “brother,” promised to plead his case with the judiciary police. Samuel was a trader who occasionally travelled to Dubai and China on business. Upon arriving in Douala, Samuel attempted to stop Robert’s case at the level of the judiciary police by financially motivating respective officers. Despite Samuel’s intervention, however, Robert was transferred to New Bell prison.

The Cameroonian penitentiary system does not separate convicted criminals from detainees being held in preventive custody; as a result, inmates can easily be subjected to rape, murder, or other acts of violence (Djoukouro 2013). From one day to the next, therefore, Robert found himself in a situation of extreme violence and hardship. The prison food, for example, caused digestive problems, both for him and other detainees, and it was only thanks to Samuel’s financial support that he was able to buy food from market women, which did not cause him health issues. Another problem was that detainees at New Bell are not automatically given beds and cells to sleep in. Once again, Robert was able to rely on Samuel’s money to buy access rights to a cell from some of the prison guards. A few days later, however, the guards transferred new inmates into his cell. Robert then decided to give up the cell, to buy a mattress, and to sleep in the open with everyone else. In prison, Robert also needed money from Samuel to be able to pay for access rights to the toilet and bathroom, as well as the “new man tax”—a fee levied by “prison chiefs” (senior inmates who collaborate with prison guards) to install discipline and order among prison inmates.

Robert was detained in New Bell prison in Douala from early January 2014, but did not appear in court until three weeks later. Although he tried to explain his case to the judge, he was quickly told, “to shut up.” The judge was only interested in hearing whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty to the offences of identity theft and “attempting to emigrate illegally.” There was no room for discussion. Robert, like most other prison inmates, did not have a lawyer.

It took Samuel several weeks and a total of €400 (the equivalent of a good monthly salary, and twice the salary of a junior university lecturer) to obtain the favours of the State Council and the judge in question. When I raised the possibility of legal defence by a lawyer, Samuel pointed out the vulnerability of his nephew and the extreme powers of the Cameroonian state system: “Francophones are very funny. If you start to work with rights, saying that you know your human rights, they can even abandon your case. You will stay here forever. So it’s better to just work according to their command.”

After one month of detention, the court finally announced Robert’s sentence of one month’s imprisonment. It then took several more weeks of struggles on the part of Samuel to get Robert released from prison. Studying actual travel trajectories makes it very clear that personal negotiation skills are key skills. Some Cameroonians report that acquaintances have had to pay CFA 1,500,000 (€2200) at the airport in order to avoid a court case, while other interviewees, such as Pamela, never had to face criminal prosecution.

At the age of 31, Pamela had a law degree, but no employment. She had tried several times—both with, and without, a broker—to emigrate, but each time had failed for a different reason. Her parents were close to retirement and needed an older member of their family to generate income so that the younger children could go to school. They therefore paid a migration broker from their home village to organise another travel and migration attempt for Pamela. Although Pamela planned to live and work in Scandinavia, the broker provided Pamela and her travel companion with visas for Ukraine. With an Italian residence permit, they were supposed to cross into the Schengen area and then move freely across Europe to their desired destination.

At Douala airport, before they had left Cameroon, Pamela and her companion were asked to stand aside before boarding the plane. They were told that the police had doubts about their travel documents; they therefore needed to “motivate” the officer to guarantee their passage to the plane. Pamela could not reduce the sum demanded below €300 because the police officers knew that she had €900 as they had just asked her to prove whether she had sufficient means of subsistence for her travel. In this way, legal requirements reduced Pamela’s scope for negotiating with the Cameroonian police.

Upon arrival at Kiev airport, Pamela and her companion were not admitted to Ukraine. As well as the telephone number of their supposed

business partner not being reachable, they did not have the full address of the company with which they were supposedly going to do business in Ukraine. Their visas, which were only valid for another week, were cancelled at the airport.

As they had arrived in Kiev with Aeroflot, the airline took them back via Moscow to Dubai, where they waited for four days in the international zone of the airport. As Pamela and her companion had originally arrived in Dubai with Kenyan Airways, Aeroflot was no longer responsible for returning them to Cameroon. Eventually, the migration broker in Cameroon sent Pamela and her travel companion a flight ticket for a Kenyan Airways flight via Nairobi to Douala, Cameroon.

As Dubai immigration officers had the travel documents for Pamela and her companion, they escorted them onto the Kenyan Airways aeroplane. Upon arrival in Nairobi, Pamela and her companion were told to remain seated in the aeroplane until Kenyan immigration officers escorted them to their flight to Douala. Pamela was concerned about how she would be treated by the Cameroonian police upon arrival at Douala. She told me that, as she now knew herself to be in Africa; she took her chance and managed to persuade the Kenyan police officer to release her travel documents (including the Italian residence permit) in exchange for €50. Afraid of extortions and threats of imprisonment in Cameroon, Pamela went straight to the toilet and destroyed the Italian residence permit she had just re-purchased, keeping only her Cameroonian passport containing the cancelled Ukrainian visa. “Otherwise, I’d still be in New Bell.”

Authorities of deporting states entrust deportees’ travel documents to staff of the airline transporting the returnees. The airline staff in turn hand the travel documents over to the police authorities upon arrival at the airport in the relevant country of origin or nationality. Cameroonian police officers in charge of legal enquiries systematically conduct interviews with nationals who have been subject to non-admission and deportation. During these hearings, officers seek to verify various things, including whether returnees are indeed Cameroonian nationals. Officers also use these hearings to collect information that could be useful to them in their criminal investigations against smugglers, migration brokers, and intermediaries who sell travel documents. These interviews provide a platform for spontaneous requests by police officers that the latter feel justified in formulating, given their mandate to combat fraud.

Upon arrival at Douala airport, Pamela paid another €20 to the Cameroonian police officers, who then waved her through. She was not

detained or imprisoned. She had spent a total of €370 on Cameroonian and Kenyan police officers, with all this money to secure safe passage through police controls upon her forced return having to be raised by her retired parents; in other words, it was the money and the police officers' willingness to accept it that saved Pamela from imprisonment.

Anti-fraud programmes create vulnerabilities for returnees, while also fuelling corruption in migrants' countries of origin. The strength of family networks and the quality of personal negotiating skills determine whether detention and imprisonment can be avoided or shortened. Protection from corruption thus fuels further corruption (Carling et al. 2015), while family interventions create new forms of indebtedness for returned and aspiring travellers. As a result, returnees without social networks and money are particularly vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

Based on a review of case law, observations of imprisonment practices and narratives of returnees' experiences in Cameroon, this chapter has sought to identify characteristics of contemporary border policing and consequences of return. Sovereign control over nation-states' borders has seen important transformations in the course of its externalisation and privatisation, with both processes diffusing legal norms to new actors and places. Today much migration control occurs through exit controls. This chapter explored how the externalisation of border policing is also connected to the internalisation of legal norms that were originally developed by the Global North as a means of controlling its own borders.

In places of emigration, the internalisation of border policing becomes visible in the criminalisation of emigration. In line with European policy priorities in what are referred to as "co-development" initiatives, the Cameroonian police and judiciary system have come to see development as a matter of needing to combat fraud. In this way, development is increasingly being seen as rooted in the needs and security of the nation-state. In the case of Cameroonian migration policy, this plays itself out in the introduction of the offence of "attempting to emigrate illegally." This offence causes returnees who have committed fraud in their travel attempt to be penalised twice: first by their involuntary return and, second by the instigation of criminal proceedings against them.

The empirical core of this chapter underlines the risks faced by returnees arriving back in their country of nationality. Individuals returning involuntarily to Cameroon risk monetary extortion, detention, criminal prosecution, and imprisonment. Support from their social networks is then crucial if they are to negotiate a safe passage and protection from police officers upon their return. Returnees also depend on their family networks to avoid and alleviate degrading and inhumane imprisonment conditions by negotiating and lobbying with state councils and judges on the outcome of court sentences. In this way, efforts to combat fraud fuel corruption, while also place additional strain on families in emigration countries and creating new dependencies and vulnerabilities.

The return narratives of this chapter thus reveal tensions between emerging legal norms and the subjectivities of aspiring migrants in the Global South. The absence of meaningful avenues for legal migration results in the prosecution of fraud, which in turn interferes on a normative level with family obligations, and care needs in the Global South. The externalisation and internalisation of border controls, including stringent entry controls, have both made it more difficult for subjects in the Global South to leave their country and produced a new category of returnees: “inadmissibles.” These are travellers who manage to leave their own country, but who never gain entry to the territory of another nation-state.

Supposedly, sovereign nation-states in the Global South generally fall short in terms of being able to provide meaningful avenues for social protection, employment, and care. Nonetheless, efforts to combat fraud portray the nation-state as the unique source of development. This conception of development has definite paybacks for elite families with a vested interest in the state in emigration countries. The active stance adopted by Cameroonian state agents in combating fraud creates both financial and social opportunities in Cameroon. Police officers, for example, can aspire to travel to France for training and seminars, while judges and state councils have the chance to earn additional income to support their own families. These new connections have allowed border controls to create new subjectivities for state agents in the Global South.

The criminalisation of emigration in Cameroon is an example of how border policies create processing centers for implementing and enforcing border policies in places of emigration. Not only do border policies lead to foreigners being imprisoned in *immigration* countries, but returnees can also be imprisoned in *emigration* countries because of

having attempted to travel without or with documents that are considered fraudulent. Although imprisonment of these non-admitted travellers is not easily visible to citizens in the Global North, “inadmissibles” are subjects whose vulnerability is immediately conditioned by border policies in that Global North.

NOTES

1. While fatalities are highest at sea borders, the numbers of entries and exits into and from the Schengen area are five to six times higher at land and air borders.
2. The question of voluntariness in return programs is complex (Chappart 2014; Collyer 2012, pp. 286–287). While not having residence permits means that not all participants sign up for return programmes, many feel forced nevertheless to opt for such programmes. Many participants in voluntary return programmes also associate their return with a failure to achieve the aim of their initial migration.
3. Interviewees’ names have been changed to protect their privacy.
4. I wish to thank and acknowledge the work of Charlotte Blondel, Marie Conciatori, Nausicaa Preiss, Meritxell Sayos Monras, Suzanne Seiller and Janine Uhlmannsiek, who contributed to the “Airport Casualties: Migration Control, Human Rights and Countries of Origin” project at Sciences Po Paris.
5. *Accord France Cameroun relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire.*
6. Between 2009 and 2010, the French state provided 50,000 for police co-operation under the Franco-Cameroonian agreement.
7. The agreement provides for a budget of 1,500,000 for reforming the civil registry.
8. These dispositions relate to special saving accounts for migrants who want to invest in Cameroon and the setting-up of a website comparing the transaction costs of various money transfer facilities.
9. During my research at the police station at Douala international airport, the commissioner instructed officers to compile a digital dataset for the research project, based on the existing registers.
10. Owing to a lack of close supervision and training, actual numbers are very likely to be higher. I was unable, for example, to trace in the register the case of a non-admitted traveller whom I had met in the prison of New Bell in Douala and who had previously passed through Douala airport.
11. The Cameroonian police do not have a budget for communications or for looking after people in preventive detention.

REFERENCES

- Amnesty International. 2013. Republic of Cameroon. Make Human Rights a Reality. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51024ac72.html>. Accessed 20 February 2017.
- Anderson, Bridget. 2013. *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andersen, Dorte Jagetić. 2014. Do If You Dare: Reflections on (Un)familiarity, Identity-Formation and Ontological Politics. *Journal of Borderland Studies* 29 (3): 327–337.
- Brouwer, Evelien. 2010. Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the EU and its Member States. In *Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges*, ed. Bernhard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas, 199–228. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Carling, Jørgen, Erlend Paasche, and Melissa Siegel. 2015. *Finding Connections: The Nexus Between Migration and Corruption*. Washington: Migration Policy Institute.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2009. The Co-operation on Readmission and Enforced Return in the African–European Context. In *Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives*. OECD/SWAC, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Chappart, Pascaline. 2014. Retours volontaires, retours forcés hors d’Europe. Une socio-anthropologie de l’éloignement des étrangers. Le cas de la France. PhD dissertation, Université de Poitiers.
- Collyer, Michael. 2012. Deportation and the Micropolitics of Exclusion: The Rise of Removals from the UK to Sri Lanka. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 276–292.
- Cuttitta, Paolo. 2008. The Case of the Italian Southern Sea Borders: Cooperation Across the Mediterranean? *Documentos CIDOB Migraciones* 17: 46.
- Djoukouo, F. Félicité. 2013. Délinquants Jeunes en Milieu Carcéral au Cameroun: Entre Exclusion et Réinsertion Sociales. Cas de la Prison Centrale de Yaoundé. Master’s thesis, Université de Yaoundé.
- Drotbohm, Heike. 2011. On the Durability and the Decomposition of Citizenship: The Social Logics of Forced Return Migration in Cape Verde. *Citizenship Studies* 15: 381–396.
- Drotbohm, Heike, and Ines Hasselberg. 2015. Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 551–562.
- Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, eds. 2013. *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*. London: Routledge.
- Guiraudon, Virginie. 2002. Before the EU Border: Remote Control of the ‘Huddled Masses’. In *In Search of Europe’s Borders*, ed. Kees Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud. The Hague: Kluwer.

- Klepp, Silja. 2010. A Contested Asylum System: The European Union Between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea. *European Journal of Migration and Law* 12: 1–21.
- Lecadet, Clara. 2013. From Migrant Destitution to Self-Organization into Transitory National Communities: The Revival of Citizenship in Post-Deportation Experience in Northern Mali. In *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation*, ed. Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti. New York: Springer.
- McKeown, Adam M. 2008. *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McNamara, Frank. 2013. Member State Responsibility for Migration Control Within Third States—Externalisation Revisited. *European Journal of Migration and Law* 15: 326–327.
- Paasi, Anssi. 2009. Bounded Spaces in a ‘Borderless World’: Border Studies, Power and the Anatomy of Territory. *Journal of Power* 2 (2): 213–234.
- Pelican, Michaela. 2012. International Migration: Virtue or Vice? Perspectives from Cameroon. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39 (2): 237–258.
- Rumford, Chris. 2007. Does Europe Have Cosmopolitan Borders? *Globalizations* 4 (3): 327–339.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.

Afterword. Deportation: The Last Word?

Nicholas De Genova

Deportation presents a paradox of namelessness. In his well-known ballad “Deportee,” also known as “Plane Wreck at Los Gatos” (1948), Woody Guthrie’s haunting lyric—*You won’t have your names when you ride the big airplane/All they will call you will be “deportees”*—powerfully evokes the desultory disregard for the human individuality of persons whose lives are travestied by deportation, rendering them effectively anonymous. As ostensibly unwanted or undesirable non-citizens, their utter disposability appears to be finally and conclusively verified by deportation as a sovereign power’s exercise in virtual “waste removal,” a state’s perfunctory and mundane act of “taking out the trash.” Hence, it is no accident that, etymologically, the origins of the very word “deportation” would indicate a carrying away, a removal, a disposal (De Genova 2014). Guthrie was moved to lament the anonymity of deportees when a deportation flight crashed in California and was reported in New York with the four names of only the white (US citizen) crew and security guard, callously relegating the 28 deceased Mexican/migrant workers to a derisive namelessness even in the face of their tragic deaths.¹ In this example, like so many others, the social and juridical disposability of deportable migrants was evidently prefigured, as well as retroactively

N. De Genova (✉)
Independent Scholar, Chicago, USA

validated, by the racialised degradation of their human personhood. The deportees were casually represented as persons undeserving, even in death, of individuality, just as they were merely particular instances of an anonymous illegalised mass, a multitude of racialised migrant labourers, a virtual herd of beasts of burden. If their deportations resulted on this occasion in their untimely deaths, the actual eradication of the deportees' individual *lives*—their personal identities and life trajectories—emerged as a frightfully routine and prosaic fact of deportation, more generally. Here today, gone tomorrow. Out of sight, out of mind. Case closed. Thus, at least from the perspective of the deporting state power, deportation appears to be the final act, the proverbial last word.

From the perspective of the deporting state power, presumptively undeserving, unwanted, or undesirable—and therefore illegitimate and “illegal,” if not “criminal”—deportees are pervasively figured as virtual human “rubbish,” a kind of “garbage” of globalisation, nameless “losers” in the high-stakes global game of capital accumulation and bordering (De Genova 2016).² Thus, deportees are depicted as being “dumped” on the receiving states, in the words of a senior government minister quoted in the chapter by Leanne Weber and Powell (this volume). For their part, deportees readily liken the bitterness of their condition to “coming home to nothing,” and “being stuck” with “nowhere to go” (Turnbull, this volume) and indeed, oftentimes, with nothing to do, “trapped” in a place that feels “like a prison away from prison” (Hasselberg, this volume). In a telling turn of phrase, Sarah Turnbull (this volume) likens the profound disruption of deportation to “being disappeared” from one’s own life, and one of her deported interlocutors eloquently adds: “I don’t live my life, I’m living someone else’s.” Predictably, for some deportees, the lived consequences of this sort of extreme alienation are a psychological trauma so severe that it may only come to finally be alleviated in suicide. In other instances, deported migrants are suspected of having originally fled the countries of their birth or citizenship as political opponents of authoritarian regimes (Alpes, this volume; Collyer, this volume; Lecadet, this volume), or are sent back to conflict zones amidst civil war, converting their deportations into de facto acts of *refoulement* (Collyer, this volume; Majidi, this volume), whereby return may subject them to persecution, extortion, rape, torture, and death.

Yet, the sociopolitical erasure and the symbolic namelessness of the deported within the *totalising* machinations of any deportation regime are nonetheless paradoxical because these more general socio-political conditions are very commonly contradicted by the fundamentally *individualising*

character of deportation within the fastidious bureaucratic functioning of administrative apparatuses of immigration control. As I have written previously, deportation presents a precise point of intersection and indistinction between totalising biopolitical procedures and modern governmental techniques of individualisation (De Genova 2010a, p. 34). Thus, although such generalisations may not always strictly apply in cases of mass expulsions (such as those described in this volume by Nassim Majidi for Iran's routine round-ups and deportations of "illegal" Afghans), it is generally true that deportation tends to always be applied in a rather targeted manner on particular individuals whose specific identities and circumstances are more or less documented and meticulously inscribed within the bureaucratic machinery of expulsion. Consequently, as borne out by the fine ethnography showcased in this volume, despite the deportees' *socio-political* anonymity and their erasure from the purview of many of the deporting states' citizenries, deportees are seldom nameless in fact, and paradoxically tend to be encumbered with a burgeoning of documentation that testifies to the administrative superintendence of what is widely euphemised as their "removal" and "return." While deportations are plainly debasing and destructive for individual deportees, their loved ones, and their wider communities, the bureaucratic rationality that coldly executes such severely punitive measures as "standard operating procedure," and the consequently heartless disregard for the veritable cruelty of deportation for those whose lives are thereby derailed, convert a systemic violence into the simple and banal functionality of a presumptively efficient governmental apparatus. It is in this respect that I have elsewhere (De Genova 2014) suggested that Hannah Arendt's ([1963] 2006) idea of the "banality of evil" is instructive when we confront and seek to challenge such otherwise routine "administrative" punishments as deportation. It was indeed the dehumanising reduction of individuals into "functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery"—as well as the reduction of others into the mere *objects* of its power—that Arendt deemed to be not only "the essence of totalitarian government" but also, remarkably, "perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy" (Arendt [1963] 2006, p. 289).

Here, it is perhaps helpful to recall that the banality of the deportation evil is ordinarily not the exclusive unilateral affair of a single deporting nation-state but rather tends to involve international cooperation and coordination between at least two states. Thus, as Shahram Khosravi underscores in his Introduction to this book, deportation provides a key site from which to problematise the methodological nationalism that has

long been endemic to social science and specifically to much of migration studies. Indeed, it is in this spirit that Nathalie Peutz and I (De Genova and Peutz 2010) have proposed that deportation entails the entrenchment and expansion of a veritably *global* regime (cf. Walters 2010). To shift our critical scrutiny from the more customary contexts of deporting states to those states entrusted with overseeing the *reception* of deportees, as the contributions to this volume do, supplies an absolutely crucial empirical and analytical framework for deepening our understanding of precisely these transnational, intercontinental, post-colonial configurations of the deportation regime. Nathalie Peutz (2006/2010) issued the programmatic call for “an anthropology of removal,” arguing in part for the necessity to investigate what happens *after deportation* and to ethnographically document the lived experiences and perspectives of the rapidly escalating number of people around the world who have been subjected to the deportation power, whether directly or as the proverbial “collateral damage” of such devastating processes of rupture and dislocation. Peter Nyers (2010) memorably characterised the abject reverse diaspora of deportees as a “*deportspora*” and Daniel Kanstroom (2012), specifically discussing the intensification of the US deportation regime, similarly invoked the image of a “new American diaspora.” Of course, neither is it the case that deportation ever ceases to produce enduring ramifications in the places from which deportees have been expelled, where their abrupt dislocation and absences continue to be palpable (Dreby 2012, 2013; Drotbohm 2015; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Hence, further elaborating Nyers’s idea of “transnational corridors of expulsion” (Nyers [2003] 2010, p. 1070), Heike Drotbohm and Ines Hasselberg (2015) have more recently proposed the concept of the “deportation corridor,” and similarly Shahram Khosravi (2016) has suggested the concept of a “global circuit of deportation,” to elucidate how this regime creates a complex web of spatial and temporal interconnections across the planet through which migration and deportation increasingly entail a succession of serial multi-directional mobilities and repercussions.

In spite of the sheer violence of the disjunctures and ruptures inflicted through deportation, notably, ethnography confirms that those who have been rendered the objects of this power persistently reassert their own subjectivity. In Alice Gerlach’s research in Jamaica (this volume), a deported woman memorably complains that the stigma of deportation supplants her identity even when people know her actual name, branding

her simply as “deportee,” and thereby extending and reconstituting the namelessness that deportation works to impose on the deported, long after their “return.” Little surprise, then, that in Sarah Turnbull’s chapter in this volume, many of those who have been deported repudiate being depicted as mere “deportees,” rejecting the notion that they should be represented as “victims” (cf. Plambech, this volume). This book admirably represents the genuine consolidation of a burgeoning scholarship around this vital new area of critical inquiry that has coalesced over the ensuing decade since Peutz’s intervention (Bhartia 2010; Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Coutin 2010, 2015; Dreby 2012, 2013; Drotbohm 2011, 2015; Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015; Galvin 2015; Golash-Boza 2012, 2013, 2015; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Hasselberg 2015, 2016; Hiemstra 2012; Kanstroom 2012; Khosravi 2009, 2016; Lecadet 2013; Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2015; Zilberg 2004, 2007, 2011). Such ethnographic insights into the lived struggles of the deported (as well as their loved ones and communities) restore names and identities to those who have been subjected to deportation’s techniques of eradication, elucidates the enduring subjectivity of those who have been made the objects of such sovereign acts of state power, and illustrates the stubborn incorrigibility of human life against the myriad forces that would seek to enforce its precarity and disposability.

Many of the chapters in this book provide an excruciating tapestry of exactly what Susan Coutin (2010), in her depiction of the post-deportation condition in El Salvador, has memorably characterised as an outright “inviability of life.” Hasselberg (this volume) rightly makes a poignant intervention by cautioning against the prospect of an ethnography of (post-)deportation degenerating into “a pornography of suffering.” Nevertheless, it is indisputable that deportation inflicts a pernicious cascade of hardships and, commonly, a truly Kafkaesque multiplication of unfathomable punishments (Bhartia 2010). Time and again, the research showcased here verifies anew that the deported, upon their “return” to the countries of their ostensible citizenship, commonly confront new formations of suspicion, criminalisation, detention or imprisonment, police abuse and sometimes brutality, prolonged surveillance, stigmatisation, hostility, marginalisation, destitution, and compounded precarisation. As Maybritt Jill Alpes (this volume) highlights, the dramatic externalisation and outsourcing of border controls in recent years, particularly on the part of the EU, ensures that would-be migrants come to be illegalised as “non-admissible” long before they ever arrive in their

destinations, subjected to “exit” controls by the very states from which they seek to depart. In Cameroon, Alpes shows, aspiring migrants are criminalised, despite their ostensible citizenship, for the peculiarly post-colonial offense of “attempting to emigrate illegally,” and for their very non-admissibility in the states of the Global North—an inadmissibility that is largely co-equal with their Cameroonian citizenship and nationality. As a result, retroactively, deportees are presumptively guilty for having violated the borders of faraway lands by daring to leave the confines of their natal country without proper authorisation and with alleged recourse to subterfuge or fraud. Alpes astutely asks, therefore, whether the mere fact of juridical citizenship in many states should ever be presumed to signal safety, protection, or rights.

Not only do many deportees come to be re-criminalised after deportation, they are often effectively re-constituted in the countries of their putative citizenship as newly undocumented persons and virtual foreigners. The newly undocumented condition of many deportees is memorably illustrated by Tanya Golash-Boza and Yajaira Cecilia’s discussion (this volume) of the Dominican “letter of good conduct” (*carta de buena conducta*), a police certificate verifying one’s lack of any recent criminal record, which is a costly requirement for access to work in the formal labour market but which is only available to deported returnees after a long probationary period, and nonetheless permanently brands them as deportees and ensures the likelihood of their exclusion from such employment in any case. In many instances, as Coutin (2010) and Elana Zilberg (2004, 2007, 2011) demonstrate with regard to the deportation from the USA of Salvadoran “criminal aliens” who themselves never in fact migrated—having crossed state borders only as infants or young children and subsequently having spent their lives entirely in the USA, while yet juridically inscribed as (deportable) non-citizens—the veritable inviability of the deportee condition often entails a process of their “migrantisation,” their “becoming migrant” (Tazzioli 2014; cf. Garelli and Tazzioli 2016, forthcoming; Riedner et al. 2016). As Evin Rodkey (this volume) notes for the analogous case of the Dominican Republic, such “deportees neither settled in the USA by choice, nor returned to their country of birth by choice.” Deportation into a condition of virtual illegality, exile, and abandonment in their ostensible “home” countries frequently compels them to seek avenues for migration back to their true homes in the places from which they have been expelled (even when prospects for such return migration trajectories are

highly implausible). Strikingly similar processes of (re-)migrantisation are evident in analogous work on Jamaica (Golash-Boza 2013, 2015; cf. Gerlach, this volume) and the Dominican Republic (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Golash-Boza and Ceciliano, this volume; Rodkey, this volume), as well as in related scenarios such as Somalia (Peutz 2006/2010), Samoa (Weber and Powell, this volume), Cape Verde (Drotbohm 2011, 2015; Hasselberg, this volume), but notably, also in research in substantially different contexts of deportation, such as the repeated mass deportations of Afghans from Iran (Majidi, this volume) or of Zimbabweans from Botswana (Galvin 2015). Expulsion serves in many cases to merely produce temporary interruptions and spatial diversions for migrants' projects, which then compel the deported to re-mobilise as soon as possible (Khosravi 2016; see also Majidi, this volume; Plambech, this volume). These dynamics of post-deportation migration are even more compelling for those who are deported to so-called "third countries," where they have neither the semblance of belonging nor citizenship, as in the example of asylum-seekers subjected to the EU's Dublin III Regulation (Khosravi 2016; Picozza, forthcoming). "By now," Ines Hasselberg (this volume) remarks incisively, "we know better than to take deportation as the end of migration."

A parallel process of (re-)migrantisation is similarly evinced by the ordinarily very tenuous efforts (when they exist at all) toward deportees' "reintegration," whereby these ostensible citizens come to be treated, upon return, as virtual foreigners. Of course, in the case of deportees who have spent nearly all of their lives elsewhere, as is often true in the Salvadoran example, deportees are actual foreigners in the countries of their birth and juridical citizenship (see Kanstroom 2012). The very notion of "reintegration," Sarah Turnbull (this volume) reminds us, incorrectly presupposes that deportees were "integrated" in the first place. Given the common affiliation of deportees with the stigma of criminality, moreover, such apparently magnanimous notions of "reintegration" become conflated with more disciplinary ideas of "rehabilitation" (Hasselberg, this volume; Weber and Powell, this volume). Thus, deportees come to be subjected to procedures and programmes (both governmental and non-) that reinforce their more general marginalisation and their construction as cultural contaminants, corrupting influences, social deviants, or genuine menaces to social order (cf. Drotbohm 2011, 2015; Khosravi 2016; Peutz 2006/2010; Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2015; see also Hasselberg, this volume; Majidi, this volume;

Rodkey, this volume; Weber and Powell, this volume). Rather than a return “home,” then, many deportees find themselves in what Khosravi has depicted as “a transnational space of expulsion, oscillating between redeparture and deportation” (Khosravi 2016, p. 178; cf. Schuster and Majidi 2015). Indeed, as Majidi (this volume) adds, “remigration”—increasingly experienced as obligatory and inevitable—begins to plainly exude many of the key features of “forced migration.”

Another formation of deportation presents itself in the form of “assisted voluntary returns.” In these instances, the neoliberal inducement for deportable migrants to consent and collude in their own otherwise obligatory and inescapable “return” tends to reduce “reintegration” to a series of rather meagre cash payments (Collyer, this volume; Plambech, this volume). Remotely supervised by the deporting state, particularly in the case of those whose deportations may be legitimated through the humanitarian logics of “protection” for the “victims” of “trafficking,” such “reintegration” formulas extend the deportees’ subjection to the power of the deporting state by sustaining a relationship of dependency. In Sine Plambech’s chapter in this book, Nigerian migrant sex worker women expose the duplicity of the humanitarian rationales of “assisted voluntary return,” which require them to perform the role of “the good victim” in need of “rescue” in exchange for quite modest monetary compensation. Notably, for many of these women, the debt and effectively indentured labour that facilitate their migration ensure that sex work belongs to a continuum of other varieties of distinctly gendered migrant labour, from housekeeping to childcare to home care for the elderly, as well as other less pronouncedly feminised types of labour, from street vending to farm work. Remarkably, these women explain, it was deportation—inasmuch as it signified the “failure” of their migratory projects and, consequently, downward social mobility for themselves and their families—that presented “a bigger problem for them than the sex work, and that it was more embarrassing for them to be deported than to be former sex workers.” As a result, their post-deportation eligibility for “reintegration” funds subjects them to a protracted condition of anxious waiting and dependency upon unreliable and capricious sources of financial support, purportedly intended to mitigate the very destitution and precarity that deportation itself has inflicted upon them. Similarly, Collyer (this volume) finds that such “pay-to-go” schemes of voluntary deportation tend to culminate in predictably ineffective “development” programmes, such that fatuous promises of

“development” are revealed to be simply a legitimating fig leaf for one or another deportation regime, while actually ensuring that the “reintegration” of deportees is likewise assured to fail. In a parallel but different instance, “development” is invoked as the hallowed ideal of post-colonial cooperation between France and Cameroon, in exchange for which the junior partner in enforcing the externalised borders of Europe must exhibit a demonstrable commitment to combatting the “fraud” of its own would-be migrant citizens (Alpes, this volume). Such heightened vigilance against fraud, however, merely multiplies the conditions of possibility for the extortion of bribes and thus contributes to the exacerbation of corruption and impunity. Unsurprisingly, such a compounding of vulnerabilities for the deported tends to merely aggravate further the predicaments that make their post-deportation condition inviable, and re-animate the desire or compulsion to migrate.

Hence, we are confronted with a global deportation regime in constant eruption. In its convulsions of expulsion, on an ever expanding scale, this global regime has generated ever-increasing multitudes of deportees—illegalised migrants, rejected refugees, as well as “criminal” denizens—who may be subjected by the deporting states to governmental procedures of eradication and seeming anonymity, and who may likewise be castigated anew by receiving states, but who nevertheless persist—often against egregious odds, as the vital ethnographic work of this volume amply demonstrates—in their efforts to re-make their lives and reconfigure the stakes of their aspirations and ambitions. Such examples of endurance and perseverance ought not, however, to be reduced to mere “resilience” (a rather compromised fetish of the neoliberal lexicon if ever there was one). Instead, the persistence of deportees must be recognised as yet another instance of migrant *struggles* (Tazzioli et al. 2015). These struggles may not ordinarily assert themselves in the customary idioms and forms of collective political mobilisations, and may remain largely imperceptible to state power. However, as Clara Lecadet (this volume; cf. 2013, forthcoming) demonstrates, deportees have also repudiated their social anonymity and their political erasure, re-appropriated their experiences of the humiliation, degradation, and brutality of deportation, and emerged as newly organised and articulate political subjects. In this respect, erupting from within the global corridors of expulsion, the deported—manoeuvring between nameless undesirability and audacious self-assertion and collective opposition—have begun to identify and name what Lecadet calls “a hiatus between states” in order to

reclaim a space for their distinctly transversal struggles. Notably, in the enunciations of the Togolese deportees that Lecadet documents, this meant promoting a conception of freedom of movement that would be capacious enough to encompass not merely a freedom to leave but also to remain. Thus, in the post-deportation condition, we confront anew the elementary and elemental human freedom of movement (De Genova 2010a), and the incorrigibility of the autonomy and subjectivity of migration (De Genova 2010b). Much as the autonomy of migration instigates a contest in which state power never has the first word, what we may now conceive as *the autonomy of deportation*—an autonomy and subjectivity of the deported within and against their predicaments of deportation—similarly ensures that state power never has the last word, either. Thus, inasmuch as deportation is never reducible to a single act or event, we should likewise underscore that deportation seldom signals a genuine closure, is never truly a conclusion, and never signifies the last word.

NOTES

1. At least 9 of the 32 passengers were witnessed leaping from the plane to their deaths. Twelve of the 28 Mexican workers were never identified. See Three Rocks Research, on the Wayback Machine Internet Archive: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140320011329/http://www.picacho.org/interest/dc3-site.html>. Accessed 7 Feb 2017.
2. It is important here to emphasise that I am referring to the hegemonic ideological rendering of people as virtual “waste,” and that this proposition ought to be rigorously distinguished from the rather uncritical rhetorical recourse of one such as Zygmunt Bauman, who cynically recapitulates this discourse even as he presumes to critique it, by more bluntly equating migrants and refugees (“humanity on the move”) with a “managerial” problem of “human waste disposal” (Bauman 2007, p. 30): “A fatal, possibly the most fatal result of modernity’s global triumph, is the acute crisis of the ‘human waste’ disposal industry, as each new outpost conquered by capitalist markets adds new thousands or millions to the mass of men and women already deprived of their lands, workshops, and communal safety nets.... The volume of humans made redundant by capitalism’s global triumph grows unstopably and comes close now to exceeding the managerial capacity of the planet; there is a plausible prospect of capitalist modernity (or modern capitalism) *choking on its own waste products* which it can neither reassimilate or annihilate, nor detoxify (there are numerous signals of the fast rising toxicity of the rapidly accumulating waste).... We

have not as yet arrived anywhere near seeing through to and grasping in full the far-reaching effects of the growing masses of *wasted humans* on the political balance and social equilibrium of human planetary coexistence” (Bauman 2007, pp. 28–29; emphases in the original). The theoretical tensions and discrepancies between Bauman’s and my own positions may be instructively attributed to Bauman’s more abstract theoretical and speculative emphasis on (capitalist) “modernity” in contra-distinction with my more focused interest in the tactics and technologies of (capitalist) state power.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, Hannah. [1963] 2006. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2007. *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bhartia, Aashti. 2010. Fictions of Law: The Trial of Sulaiman Oladokun, or Reading Kafka in an Immigration Court. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 329–350. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Brotherton, David, and Luis Barrios. 2011. *Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2010. Exiled by Law: Deportation and the Inviability of Life. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 351–370. Durham: Duke University Press.
- . 2015. Deportation Studies: Origins, Themes and Directions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 671–681.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2010a. The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 33–65. Duke University Press: Durham.
- . 2010b. The Queer Politics of Migration: Reflections on ‘Illegality’ and Incorrugibility. *Studies in Social Justice* 4 (2): 101–126.
- . 2014. Deportation. In *Migration: A COMPAS Anthology*, ed. Bridget Anderson and Michael Keith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://compasanthology.co.uk><http://compasanthology.co.uk/deportation-2/>.
- . 2016. The ‘Crisis’ of the European Border Regime: Towards a Marxist Theory of Borders. *International Socialism* 150: 33–56. <http://isj.org.uk/the-crisis-of-the-european-border-regime-towards-a-marxist-theory-of-borders/>.

- De Genova, Nicholas, and Nathalie Peutz, eds. 2010. *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Duke University Press: Durham.
- Dreby, Joanna. 2012. The Burden of Deportation on Children in Mexican Immigrant Families. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 74 (4): 829–845.
- . 2013. The Modern Deportation Regime and Mexican Families. In *Constructing Immigrant “Illegality”: Critiques, Experiences, and Responses*, ed. Cecilia Menjivar and Daniel Kanstroom, 181–202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drotbohm, Heike. 2011. On the Durability and the Decomposition of Citizenship: The Social Logics of Forced Return Migration in Cape Verde. *Citizenship Studies* 15 (3–4): 381–396.
- . 2015. The Reversal of Migratory Family Lives: A Cape Verdean Perspective on Gender and Sociality Pre- and Post-Deportation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 653–670.
- Drotbohm, Heike, and Ines Hasselberg. 2015. Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 551–562.
- Galvin, Treasa M. 2015. ‘We Deport Them but They Keep Coming Back’: The Normalcy of Deportation in the Daily Life of ‘Undocumented’ Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in Botswana. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 617–634.
- Garelli, Glenda, and Martina Tazzioli. 2016. *Tunisia as a Revolutionized Space of Migration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . Forthcoming. Choucha Beyond the Camp: Challenging the Border of Migration Studies. In *The Borders of “Europe”: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2012. *Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and Deportations in Post 9/11 America*. New York: Paradigm Publishers.
- . 2013. Forced Transnationalism: Transnational Coping Strategies and Gendered Stigma among Jamaican Deportees. *Global Networks* 14 (1): 63–79.
- . 2015. *Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor, and Global Capitalism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya, and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo. 2013. Latino Immigrant Men and the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program. *Latino Studies* 2013 (11): 271–292.
- Hasselberg, Ines. 2015. Balancing Legitimacy, Exceptionality and Accountability: On Foreign-National Offenders’ Reluctance to Engage in Anti-Deportation Campaigns in the UK. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 563–579.
- . 2016. *Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and Everyday Life*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2012. Geopolitical Reverberations of US Migrant Detention and Deportation: The View from Ecuador. *Geopolitics* 17 (2): 293–311.
- Kanstrom, Daniel. 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Khosravi, Shahram. 2009. Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers in Sweden. *Race & Class* 50 (4): 38–56.
- . 2016. Deportation as a Way of Life for Young Afghan Men. In *Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global and Transnational Issues*, ed. Rich Furman, Douglas Epps and Greg Lamphear, 169–181. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Lecadet, Clara. 2013. From Migrant Destitution to Self-Organization into Transitory National Communities: The Revival of Citizenship in Post-Deportation Experience in Mali. In *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation*, ed. Bridget Anderson, Matthew Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti, 143–158. New York and London: Springer.
- . Forthcoming. Europe Confronted by its Expelled Migrants: The Politics of Expelled Migrants' Associations in Africa. In *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Nyers, Peter. 2010. Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 413–441. Durham: Duke University Press. (First published in *Third World Quarterly* 24 (6) [2003]: 1069–1093).
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2010 [2006]. Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. *Current Anthropology* 47 (2): 217–241. Revised version reprinted as 'Criminal Alien' Deportees in Somaliland: An Ethnography of Removal. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 371–411. Durham, NC: Duke University Press [2010].
- Picozza, Fiorenza. Forthcoming. 'Dubliners': Unthinking Displacement, Illegality, and Refugeeess within Europe's Geographies of Asylum. In *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Riedner, Lisa, Soledad Álvarez-Velasco, Nicholas De Genova, Martina Tazzioli, and Huub van Baar. 2016. Mobility. In *New Keywords Collective* (edited by Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli), *New Keywords of 'the Crisis' in and of 'Europe'*. *Near Futures Online* #1. Zone Books: New York. <http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe-part-6/>.
- Schuster, Liza, and Nassim Majidi. 2013. What Happens After Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies* 1 (2): 221–240.

- . 2015. Deportation Stigma and Re-migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (4): 635–652.
- Tazzioli, Martina. 2014. *Spaces of Governmentality: Autonomous Migration and the Arab Uprisings*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Tazzioli, Martina, Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra, and Glenda Garelli. 2015. Migrant Struggles. *Cultural Studies* 29 (1): 55–87.
- Walters, William. 2010. Deportation, Expulsion and the International Police of Aliens. In *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, 69–100. Durham: Duke University Press. First published in *Citizenship Studies* 6 (3) [2002]: 265–292.
- Zilberg, Elana. 2004. Fools Banished from the Kingdom: Remapping Geographies of Gang Violence Between the Americas (Los Angeles and San Salvador). *American Quarterly* 56 (3): 759–779.
- . 2007. Gangster in Guerrilla Face: A Transnational Mirror of Production Between the USA and El Salvador. *Anthropological Theory* 7 (1): 37–57.
- . 2011. *Space of Detention: The Making of a Transnational Gang Crisis between Los Angeles and San Salvador*. Durham: Duke University Press.

INDEX

A

- Aboubacar, Razak, **187, 188, 195**
- ABRF (*Association des Béninois revenus de la France pour l'autoemploi*), **188**
- Absence left by deportee, **17**
- Accommodation, provision of, **45, 69, 70**
- Active invisibility, **17**
- Administrative detention, **17**
- Administrative removal, UK, **44, 45, 57n3**
- Afghanistan, **127–146**
- Camp Ansar, **134, 139, 141**
 - demographics of return, **129, 130**
 - economics of return, **142–143**
 - families and women, **137–138**
 - ID cards, **3**
 - involuntary return to family, **11**
 - lack of preparedness, **129, 139**
 - loss of control, **141–143**
 - methodology, **131, 132**
 - minors, **133, 134–136, 137**
 - new networks, **139–141**
 - reintegration, **112**
 - theoretical framework, **128, 129–130**
 - violence, **144**
- African Union, **202n11**
- Agamben, Giorgio, **6, 42**
- Algeria, **188, 234**
- Alter-globalisation movement, **198, 199**
- AME (*Association Malienne des Expulsés*) (Malian Association of Expelled Migrants), **187, 188, 190–193, 198, 200**
- ANC (*Alliance Nationale pour le Changement*) (National Alliance for Change), **195**
- Anderson, Bridget et al. (2011), **88**
- Anderson, Dorte Jagetić, **234**
- Andrijasevic, Rutvica, **101n9**
- Andrijasevic, Rutvica and Walters, William, **5, 89**
- Angola, **187**
- Anti-trafficking return programmes, **91**
- ARACEM (*Association des Refoulés d'Afrique Centrale au Mali*), **188**

- ARECC (*Association des Rapatriés et de Lutte contre l'Emigration Clandestine du Cameroun*), 188
- Arendt, Hannah, 255
- ARTD (*Association Retour Travail et Dignité*), 188
- Assisted Voluntary Return scheme. *See* AVR
- Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programmes. *See* AVRRs
- Assisted Voluntary Return of Irregular Migrants. *See* AVRIM
- Association des Béninois revenus de la France pour l'autoemploi*. *See* ABRF
- Association des Rapatriés et de Lutte contre l'Emigration Clandestine du Cameroun*. *See* ARECC
- Association des Refoulés d'Afrique Centrale au Mali*. *See* ARACEM
- Association Malienne des Expulsés* (Malian Association of Expelled Migrants). *See* AME
- Association Retour Travail et Dignité*. *See* ARTD
- Association Togolaise des Expulsés* (Togolese Association of Expelled Migrants). *See* ATE
- Asylum seeking
 danger of, 4
 experiences of, 47, 48, 49, 52, 90, 99
 and sexuality, 44
 self-deportation, 124
 shame of failed, 49
 war and unrest, 110, 113. *See also* Dublin III; VARRP
- ATE (*Association Togolaise des Expulsés*) (Togolese Association of Expelled Migrants), 188, 191, 193–200
- Attac Togo, 197, 198
- Australia
 Migration Act 2014, 226n5
 and Samoa, 206, 208–209, 210, 215, 216, 218, 219–220, 221
- AVR (Assisted Voluntary Return) scheme, 43, 45, 53
- AVRIM (Assisted Voluntary Return of Irregular Migrants), 115
- AVRRs (Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programmes), 84, 87, 88, 89, 97, 98, 105–107
- B**
- Bamako, Mali, 187, 200
- Bangladesh, 6, 37, 38, 55
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 262n2–263n2
- Begging, 69, 70, 176
- Belgium, 105, 238, 240, 242
- Benin, Nigeria, 82, 85, 90, 91, 92, 188, 196
- “Bienvenido Seas”, 154
- Biya, President Paul, 236
- Black, Richard and Castaldo, Adriana, 109, 116
- Blitz, Brad et al. (2005), 123
- Bonanjo, Cameroon, 239
- Border control
 externalised and internalised, 234–235, 239, 249, 257
 forced removal and, 16, 88
 and identity, 232, 233, 236, 243, 244
 “preferred future” methodology, 32
 and risk, 205
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 177
- Bourgeois, Philippe, 170
- Bowling, Ben, 215, 220, 221
- “Brain waste”, 109, 112
- Brazil, 43, 44, 50, 54, 55, 152

Brotherton, David and Barrios, Luis,
151, 181
Buff, Rachel Ida, 87

C

Call centres, employment in, 54, 160,
170, 172–175, 177, 184
Cameroon, 236–250
 Criminal Code, 237
 criminalisation of emigration, 232,
 233, 236–239
 discrimination against Anglophones,
 243, 244
 forced returns and risks, 239,
 240–243
 non-admission and fraud, 243,
 244–248
 prison system, 239–248
Cape Verde, 19–32
 absence, 17
 “deportation” by parents, 22
 gender roles, 25, 27
 Instituto das Comunidades, 22
 language problems, 20
 representations of deportees, 18, 19,
 21, 22
 social integration programme, 22,
 23
 young deportees, 19, 20
Caritas (NGO), 98
Cassarino, Jean-Pierre, 63, 77, 78,
106, 110, 139
Central America, 87, 152
Ceuta, 188
Citizenship
 “derivative”, 155
 “estranged”, 2, 3, 20
 rights, 4
Collectif Sauvons le Togo (Save Togo
Collective), 195
Collective identity, 191

Collyer, Michael, 231
Colnbrook Immigration Removal
Centre, UK, 37, 38
Copenhagen, Denmark, 81, 82, 89
Corruption, 120, 195, 200, 232, 248,
249, 261
Coutin, Susan Bibler, 41, 55, 56, 181,
206, 211, 257, 258
Criminal deportation and risk,
205–224
 real and imagined threats, 215–217
 regionalisation of risk, 221–223
Criminalisation
 Cameroon, 236–239, 249, 250
 and externalisation of border con-
 trol, 233
 Jamaica, 66
 research difficulties, 16, 17
 secrecy, 48
 UK, 39–42
Critical trafficking studies, 86
Cultural capital, 6, 10, 177, 179–181,
184
Cyprus, 238

D

Dakar, world social forum 2011, 200
De Bono, Daniela, Rönnqvist, Sofia,
and Magnusson, Karin, 129
De Regt, Marina and Tafesse,
Medareshaw, 53
Debt, 86, 95, 112, 115, 130, 248,
260
De Genova, Nicholas, 40, 106
De Genova, Nicholas and Peutz,
Nathalie, 87
Démurger, Sylvie and Xu Hui, 109
Denmark, 81, 82, 89–90
Deportation, definition of, 127
“Deportation corridor”, 16, 256
Deportation regime, 87

- Deportation studies, 1, 2, 10–12, 86, 87–9, 232
- Deportation terror*, 87
- The deportation turn*, 87
- Deportee agency studies, 41
- Deportspora*, 9–10, 42
- Depression, 52, 155, 162, 167
- Detained Fast-Track scheme, 43, 47
- Detention
- Cameroon, 238, 239, 241–243
 - incentives to leave, 106
 - Iran, 134, 135, 137, 143–144
 - mental health and, 52, 53
 - Sweden, 78
 - UK, 38–41, 44–49, 65, 74–75, 114, 115
 - USA, 150, 151
 - women and, 65, 74–75, 82
- Development impact, 106–113, 116–124
- Diarra, Ousmane, 187
- DIASTODE (*Diaspora togolaise pour la démocratie et le développement* (Togolese Diaspora for Democracy and Development), 194
- Dicko, Alassane, 188
- Disposability of deportees, 253–254
- DNA collection, 220
- Dominican Republic, 149–167, 169–185
- arrival, 154, 155–158, 159
 - cartas de buena conducta, 5, 151, 152, 159, 161
 - Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada, 159
 - criminal deportation, 150, 151
 - Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones, 150
 - Dirección General de Migración, 150
 - drug related offences, 170
 - education, 154
 - employment, 159–161, 166–167
 - future plans, 164–165, 166
 - gender of deportees, 153
 - harassment deportees, 181
 - ID cards, 150, 181
 - methodology, 153–154
 - minimum wage, 156
 - patronage and clientelism, 152, 153
 - police, 10, 150, 151
 - sex workers, 182, 183
 - stigmatisation, 151, 152, 161–162, 172, 181
 - survival in, 159–164
 - US tourists, 176–177, 178, 182–183
- Douala, 233, 237–239
- “Double abandonment”, 2
- Drotbohm, Heike, 17, 31
- Drotbohm, Heike and Hasselberg, Ines, 16, 256
- Drugs
- offences, 19, 26, 28, 156, 158, 161, 169, 170, 181, 182, 215, 216
 - trafficking, 65, 66, 67, 71–74, 76
 - use of, 151, 219, 220
- Dublin III Regulation, 41, 44, 47, 48
- Dustmann, Christian and Kirchkamp, Oliver, 108, 109, 110, 112
- E**
- Eastmond, Marita, 93
- Echeverri Zuluaga, Jonathan, 8
- ECRE (European Council for Refugees and Exiles), 106
- Education
- level of in Dominican deportees, 154
 - and preparedness, 72–73, 74
 - as reason for migration, 64
 - young deportees, 3, 53, 72

- Egypt, 108
 El Salvador, 181, 221, 257
 Entrepreneurialism, 108, 109–110, 115, 116–117, 119–122
 Escorts, privatisation of, 40
 EU (European Union)
 border control, 100n3, 234–235, 257
 Cameroonian migrants, 238
 labour market, 101n9
 Schengen area, 235, 246
 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, 234
 European Council for Refugees and Exiles. *See* ECRE
 European Court of Human Rights, 114
 European Training Foundation (ETF), 109
 Exile, post-deportation as, 7
 Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, 193, 194, 195
- F**
- Fanon, Frantz, 191
 Fiji, 208, 222
 Fingerprinting, 48, 150, 220
 Fogo, 19–20, 22, 23–30
 FORAM (Forum for a Different Mali), 192
 Forced family reunification, 11
 Forced returns
 demographic change in, 130, 137
 Cameroon, 231–232, 237–243
 and entrepreneurialism, 117
 and incentives, 106
 mass, 128
 negative, 12, 210
 and poverty, 214
 and remigration, 53
 “Foreign-national offenders”, 44
- Forum for a Different Mali. *See* FORAM
 Foucault, Michel, 190
 France
 and Cameroon, 236–238, 240, 261
 deportations, 19
 early financial incentives, 105, 107
 and Mali, 192
 Togolese in exile, 194, 195
 “Fraud”, 232, 233–237, 243, 248–250
 Frontex, 84
- G**
- Galvin, Treasa, 130
 Gangs, 19, 66, 87, 211, 212, 216–218, 221–222
 Gender
 and culture, 18, 25, 27, 29, 49, 50, 87, 167
 labour, 260
 and stigmatisation, 3, 4. *See also* Women
 Germany
 and Cameroon, 238
 early financial incentives, 105
 imperialism, 207
 perception of, 92
 remigration to, 48
 and Togo, 187, 194, 195
 Ghana, 109, 116
 Gibney, Matthew J. and Hansen, R., 87
 Gladwell, Catherine and Elwyn, Hannah, 9
 Globalisation, 184, 233, 234, 254
 Golash-Boza, Tanya, 5, 9, 54, 181, 214
 Goldin, Claudia, 160
 Grewcock, Michael, 215

Guthrie, Woody “Deportee”, 253

H

Heteronormativity, 50, 51, 53

Hibiscus (NGO), 74

Hiemstra, Nancy, 18

Homelessness, 176

Human capital, definition of, 160

Human rights, 49, 117, 123, 130, 192, 206, 217

Human trafficking, 83, 84–86, 90, 92, 97

Hustling, 69, 179

I

ID cards, 3, 150, 181

Identity, 91, 184, 191, 222, 234–236, 256

IIRIRA (Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act), 169, 170

Immigration Removal Centres. *See* IRCs

Indian Tamils, Sri Lanka, 118

Internal displacement, 3, 118, 122

Internal migration, 109

International Airport Control and Safety Services Company. *See* SICASS

International Migrants Day, 198

Interpol, 223

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), 84, 111, 114–116, 119–120, 131, 134, 136

Iran, 128, 129, 131, 132–138

Iraq, 112

IRCs (Immigration Removal Centres), 38, 42

Isolation, 50, 51

as avoidance, 68

cultural, 207

and loss, 156

and stigmatisation, 4, 48

Italy, 42, 47–48, 82, 90, 92–93, 97–98, 234

J

Jamaica

deportation to, 208, 214

experience, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 54, 55

shame, 214

stigmatisation, 152, 215

women’s preparedness, 63–78

K

Kanstroom, Daniel, 87, 256

Die Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und Migrantinnen, 187, 199

Keita, Mahamadou, 188

Keshavarz, Mahmoud, 2

Khosravi, Shahram, 41, 42, 78, 256

Konaré, Alpha Oumar, 196

Koser, Khalid and Kuschminder, Katie, 106, 110, 112

L

Lagos, Nigeria, 85

Language

of “home” country, 3, 211

of host country, 27, 54

and employment, 54, 177

Lee, Helen, 210

Levitt, Peggy and Lamba-Nieves, Deepak, 206, 207, 221

Liberal state perspective, 88

“Liminal legality”, 184

Liminality, 7, 8

LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), 113

M

Mali, 82, 187–193, 196–199
 Martin, Lauran, 7
 Martín, Yolanda, 151
 Mbembe, Achille, 32
 McCormick, Barry and Wahba, Jackline, 108
 McKeown, Adam, 233
 Media and stigmatisation, 19, 20, 161, 162, 193, 215, 221
 Melilla, 188
 Menjívar, Cecilia, 184
 Mental health, 52, 53, 129, 134. *See also* Depression
 “Methodological nationalism”, 2
 Mexico, 87, 108
 Micro-enterprises, 109
 Minors, 11, 128, 129–130, 131, 132, 133–137
 Mobility, 5, 6, 9, 12, 40, 108, 111, 122
 Morocco, 46, 50, 83, 109, 234
 Muslims, Sri Lanka, 118, 120

N

Namibia, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52
 NAPTIP (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons), 91
Necropower, 31, 32
 “Neoliberal deportation”, 89
 Neoliberalism, 4–6, 11, 89, 206
Nerooye Afghan Begir, 144
 New Zealand, 206, 208–209, 212, 215–216, 219–221, 222
 Nigeria

experiences, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 244
 sex workers, 81–100, 260
 “No Go Area Policy”, 133
 Norwegian Refugee Council, 131
 Nyers, Peter, 9, 41, 256

O

OAU (Organisation of African Unity), 202*n*11
Observed departure, 90
 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) report 2010, 165
 Offshoring, 6
 OHCHR (UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights) report 2015, 113, 114
 Outsourcing, 5–6, 10, 170, 172–173, 235, 239

P

Pacific Islands Forum. *See* PIF
 Pacific Transnational Crime Network. *See* PTCN
 Pakistan, 3, 45, 49–51, 128, 131, 137, 144
 Pardons, 157
 Patriarchal societies, 11
 “Pay-to-go” schemes, 105–107, 108, 110, 113, 115–122
 “Penalty”, 1
People with Specific Needs. *See* PSN
 Pereira, Natalia, 206, 208, 212, 214
 Peutz, Nathalie, 2, 16, 17, 18, 206, 210, 214, 256
 Physical appearance, cost of, 75–77
 PIF (Pacific Islands Forum), 222
 Police

border control and, 234, 235
 Cameroon, 236–249
 and criminal deportees, 150–151
 detention by, 11
 harassment by, 3, 132, 161, 162, 181, 217–222
 and sex workers, 81–82, 84, 89
 Portugal, 19
 Positionality of researcher, 30, 31
 Post-deportation organizations, 187–201
 and political regimes, 196–199
 Post-deportation studies, 17, 31, 41, 152, 206, 207
 Poverty, 42, 70–71, 85, 132, 135, 214, 217
 Praia, Cape Verde, 19, 20
Preferred future methodology, 32
 Preparedness
 and ability to resettle, 63–78
 and education, 72–73, 74
 hope of intervention, 74
 lack of, 110, 129
 responsibility for children, 71–72
 women in detention, 74, 75
 Prison system, UK, education, 72–73
 Prostitution-abolitionist activism, 83
 Psychosocial wellbeing, 52, 53, 129, 134
PSN (People with Specific Needs), 139
 PTCN (Pacific Transnational Crime Network), 223
 Puerto Rico, 153, 156

R

Racism, 47, 175
 Radio Kayira, 196
 Rajapaksa, President Mahinda, 113
Refoulement, 127, 254

Refuge Action, 45, 58*n*9
 Rehabilitation, 22, 219, 220, 221, 259
 “Reintegration”, 10, 45, 259–261
 Remigration, 9, 53–54, 122, 130
 Remittances, 3, 85, 163
 Representation and terminology, 10–11
 Risk; exportation of, 205–207; and forced return, 239, 240–243; regionalisation of, 221–223
 Rumford, Chris, 239

S

SADI (*Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l’indépendance*) (African solidarity for democracy and independence), 196
 Samoa (Western Samoa), 208–224
 criminal deportation, 208
 financial situation, 214, 215
 and imperialism, 207, 208
 kin-based support system, 210
 stigmatisation, 215–217
 traditions 207, 210
 Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 169, 172, 176–177
 Save Togo Collective. *See Collectif Sauvons le Togo*
 Schengen area, EU, 235, 246
 Schuster, Lisa and Majidi, Nassim, 9, 112, 127, 130, 210
 Self-designation, 191
 Sexuality, 50, 51, 53
 Shame
 and appearance, 76
 of criminal conviction, 210
 of failure, 49, 130, 214
 women’s, 69, 70, 72

- Shih, Elena, 98
- SICASS (International Airport Control and Safety Services Company), 238
- Singhalese, Sri Lanka, 118, 120
- Sirisena, President Maithripala, 113
- Social abandonment, 2–4
- Social embeddedness, 2, 3
- Social exclusion, 6, 12, 130, 152, 184, 210–211, 218
- Social capital, 178
- Social control deportation*, 87
- Social mobility, 97, 236, 239, 260
- Sokodé, Togo, 187, 188, 193, 194
- Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance* (African solidarity for democracy and independence). *See* SADI
- Somalia, 128
- Spain, 84, 90, 94, 234, 238, 240
- Sri Lanka
- civil war, 113–116
 - pay-to-go schemes, 107, 112–122, 123
- Stanley, Elizabeth, 226*n*1
- State power, 40, 42, 152, 239, 243, 257
- Stephen, Lynn, 170, 171
- Stigmatisation, 48–49
- and contamination, 3, 50, 51, 130
 - in Dominican Republic, 151, 161–162, 172, 181
 - and exclusion, 210–213
 - gendered, 3, 4
 - labelling and, 66–69, 70, 152
 - and sex work, 97
- Student visas, 37, 53, 65, 67
- Surveillance, 84, 220, 223
- “Sustainable return”, 110, 111
- T**
- Tamils, Sri Lanka, 120
- Temporality, 7–9, 16
- Thailand, 98
- Togo, 187–191, 193–199, 200
- Tonga, 208–209, 211, 220, 222
- Transnational mobilisation, 199, 200, 206, 221–223
- Transnational paradigm, 108
- Transnational practices, 172–175
- Traoré, Aminata Dramane, 202*n*4
- Trujillo, President Rafael, 155
- Turner, Victor, 7
- U**
- Uganda, 10
- UK
- deportation from, 36–56, 63–78, 238
 - methodology, 42–45
 - perception of, 49
 - ties after deportation, 54, 55
- Unbelonging, 93
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) report 2011, 222
- Unemployment, 3, 8, 69, 85, 91, 93, 132
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation) study 2011, 206, 208, 212, 214
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 111, 133, 137, 139
- report 2012, 9
- Union des Jeunes Rapatriés Togolais* (Union of Young Repatriated Togolese), 188, 197

UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. *See* OHCHR

UN-Palermo Protocol, 86

USA

as corrupting, 22

criminal deportation, 205, 206, 208–209, 212, 218, 219

deportation of Cape Verde citizens, 17

detention centres, 150

deportation of Ecuador citizens, 18

gang identities, 222

Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 169, 170

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 149

migration from Samoa, 208

rate of deportation, 170

V

VARRP (Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme), 110, 111, 113–116

Versant English Test, 173

Vietnam, 112

Violence, exposure to, 110, 111, 113–116, 141, 145, 218–220

Visa overstayers, 37, 65

Visibility, 3, 24, 30, 190, 193, 211, 222

Visions Solidaires, 197

Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme. *See* VARRP

W

Wage levels, 6, 68, 142, 156, 160

Walters, William, 42, 88

War Child, 137

Weber, Leanne, 32

Welcome Back Cameroon, 188

Women

deportation to Jamaica, 63, 64–78

deportation to Afghanistan, 129, 130, 132–133, 137–138

deportation to Sri Lanka, 115

Nigerian sex workers, 81–100

Y

Yaoundé, Cameroon, 188

Z

Zavella, Patricia, 184

Zilberg, Elana, 221, 258